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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
Development of Soviet Maritime Power
The development of Soviet maritime power has been an uneven and
complex process closely associated with the level of Soviet industry and
supplemented by skillful utilization of foreign technology. The Soviet
government inherited a relatively strong maritime tradition and a substantial
number oi Tsarist specialists. During the restoration stage, 1921-1927, the
shipyards were put back into operation, and construction of a number of
ships, laid down prior to the Revolution, was completed. Toward the end of
the 1920's. the construction of naval ships, particularly submarines, started.
Primary attention up to the mid-1 950's had been given to the Navy. The
development of merchant marine, fishing fleet, and river transport had been
exercised mainly on a residual basis. A number of naval programs, approved
and partially implemented during Stalin's reign, resulted in a numerically
sizable Navy. Rapid development of all aspects of the Soviet maritime
power, which started in the mid-1 950's, was the result of a major revision of
policy, particularly with respect to naval construction. The USSR decided
not to build aircraft carriers, not to fight its major opponent with his
weapon system, but, instead, to build a Navy whose striking power would
he concentrated in new weapon systems-missiles, which can be launced by
various carriers from the surface, in the air, and under water. Consequently.
j number of classes of Soviet ships have no equal among the major naval
powers at this time. The Soviet Merchant Marine presently occupies sixth
place in the world. It is capable of satisfying the needs of rapidly growing
Soviet foreign trade, domestic sea transportation, and military and
economic aids; and it plays a significant role as an auxiliary of the Soviet
Navy. Soviet shipbuilding is well developed, utilizing advanced methods of
construction. Foreign deliveries played an important role, and permitted
concentration on naval shipbuilding. In oceanography, the Soviets are one
of the leaders in the world. During the last decade, considerable attention
has been devoted to the exploitation of mineral resources from the sea. The
appearance of the Soviet fishing fleet in remote areas of the world's oceans
preceded that of the Soviet Navy and Merchant Marine. Presently, both the
fishing vessels and the gear they employ are among the most advanced in the
world. The role of the Soviet fishing fleet in foreign aid is substantial and
growing.
The vastness of the Soviet Union's territory and its poorly developed
land transportation made inland waterways indispensable for the transpor-
tation of goods, raw materials, and people. Efforts to master the Northern
Sea Route, which is destined to play an important role, continue. The
Soviet maritime power of today is the result of more than 50 years of the
Soviet Union's development as a state and represents to a large degree the
realization of t tie long-cherished Russian dream to be a great maritime
nation. In May, 1972, Admiral Gorshkov emphasized the peacetime role of
navies as "political force at sea" which "continues to have paramount
importance as an instrument of policy of great powers." The upward trend
m the development of all aspects of the Soviet maritime power should
continue, creating greater capabilities and permitting more flexible appli-
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Most of the research material for the dissertation was
derived from Soviet sources. Some German and Polish language
publications were also used. Use of American and British sources
was limited primarily to naval matters. Soviet specialized
periodicals (particularly journals and transactions) , as compared
to books, were found most useful, and provided historical
data based on the Soviet archives, most of which is unavailable •
in the West. These periodicals have presented a detailed picture
of current trends in the development of the civilian branches
of Soviet maritime structure.
There are many to whom the writer is indebted for various
degrees of assistance and encouragement. The idea to study the
subject of Soviet maritime development in a broader scope was
born during many prolonged discussions of naval development
with Robert W. Herrick and a number of mutual friends. In
spite of often profound disagreement over various aspects of
the subject matter, those discussions were extremely stimulating
and contributed heavily to the decision to write.
In addition to the many faculty members of the George
V/ashington University, whose efforts and patience are deeply

appreciated, I wish to express my particular gratitude to
Professors Wolfgang H. Kraus, Kurt Loudon, Franz Hv Michael,
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Many scientists have pointed out that a more appropriate
name for our planet would be the Ocean and not the Earth, for close
to three quarters of the planet surface is covered by the water.
Historically, a maritime or sea power has played an important
role in international development. Quite often naval power has
— \
been associated with such terms as sea power or maritime power,
but such important elements as merchant marine, fishing fleet,
oceanography, shipbuilding, and associated research and development
have been overlooked. Recently, the traditional importance of the
sea and its use for communication and application of power or
power-in-being has been elevated, and it is rapidly becoming an
important source of minerals and food. Post World-War-II changes
in the world's socio-p'olitical structure, particularly the
formation of opposing blocs of nations and the emergence of
numerous newly independent states, have provided conditions for
the more intensified use of the sea for development, competition,
and containment. A pattern of world trade creating a certain
interdependency of nations is substantiated by transport, of which
the merchant marine is a most vital part,, and thus, of great

importance to national economies. Internationally, there is
a tendency to solidify maritime nations in a regulated approach
i.e. peacetime mutual protection in the sphere of economics and often
in military alliances. Continents which have oceans between
them are no longer divided by their expanse but rather are joined
by them.
In the post World-Y/ar-II period, the originally undisputed
and unquestioned capability of the US to control the sea has been
gradually contested, particularly in the decade of the 1930' s,
and the main challenge has come from the nation whose maritime
power had not been felt for a long time, and which the West was
accustomed to treat as a classical land power, the Soviet Union.
Growing Soviet political, economic, and military involvements
around the world have recently been practically without exception
associated with maritime power. The analysis of this power, its
development, internally and in the relation to other states, and
the nature of the challenge is of obvious importance.
Not long time ago, one US Air Force general, arguing for
a greater budget appropriation for his service vs. the US Navy
requirements, expressed what well might have been a widespread
feeling: "To maintain a five-ocean navy to fight a no-ocean
opponent is a foolish waste of time, men, and resources". Today,





the mightiest military power ever assembled can hardly be put
to the test, particularly in the form of open warfare. Economic
competition, on the contrary, is less constrained, and, being one
of the constants of foreign policy, can, under certain circumstances,
assume a form of economic warfare with maritime power being an
essential element of its implementation. •
The very size of the Soviet Union makes certain of its
regions dependent on maritime transportation. It is transportation
in general, more precisely poorly developed transportation, which
has kept the rich resources of Siberia, the Far East, and the
North, from being utilized in the Soviet economic development
up to a recent time, and still handicaps the development of an
integrated economy. But it seems that the more unfavorable is the
geographic location of a country with respect to the sea, the
more mobile and numerous must be her maritime power in order to
satisfy internal needs, and to be able to make a bid equal to
that of a possible opponent.
Y/ith due recognition for the prevailing interest in the
present and the future, the past, however, cannot be ignored,
for there lies the foundation of the development. For this reason,
the development of the Soviet maritime power, the analysis of
which is undertaken in this dissertation, is examined in a
historical context. All significant facets of Soviet maritime
•?

power, naval, merchant marine, fishing fleet, river transport,
shipbuilding, oceanography, and the mastering of world's unique
Northern Sea Route, will be examined in connection with the
political, economic, and military aspects of the country's recent
historical process. In addition, there will be a brief analysis
of the post-war maritime development in Eastern 'Europe, as well
as of Soviet Union foreign trade, economic and military aid/
and of certain aspects of maritime law. Combining the historical
method with functional analysis, it is still necessary to make
.
considerable use of statistics and limited technological data
and considerations, for they appear to provide a better guarantee
against arbitrary conclusions. Scenarios have become a fashionable
approach in analyzing complex socio-economic and military-political
problems. But too frequently constructed on the basis of liberally
exercised assumptions, and often without consideration of essential
factors, many scenarios proved nothing and confused greatly.
Dealing with a long neglected and still weakly researched subject,
and forced to rely on scarce sources, which obviously do not
provide complete information, it was found advisable not to employ
the scenario approach at all.
In the process of collecting research material for this
dissertation, the main emphasis was on the Soviet sources.
Western sources were used when the desired information was not to
/ .

be found in Soviet sources, as frequently occurred in matters
associated with the Soviet Navy. While tradition has played an
important role in the development of all aspects of Soviet maritime
power, it has been particularly important for the Navy. For
this reason, a brief outline will be provided of Russia's naval
development in the continuum of history. The leaders of the Soviet
maritime establishment have been using Russian maritime tradition
not only for indoctrination of personnel, but to justify Soviet
maritime expansion. The West is being frequently attacked for
portraying the Soviet Union as a land power. Commander-in-Chief
of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral Gorshkov has labeled that
alleged practice as a "diversion", a subversive act of psychological
warfare emphasizing that the Soviet Union did not build its maritime
power, "from scratch".
The importance of the ocean to mankind in the future will
certainly grow. Many scientists predict that a great age of the
oceans is upon us. New factors of a political, military, economic
and scientific-technological nature unknown or unforeseen by the
classical figures of sea power are now operating. Regardless of
wbich school or theory of international relations one subscribes,
the combined effect of these factors exercises a profound influence
upon international relations. The share of Soviet maritime power
in this influence appears to warrant examination.-

CHAPTER I ' *
NAVY
Heritage '-.
The naval tradition which has been vigorously
portrayed in pre-Revolutionary Russia and in the Soviet
Union became part of the Russian heritage. The extensive
Russian naval histj^qy which dates back more than a
thousand years was initiated with a drive to have access
to the open sea. From the 9th to the 11th centuries
inclusive, the Kiev princes initiated nine sizeable sea
expeditions in the Black and Caspian Seas in order to gain
access to the trade routes. The largest was the expedition
of 907 led by Prince 'Oleg, in which an 80,000-man army
supported by 2,000 boats participated. Oleg's expedition
culminated in the capture of Constantinople, where the
decisive role was played' by a well prepared and skillfully
executed landing.
In the Baltic Sea successful expeditions against
Sweden were initiated by Novgorod (1188 and 1191) . A

pence treaty with Sweden concluded in 1201 guaranteed
Novgorod secure trade routes in the Baltic Sea. >
i
The disintegration of the state of Kiev in the
12th century, the advance of the Mongols, continuous wars
with German Orders and Sweden forced the Russians to
retreat from the sea. In the 14th century all 'trade
routes in Black, Caspian, and Baltic Seas were lost,
although Novgorod continued to navigate the White Sea.
In the 16th century, particularly during the reign of
Ivan IV (the Terrible) , the drive to gain access to the
sea became one of the major goals of Russian foreign
policy. V/hile Ivan IV opened access to the Caspian Sea
but failed to in the Baltic, Peter the Great succeeded.
As a result of prolonged wars with Sweden "the
window into Europe" was opened at the beginning of the
18th century and Russia established a stronghold in the
Sea of Azov where the first flotilla of ships was organized
in 1696, the year considered to be the year the regular
Russian Navy was born with Peter the Great as its creator.
The first major battle was won by the young Russian regular
navy in 1714 at Gangut against the Swedish Navy.
During the reign of Peter the Great not only





bases as well was initiated. In 1700 the Admiralty was
organized, and in 1701 a nautical school, the forerunner
of the Naval Academy, was established in Moscow. The
development of the Russian Navy after the death of Peter
the Great in 1725 depended to a large degree upon each
ruler's attitude toward it. Its fortunes fluctuated, but
in general it was an important element of Russian military
power up to the Revolution.
During the reign of the Catherine (1762-1796) the
Russian Navy was active in the Mediterranean and Black
Seas. The Baltic squadron dispatched to the Mediterranean
in 1769 won a victory over the Turkish fleet at Tchesme
(June 24-26, 1770) which, together with the Battle of Gangut
and Sinope (1853) , has been viewed as a most important
event in the history of the Tsarist Navy. A number of
victories were achieved by Admiral F. F. Ushakov in the
war with Turkey (1790, battle of Tendra) and in joint
actions with Turkey and the allies against Napoleon's
fleet in the Mediterranean (Battle of Corfu, February 1799)
.
Admiral D. N. Sinyavin also won an important victory at
Afon in June 1807.
The covenant of 1780, known as armed neutrality,
was a Russian attempt jointly with other European nations to
8

restrict the British application of sea power and to protect
neutral merchant shipping.
The beginning of the 19th century was marked by a
number of scientific and commercial cruises, including
Krusenstern cruise to circumnavigate the globe. In 1814
the Russians made an appearance on Kauai Island, Hawaii.
A ship belonging to the Russian-American fur company which
had control of the Alaskan fur trade and a base in
California was wrecked off the coast. During the following
year another ship was dispatched to the island to recover
the cargo and possibly set up a trading post. Outposts
were set up in Hanalei and Waimea. Kauai's king, Kaumaulii,
agreed in writing to place himself and his kingdom under the
control of the Tsar and to permit the Russians to establish
factories and plantations and export sandalwood. The
documents also gave half of Oahu, then ruled by Kamehameha I,
to the Tsar. The expedition was recalled in 1819 because
of political complications with England.
The success of the Battle of Navarino Bay in 1827
in which a Russian squadron participated on the side of
allies in the war against Turkey for Greek independence




was not followed up, due to British opposition to the
Russian plan to attack Constantinople.
The first half of 19th century witnessed the '
beginning of the gradual replacement of sailing ships by
steamships, a process which in Russia was delayed by
technological backwardness. The first armed steamship,
Izhora, was built in 1826 and the first steam frigate, the
1,340-ton Bogatyr 1 ,' armed with 28 guns, in 1836. The
first screw driven steam ship was built in 1848 but
construction of ships of the line started just prior to the
Crimean War, for which Russia was poorly prepared. Mines
were also developed during the first half of the 19th
century, and Russia v/as well advanced in this development.
The year 1853 produced two important events: (a) The
first battle between Russian and Turkish steamships on
November 5, as a result of which the Turkish ship was
captured. The Russian ship v/as under command of Lieutenant
Butakov, a future admiral and author of the first tactics
for the steam fleet. (b) The Battle of Sinope of November
18th, during which eight Russian ships under Admiral
Nakhimov attacked a Turkish squadron of 16 ships and, using
explosive shells, destroyed all but one Turkish ship.




battles, for vastly superior British- French fleet was in
complete control of the Black Sea. The defense of
Sevastopol' for eleven months by the Russians has been *
glorified since, with the Navy given the major part of
the glory. In the Baltic the allied fleet made an attempt
to attack Kronstadt, but the strength of the defenses and
the first use of mines (contact and controlled) by Russians
changed the plan. Defeated in the Crimean War, Russia
was denied sizeable naval forces in the Black Sea under
the 1856 Paris Treaty. The main goal of the war - to
prevent Russia from free access to the Mediterranean
through the Straits - was achieved by the allies. 2
Soon after the Crimean War Russia began an intensive
modernization of its navy. Several types of armored
ships - ironclad, armored steamers, large gunboats - were
built. Russian preoccupation with mine-torpedo warfare
resulted in the const-ruction of the first minelayers and
steam boats carrying torpedos. The intensive shipbuilding
2 The above historical period of the Russian Navy
is described in (1) Istoriya Voyenno - Morskogo Iskusstua
(History of Naval Art) . Textbook for higher naval schools
edited by Admiral S. E. Zakharov, Moscow, Boyenizdat, 1969
pp. 20-69. (2) David Woodward, The Russian at Sea (New
York, Praeger, 1965) pp. 40-69, 95.
11





In 1863 Russia dispatched two squadrons of its ^liips
to the U.S. The motives behind the move remain controversial,
but the Russian version, recently reinforced by the Soviet
Press, goes as follows: "The Lincoln Administration does
not feel too strong: The Southern Confederates are
attacking and Great Britain and France are about to give
them direct support by intervening in the war with their
navies. On 24 September a Russian naval squadron, under the
command of Vice Admiral S. S. Lesovskiy, entered the mouth
of the Hudson in New York .... Then Secretary of War
of the United States Wallace, exclaimed: 'God bless the
Russians!' New York authorities expressed the same
sentiment in a different way: a lavish reception, a "soir'ee
Russe", was held for the officers of the squadron.
Why did a Russian squadron come to New York? Vice
Admiral S. S. Lesovskiy had his orders: in event of
recognition of the Southern Confederates by Great Britain
or some other European power, place a squadron at the
disposal of the government of President Lincoln. In U. S.
History of Naval Art, pp. 71-72.
12

diplomatic documents of the period there is the following
message of the U. S. envoy from St. Petersburg: . . . it
cannot be doubted that knowledge of this fact by the French
and British Governments was the bridle which kept them on
a leash."4
Modern American writings, while recognizing the
existence of speculation in 1863 that the visit of the
Russian squadron was the expression of support for the
North, emphasize that the real motive was the Russian
desire to save the ships in case of war between the European
powers and to employ them against the enemy from the American
5
ports, thus downgrading the visit to a sort of deception.
During the 1877-1878 war with Turkey, the Russian
Black Sea Fleet was still weak in contrast to a strong
4 Izvestiya
,
7 October, No. 236, and 18 October, No.
247, 1969. The article by Sagetelyan, " In Neutral Waters ",
described the cruise of Soviet squadron in Atlantic and its
visit to Cuba. Unfriendly remarks of the American press
to the presence of Soviet ships in proximity of the U. S.
were given in contrast to the described visit of Russian
squadron in 1863.
William E. Nagengast, "The Visit of the Russian Fleet
to the United States: Were Americans Deceived?" The




Turkish fleet, which had many new heavy armored ships.
The round ironclads designed by Admiral Popov (called
Popovki) , although well armed and protected by heavy armor,
could not be used at sea owing to their poor seaworthiness,
and hence were employed only for off-shore (coastal)
defense. Mines were widely used for defense in the Danube
and in the Black Sea. On the initiative of Lieutenant
S. 0. Makarov a faster steamer carrying four torpedo boats
was used for torpedo attacks. The war ended victoriously
for Russia, but. the Berlin Treaty of 1878, while removing—
restrictions on Russia's Black Sea Fleet, did not change
6
the Straits situation.
During the last two decades of the 19th century
the Russian Navy was reinforced with a considerable number
of newly built ships including battle ships and cruisers.
The theoretical search for modern naval tactics and employment
of naval forces produced a number of major works by the
Russians, particularly the works of Admiral Butakov, (New
Basis of Steam Navy Tactics 1874 ) , and of Admiral
Makarov (Discourses on problems of naval tactics 1896) .
At the end of the 19th Century more than 200 years
6




of a struggle to have direct access to the Mediterranean
Sea with the desire to control the Turkish Straits ended
i
in vain for Russia, mainly because of the opposition of
the European States, particularly England. While militarily,
all wars with Turkey were won by Russia, the desirable
outcome was not achieved by diplomacy, although* the degree
of access as defined in various treaties fluctuated.
The treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (1774) opened the Straits^
to Russian commercial shipping. During 1807, at the
Tilsit meeting between Napoleon and Alexander I, an
attempt was made to determine the boundaries between the
spheres of influence of the East and the West. The Tsar
claimed Constantinople, but Napoleon exclaimed, "no, never
Constantinople, that would mean world dominance!'
The 1329 Treaty of Adrianople opened the Straits
to commercial ships of all nations. In 1833 the Sultan
was forced by circumstances (advance of rebellious Viceroy
of Egypt) to accept a Russian offer of assistance consisting
of a Russian warship at anchor in the Bosphorus supported
7Cited by Dr. Egmont Zechlin in awe 11 docuinented
lecture delivered at the meeting of the Joachim Jungius
Society for Science, Hamburg, 31 October and 1 November
1963, Goettingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1964, p. 1.
15

by a 13,000-man army ashore. Under pressure from Western
powers, however, the Russians moved off, but only after
»
securing their position by a new Unkiar-Skelessi Treaty,*
guaranteeing Russians the right of passage of their
warships through the S.traits and thus into the Mediterranean
The French and the British protested the treaty, supporting
the protest with a naval demonstration at the Dardanelles.
The London meeting of the Concert of Europe resulted in
a different rule (the Covenant of the Straits of 1841)
,
which prohibited naval ships from transiting the Straits
in peacetime. This rule was reaffirmed in the Treaty of
Paris (1856) and of Berlin (1S78) , and remained in force
until World War I. While offering Russia a safeguard
against an attack from the Mediterrannean, it made her
"prisoner" of the Black Sea, which proved to be true during
the war with Japan, 1904-1905. As a member of the Entente,
Russia continued her 'effort to gain control of the Straits.
According to the 1915 London agreement, the Allies agreed
that the Straits should go to Russia after World War I.
The agreement was nullified by the October Revolution of




treaties. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne demilitarized
the Straits and provided for free passage for warships of
all nations with some limitations imposed on the total
strength of the transiting naval force.
The Montreaux Convention of 1936, which is in force
at the present time, permitted Turkey to fortify the
Straits again and made passage of Black Sea power warships
practically unrestricted, though limiting passage of
non-Black Sea power naval forces to size and cruising
time. The last time the Turkish Straits became an international
issue was in the middle of the 1940's, when the Soviet
Union tried unsuccessfully during the Yalta and Potsdam
Conferences to obtain support of the Western allies for
control over the Straits, and/or to obtain rights for a
naval base in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union tried
to apply direct pressure against Turkey in 1946, which met
United States opposition and contributed to Turkey's
entering NATO. In May 1953 the Soviet Government formally
9
withdrew the demand.
At the beginning of the 20th century growing Russian
influence in the Far East (Manchuria and Korea) and her
9 Ibid.
, pp . 45-56
17

possession of Port Arthur (since 1S98) worsened Russo-
Japanese relations. When war broke out with the Japanese
attack of Port Arthur (February 1904) , Russia had considerable
overall numerical superiority in ships but qualitatively
many of the Japanese ships were better. But the major
factor was geography, for most of the Russian ships were
in the Baltic, and the Black Sea Fleet was useless.
In the strategic sense, the problem of war was
centered in the control of the sea, and the Japanese Navy
which was superior to the combined strengths of the Port
Arthur and Vladivostok squadrons, exercised that control.
In order to reverse it, the Russian government decided to
send to Port Arthur the Second Pacific Squadron, which was
formed in the Baltic. The squadron consisted of a mixture
of new as well as old ships and it had to make an
unprecedented 18,000-mile cruise. There were no bases on
the way, and replenishments, repairs, and combat training
presented the squadron with enormous difficulties. The
Second Pacific Squadron left Libau in October 1904 and
reached Madagascar, in December where it spent almost
three months waiting for the formation of the Third
Pacific Squadron, which was being organized in the Baltic
from old, slow and mainly obsolete ships. The Third Pacific
18

Squadron left Libau in February 1905 and in May joined
the Second Pacific Squadron at Cam Rahn Bay (French
Indochina) . With the fall of Port Arthur, Commander of
Joint Squadron Admiral Rozhestvenski decided to break
through to Vladivostok. In the middle of May the joint
squadron reached Korean Straits, where it was ciet by the
Japanese Fleet. In the Battle of Tsushima (14-15 May 1905)
the Russian Squadron was destroyed. Of the 37 Russian ships
only one cruiser and two destroyers reached Vladivostok.
Five ships escaped and were interned in foreign ports,
and five other ships carrying the wounded Rozhestvenski
and the Commander of the Third Squadron, Admiral Nebogatov,
were captured by Japanese. The defeat was disastorous
and among other things demonstrated Russia's backwardness
and unpreparedness for the war, the lack of talented
leadership at the top, mistakes of the command, the low
level of readiness, and the poor tactical training of the
Russian Navy. In spite of numerous examples of valor on
the part of the Russian crews, the extensive use of mine
warfare, attempts to employ submarines, and delayed and
adventuristic decision to reinforce the Pacific naval
forces with the Baltic squadron, the main objective to gain





The war clearly demonstrated the importance of the
navy. If Russia would control the sea or at least have '
superior naval forces, Japanese would have little chance
for success in Manchuria. The defeat was particularly
bitter to the Russian navy for it was the first large
scale battle it lost in its 200-year history.
While at the turn of the century the Russian Navy
ranked third after Great Britain and France, the war
reduced Russia to the sixth place as a naval power. The
defeat did not discourage the Russians, for soon a new
program of navy modernization and build-up was launched.
The semi-official naval officers "League for Fleet
Renovation" demanded the construction of the most powerful
ships. The naval build-up among leading maritime nations
of the time clearly demonstrated the increased role of sea power,
and hence, helped to -ally various elements of Russian society
favoring shipbuilding porgrams in spite of strong opposition
in the newly created Duma.
In 1906 the naval general staff was organized and
in addition to other functions charged with developing the
10









shipbuilding program for fleet restoration. The staff
worked out four variants of the program of which the last
was approved and accepted in 1908 as a minor program. In
1910 a new major shipbuilding program was worked out under
which instead of the 1,125 million rubles required for the
program, only 787 million v/ere allocated. The. government
appropriation for shipbuilding and reconstruction of
shipbuilding yards grew steadily, however, prior to
World War I; in 1908 it was 36 million rubles, in 1908,
35 million rubles, in 1910, 50 million rubles, and in 1912",
114 million rubles. But those amounts v/ere too late
and too little, and, when war started, the Russian navy
had a preponderance of old ships, repeating to a large
degree the sad experience of the war in 1904-1905, and not
a single ship visualized by the large shipbuilding program
A 12was ready.
In 1910 the naval general staff made an attempt to
introduce a Navy Bill visualizing the construction of a
very powerful navy. Accordingly, in the Baltic Sea alone,
"^Shipbuilding No. 7, 1966, pp. 71-72.
12
"Floty v pervoy mirovoy Voyne"
,
("Navies in the
First World War"), v. I - Actions of the Russian Navy,




24 battle ships, 12 battle cruisers, 24 light cruisers,
103 destroyers, and 36 submarines were visualized , by the
end of the 1920 's. The execution of such a program would
require tremendous appropriations which Russia could not
afford and, instead, the socalled major shipbuilding
13
program of 1911-1915 was approved. •
The backwardness of her industry forced Russia
to place many orders for ships, and particularly ship
machinery, in foreign countries, including Germany. In
1909 began the build-up of a modern Russian navy; four
dreadnought type battleships were laid down in Petersburg
for the Baltic and two years later, three more battleships
14
for the Black Sea were laid down in the Nikolaev shipyards.
The increased role of torpedo armament was reflected
in the construction of the Novik-class destroyer, the best
15
ship of its type in its time. The first detachment of
TO
M. A. Petrov, "Podgotovka Rossi i k pervoy mirovoy
voyne ha more " (Preparation of Russia for First V/orld War
at Sea) Voenizdat, 1926, pp. 98-100, 133-148.
l4Sudostreniye No. 10, 1971, pp. 60-62.
*•* In 1911 Novik had most powerful torpedo armament
(15 tubes) , and during a test in 1913 set a world speed
record of 37.3 knots. The shin, modernized in 192S, served
the Soviet Navy until 1941 when she took a torpedo intended
for the cruiser Kirov and was blown up. .Military Historical
Journal No. 12, 1970, pp. 109-110.
22

torpedo boats was formed in the Baltic and was composed of
several Nixon patrol boats. The prototype was bought in the
U. S. in 1906 and produced in one of the plants in southern
. 16
Russia.
The Russian navy built the world's first minelayers and
minesweepers (Zapal class) during 1910-1912, as was the world's
first submarine minelayer, Krab. Under the major program of
1912 four Ismail-class or Borodino-class battle cruisers,
32,000-ton capital ships combining the speed of the cruiser and
ft
armament and protection of battleships, were laid down. This
ambitious program had no paralled in any other navy. For
example, it visualized the construction of most powerful
battleships, "monsters, larger and more powerful than anything
sought theretofore".„ 17
'>->
The Baltic and Black Sea battleships were completed
Sudostroeniye No. 4, 1967, pp. 75-76.
17David Y/oodward, pp. 161-162, described the ships as
follows: "They were to have an armament of twelve sixteen
inch guns, equal in power to the armament of nine eighteeen
inch guns, which was the main armament of the biggest and most
powerful battleships ever built, the Japanese giants Yamato
and Musashi which, were laid down twenty years after the




during the war, but the majority of the planned ships were
either never completed or even started. The prolonged
construction of ships was explained by a shortage of material,
a weak industrial base and great dependence upon foreign
deliveries some of which were obviously stopped as soon as
hostilities commenced and some purposely delayed prior to the
18
war.
The Russian Navy started experiments with what might
be termed- shipboard aviation at the turn of the century.
Experiments with ballons were followed by man-carrying kite
systems, one of which was installed in a torpedo gunboat in the
Baltic in 1903. A number of seaplane models were designed by
D. P. Grigorovich, and the M-5 model was built in considerable
quantity. A design of aircraft carrying ship was proposed
in 1909 and 1913, both with catapults and speeds up to 30 knots.
The lack of shipbuilding capacities and delays in
construction of warships of other types precluded the Tsarist
Navy's utilization of such concepts. The ships assigned to carry
Planes were in the majority obsolete and ill-fitted for the job
" a blunder typical of the Tsarist Navy of the period, in which
18
two li ,f










a soraeivhat Similar picture, though on a smaller
-cau., was repeated at the beginning oi World War II.
24







Nonetheless, just prior to World War I, the Russian Navy
had aviation schools on the Baltic and on the Black Sea. .^~
Naval aviation was widely used during the war, particularly in
20
the Black Sea. When World War I started, the Russian Navy
consisted of nine battleships (pre-dreadnought type)
,
14 "
cruisers, 62 destroyers, and 15 submarines. In addition there
were under construction 7 battleships (dreadnought type)
, 4
battle cruisers, 6 cruisers, 36 destroyers, and 18 submarines. 21
Theoretically facing a vastly superior German Navy in the
Baltic, the Russian fleet received the defensive task of
holding the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and assuring
the defense of the Petrograd from the sea hy fighting a
mine-artillery position prepared in advance in the narrowest
part of the Gulf. m reality, however, the German navy was tied





the Russian seaplane carrier force wasnumerically the second largest in the world. U.S. Navalinstitute Proceedings
. April 1971, p . 63 . ~ ~~
21
History of Naval Art , p. 104.
25

up by a vastly superior British navy and could spare little
to fight Russian navy in the Baltic. The main task on the
Black Sea was said to maintain control of the sea. There was
not a more detailed plan for the war. But in the Black Sea;
the Russian navy was a superior force and was more active
22during the war.
During the course of war, mine warfare was extensively
used in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the North Sea. Mines
used by the Russian Navy were quite advanced and effective
for the time. In addition to employment of mines in the central
mine-artillery position in the Gulf of Finland, they were used
in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, in the blockade of the
Bosphorus in the Black Sea and for the protection of sea
communications in the north, resulting in a number of losses
to the German Navy, including the damaging of the Goeben and
the Breslau.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet was also active against
lines of communication, particularly against the Zonguldak
coal traffic. Both the Black Sea and the Baltic fleets were
also active in supporting the army's maritime flanks. Starting







north, and the Northern Flotilla was organized to protect it
in July 1916. Ship traffic in the north was quite extensive;
in two years, 1915-1917, 1,800 ships delivered 5 ,475,000
' tons
of various cargo and 1,780 ships departed Arkhangelsk and
Murmansk carrying 4,463,000 tons. In addition, 36,000 Russian
expeditionary corps troops
-were delivered from 'Arkhangelsk to
23
France.
The combat activity of the Russian Navy continued even -
after the first revolution, in February 1917, in spite of the
fact that the command of the navy was gradually disintegrating
and was being replaced by committees consisting of elected
commissars. The 1917 October Revolution put an end to the
Russian participation in the World War I.
By way of summary it can be stated that at the time of
the 1917 October Revolution, Russia had a well established
naval tradition and a sizeable navy, which although not
distinguishing itself' in a major sea battle, managed nonetheless
to fulfill the basic tasks assigned to it. The first world war
interrupted the planned development of the Russian navy. More
than 200 years of Russian naval history up to the time of the
Revolution had to its credit a number of considerable
23
History of Naval Art, p. 128.
27

achievements as well as disappointing failures, of which
Tsushima was the major one. The pre-Revolutionary Russian
t
Navy had traditionally combined the innovativeness and ingenuity
of seme of its officers with the backwardness of the economy
supporting it and the incompetence and corruption of the
administration. The established naval tradition served the
future Soviet navy well, and represented a powerful base upon
which the navy was restored, rebuilt, and developed.
From the Revolution to World Wa r II ' ^
During 1905-1906, mutiny and revolutionary movement ,
infected the Russian Navy, m addition to well known mutiny on the
battleship Potemkin, there were mutinies on other ships of
the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. The revolutionary movement
intensified again in 1911 and 1912, when attempts to organize
sailors rebellions were uncovered in the Baltic and Black Sea
Fleets. 24
At the time of the February 1917 Revolution, the influence
of various leftist parties in the Russian Navy was quite strong.
The period between February and October 1917 witnessed the
gradual disintegration of organized command in the navy and the
24„ _ ..
Academ* *i I' -
Nayda
«




further growth of leftist influence. The Communists skillfully
used the confusion created by the February Revolution and
indecisiveness of other parties and considerably increased their
influence and the number of party organizations under their"""
control in the Navv At th^ +-;™~ ^ u.,*<*. y. az tne time of the October 1917
Revolution, a great number of sailors sided with the Communists.
.Many naval units, particularly from the Baltic Fleet, actively
participated in the revolution on the side of Communists.
During the civil war which broke out soon after the October
1917 Revolution, the Navy was active again. Although some-
combat actions took place at sea in the Baltic, the Black Sea,
and the North Sea, which have been treated by Soviet historians
as important military contributions of the Navy, helped to
resist intervention and thus to protect the Young Soviet
Republic, the sailors ashore acting as commissars, commanders,
members of the newly organized secret Police, and agitators
Played a much more important role. But the Red forces did
*>t enjoy a monopoly of the sailors' affection, for some
supported social revolutionaries and some joined the anarchists,
m general, Communist influence was considerably stronger in
the Baltic Fleet then in the Black Sea Fleet. 25
23

The Council of People's Commissars decree 29 January
1913 signed by Lenin announced the disbanding of the Tsarist
Navy and the creation of new, workers-peasant Red Navy, based
on volunteer service and elected commanders. In addition to
the position of People's Commissar for Naval Affairs, occupied
by sailor-Bolskevik P. E. Dybenko, the position, of Commander
of Naval Forces of the Republic was established in September
1918. Rear Admiral of the Tsarist Navy V. M. Al'fater, was
appointed to be the first commander of the Soviet Navy. In
December 1918, the Naval General Staff was organized.
During the winter of 1917-1918 the majority of the v
Baltic Fleet ships were at Revel (Tallin) and Helsinki. In
February 1918, the Soviet government ordered all ships of
the Baltic Fleet to be transferred to Kronstadt in order to
prevent their capture by the advancing Germans. Initially,
all ships were concentrated in Helsinki, and from there they
were moved in three detachments to Kronstadt during March-April
1918. The event known as "the ice cruise" undertaken under
severe winter conditions with the Gulf of Finland covered
by thick ice, resulted in the arrival at Kronstadt of 236
27
combatant and auxiliary ships of the Baltic Fleet.
26




History of Naval Art, pp. 144-146.
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During the summer of imo1918 somewhat similar situation in
the Black Sea had a different outcome Th.. e spring 1918 advance
of the Germans threatened to occupy Sevastopol',
.here '
practically the whole Black Sea Fleet was stationed. The
Soviet government decided to transfer ^ *iX QS the fl^et to Novorossiysk.
Because the Bolsheviks ' ^-pt,,V1"S influence in the Black Sea Fleet
.as considerably weaker than the Baltic Fleet, the execution of
the order was delayed until April 30, 1918, when finally
.est of the ships, including two new battleships, sailed for '
Novorossiysk. The Go-mon tr-,-~u r>ei a High Command, however, demanded Ihe
return of fleet to Sevastopol'. The Soviet^^ ^^
agreed to satisfy the demand hut secretly ordered the scuttling
of the fleet. The order again was not executed immediately, and
the fate of each ship was decided hy a hailot of all the memhers
o* the crews. As a result, one battleship, one cruiser, and 6
destroyers returned to Sevastopol- and the rest of the ships
were sunk by their crews. 28
The civil war was fought on land, and naval forces under
the command of the Soviet Government were employed exclusively
to assist the ned Army maritime flank and also, as was the case
^the^ster^part of the Gulf of
.inland, to protect the
28
Sudostrenive No p. tq^o ^^









maritime approaches to the main centers. Many specialists
of the former Tsarist Navy were employed, and during 1918-1920
29
7,605 mines were sown in extensive mine warfai*c. *
A number of river flotillas formed and manned by sailors
of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets took an active part in the
combat. At the beginning of 1921, when the civil war was
practically over, the Soviet Navy presented a sorry spectacle.
In the Black and the North retreating White Guards and
intervening foreign powers took away three battleships, 10 '
cruisers, 64 destroyers, 30 submarines, and many auxiliary" ships
and transports. Actually, the fleets in the Black Sea, the,
30
Pacific, and the North ceased to exist. The Baltic Fleet
represented a "gathering of lifeless ships" moored to the docks
31
and manned at only 20-40 % of strength.
Most of the ships were badly in need of repair, but the
Navy's supply of spare parts was exhausted. There was no fuel
and the greater portion of ship repair facilities were damaged,
I
destroyed, or deteriorated. Added to the Navy's desperate.
29History of Naval Art
,
pp. 166-167.
30Boyevoy put' Sovetskogo voyenno-inorskogo flota (Combat
Path of the Soviet Navy, hereafter referred to as Combat Path)
,





material condition was the problem of ideological reliability
and the regime's trust in the Navy.
The sailors, particularly from the Baltic Fleet, became
"the glory and the pride of the Revolution". Accustomed to
having their own organizations such as Baltic-Revvoensovet
(Revolutionary Military Council) and Tsentrobalt, the sailors,
particularly those in Kronstadt not only continued to enjoy -
a degree of revolutionary independence but represented a force
to be reckoned with. The number of Bolsheviks among the
sailors during the civil war was considerably reduced, for many
of them left the ships to fight ashore, later to be appointed
to party and government positions throughout the country.
Measures initiated in 1920 by the Party to tighten political
control in the Baltic Fleet (which for all practical purposes
meant Kronstadt) was met with great criticism by the sailors.
This coincided with the profound disappointment of the
Petrograd workers, leading to large-scale disturbances which
were ruthlessly suppressed by the regime. 32
i
The sailors in Kronstadt proclaimed their support of 'the
i
Petrograd workers, and in early March 1921 the Kronstadt









attack over the ice by Red Army units, with the participation
of a few hundred delegates to the Tenth Party Congress which
started its work in March 8th in Moscow. Thus, the revolutionary
activity in the Navy was ended and the "wings" of the "eagles
of the revolution" clipped.
Suppression of Kronstadt mutiny was follqwed by the
purge and the "filtering" of all Navy personnel. These measures,
coupled with the discharge of personnel in the course of
demobilization, reduced the Navy's manpower from 180,000 to
33
39,859 men by the end of 1921.
The Tenth Party Congress resolved "to undertake measures
for the restoration and strengthing of Red Navy" subject to
the "general conditions and material resources of the country".
The Congress also decided "to strengthen the Navy with
political workers, and to return to the Navy all Communist
seamen working in other fields." The decree signed by Lenin
ordered the salvage of repairable ships sunk during the civil




the 1922 ship repair program, according to Lenin, had to be
i
defined by "the size of the Navy which was necessary to keep
33Combat Path of the Soviet Navy
, pp. 148-149.





for political and economic reasons". During the 1921-1924
period, two battleships, two cruisers, and a number of destroyers
36
and submarines underwent major repair and entered the service.
The first All-Union meeting of Communist seamen to
discuss the problem of restoring the Navy was called in
Moscow in April 1922. While they discussed the nature of the
future navy, participants rejected proposals of two opposing
groups: one headed by a former Tsarist navy specialist demand-
ing construction of "an open sea fleet", e.g. in general a
balanced navy built around super dreadnoughts, for "lack of
money, production capacity, and human resources", and the
socalled "young school", demanding const rua-tion ox a light
navy, a "mosquito fleet", submarines, and aviation for its
one-sided emphasis. It was stressed that a navy incorporating
all classes of surface ships, submarines, and aviation and
"acting aggressively in cooperation with the Red Army" was
needed for the country's defense. A resolution also
recommended the sale of old ships and the use of the money thus
37




History of Xaval Art
,
p. 169.
37The Combat Path, pp. 149-150.
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During 1921-1922 all shore fortifications were taken away
from the navy and subordinated to the army.
The Fifth Congress of Komsomol (Young Communist League)
q o
in 1922, acting on Party orders assumed the role of Navy patron.
In addition to sending thousands of its politically reliable
and hard working activists for Navy service, the Komsomol
conducted an effective pro-navy propaganda campaign and organized
socalled "The Navy Week". As a result in 1922-1924 over
10,000 young Communists joined the Navy and more than a
thousand of them entered the Navy's educational institutions.
A considerable amount of money and goods, including clothes,-
were collected and sent to Navy units and many enterprises,
districts, and cities, became patrons of individual navy units.
Certain measures to train future command personnel, as
officers were called at that time, were undertaken as early as
October 1918, when an eight-month officer training course was
organized. In 1922 a number of preparatory schools (some with
three-year programs) were opened to train future cadets of the
naval school, which at the same year switched over to a four-year
program. In February 1922 the naval academy for the advanced
38
The Komsomol has continued this role of patron of the
Navy from 1922 up to the Present. It sends its "best
representatives" for service in the Navy.
3 r-o

training of senior naval officers resumed operation. In
addition, a special school to train political officers for the
,
39 ,
Navy was also organized.
In 1922 ship exercises were resumed in the Gulf of
Finland and in October 1923 Baltic and Black Sea naval units
held maneuvers with the participation of Red Army units. In
1924 the number of ships in commission increased considerably,
and in addition to regular exercises the training detachment
of the Baltic Fleet (cruiser Aurora and training ship
Komsomolets) performed a 47-day cruise from Kronstadt to
Arkhangelsk and back with calls at Bergen and Trondheim
(Norway) . In the same year the Soviet ship Vorovskiy was
transferred to the Far East via the Cape of Good Hope. The
ship stopped in Canton where it was visited by Sun Yat-sen.
The appearance of a Soviet ship in China resulted in considerable
40
pro-Soviet propaganda.
In 1925 Soviet 'ships visited Norway, Sweden, Italy, and
Turkey, those visits helping the Soviet government to strengthen
its position in foreign relations. During the same years
extensive minesweeping was conducted, and in 1925 the approaches
o9
.Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1971, pp. 16-19; Combat Path
of the Soviet Navy
,
pp. 153-154.
40Combat Path, pp. 155-157
37

to the Soviet ports were declared to be clear from nines in
41
the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov.
In 1924 the first stage of the Red Navy restoration was
completed. In addition to the Baltic and Black Sea, modest
naval resources, primarily patrol ships, appeared in the
Caspian Sea, the Far East, the Amur River, and the North.
The second stage of the Red Navy development and the final
stage of its restoration started in 1324. The years 1924 and
1925 are known as a period of "military reform" worked out by
Frunze, who replaced Trotsky as chairman of Revvoensovet and
the People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. Approved
by the April 1924 Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the
military reform influenced the organization, personnel policy,
4:
training and hardware development of the Red Navy and Red Army.
Fleets, shore defense systems and naval aviation were
united into the Naval Forces under a single chief. The
military lav/ approved 18 September 1925 established compulsory
military service, and the duration of conscript service in the
Navy was set at four years. Starting in 1925 the gradual




42 Sudostroycniye No. 2, 1970, pp. 52-55.
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dual commander-commissar system was initiated in the Soviet
Armed Forces. In the Navy the process was particularly slow
43
and exercised with great care, continuing until 1933.
The October 1924 decision of the Council of Labor and
Defense approved a shipbuilding program, authorizing major
repair of a battle ship, cruisers, and destroyers, as well as
completion of construction of ships laid down prior to the
Revolution and found suitable for completion. Thirty-five
million rubles were appropriated for ship restoration in 1925,
44
and 64 million rubles, in 1926. The year 1925 was marked
by more extensive combat training. For the first time, a
squadron of ships headed by the battleship Marat with Frunze
aboard entered the Baltic Sea and sailed to Kiel Bay where it
anchored. During the year, Soviet Navy ships sailed a total
of 260,000 miles, 159,000 in the Baltic Sea, 49,000 in the
45
Black Sea, and 24,000 in the Far East.
43
The number of socalled old specialists, former Tsarist
naval officers, in the Navy was considerable and proportionally
higher than in any other services. On the other hand, Party
members represented only 27% of the naval officers. The special
nature of the service was also taken into consideration. Combat
Path of the Soviet Navy, p. 196.
44
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Shipbuilding No. 4, 1971, pp. 45-4S.
Combat Path, p. 160.

The first Soviet six-year (1926-1932) shipbuilding
program authorizing the construction of 12 submarines, 18
patrol ships, and 36 torpedo boats was approved and successfully
fulfilled.
When the second period of development ended in 1928, the
Soviet Navy in general had recovered from the ordeal of the
Revolution, the civil war, and the Kronstadt mutiny; there
was an established system of organization and command; a
number of documents defining principles of combat training
and combat employment of the ships were produced; the majority
of ships suitable for restoration were repaired and in
commission; the gradual construction of new chips- had begun.
The Soviet Navy had in commission three battleships, five
cruisers, 24 destroyers, 18 submarines, and a considerable number
46
of smaller combatant and auxiliary ships.
Rapid industralization of the nation, initiated in 1928
with the launching of first Five Year Plan, was an important
factor in future naval development.
The construction of first Soviet naval units commenced
In 1927, when the first D-class (Dekabrist) submarines were
laid down in Leningrad. In the Black Sea, the first Soviet
46
History ox Naval Art, p. 169.
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.pedo boat, Pervenets, was built in the same year, to be
•allowed by the construction of the G-5 series of torpedo
ts (Tupolev's design) and later the D-3 class. The
struction of escort type ships of the Uragan class (also
47
nown as the "bad weather" class) was initiated in 1923.
During the years of the second Five Year 'Plan, naval
construction not only intensified quantatively but became
:-.oi*e diversified and sophisticated qualitatively. While the
construction of L and Shch classes of submarines initiated
during first Five Year Plan continued, the Soviets started to
build railroad transportable submarines of the M class.
Construction of more sophisticated submarines of the P and
S classes was also started. In 1936 the first X-class
submarine, the largest and most powerful for that time, was
laid down. The development of surface forces was accelerated
concurrently. In 1932, the destroyer leader Leningrad was
laid down, followed by Minsk (Baltic Fleet) , Moskva and
Kharkov (Black Sea)
,
Baku and Tbilisi (Far East) . During
the same period construction began of a large series of
destroyers (Project - 7
)
Gnevnyy-class) and of the cruiser
47*'Sudostroyenie No. 4, 1971, p. 47, Combat Path
,
p. 165,
and History of Naval Art, p. 170.
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virov. A considerable number of minesweepers, coastal patrol
48
boats, and torpedo boats were also built.
I
When the second Five Year Plan was completed, the *
Soviet Navy had in commission more than 6 times as many
submarines, twice as many destroyers, 6 times as many aircraft
and 3.5 times as many torpedo boats as in the last year of
49
first Five Year Plan.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet was organized in 1932 and the
Northern Flotilla in 1933 (since 1937, the Northern Fleet) ,
'
ft
thus establishing the Soviet naval forces in all four major
theaters.
The Spanish Civil War (1936-1937) clearly demonstrated
to the Soviets the need for stronger naval power. They did
their best to provide assistance to the republican government,
but could not convoy their merchant ships delivering the war
material. They also could not produce any convincing show of
naval strength which would restrain the activity of the
i
i
Franco Navy, patently supported by German and Italian forces;
i
/ I
a few Soviet "merchant ships were sunk or captured. As Admiral
Ibid
.
, A short review ox the development of individual
types of ships by the Soviet Union will be presented later.
49




,. G. Kuznetsov noted, "At that time it became particularly




A separate Commissariat of shipbuilding was organized
and a new shipbuilding program worked out toward the end of
1937 was approved in 193S - Whii^ +uaydB. ,irhlle the program visualized the
continued construction of submarines and destroyers, it placed
heavy emphasis on building battle ships, heavy and light
cruisers, and minesweepers. 51
V/hile the events in Spain had definitely contributed to
the size of the approved program and speed with which the *
Soviets began to execute it, the Soviet awareness that a larger,
.ore balanced and modern navy was needed had existed before.
But the extremely limited resources and industrial capacity
had excluded the initiation of any sizable shipbuilding
Program. ln 1935
, then Soviet industrial^
on a visit to the Black Sea Fleet, predicted the construction
Of larger ships of "any type" in the not so remote future, but
Kphasized "the difficulties with^ ^ ^ ^^^
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linin, when presenting medals to a group of naval officers,
stated that the "time had come for the Navy to take a greater
53 i
part in the country's defense". Ordzhonikidze also stressed ,
the necessity to count on Soviet production capacity alone;
a statement which requires some qualification. The Soviet
Union had tried hard for years, and not without some success,
to receive foreign assistance to its naval construction. In
1026 there were official contacts between representatives of
54
German and Soviet navies to that end. The Soviets desired
German cooperation in the reconstruction of their navy,
particularly in submarine construction. In spite of German
reluctance, plans for a submarine were purchased. Consequently,
the modified and improved version of the German B-3 submarine
designated Type-S by the Soviets was built in a large series.
Many Soviet ships of the pre-Y.rorld Y/ar II period showed many
sisns of foreign design (particularly Italian and some French)
.
One destroyer leader,' Tashkent, was even built in Italy and






D. Woodward, p. 202; The visit of a German naval mission
to the Soviet Union led by Admiral Spindle r mentioned in the
book was actually preceded by the March 1926 Berlin meeting




installations, particularly for Pro.jcct-7 destroyers, was
bought in England, but the American government rejected
55
requests for capital ship designs. '
After the 1939 German-Soviet Treaty was signed, the
Germans were asked for blueprints of a battleship (Sharnhorst
class) and an aircraft carrier (the Graf Zeppelin class)
.
The request was turned down, but a deal to buy the cruiser
56
Lutzow was concluded. The Soviet spy apparatus was also
57
involved in obtaining the blueprints of new foreign ships.
The knowledge of foreign ship designs and construction
methods had certainly helped the Soviet shipbuilding industry.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the foreign
assistance and/or information was crucial, for the bulk of the
weapon systems and main propulsion and auxiliary machinery had
been Soviet designed and built. The decisive factor determining
the Soviet shipbuilding output and the quality (or lack of it)








p. 207-211, and S. Breyer, "Guide to the
Soviet Navy ", United States Naval Institute, 1970, pp. 21-37.
57For example, the blueprints for a new Italian
submarine were obtained by master spy Krivitsky. ' Washington
Post, February 13, 1966, "Who Killed Krivitsky?".
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the precision in production of machinery and armament systems.
Many quite advanced systems were designed which could not be
produced for lack of the same production capacity, materials,
and experience. In 1937 when two Five Year Plans of
industrialization, with the great emphasis on heavy industry,
were fulfilled, the Soviet Union managed, despite the great
strain on its economy, to increase naval construction. The"
decision to develop a "large sea and ocean navy" and to
start the construction of ships of all types was made in 1937.
The 1938 shipbuilding program was prepared in the typical"
Stalinist style manner, i.e. in great secrecy, without
consultation with the top naval leadership. Execution of the
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a shipbuilding boom. Throe new battleships of the Sovetskiy
Soyuz-class, and a number of Chapaev-class cruisers were
laid down. Construction of improved destroyers (Project-7U)
and of submarines was accelerated. As a result, the total
tonnage of the Soviet Navy surface fleet grew by 108,718 tons
59
and submarines by 50,385 tons from 1939 to June 1941. As
early as 1939 the Soviet Union had more submarines than any
other country in the world. In fact, the Soviet submarine
60
fleet was larger than those of Germany and Japanese combined.
The task to build "the open sea and ocean navy worthy of Soviet
Union as a great sea power" was proclaimed. Molotov's
statement to the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR that the "mighty Soviet state should have an open sea
and ocean navy corresponding to its interests and worthy of
its great tasks" became a slogan. Minister of Shipbuilding
Industry, I. Tevosyan, writing in Pravda5 promised to move
his industry from 6th place in the world in 1939 to first
place in 1942-1943.









Pravda, 21 and 23 July 1939
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recognized by the establishment of an independent People's
Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR in December 1937 and by
the organization of the Main Political Directorate of the
62
Navy and the Main Naval Military Council. One of the
Stalin's top lieutenants, a member of the Politburo and
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, A. A. Zhdanov,
who since the middle 1930 's had been responsible for naval
development, was appointed as a member of the Main Naval
, 63
Military Council.
In 1939 the naval officer's schools, which had grown in
number, acquired the status of higher educational institutions
and increased their enrollment. While the number of young
officers graduating from naval school increased, the Stalin's
purge of 1937-1938 considerably reduced the number of
experienced senior officers, particularly flag officers.
Former commanders-in-chief of the Soviet Navy Orlov,
t
Murlevich and Viktoro'v, fleet commanders Dushenov, Sivkov,
'I
Kozhanov, and Xireev, and many other senior flag officers were
/
arrested and most of them shot. Only one, Pacific Fleet
.












People's Commissar of the Soviet Navy. Many young inexperienced
officers were promoted to fill the positions of the liquidated
commanders of fleets, flotillas and units. The widespread
belief that nearly all of the former Tsarist naval officers
64
left the Navy and that the majority of them became victims of
the purge is erroneous. Surprising as it may be, the percentage
of former Tsarist officers who fell victim to the purge was"
considerably smaller than that of the purely "Soviet bred"
officers. Moreover, the most senior of them (Admiral Galler
and Fleet Admiral Isakov) were promoted and became Chief
of Main Naval Staff and a Deputy People's Commissar of the ^
Navy respectively. In general, the wide use of the former
Tsarist officers by the Soviet Navy continued up to the end
of 1947, they were particularly numerous in the scientific,
research, and educational establishments. 65
The problems associated with the development of Soviet
Naval theory, especially in connection. with the old specialists,
the former Tsarist officers, should be briefly mentioned. The
'See for example, R. W. Herrick, "Soviet Naval Strategy",United States Naval Institute, 1968, p. 45\
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In 1947, for example, majority of position of full
professors and heads of the departments both in the Soviet
naval Academy and Frunze Higher Naval School were occupiedby former Tsarist officers.
43

decade of the 1920' s and first half of the 1930' s witnessed
the theoretical struggle between the various points of view
on construction and combat employment of naval forces in the
Soviet Union. In general, the debates were mainly conducted
in the Naval Academy and naval schools, although occasionally
commanders of fleets and even the commander-in-chief
66
participated in them. Basically, the two opposing points
of view were most loudly expressed. One, held mainly by the
socalled old specialists (primarily, but not exclusively, former
Tsarist officers) argued for the balanced navy, an open seas
fleet composed, together with light surface forces and
aviation, of capital ships as the backbone of the Navy. The
proponents of the other view, the "young school", rejected
any crucia.1 role for the capital ships and argued for a
light-forces navy with preference given to submarines. "Down
with the doctrine of the command of the seas" became the main
slogan of the young school, expressed by its loudest proponent,
A. B. Alexandrov. The debates have received comprehensive
analysis in Western as well as Soviet literature.
66Nakanune
, pp. 49-51.
Sec for example, D. Y/oodward, pp. 205-203, and
particularly, Fedotov-Y.'hite in Journal of "che Royal United
Sorv i
c
g s In s t i t u
t
i on
, August 1935; R. W. Ilerrick, Soviet Naval
Strategy ; N. G. Kuznetsov, Nakanune , rjg, 49-55; and S. Gorshkov
in ilo rskoy Sbornik
, No . 2, 1967, pp. 9-12.
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The debates definitely contributed to the development
of Soviet naval theory, helped Soviet naval officers to learn
more about Western naval theories, and in general reflected ._
the concern of naval circles regarding the condition of Soviet
Navy and the need for its improvement. However, the debates
neither resulted in an officially approved theory nor influenced
any shipbuilding program. The theory of "small war" which was
most widespread and recognized since the mid 1920* s up to beginning
of the 1930's reflected the pragmatic recognition of the -"
weakness of the Soviet Navy at that time. The Soviet ship-
building of p re-World War II period reflected, at most, the
occasional excessive utilization of available industrial
capacities assigned to naval construction by arbitrary decision
of Stalin and his immediate circle. Thus, newly appointed
Commissar of the Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov, learned about the
details of 1937-1938 shipbuilding program from the head of the
shipbuilding industry. His previous knowledge of the program
was limited to "rumors" and "some small details" overheard
f? Qduring the sessions of Main Naval Council. Of course, the
future program was discussed and debated among top leaders of





with one another that, when top naval commanders were invited
to the conference with Stalin in late 1936 or early 1937 and
were asked what kind of navy was needed and what types of ships
should be built, they could not give uniform answers. Reportedly,
Stalin concluded the meeting with this remark that they themselves
69
did not know what they needed.
The war with Finland (November 1939-March 1940) produced
important consequences for the pre-World War II development
of the Soviet Navy. The role of the Baltic Fleet in the Y/ar
was limited to the support of the Red Army and marginal
submarine activity. The war revealed the extremely poor
preparedness of the Red Army and the absolescense of its
armament. The March 1940 Plenum of the Party Central Committee
70
"analyzed the results and lessons" of war with Finland and
decided to speed up the rearmament of the Red Army, particularly
its armored and air branches. Implementation required
industrial capacity and steel, both of which were in short
supply. As a result, the construction of large ships, battle-
/
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after drastic revision of the shipbuilding program in October
of 1940, was stopped completely. Only the construction of
71
submarines, destroyers, and smaller surface ships continued.
Simultaneously, the accelerated development of naval bases
and shore defense installations was undertaken.
During the 14 years of pre-World War II shipbuilding
(1927 to June 1941) 433 ships (excluding torpedo and
patrol boats and auxiliaries) were laid down. Of that number,
312 including 206 submarines and 106 surface ships (4 cruisers,
7 destroyer leaders, 30 destroyers, 18 escorts, 38 minesweepers,
1 minelayer, and 8 gun boats) were completed before the wars
started and commissioned. At the beginning: ox the v/ar, 219
ships, including 3 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 cruisers,
45 destroyers, and 91 submarines were on the building ways.
Twenty-three submarines were completed during the second half
72
of 1941.
The Soviet pre-World War II naval development has been
differently assessed at home and abroad. The main controversy
have been centered around the role of the submarines in over-all





"Voenno-Isto richcskiy zhurnal - VIZ (Military Historical
Journal) No. 6, 1971, pp. 36-37.
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For example, some claim that the submarines were under evaluated
73
in theory and practice. While others came to the opposite
conclusion, claiming that submarines were the main striking
74
~~^~
force of the Soviet Navy.
It is hard to agree with either conclusion. The May
1928 decision of the Revvoensovet of the USSR, .which discussed
the role of Navy in the military forces of the country, stated
"while developing the Navy it is necessary to combine surface
and submarine fleets, shore and mine position defense, as well
as naval aviation in proportion corresponding to the character
75
of combat operations". The naval development program
incorporated into the second Five Year Plan again emphasized
close cooperation between fleet aviation and shore defense but
some preference was shown to the development of submarines and
"heavy aviation".
In the late 1930 's preference was given to surface
ships, which were viewed as the nucleus of the navy. The
submarines were supposed to act against enemy communications,
and when this task was the main one, the submarines were viewed
73




pp. 216 and 363.
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VIZ No. 6, 1971, p. 34.
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as the main forces. The 1937-1933 program was visualized
as a program for the development of a balanced navy. Not a
single Soviet pre-World War II program neglected submarine
construction, and each one planned and actually built more
submarines than the previous one. Accelerated construction of
surface ships became possible because of new shipbuilding
capacities introduced in the mid and late 1930s, but by no
means did it affect the construction of submarines. The
fluctuation in the number of submarines built (6 during the
first Five Year Plan, 137 during the second Five Year Plan,
and 86 during uncompleted third Five Year Plan) is explained
by the construction in the third period of a larger number
of more sophisticated classes (S, L, M, and K) submarines, which
obviously lengthened the average time for construction of one
unit.
To summarize the pre-World War II development of Soviet
Navy it should be stated that with the exception of a short
i
period of disgrace following the Kronstadt mutiny, considerable
/
attention was devoted and effort spent to restore the available
naval units, to organize naval forces, and to incorporate them









weak Soviet economy, the shortage of industrial capacities,
which were overtaxed, the number of ships built and the even
larger number laid down in the pre-war period is remarkably
high. The initiation of the 1937-1938 shipbuilding program
borders on adventurism, for, apart from the demands of the
civilian sector, which had been traditionally neglected, the
program was carried out to the detriment of the other services,
including the army. The minor war with Finland clearly
revealed this weakness, forcing redistribution of industrial
capacities and, hence for all practical purposes termination
of the program as far as capital ships were concerned.
Tremendous expenditures of money, production capacities, and
steel for the program brought little benefit to the Soviet
naval forces.
To a certain degree, the situation in 1941 was the same
as the one in 1914. Moreover, in an operational sense, the
planned naval employment, particularly of the Baltic Fleet and
the Black Sea Fleet, was not much different from that of the
/ . ;pre-Revolutionary period. The decisive battle on the mine-t
artillery position held sway in the theory of naval employment.
Moreover, while the Tsarist Navy v/as well prepared for mine
warfare, the Soviet Navy had fallen behind in mine development
5G

and had neither magnetic mines nor the means to sweep them.
The number of minesweepers and anti-submarine ships was
inadequate, and there were no amphibious ships. Neither ships
nor aircraft were equipped with radar, and sonar was in the
embryonic stage of development. Soviet naval gunnery was good,
as was torpedo armament, but the anti-aircraft 'artillery of
ships was weak. Naval aviation had about 2,000 aircraft, but
77
many of them were old. The geography of the Soviet Union has
>
forced it to keep naval forces in four major theaters, with
primary attention as far as strength is concerned given to
the Baltic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, a logical step, for
the major threat was anticipated from Germany and Japan.
However, what is logical does not always turn out to be
practical, as the war confirmed for the Northern Fleet, which
was the most active, was at the same time the weakest of four
major Soviet fleets, and had the least well developed base
system.
The importance of Northern Fleet apparently was well
understood by the Soviet command and Stalin personally.
N. G. Kuznctsov, pre-war and wartime chief of the Soviet
Navy, in his memoirs described a conversation with Stalin




during which the latter emphasized the necessity to train the
fleet under much harsher conditions in the North and the whole
year round, and the necessity, with the aid of the largest
Soviet shipbuilding yard, to create large naval forces in
the naval theater which was ice free and had outlets to the
oceans. The admiral concluded that "It is more difficult
to train and educate skillful commanders and sailors than it is
to build ships" is quite revealing and corresponds to the
78
conditions prevailing in the Soviet Navy in the pre-war period.
In general, Stalin's role in the Soviet naval development was
crucial. Admiral Kuznetsov stated, "The Navy was allowed under
an unwritten rule to decide on any important matters only after
consultation with him (i.e. Stalin), although Molotov and
Zhdanov were sometimes authorized to prepare naval decisions
before they were examined by Stalin". And further: "After
my first few meetings with him in 1938, I became convinced that
he had a clear idea Of the importance of the Soviet Navy, which
by then had grown. The Soviet Union had come to occupy a
fitting place in the world political arena. The events in Spain
from 1S36 to 1939, and the need to back up our foreign policy
with the strength of our navy well beyond the nearest seas like
78
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the Baltic, which were restricted or almost closed, made us
speed up the working out and implementation of a large-scale
shipbuilding programme. In that period, Stalin took the most
active part in creating a big navy. It was he, as I later
discovered, who had taken the fundamental decision that we
should have a big navy, and it was a correct one. The policy
of building up the Soviet Union's defense might, which was
pursued by the Party and the government, called for readiness
79
to fight not only on land, but also at sea".
The Soviet naval command had been analyzing German
submarine operations in the Atlantic and the Weserubung
(the Weser Exercise, i.e., the capture '_>£" Norway and Denmark)
and was convinced that "the importance of sea battles was not
to be underestimated". Evaluating the Weserubung as "an
adventuristic operation" the Soviets nonetheless that "nobody
could say with conviction that their adventure was not to be re-
peated when Germany attacked the Soviet Union" somewhere in
80
the Baltic or in the North.
In spite of the Navy's subordinated role in the Soviet








general staff strategic plans?1 the existence of an independent
People's Commissariat of the Navy permitted the naval staff to
analyze the situation independently. Soviet naval intelligence
detected the German preparation for the war and reported its
findings, but as was the case with a number of other sources,
the warning was apparently ignored by Stalin. 'Nonetheless,
the Soviet Navy, by order of Admiral Xuznetsov, had been
alerted to readiness state No. 2 since June 19, 1941, and
at 2335 H on June 21st was placed in state of readiness No. 1
(war). As a result, during the first day of war, June 22,~1941,
and in spite of first German air strikes on Sevastopol and the
Baltic Fleet naval bases, there were no losses of Soviet
ships. As a matter of fact, Moscow learned first about the war
from Sevastopol (the main base of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet). 82
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The_Soviot Navy during World War II
The element of surnHco ^^u-x prise achieved in the German attack
on the Soviet union and the fast advance of Geraan Army created
conditions under which the traditional role of the Soviet
Navy to support the Red Ar.y's marltime flanks gained ^
overling importance. While C-ennan navai activity, centered
mainly around the air and mine warfare action in the Baitic and
nearly totally ahsent in the northern region and the BU<* Sea,
inflicted considerable l c;cPQ rt„ +uosses on the retreating Soviet fleets
it did not prevent them from fulfilling thp ,„unn eir assigned tasks
completely, but did reduce their effectiveness.
TJie_BajLtic Fleet
The Baltic Fleet hart -,-« ~6 h d ln co^ssion 2 old battleships,
2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders iq a +y i , 19 destroyers, 6 minelayers,
7 escorts, 33 minesweepers, 48 PT boats a »H e« .> -i o , nd 65 submarines.
The fleet aviation had 656 aircraft i^i „•
'
I a«o i i , including 172 bombers. 83
Between June/ 23 and the end rt -p + iof the month, several minelaying
operations were conducted and th* „ * -, !
'
e antral mine-artillery
Position in the western part of the Gulf of Finl ,
_________






as a number of secondary minefields were established. The
fleet bases of Libau, Riga, and Tallin were captured by the
German Army. Considerable resistance was offered by joint
efforts of the Baltic Fleet and Red Army units during the
defense of Tallin and the Moonsund Islands. The Baltic Fleet
bombers based on Sarema Island managed to bomb •Berlin,
carrying out a total of 9 raids in August and the first four
days of September. Although the material losses inflicted
on Berlin were negligible, the raids had some psychological
value, for it was the only time that Soviet aviation succeeded
in bombing Berlin until 1945.
Despite considerable losses inflicted by German mines
and aviation, the evacuation of Tallin saved not only most of
the ships, but most of the personnel as well. The defense
of Hanko Naval Base in Finland lasted 165 days, until
December 1941. The evacuation of the base ordered by Moscow
was conducted under extremely unfavorable conditions and
i
resulted in considerable losses in people and in ships.
Nonetheless, the Leningrad garrison was reinforced by 23,000
men with combat experience and a large amount of badly needed
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The loss of bases bottled up the Ealtic Fleet in the
eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, mainly in Leningrad and
Kronstadt. The naval guns even from damaged and partially
sunken ships were effectively used in the defense of Leningrad,
but massive German air raids (particularly in September 1941)
inflicted additional losses on the ships. One »out of two old
battleships lost half its guns, but its two remaining turrets
continued to firer
During the winter of 1941-1942 and the spring of 1942
Germans improved the minefields in the western part of the
Gulf of Finland, of which both shores were in German hands, *
thus effectively blocking the surface forces of the Baltic Fleet
in their remaining bases. The only forces of the fleet which
could be used for a campaign at sea were submarines and naval
aviation, and the latter was used mainly against land targets.
This is how Admiral Kuznetsov describes the use of naval
aviation during the f*irst year of war: "Torpedo-carrying ,
planes were, of course, the best means of striking at transports,
/ !
and for years they had been preparing for just that/" But in
J
view of the emergency, the bulk of the fleet air arm had been
sent against the enemy's tank columns moving towards Leningrad.
°VIZ, No. 10, 1970, pp. 72-78.
G3
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In addition, it was providing cover for the Fighth Army
fighting in Estonia, and bombing German units advancing on
„87 *
Tallin. Later, particularly after 1943, when the situation
at the land front stabilized, fleet aviation was reinforced
and it resumed its activities in the Baltic against German
ships, particularly transports in the route alo'ng Swedish
S3
coasts. The light surface forces of the Baltic Fleet, especially
PT boats, maintained combat activity through all over the war,
in 1942-1943 in, the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and
starting with the summer of 1944 in its western part as well
as the Baltic Sea.
The activity of the Baltic Fleet submarines was the most
interesting. In spite of the most adverse conditions for
transiting the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Fleet submarines,
with marginal assistance from naval aviation and the minesweepers
in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, managed to reach the
open Baltic and inflicted losses on- German shipping in every
year of the war. The number of submarines sorties into the
open sea and their successes varied, the low point being in







combat effectiveness of Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines towards
the end of the war increased steadily. While in 1941 only
seven submarines scored successes, sinking fifteen ships'
including one submarine; in 1942 14 submarines sank 37 ships;
in 1943 only 2 submarines managed to sink 4 ships; in 1944 13
submarines sank 37 ships, and in 1945, 12 submarines sank 35
snips. One Soviet submarine, L-3 , was successful in each
of the 4 years of the campaign, specializing in gunnery attacks,
to which 17 ships, mainly small, fell victim. The greatest
combat successes in torpedo attacks were scored by submarines
Shch-310 and Shch-307, which sank 10 and 9 enemy ships
respectively. Submarines S-13, K-52, and: L-3 were credited
with having torpedoed 6 ships each. The activity of the Soviet
Baltic Fleet submarines forced the Germans to introduce the
convoy system in 1942 and again in the second half of 1944. 90
Submarine S-13 is credited with six sunken ships, among them two
large ones, Wilhelm Gustloft (25 ,484 tons) sunk January 30, 1945
and Steuben (14,660 tons) sunk February 9, 1945. The loss of
39Morskoy Sbornik No. 8, 1967 and No. 11, 1967, pp. 46-52.
These well documented articles presented only confirmed enemy
losses and are the first Soviet open press publication of this
nature
.
90Morskoy Sbornik No. 11, 1967, p. 49. For example, in
December 22, 1942, in a communication to Hitler's headquarters it
was pointed out that "every submarine breaking through the blockade
is a threat to shipping throughout the Baltic Sea and endangers




Wilhelin Gustloft was the largest marine catastrophe, in which
91
4,000 people perished. In 1945, with the advance of the Soviet
armies, larger surface units of the Baltic Fleet, destroyers
and cruisers, continued to be kept mainly in the eastern part
of the Gulf of Finland, for neither their condition nor the
»
navigational situation (mine danger) permitted their employment.
Besides the submarines only light surface forces (PT boats and
patrol boats) and naval aviation were active in the Baltic.
The Black Sea
At the beginning of the war the Soviet Black Sea Fleet
had in commission one old battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 destroyer
leaders, 13 destroyers, 2 escorts, 47 submarines, 84 PT boats,
92
and 626 aircraft. At the beginning of the war, Germans did
not have their own naval forces in the Black Sea and were
apparently counting on the Rumanian Fleet, which was greatly
inferior to the Soviet Black Sea Flee't. "However, with the
majority of Soviet naval aviation involved in the land struggle,
650 Rumanian and 450 German aircraft represented a real threat
to the surface forces of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Later,
91
N. Kuznetsov in Novy Mir No. 7, 1969, pp. 150-156,
"S-13 Attacks".
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in the course of the war, Germans brought their own naval forces
consisting primarily of light surface ships and sqveral submarines
to the Black Sea, but they were not very effective against the
vastly superior Soviet Black Sea Forces. The German advance-
on the land represented the main problem encountered by the
Black Sea Fleet just as in the Baltic. The defense of the naval
bases of Odessa (more than two months) and Sevastopol' (more
than eight months) was assigned mainly to the Navy and commanded
by admirals. Supported by a number of amphibious landings,
particularly at Kerch-Feodosiya, the defense of the naval bases
tied up a considerable number of German troops.
From the very beginning of the war, Black Sea naval
aviation made a number of strikes against Rumanian oil refinery
centers with marginal success. However, when the situation on
the land front worsened, the aviation was tied up and its
activity in support of the naval operation diminished. In mid
1942, because of the loss of all major bases the Black Sea
Fleet was forced to operate out of the auxiliary bases of Poti
and Batumi. More than ten amphibious landings were made by




History of Naval Art, pp. 256-271,
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The forces of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet were used in
all types of naval operations. However, the special nature of
the opposition and the often not very skillful application of
forces precluded the Soviets from achieving a more effective
employment of their fleet. For example, the dogmatic approach
to mine warfare produced a number of mine fields in the Black Sea
which handicapped the operation of Soviet naval forces much
more than they did the Germans. The submarines, particularly •
in the early period of war, were not employed aggressively and
were losing valuable combat time waiting at assigned positions
for the few enemy ships navigating the sea. Naval aviation,
in contrast, was very active in the Black Sea and is credited
94
with 80% of the enemy tonnage sunk. In 1944, when the Germans
were retreating, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet failed to completely
interrupt German communications, thus permitting the partial
95
evacuation of German troops from Crimea.
cj4








When war broke out, the youngest Soviet flee't, the Northern,
was in a stage of accelerated development. One of the main"'—-._
problems was the absence of a well-developed base system, which
detained the reinforcement of the fleet with ships and aircraft.
There were only S destroyers, 7 escorts, 2 minesweepers, and
15 patrol boats in commission. The fleet also had 15 submarines
and 116 aircraft, both of which were considered to be the main
striking force. But, almost half of the aircraft were obsolete
96
seaplanes and there were only 11 bombers. By a special
decision of the State Committee for Defense, the Northern Fleet
was reinforced by 130 civilian ships (merchant ships, fishing
trawlers, etc.) converted into minelayers, patrol ships, mine-
sweepers, and tenders. But the quality of the converted ships
was such that they were a poor imitation of what was needed;
they were badly suited for the intended missions. In addition,
.
by the same decision, S submarines (out of 20 planned) , six PT
boats, and 4 patrol boats were transferred via the White Sea-
Baltic Canal from the Baltic Fleet. Eight small submarines
were delivered from the industry in 1942. During July-October
1942, the Soviet Pacific Fleet sent one destroyer ' leader and
96Combat Path, p. 216.
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two destroyers, which fn~ +ho f-j *»,-+ -*-.;
.
*>, «m n io. . e first time traversed the Northern
Sea Route from East to V/e<?t a mmy.^** ~-?u w st. number of minesweepers for
sweeping influence mines were bought in England. In the 'middle
of 1942, the fleet aviation was reinforced by 31S aircraft
from the Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Caspian
97
Flotilla. The Pacific Fleet sent 6 submarines to reinforce
the Northern Fleet in the fall of 1942. Those submarines had
to make a secret crossing of the Pacific and to enter the
Atlantic. through the Panama Canal. In the process of this
17,000-mile transfer, one Soviet submarine, L-16, was torpedoed
by an unidentified submarine S00 miles from San Francisco. 98
The base system cf the Northern Fleet was also improved in the
course of the war. In August of 1941 the White Sea Flotilla
was formed. In 1941 the naval base on Novaya Zemlya was
organized, and, to protect communications in the Kara Sea, the
Kara Naval Base was organized in 1944 on Island Dikson." As
was the case in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, no large scale
naval operations were planned by the Germans in the Arctic
waters. Plan Barbarossa visualized the capture of Murmansk
—
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by ground forces. When the Germans failed to fulfill the plan,
the Allied convoys started to arrive at Murmansk with vital
supplies and armaments. The Germans own shipping supporting
forces in Norway began to be attacked by forces of the Soviet
Northern Fleet. The Germans then shifted considerable naval
forces to the north and engaged in more active 'operations against
the Allied convoy system as well as the Russian Northern Fleet.
The general weakness of the Soviet naval forces in the North
and their preoccupation with supporting the Army flank limited ^
their operations against Nazi shipping and in defense of their
own shipping, thus precluding any substantial contribution by
the Northern Fleet to the protection of the Allied convoy
system, which took on strategic importance. Overall, 41 convoys
totalling 797 transports arrived in the Soviet Union and 36
convoys totalling 726 transport left Soviet ports in the North
during the war. Eighty-three transports, including seven Soviet
100 .
ships, were lost. During the war there werel,471 internal
Soviet convoys involving 2,568 transports escorted by total
number of 3,617 naval ships. The system assured the transportation
of 1,672,000 men, 3,863 guns, 380 tanks, 13.5 thousand vehicles,
1Q1
and other military cargo totalling 1.5 million tons. In the
TOP
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summer of 194-1 the Soviet Northern Fleet was reinforced by a
number of British and American ships, including one battleship,
one cruiser, 9 destroyers, and 4 submarines. Those ships were
102
employed mainly in the White Sea Flotilla.
The action of the Soviet naval forces caused some damage
and forced Germans to escort their convoys. According to the
Soviets, 158 German transports and up to 50 combatants were
103
sunk or badly damaged. During the first two years of the
war, the submarines occupied first place in the number of enemy
ships sunk, but starting in the second half of 1943, naval
aviation took the lead. Lack of repair facilities and a weak
base system led to the steady decline in number of Soviet
submarines at sea. Thus, whereas at the beginning of wa r an
average of up to six submarines were on patrol, in 1944 this
104
number was reduced to 2 or 3. The submarines of the Northern
Fleet made 194 attacks, fired 676 torpedos, and placed 837
mines. The Germans in turn were also active in mine warfare;
1 09^All the ships were old and could hardly be used in
the high seas. After the war all of them minus two which were
lost, were returned to their original owners. D. Woodward,
The Russians at Sea
,
p. 214.
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50% of Soviet submarine losses are credited to mines.
During the war with Germany the Soviet Pacific Fleet
represented a deterrent force against Japan, and also served
a role of reserve fleet for the Soviet Navy from which some
ships and considerable numbers of personnel were transferred
to active Soviet fleets, particularly the Northern. In August
1945, when war against Japan was declared, the fleet had in
commission 2 cruisers, one destroyer leader, 12 destroyers, 19
escorts, 78 submarines, 10 minelayers, 52 minesweepers, 49
submarine chasers, 204 PT boats, 19 landing ships, and 1,549
aircraft. In addition, the Amur Flotilla had about 200 ships
and 70 aircraft. The fleet was in good level of training and
combat readiness. The remnants of the Japanese Navy still
tied up by the US Navy could hardly offer substantial resistance
The capture of Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and a number of
ports in northern Korea was the main task set forth for the
Pacific Fleet. A number of successful amphibious landings,
during which for the first time in the Soviet Navy specially
built (mainly American) amphibious ships were used, were
executed. The war was over in seven days, although the
105
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occupation of the Kurile Islands took until 31 August.
In summary, World War II threatened the very, existence of
the Soviet Union. To be or not to be was not an academic
question. The main role of the Soviet Navy in such a struggle,
auxiliary in nature, was "to assist the Army in the maritime
flanks", and was determined mainly by the interests of the
ground forces. However, the defense of Leningrad, Odessa,
Sevastopol, as well as Moonsund Islands, Tallin and Hanko, in
which the Navy played a very important role, had strategic
TOP —
importance. The Soviet Navy was neither prepared for
nor there was any necessity created by the opponent to contest
the control of the sea in a strategic sense, for German naval
activity with the exception of in the North, where they
challenged the allied convoy system, was marginal. To a large
degree that was attributable to the intense naval campaign
conducted by the Allied naval forces in Atlantic. The former
head of the Soviet Navy, Admiral N.» G. Kuznetsov, evaluated
the situation as follows: "It must be said in all fairness
that the deployment of the German Navy against the Soviet Union
depended, in certain measure, on the battles which had been
1Q7IIistory of Naval Art
,
pp. 513-514.
108VIZ, No. 5, 1970, pp. S8-89.
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fought at sea since the opening of the war. If it had not been
so, the German High Command would have assigned it^s navy a
bigger role in Plan Barbarossa. The actions in the Atlantic
prevented the German High Command from switching its ships
to the Soviet shores .... our allies' success or failure in the
Atlantic determined the size of their aid to us' during the
hardest years of the war. The battle for the Atlantic was,
to some extent, fought to allow passage of convoys to our
109
ports of Murmansk and Archangel."
The Germans failed to conduct a single amphibious
operation on the maritime flank of the Soviet Army, nor was
there any indication they planned to. The Soviets, however,
made several dozens of landings. Navy infantry and socalled
naval rifle brigades formed from sailors and navy shore units
totalling 405,000 men, were often incorporated in the ground
forces and used as shock troops, in addition to their role
in the defense of naval bases. Moreover, the formation
I
of the numerous naval flotiallas mainly on the rivers (Volga,
/ !
'
Dnepr, Danube) played an important role in the war. In spite
of the predominant importance of the land struggle, naval
I
combat, limited mainly to coastal waters, was intense during
109





certain periods of war. The main role on both sides was
played
by the land based aviation, followed by
submarines and light
surface forces (particularly Soviet PT boats). The Soviet
Navy was poorly prepared for antisubmarine
warfare. Only
towards the end of war were anti-submarine forces increased
and their equipment, thanks mainly to the Allied deliveries,
improved.
Mine warfare was also extensively used, but the Soviet
Navy , while improving towards the end of the war, was
not at
its best in this traditional form of warfare. The Soviet
Navy neither had influence mines at the beginning of the war
nor the means to sweep them. Again, it was the Allies who
supplied the original equipment to the Soviet Navy. The Soviets
failed to enlarge its navy with merchant ships capable of
operating as minesweepers. The leading role of aviation
in naval combat was clearly established. When circumstances
permitted, during the second half of the war, Soviet naval
ll2
aviation was increased considerably. The important role
H QMorskoy Sbornik No. 11, 1971, pp. 25-28.
11:L
The Y/ar Years, p. 134.
Soviet sources credited naval aviation with two
thirds of all enemy ships sunk or damaged during the war.




f the aircraft carriers was clearly demonstrated
to the
Soviets by its Western allies. But the conclusions drawn by
some Western students of Soviet naval affairs that the
carriers
could have greatly changed the conduct of the war in the
Baltic
and the Black Seas are clearly erroneous to say the
least, and
ignore the then existing realities. ' The anti'-aircraf
t
defense of the Soviet ships was weak, and the short radius of
Soviet fighter aircraft and their small number, particularly
during the initial period of war, were additional obstacles
to more active Soviet surface forces operations.
The Soviet Navy of the war years could in no sense be
called a balanced fleet. However, the construction of a
considerable number of surface ships in addition to numerous
submarines, particularly during the late 1930' s, demonstrated
the Soviet understanding of the concept of a balanced fleet in
general, but it did not have the capability to realize it.
Defending the pre -Wo rid War II naval development, Admiral
Kuznetsov stated: "The war showed that the sea power was
113For example, R. W. Kerrick in the Soviet Naval
Strategy, p. 53, stated, "Had the Baltic and Black Sea fleets
had their own carrier-based air cover to protect the forces
afloat, including carriers themselves, from the Luftwaffe
attacks, there is every possibility that those fleets could
have continued offensive operations and greatly retarded the




something more than just submarines .
The pre-war distribution of naval forces with traditional
concentration in the two closed seas, the Baltic Sea and* the
Black Sea, did not meet the requirements of the war. The
delayed development of system of bases in the North with the
resulting weakness of the forces of the Northern Fleet, which
was most active during the war, was one of the serious mistakes
committed in the pre-war naval development. The rapid advance
of the German Army interrupted the attempted reinforcement of the
Northern Fleet from the Ealtic.
In spite of the considerable losses in submarines,
particularly in the Baltic, the Soviet Navy stubbornly continued
to employ them throughout the war. Initially suffering from
poor training and the consequences of the pre-war purges,
the Soviet Navy had considerably improved its operational and
tactical skills toward the end of the war. The combat activities
of Soviet submarines,* naval aviation, and PT boats forced
Germany to escort shipping in the North and in the Baltic.
In the Black Sea, the Soviet Navy managed to retain supremacy
but it is doubtful that the Black Sea Fleet potentials were
fully realized in the war.
U 4
The War Years, p. 1G2.
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The outcome of the war produced considerable improvements
in naval geography for the Soviet Union, compared, with what
it had been prior to the war. Both successes and failures of
the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and the enemy
on the other produced rich material for examination and
evaluation which influenced the consequent development of the
Soviet Navy.
The First Post-World-War-II Period
to the mid 1950s
When World War II ended, the Soviet Navy had in commission
2 old battleships, 9 cruisers, 48 destroyers, 173 submarines,
393 torpedo boats, 59 patrol ships, 208 minesweepers, and
4,150 aircraft. The civilian ships mobilized at the beginning
of war were transferred according to a special decision of the
115Soviet Government to their previous owners.
When the navies of defeated opponents in World War II
were divided among the victors, the Soviet Union received:!
!
from Germany/ one cruiser, 10 destroyers, 10 submarines, 44
'
/
minesweepers, 30 torpedo boats, and other ships, mainly
auxiliaries; from the Italian Navy, one battleship, one cruiser,






miscellaneous boats: from Japan, 7 destroyers, 17 escort ships,
2 mine layers, one sub chaser, 4 minesweepers. According
to an agreement, all Japanese ships were disarmed. Most 'of
the ships received from the former German, Italian, and Japanese
navies, with the exception of some German submarines, particularly
those captured by the Soviets as a war prize in Gdansk, were
of old designs with worn out machinery and armament. There"
was a very limited supply of spare parts and ammunition for
them. Many of the ships were never commissioned in the combat
nucleus of Soviet Navy, and those which were did not serve for
a long time. The ex-German submarines of the XXI, VII, and
XXIII types, minesweepers, and some auxiliaries were used by
117
the Soviets up to the late 1950s.
The degree of destruction of Soviet industry caused
by the war, particularly in the Soviet European part, was
colossal. Yet, the first post World War II Five Year Plan
approved March 18, 1946, and devoted mainly to the restoration
of the economy, visualized the "1950 level of shipbuilding
exceeding that of 1940 by two times" and "the development of
Combat Path
, p. 535.
117 uThe detailed list of disposals of older submarines
and surface ships by the Soviet Navy are given in 1962-1963





strong and mighty navy in the USSR".
But, during the first 3 to 4 years, Soviet industry
was in no condition to assure construction of newly designed
ships. Soviet Navy attempts to force the shipbuilding industry
to accelerate the beginning of construction of new ships
failed and the ships of pre-World War II design, whose short-
comings were revealed during the war, were built at first.
Thus, a number of Chapayev-class cruisers, Otlichnyy-class
destroyers, and improved M-class (M-V) submarines were built. ^
Toward the end of the 1940s the construction started on
Sverdlov-class cruisers, Skoryi-class destroyers, large ocean-
going Z-class submarines and medium-range W-class submarines.
Foreign experience, particularly that of the Germans, became
known in detail and helped the Soviet Union in the development
of new ship types. The development and beginning of construction
of new destroyers and escorts, both with flush decks, with improved
armament started as early as 1950. The destroyer Neustrashimyi
(Tallin-class) served as a prototype for a large series of
i
/ I
Kotlin-class destroyers. The construction of a number of i











and modernized Riga class. A large number of minesweepers, PT
and patrol boats, and submarine chasers were built. Also in
the early 1950's two Stalingrad-class battle cruisers were
laid down, but their construction was stopped soon after
120
Stalin's death.
The post-war development of the Navy was* accompanied by
traditional reorganizational measures and repressions which"
were particularly harsh under Stalin. On 25 February 1946 the
People's Commissariat of the Navy was abolished. Four years
later, 25 February 1950, the Naval Ministry of the USSR was
reinstituted in order to "focus attention on the speediest •
development of the navy". On March 15, 1953, the separation
was ended, and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR was formed
unifying both ministries, the military and the navy. Stalin's
post-war order to have two fleets instead of one in the Baltic
. _ . .. 121
and Pacific was abolished in 1956. " Among other organizational
changes was the abolition of a number of naval flotillas
(White Sea, Danube, and Dnepr) and the socalled naval defense
districts. In the mid 1950s the Soviet Union returned its naval
bases in Port Arthur and Porkalla-Ud to China and Finland
120
Stalin had "unexplainable partiality for' heavy cruisers",








respectively. In 1947, the top leadership of the navy
was shaken by Stalin. The head of the navy, Flee^ Admiral
Kuzhetsov was demoted in rank to Rear Admiral and sent to the
123
Far East. Kuznetsov's three top deputies, Admirals Alafuzov,
Galler, and Stepanov, were court martialed and sentenced to
prison, where Galler, a former Chief of Main Nctval Staff,
died. The waves from this Moscow repression reached the
lower echelons of the navy structure, but were not as disastrous
as in the late 1930s. Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral
Yamashev was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.
In July 1951, however, Vice-Admiral Kuznetsov was recalled
124
to Moscow and appointed Minister of the Navy. Kuznetsov's
name again became associated with the accelerated development
of the Soviet Navy. In the same month of his appointment as
minister, Kuznetsov went on an inspection of the Baltic Fleet.










V/hile commanding a fleet in the Pacific, Kuznetsov
was promoted to vice-admiral, for the second time.. The third
was in 1956, when he was demoted again from the rank of Fleet







the review. After the parade the Admiral called a meeting of
officers at which hedescribed the bright future of the navy
and the large shipbuilding program for the development of an
ocean-going navy. He also declared that in the not-too-remote
future, the Soviet Union would start the construction of aircraft
125
carriers. -- •
Parallel to the shipbuilding activity, considerable
research and development efforts were initiated in atomic
weaponry, rocketry (missilery), electronics (radar, sonar,
communications, and control), and propulsion. In 1950 aviation
received the first free-fall atomic bombs. At the beginning
of the 1950s nuclear warheads for torpedos and cruise missiles
were developed. In 1953 the first hydrogen bomb was tested.
Also at the beginning of the 1950s the Soviet Union started
the development of nuclear propulsion systems, and the
construction of nuclear powered submarines dates back to 1953
Simultaneously, the experiments were being conducted on a wide
_ 1?7scale to employ closed-cycle engines for submarines. During
/
7
12 5This was the last time that the subject of aircraft
carrier construction was raised in such a definite manner.!
126
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Combat Path, p. 544, and Morskoy Sbornik No. 6,




the first half of the 1950s the Soviet Union conducted an
extensive research and development program with various missiles,
including those for the Navy. The first elements of the? Navy
for which missiles were developed were aircraft (TU-4 , Bull,
in the early 1950s and later the TU-16, Badger) and the
submarines. The first experimental launch of a ballistic
missile from an obviously submerged submarine (most likely "
128
converted Z class) was conducted in September 1955. In
129
addition to the TU-4, TU-16, and IL-28 bombers, a considerable
number of jet aircraft, mainly MIG-15, MIG-17, and YAK-25 "
fighters were delivered to the Navy.
Thus, during the first post-war decade, the. Soviet Navy
was reinforced with a considerable number of newly built ships,
*
submarines, and aircraft. Many old and obsolete ships were
decommissioned. A number of ships built just prior to World
War II were modernized. The research and development efforts
resulted in a number- of successes in the nuclear field, missilery,
and electronics. The first cruise missiles entered the service,





The IL-28 were first delivered to the Navy in 1951
in two versions, one as a bomber-mine-torpedo carrier, and the
second as a reconnaisance aircraft, designated IL-28R; the
TU-16 aircraft were first received in 1954.
8

1tested. In short, the prerequisites were achieved for the
future development of qualitatively new navy on the basis of what
the Soviets later called the "scientific and technological
revolution in the military affairs".
By the mid-1950s, the Soviet Navy had become larger than
any in the world except that of the United States, but
qualitatively, particularly in the relation to the threat from
the most likely opponent and in the relation to the tasks
which it had to fulfill, the Soviet Navy was in no better
position than that prior to World War II. The Soviet Navy
long-range forces were still in very short supply, while the
forces for the traditional mine-a raillery- ?crs±ticm warfare
were in abundance. But it was highly problematic that a
potential enemy would be so obliging as to bring itself into
position and subject itself to very powerful combined gunnery
torpedo attacks. The employment of submarines was planned
independently from th'e main forces, the squadrons o.f surface
ships, and the main tasks of submarines were preliminary,
130independent strikes against enemy forces. Such forms of
naval combat represented nothing more than the use of naval
130History of Naval Art
,
pp. 564-565, and S. Gorshkov
in Morskoy Sobrnik No. 2, 1967, pp. 9-21.
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forces in the proximity of one own shore, i.e. the forms typical
for a coastal navy. The main limiting factor, of course, was
the absence of carrier-based aviation and the dependence* upon
land based aviation of very limited radius of action (particularly
fighters). It had become evident to the Soviet leadership,
particularly the military, that despite considerable resources
devoted to the Navy under conditions of a very tight economy,
it was not going to fulfill its major tasks unless drastic
changes were instituted. While apparently there was a mutual
understanding of the necessity for change, what was desirable
was viewed differently by the various power groups. Except for
the loud pronouncements of Khrushchev against large surface
ships (which, considering the types the Soviet Navy had at the
time, were basically correct) there is no indication whatsoever
that the Party leadership had turned anti-Navy. But some Army
leaders came very close to demanding the practical abolition
of the Navy, claiming that there were not many naval tasks (as
they understood them) which the army, armed with the nuclear
missiles, could not fulfill, including strikes against carriers
(with long-range aviation) and against amphibous forces approaching
131
a defense area. Particularly strong attacks were launched
131
See S. Gorshkov, The Development of Soviet Naval Art
,
Morskoy Sbornik No. 2, 1967, pp. 9-21.
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against the surface ships and naval aviation. It was also
claimed that the ground troops did not need the Navy's support
even during anamphibious operations and, thus, the amphibious




The need for the submarines was never challenged by any
group.
The period of the mid 1950s and the decisions made at
the time resulting in "the decisive changes in the shipbuilding
program in the direction of the creation of nuclear missile-
carrying submarines, missile-armed surface ships and ships v
armed with modern anti-submarine, anti-mine, and anti-aircraft
weapon systems and missile-carrying aviation" were crucial for
133
the further development of the Soviet Navy. It seems
appropriate at this point to interrupt the examination of naval
development and to make a brief analysis of international
factors influencing the military policies of the Soviet Union,
to indicate the major stages in the development of Soviet
/
military doctrine, and briefly examine the Soviet military













considerations are also essential for the establishment of the
role assigned to the various naval forces by Soviet military
theory, and for a clear understanding of the employment of
those forces under various conditions.
Military Theory
"Whoever operates without principles has not pondered
on what he wants, falls into hesitation and half-measures, and
loses all in war." Napoleon
Soviet military thinking focuses primarily on three broad
interrelated concepts: military doctrine, military science/
and the military art. In spite of a distinct overlapping
of these three concepts, there are clear distinctions as to
their particular content and purpose, and a clear hierachical
relationship among them with military doctrine at the top.
Military doctrine is defined as "a system of states
guiding opinions on the character of war under given specific
historical conditions, the determination of the tasks of the
armed forces and the principles of their construction, as well
as the methods and forms of armed conflict, following from the
goals of the war, and the socio-economic and military technological
134
capacities of the country." Developed and determined by the
Spravochnik ofitser g, (Officer's Reference Book)
Voenizdat, Moscow, 1971, pp. 73-74.
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political leader-ship of the state, the military doctrine,
according to the Soviets, reflects the social, economic, political,
and historical characteristics of the state, the nature of its
internal and external policies. Military doctrine, when adapted
and put into effect, acquires the nature of a state law.
Usually five periods in developing Soviet military doctrine are
distinguished:
(1) 1917-1928' that is, the Civil War and the time preceding
the industrialization of the country;
(2) 1929-1941, up to the beginning of World War II r In
view of the predominantly continental character of the war n
contemplated, the main role during this period was assigned to
the Army, although considerable attention was devoted to the
role of the Navy, and it was correspondingly strengthened.
The main emphasis was on the combined efforts of all forces and
resources, and the ideas of waging war by any particular
predominant branch of* the armed forces (for example, Douhet's
135
aviation theory) were rejected.
(3) 1941-1945, the war period. In spite of the fact
In the course of the second world war, the Air
Force certainly proved its indispensibility but not its
independent and conclusive power without the effective




that much new and original was contributed to military theory
in the course of war, the period can hardly be recognized as
a stage in doctrinal development, because, for all practical
purposes, it was a reaction to the reality imposed by the
enemy.
(4) 1946-1953, the post-war period, when the experience
of World War II, the sharp deterioration of relations between
two opposing systems in the international arena, and the
availability of nuclear weapons were determining factors.
(5) From 1954 to the present. The period began with the
availability of nuclear missiles, and is characterized in the
Soviet military writings as a revolution in military affairs,
with corresponding fundamental changes in the doctrine.
Usually two sub-stages in the development of doctrine are
distinguished in this period; the first, 1954-1959, when the
introduction of nuclear armament into the Soviet armed forces
and its quantative accumulation started, accelerating towards
the end of the stage; and the second stage, starting in 1960,
during which the rearmament of Soviet military forces with
nuclear missiles was concluded on a broad scale. Major
"1 o r*
Istoriya voyn i voennogo iskysstva (History of wars and
military arts ) Textbook for officers-students of higher
educational establishments of the Soviet Armed Forces. Approved




changes occurred in the views on the character of combat
actions. Toward the end of the 1950s, defense as^a combat
action had started to be considered as acceptable only for the
secondary areas and only at operational and tactical levels.
Defense on the strategic level was rejected as unacceptable.
The defense of the country, and its military forces from the
enemy's nuclear strikes had started to be viewed as an independent
type of strategic action. The naval combat activity acquired -
137
the same importance, i.e. independent strategic actions.
Thus, it took a considerable period of time, close to a decade,
before the present Soviet military doctrine was formulated in
138
the years 1963-1964.
The Soviet doctrine emphasizes that a future war will be
a decisive armed clash of two opposing social systems
characterized by the unprecedented bitterness of the armed






The practice of many Y/estern military analysts to
consider changes in the doctrine and the development of Soviet
armed forces in connection with changes at the top leadership is
erroneous. While there is no denying the influence of various
top men upon the development of military policy, it has to be
stressed that in the post-war period, the Stalinist stage not
excluded, socalled Zadel or laying the foundation for change was
the work of the predecessors. The wave of writings which
inevitably occurred right after the change of the. leadership
were probably encouraged by it to promote appearance of novelty.
Q

to nuclear missile armament. Simultaneously, the use of '
conventional armament is not excluded and the need is stressed
»
for a flexiable organization of military forces corresponding
139
to the various conditions of the conduct of the military struggle.
Two facets, or principles, of military doctrine are distingusihed,
the political and the military-technical. The 'political
principles apparently reveal the socio-political essence of
the war, the character of political objectives, and the
strategic tasks of the state. The military-technical principles,
being more dynamic, determine problems of organization, the
tasks of military forces, and the means, methods, and forms
of military struggle. With respect to means of conducting
warfare, both nuclear and non-nuclear war are considered, and
to scale, world and local. A world war is viewed most likely
to be anuclear war, and under certain conditions of short
duration; and yet, together with the action of strategic nuclear
forces, which include' the strategic missile troops and ballistic
missile nuclear submarines, are visualized the independent
operations of naval forces.
i
139Officers Reference Book, p. 77-78. See also, Major
General S. N. Kozlov, "Military Doctrine and Military Science"
in Xommunist vooruzhennykh sil, No. 5, March 1964, and Thomas
W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Theory: An Additional Source of
I nsight into Its Development
,
p-3258, Santa Monica, California,





Soviet military science includes the following:
general theory (general basis) of military science;
theory of education, training and indoctrination;
military historical science; military administration





The theory of military art, or just military art, is
considered to be the most important component part of Soviet
military science, and has been traditionally divided into
strategy, which studies the conditions of the preparation and
conduct of war as a whole, and its campaigns, and operational
art, which is the study of operations and of tactics, of battle.
It has been the tradition of Soviet military science to consider
all three component parts of military art as being mutually
connected and inter-dependent, with the leading role reserved
to strategy. In the 'nuclear age, the role of strategy has
been elevated even more, basically because of the crucial,
decisive role upon the outcome of the war of nuclear strikes,
which are controlled by strategic leadership. Strategy









but the armed struggle is directly guided not by doctrine,
141
but by strategy. The major propositions of strategy, as
part of military science are taking into consideration in
doctrine, and represent the main content of its military
technical principles. The Soviets view strategy as common and
unique for all services of the military forces.of the country,
142
for war is conducted by the joint efforts of all of them.
Operational art (not tactics) dealing with the
preparation and conduct of combined and independent operations
of the armed forces is more heterogeneous, and each branch of
the armed forces has its own operational art.
No single branch of the Soviet ?»n&e*i £or.<sas- i.e. ground
forces, air force, strategic missile troops, and air defense,
with the notable exception of the Soviet Navy, claims to have,
apart from the operational art and tactics, a different concept
of the military art, not to mention of military science as a
whole. The Soviet Navy, however, does and proclaims it quite
loudly. Accordingly, naval science is a part of the military
science to the extent that it uses most of the common laws
141Marshal V. Sokolovskiy and Maj . Gen. M. Cherednichenk,
" sovremennoy voennoy stategii " (On Contemporary Military
Strategy)
,
Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil , No. 7, April, 1966.
1420fficers' Reference Book, p. 68.
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of the latter and is subordinated to the common military
strategy. In its turn, naval science includes as' a main
component, naval art divided into tactics, operational art,
and strategic employment of the Navy. 43 Moreover, the growing
importance of the Navy, under contemporary conditions, was said
»
to contribute to the appearance of a "qualitatively new naval
art" and "further outgrowth of naval science from military
science", particularly as far as the development and the
operations of the Navy are concerned. In general it is
claimed that naval science is based on the common laws with
military science, and naval art on the common principles
with the military art, but "in the area of tactics, the theory
of naval art is practically independent and in the area of
operational art it is to some degree connected with the theory
of military art; but only in the area of strategic employment
of the Navy does it (the theory of naval art) have its source
in military strategy, except however, for features completely
143 /Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo, "Razvitiye voenno-morskoy
Nauki" (The Development of Naval Science), Morskoy Sbornik








secular to it". Thus, the independent character of Soviet
Navy operations has been recognized, first when its fleets were
converted into "striking power oriented first of all against
the land" and now when they are considered together with the
strategic missile troops as "the main deterrent to aggression".
^
S
Nevertheless, it is basically wrong in the framework of Soviet
military theory and terminology to speak about the Soviet naval
strategy, for such a category does not exist.
*
In general, Soviet military theory as a well organized
discipline has been developing all of its elements in ~~.
historical perspective and conceptual unity. It took into s
account changes which occurred in the political and technological
spheres. It seems that both understanding of the power of
threat and the power of presence have been demonstrated by the
Soviet Union lately, particularly through the employment of its
145
Ibid
. , p. 37. The specific character of the Soviet
Navy and, before it the Russian Navy, has to be recognized, for
it is the only service which in the past has had its own ministry.
Even today, even in the presence of unified agency of operational
control of the services, the Ministry of Defense ,* there is the
Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and the Navy. More-
over, the 1967 Universal Military Law approved by the Supreme
Soviet and put into effect in January 196S in paragraphs three
and four defines the Soviet military forces as composed of the
Soviet Army, the Soviet Navy, Internal troops (the Ministry of
Internal Affairs)
,
and Border troops of the KGB (the Committee
for State Security)).
4oMarshal M. Zakharov, "uroki istorii"
,
(The Lessons of
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role in the official denigration of Mahan's philosophy of sea
power.
V/hile the Soviets' dislike of Mahan's theories on ideological
grounds can be disregarded, the correctness of some of Mahan's
conclusions and the applicability of his major tenets to the
present situation is another matter. It seems .that the sea
power theories formulated by Mahan have not been compatible "
with the times for decades in either in the political-economic or
the military spheres. Mahan was obviously wrong in intimating
that control of Europe depended on control of the sea. Neither
World War I, with the presence of the grand fleet of England and
of the High Seas Fleet of Germany, nor World War II prove it.
Submarines in both wars drastically changed the late 19th
century equation (which in turn was based on 17th and 18th
century facts). Particularly questionable on the broad scale
is Mahan's concept of the control of the sea, which lies at the
very heart of his theory. The concepts have been variably
defined and interpreted. For example, late Fleet Admiral W. F.
Halsey, USN, used to define control of the sea as a state of
affairs in which "we can go wherever we want to go, on, over
or under the sea, and do whatever we want to do when we get
there; and we can prevent other people from going where we




to do". During the decade of the 1950s the Sixth Fleet
in the Mediterrnean did exercise such control to a large degree.
However, there was no opposition and the environment was*
extremely favorable and far from being hostile. The command
of the sea concept often claimed to be exercised in the waters
around Vietnam (and previously in Korea) is highly questionably
today. First, the U. S. ships have been treated as sanctuary
for fear of retatiatory blows far outweighing the questionable
outcome of attacks agaiust the ships. Second, the major port
feeding the war, Hai Phong, has never been blockaded and the
supply ships of the opponent's friends continue to sail.
Moreover, the navies of all major powers, particularly super
powers, are being charged with the mission of conducting military
actions against the land, much more than with the decisive
battles at sea, whose goal would be to destroy the enemy's
naval forces. Moreover, the naval forces of today are so
widespread and so heterogenous that one can hardly speak of a
decisive battle or even the need for unqualified control of the
sea. While essential in some areas, desirable in others, and
for a limited time, revision of the control of the sea concept
is long overdue, and new theories of sea power or maritime power
Marine Corp Gazette, June 1969, p. 27
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reflecting changed realities are needed. The growth of Soviet
military power in general and naval power in particular are
14 8
among the major factors generating the need for reexamination.
The development of Soviet maritime power, particularly
its naval power, has been one of the major factors forcing
reevaluation of old concepts and the necessity »to adjust for
new realities. These new realities did not appear at once , but
are the result of two decades of development. Particularly
important was the decade of the 1960s, foundations for which,
at least, in the case of Soviet Union, were laid in the mid-1950s
and were the result of a changed strategical situation which
must be examined and of advances in science and technology for
which the term "revolution in military affairs" was coined.
Soviet military specialists distinguished three main stages
in this military-technological revolution which are associated
with nuclear armament, missiles, and control respectively.
Nuclear armamen't initially was to be employed together
I
i
with conventional means of warfare. Approximately in the
/ ' !
mid-1950s a contradiction between the potentials of nuclear
i
warheads and the mean of delivery developed (free fall bombs
148The reexamination seems to be underway, as evident from
a number of articles, Congressional hearings, and some books. See
for example, the Wall Street Journal, October 20, 1971; The
Washington Post, 17 January 1971; The Congressional Records, Vol.
117, No. 125, 1971, and Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow
,




delivered by aircraft) . The appearance of missiles wedded the
tremendous destructive power of nuclear weaponry with a most
reliable means of delivery. The new missile-nuclear armament
has acquired a high degree of sophistication and reliability
thanks to the wide introduction of cybernetics, which also
149
tremendously improved command and control and communication.
The post-World War II period produced a drastic shift in
the nature of threat to the Soviet Union from a potential
enemy. While before the war the primary threat had been posed
by the continental powers, after the war the Soviet Union had
to face the coalition of Western powers headed by traditional
naval powers "in whose armed forces special importance had,
150
for a long time, been attached to the navy". The formation
of NATO with the United States as the chief ally elevated the
significance of the naval power even more. In addition to the
direct maritime threat to the Soviet Union, the Atlantic Ocean
communications again *became the arteries through which American
military power would be delivered, but in this case as reinforce-
/
raent to the NATO. However, by the early 1950s except for the
149Colonel V. Bondarenko, " Scientific-Technological
Progress, and Strengthening the Country's Defense" , Communist
of Armed Forces, no. 24, December 1971, pp. 9-16.
150
;vlorskoy Sbornik No. 2, 1967, p. 16.
102

need to increase the Soviet naval forces along the familiar
quantitative line to fulfill the traditional tasks; not much
seemed to have changed for the Soviet Navy. '
In the early 1950s, however, when the American aircraft
carriers were assigned the task of delivering nuclear strikes
against the Soviet Union, the situation had changed, and quite
drastically. In the eyes of the Soviet military leaders, the
attack carrier became at once a ship capable of fulfilling
strategic tasks and together with the Strategic Air Force of
providing the Americans with the capability of a broad targeting
possibility which included practically the whole country.
Obviously it became the task of the Na^y and the Air Defense
(PVO) of the country to prevent the attacks of carrier-borne
aircraft. In order to fulfill its tasks the Soviet Navy had
to destroy the United States carrier strike forces before they
reach launching position. If the Navy failed, it would become
the task of the PVO to repel the attacks of carrier-borne
aircraft. Obviously, the Navy's task to sink or even severely
damage the attack carrier before she could launch the aircraft
was the most important, for it was unrealistic to count on a
one hundred percent success in intercepting and destroying
flying aircraft, and yet it was unacceptable to let even few
aircraft carrying nuclear bombs to penetrate. Thus, the problem
103

or how to counter the attack carrier forces acquired a very
important significance. I„ addition, the American experiments
with the REGULUS missile with a nuclear warhead and intended
for the strategic delivery by submarines became known. This"^
just reinforced the Soviet's conviction that "during the first
post-war decade, the fleets of
-the Western coalition were built
up with great intensity, far and away surpassing in their "
striking power the other branches of the armed forces. The
tendency to assign to the naval forces the role of one of the
primary strategic weapons in a future war was becoming ~
increasingly clear". Fo r the Soviets all these meant that
the threat of an attack from the maritime direction had increased
sharply and the defense interest of the country "demanded a
considerable increase in the combat might of the Soviet Navy". 152
The doctrine of "massive retaliation" proclaimed by the
American government in 1954 had probably reinforced Soviet
convictions of the necessity not only to improve defensive
measures but to speed up the development of the means of delivery
for nuclear weapons. The latter, naturally, raised the question




of the Navy's role in delivery, and the best means of achieving
it, if the role should be assigned. In short, while the Soviet
shipbuilding industry was involved in the massive production
of conventionally armed ships and submarines, the urgent need
for a constructive revision of naval policy had arisen. The
death of Stalin in March 1953 released the Soviet naval planners
from the need to follow his arbitrary rule, and produced a more
favorable atmosphere for objective discussion and evaluation
of naval policy. Moreover, the physical characteristics of
nuclear armament (size and weight) made it possible in the"
mid-1950s to consider its delivery by a variety of means.
This led to the problem of selecting the best carriers for
nuclear armament, i.e. whether aircraft (and in what mode of
operation, land based or carrier based) or submarines or surface
ships; as well as the means delivering nuclear weapons to the
targets, i.e. bombs or warheads for torpedoes or missiles. The
progress achieved in *the research and development of missilery
indicated the rockets might soon become an important means for
153
the delivery of nuclear weapons. As was indicated earlier,
153
The progress with missile development in the mid-1950s
made the Soviet Army so happy that its "influential authorities"
decided to solve all problems including those associated with naval
warfare, by missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. See Morskoy
Sbornik No. 2, 1967, p. 11.
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a further consideration was that definite progress was achieved
in the development of nuclear propulsion systems for submarines.
West Germany's joining NATO and the creation of the
Warsaw Pact in May 1955 further aggravated the already tense
situation of confrontation between the two major opponents, the
US and the USSR, and the systems of alliances Under their
leadership. This in general was the political, military and
technological situation in the mid-1950s, when the crucial
decision which changed the course of Soviet Navy development
was made.
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy and Fleet Admiral
of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov described the decision-making
process in the following way : "Party and government did not
share efforts but devoted considerable time in studying the
problem in detail, clarifying and comparing various points
of view of Navy and Army specialists, scientists, and designers,
analyzing experience of the war and the possibilities which
had been opening in connection with accelerated progress in
/ 154
science and technology." Consideration was given to the
composition of the future Navy and what forces, i.e. surface,
I
submarine, aviation, or any combination of them, should
154




represent the "main striking forces" of the future Navy.
Apparently, as to the nature of a future war, i.e N whether
nuclear or conventional, there was no problem, for it was
assumed that it would be nuclear. Special consideration was
given to capital surface ships. The Soviets "know that sun
had set on battleships as far back as the Battle of Midway in
1942", and, according to Gorshkov, "the replacement of long-range -
guns in surface ships with artillery using nuclear ammunition
and even missiles would not make them any less vulnerable or ^
suited for the employment in a nuclear war as a primary naval
155
strike force." The Soviets also concluded that "the process
of the sun setting on aircraft carriers as well had begun,
and that the process was irreversible". The Soviets became
convinced that "seeking ways in which to employ them (aircraft
carriers) as a primary strike force in the armed struggle at
156
sea had no future".
The rejection of the attack aircraft carriers as the main
striking force of the future Soviet navy was made in the atmosphere
of a strong belief that the era of the general erosion of surface
naval forces has began. This, of course, does not mean the
complete rejection of the surface ship's usefulness or the





necessity to have them. But the Soviets strongly believed
that it is much easier to locate the surface ship,
v
including
the carrier, than to locate even a diesel-electric submarine,
not to mention nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, they have
been convinced that any surface ship is more vulnerable to a
nuclear blast than a submarine. Finally, the package of weapon
systems, i.e. the variety of missiles which did not require
large capital ships and could be effectively deployed aboard
smaller ships, and particularly aboard submarines and long-range
aircraft was selected.
' Thus, in the words of S. Gorshkov, "In the mid-1950s,
in connection with the revolution in military affairs, the
Central Committee of our Party defined the path of Navy develop-
ment, as well as the Navy's role and place in the system of Armed
Forces of the country. The course taken was one which required
the construction of an ocean going navy, capable of carrying
out offensive strategic missions. Submarines and naval aviation,
equipped with nuclear weapons, had a leading place in the
program. Thus, there began a new stage in the development of
the Navy and of its naval science.
The latest achievements in science' and production, and
the creation, on this base, of what were, in principle, new






in a short period a radical change in the technical base, and,
in essence, to create a qualitatively new type of ; armed force,
4
our ocean going navy, in which submarine forces, aviation, .^
surface warships, and other types of forces developed
harmoniously. Thus the beginning was made for the creation
of a balanced Navy, capable of successfully conducting combat
157
operations under differing circumstances."
Of course, it must be realized that the decision of the
mid-1950s just established a concept which gave the green ^
light so to speak for the corresponding development of the Soviet
Navy, and it would take years, more than a decade, for its
final implementation. Neither the Soviet technological-
industrial base was immediately ready for the concept implementation
nor was the Soviet military theory, especially its naval art,
adjusted to the concept. Now we shall examine the development
of the Soviet Navy since the mid-1950s to the present time.
157S. Gorshkov, Morskoy Sbornik No. 2, 19 67, p. 20.
The balanced navy was defined by Gorshkov as follows: "By
well balanced navy we mean a navy which, in composition and
armament., is capable of carrying out missions assigned it in
a nuclear war, as well as in a war which does not make use of
nuclear weapons, and is also able to support state interests
at sea in peacetime."
ic Q
•
Fron tho "id-lPSOs to the
Beginning of the 1970s
At the time of mid-1950 decision the construction of light
and heavy cruisers had already ceased, the construction of the
last new conventional Kotlin-class Soviet destroyer was well
underway, and the production of submarines, accelerated.
Approximately between 1955 and 1957 the Soviet shipbuilding
program was shifted partially from the construction of
conventional submarines and destroyers to the construction
of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles and to
destroyers equipped with cruise missiles. A prototype of a
nuclear submarine was already under construction and, as stated
previously, a ballistic missile of approximately 350-nautical
mile range had already been tested in 1955 (surface launch)
.
The construction of the post-war second Soviet long-range
diesel-electric F-class submarines was started.
In 1956 and 1957 the situation was probably considered
promising by the Soviets. They started to get the first,
primitive, ballistic missile delivery system placed on their
Z-V-class submarines, later to be placed on the nuclear H-1-class
158
submarines. Construction of the first surface ship armed with
1 r o
Congressional Records, July 1, 1971, p..E6854
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cruise missiles, a modified Kotlin-class destroyer, was well
underway. Naval aviation which already had a substantial
number of TU-16 (Badger) aircraft, was about to receive a
longer-range TU-95 (Bear). m short, it looked as though the
Soviets were acquiring forces which would be able to deal with
aircraft carriers successfully. But they were 'not alone in
enjoying the fruits of the "revolution in military affairs" 'they
so loudly glorified.
Towards the end of the 1950s the emphasis on nuclear
delivery capabilities was growing steadily in the United States.
Aircraft primarily designed for nuclear strikes, the A-3
(A3D Douglas Sky Warrior)
, were introduced in quantity in
159
aircraft carrier strike forces. Larger planes, larger carriers
and smaller nuclear weaponry made the US Navy a powerful
strategic offensive force. The increased range of US carrier
borne aircraft permitted launching farther from the Soviet shores
and deeper penetration inside the Soviet territory, thus making
defense against them of strategic significance.
The next problem which became strategic from the beginning
was the Polaris program launched in the US during the second
half of the 1950s. In the case of the Polaris submarines, the
159




necessity to destroy the ballistic missile carrier, the "platform"
from which the nuclear missiles are launched, became even more
important than the anti-carrier tasks. A carrier does not
launch the weapon but only the weapon carrier, the aircraft..
There was a well-developed country air defense program (PVO)
disposed in depth which could intercept at least the majority
of the aircraft and prevent them from delivering the nuclear
weapons. In the case of the Polaris submarines, if the weapons
were launched, the only defense would be an anti-ballistic
missile system (ABM) defensive capability, which, even if "fully
developed, would have to be distributed between ICMBs and SLBMs.
Because of the strong possibility that the SLBM would be
launched after the ICBM, the available ABM's would be few in
number at best or even lacking. The situation might be even
more complicated in case of a coordinated attack by ICBMs,
SLBMs, SAC (Strategic Air Command) and carrier borne aviation,
when each previously -launched system would considerably reduce
or nullify the defense against the next offensive system. All
this made the task of countering the Polaris submarines of
utmost importance. However, this extremely complex task
compounds an already complex ASW (anti-submarine warfare) problem
and would have to be performed in the remote areas of the
oceans, where ail kinds of opposition to. the ASW "forces had to be
11?

expected. The rapidly increasing ranges of Polaris missiles
(A-l, 1,200; A-2, 1,500; A-3 , 2,500 nautical miles) would draw the
ASW forces farther and farther into the open sea. It was also
important to establish an optimum package of ASW forces, i.e.
a combination of surface forces, airborne forces, and killer
submarines. Thus, the announced Polaris program, even more
than the increased potentials of carrier-borne aircraft,
contributed to the necessity of forward deployment of the Soviet
161
Navy.
The third factor forcing the Soviet Navy's forward
deployment was the necessity to assure the deployment of their
own submarines. Because of the geography, the deployment of
Soviet long-range submarines would often if not always have
to be accompanied by protective forces which would minimize, if
not eliminate, the effectiveness of enemy ASW efforts. This is
a complex and very intensive operation in which a considerable
portion of the Soviet fleets, primarily the Northern and Pacific,
would have to participate. When a growing number of Soviet
-






It must be realized that any program is announced or
detected by intelligence long before its practical realization,




part of the Soviet strategic forces, their deployment assumed
correspondingly greater importance. Thus, the threat initiated
by the opponent and the growing participation of Soviet naval
forces in nuclear delivery generated a number of specific tasks
which, in turn, determined the development and the mode of
operation of the Soviet navy^ during the decade »of the 1960s and
the beginning of the 1970s. 162
As previously stated, toward the end of the 1950s Soviet
military theory rejected strategic defense as a predominant
type of warfare, and started to emphasize the strategic offensive.
Such an emphasis, however, while being treated as an important
shift in the Soviet military policy, could not and did not
eliminate the necessity of having various forces capable of
both offensive and defensive operation. This was particularly
true, more than in any other services, in the case of the Soviet
navy. For this reason, considerable resources and production
An analysis of factors influencing Soviet naval
development can be found in John Erickson, "Soviet Military Power ",
Royal United, Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, 1971,
pp. 52-61, and Michael McGuire, " Soviet Naval Capabilities and
Indentions" , Congressional Record, July 1, 1971, pp. E6850-E6S65.
While it would be wrong to underestimate the influence of
American naval development on generating a corresponding Soviet
reaction, it would be equally wrong to treat it as asole factor.
The Soviets have had their own plans and programs, but the threat
as they see it could not be ignored and hence, it obviously played
an important role in necessitating a speedy reaction and thus





capacities were allocated for naval development. In addition
to the construction of the first ballistic missile submarines
both nuclear and conventionally powered, and the conversion of
the first diesel submarine into long-range cruise-missile
submarines, a search for a new type of surface ships corresponding
to the newly emerged tasks was underway in 1957-1958. The
new types of surface ships armed with various missiles were"
widely discussed during special conferences called for this
purpose in late 1957 and early 1958. Commander-in-Chief of the
Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Gorshkov himself used every occasion
to find different opinions and arguments concerning the type
of ships needed. 'As a result, the basic designs of such missile
ships as the Kynda and the Kashin were proposed by the Navy
in the spring of 1958 and were soon approved by the Soviet
government. Considerable resources were allocated for research
and development, apparently in excess of what could be absorbed.
All the foregoing permitted Admiral Gorshkov to state, "The Navy,
having always been the focus of the latest achievements in
science and technology, was the first of the branches of the
armed forces to see the large-scale and general introduction
In the fall of 1957 Admiral Gorshkov bitterly complained
about the underutilization of allocated resources for research






of nuclear missiles, radio electronics equipment, and nuclear
i • ,,164propulsion.'
In February 1959, addressing the 21st Party 'congress,
Soviet Defense Minister Marshall of the Soviet Union R. Ya
Malinovskiy stated, "Our Navy has become in full a modern navy,
capable of resolving any strategic mission in its area of
responsibility. Overseas, they quite frequently speak and write
that the U. S. Navy is capable of delivering an attack and
landing at any point along our coastline. But as the saying
goes, 'It is easy to boast, but it is also easy to fall. '- It
seems to me that the people overseas should be thinking about
the fate of their own coasts and their extended lines of
communication, whose vulnerability is now monstrously bared,
and about the traditional invulnerability of America which
has forever been eliminated." 165
But in spite of the gradual introduction of some new
types of missile carrying surface ships, the end of the decade
of the 1950s and the beginning of 1960s witnessed the main
emphasis placed on submarines and naval aviation in the Soviet
Navy development. For example, an editorial in the Soviet' Navy
164
jS. Gorshkov in Morskoy Sbornik No. 10, 1967, p. 7.
165 TIzvestiya





newspaper emphasized the "nrnfn,.^ -, ^ ^p o ound qualitative change which have
recently been made and are beinz mid^" <« +u
"
a e in the composition of
the Soviet Navy, stressing that " + }-,« ^ v
l
^sm n the submarine • force armed with
modern weapons has become the basis for the combat force" of
the Navy. Naval aviation was named as a second most important arm
of the Soviet Navy. 166
That attitude was understandable, for the main stress- up
to the beginning of- the 1960s had been placed on anti-oarrier
operations and the necessity of assuring the deployment of Soviet
submarines in the face of opposition by those attack carriers
and their supporting- forcpc ti,» ,. uvv mg x es. The submarines and naval aviation
were viewed as the main forces for anti-carrier operations, and
the leading role of submarines armed with cruise missiles in
aati-carrier operations was supplemented by the "sophistication
ot naval aviation". 167
The role assigned to the naval aviation, particularly in
mti-carrier operations, can be seen from the following statement
>/ Chief of soviet Main Navy Staff Admiral ». D
. Sergeyev, "The
diking power of the Soviet submarine fleet is successfully









naval aviation, which is equipped with fast, long-range
aircraft and armed with long-range missiles for various
purposes. Even the most modern of surface ships cannot oppose
this aviation successfully, because nowadays it is not the
aircraft themselves which must be repelled, as was the case
previously, but rather the homing missiles they release from
long ranges."
Rejecting the attack aircraft carriers as a main force
for their own navy, the Soviets did not lose respect for them,
and were not ignoring the threat they posed. In the middle
and late 1960s they still viewed aircraft carriers as an
16 ^
"extremely powerful enemy at sea".
The Soviet Navy's confidence in its ability to counter
attack carriers force in the pre-launch zone and hence reducing
the danger to the ships operating in coastal waters, was
reflected in a decision to remove fighters from naval aviation
and to transfer them 'to the PVO and the Air Force. Since 1960
the Soviet naval aviation has been divided into three major
types: missile carrying (strike) aviation, reconnaisance
Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1965, pp. 89-93; I. M. Korotkin,
Z. ?. Slepenkov, B. A. Kolyzaye, "Avianostsy " (Aircraft Carriers),
Voenizdat, 1964, pp. 280. In 1967 S. Gorsakov, Morskoy Sbornik
No. 2, 1967, while denigrating the aircraft carrier as a main




aviation, and anti-submarine aviation. The Soviet Long Range
aviation (LRA) subordinated to the Air Force, was intended for
use against naval targets since the mid 1950s. With the'
development of Soviet ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines,
the LRA role in delivering strategic strikes was gradually
diminishing while its naval role, particularly .against carriers
and large grouping of ships and convoys, increased. The LRA
role in anti-ship operations was clearly emphasized by the
authors of Military Strategy
,
particularly in its second, revised,
-
edition, where they stated that "long-range bombing aviation
armed with long-range missiles retains the capability to launch
attacks on enemy targets, especially at sea and in the oceans,
and also on those along the shore."
"Attack carrier units can also be successfully combated
169
by bothnaval and long-range aviation."
This role of Soviet long-range aviation v/as confirmed
by the commander-in-ohief of the Soviet Air Force: "Long' range
aviation armed with air-to-surface missiles can attack important
/ !
strategic objects at a great distance on land and fulfill
missions at sea in annihilating naval forces of the enemy
l
Thus our aviation in close cooperation with other armed forces
169 !
Voennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy) , 2nd Revised





of the country is called upon to perform a sizeable number
170
of tasks in modern warfare.'
Early in the 1960s, the Soviet military planners probably
realized that the growing nuclear strike capability of the US
Navy had started to shift in favor of the Polaris system.
With the announced forthcoming increase in the 'Polaris missile
ranges, it became evident that countermeasures, preferably in
the form of the permanent presence of naval forces in the
remote areas were the Polaris submarines were most likely to
operate, were needed. Such an awareness was clearly expressed
by Admiral S. Gorshkov, when he emphasized the necessity for
the Soviet Navy to have, in addition to the long range striking
forces, "other forces which are necessary for the active
struggle against any type of enemy". Such forces, in the
opinion of admiral, should be represented by "missile ships
171
and boats, ships and aviation to fight enemy submarines".
To a certain degree, dual forces had been under development
since the late 1950s. However, except for the long-range
i
striking forces, that is, submarines and naval aviation, the
170Marshal X. Vershinin, "Contemporary Aviation and War",
Aviatsiya i Kosinonavtika
,
No. 6, 1963, p. 14. See also Lt . Gen.
S. A. Gulyayev, The Role of Aviation in Combat Operations, Morskoy
Sbornik No. 6, 1965, pp. 36-43.
i 7]
S. Gorshkov, The Party's Care of the Navy, Morskoy






rest of the Soviet Navy forces, had been handicapped by the
lack of air cover, and their effective operating range was
limited to that of shore-based air cover plus the range of their
missiles. At the beginning of the 1960s that was obviously .
not enough, particularly if the Soviets wanted to seek out
Polaris submarines. Any forward deployment of .the Soviet naval
forces, even for a short period of time, would require a
considerable increase in air defense armament. This is precisely
the end toward which the Soviet Navy started working from the
beginning of the 1960s. Not only ship constructions received
drastically increased and improved air defense armament, but
some older units were modernized and equipped with surface-to-air
instead of surface-to-surface missiles.
Historically, the Soviet Navy approach to antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) was quite specific. Up to the mid 1950s very
little attention was paid to the problem, and anti-submarine
defense was centered -around self-protection of individual'
units underway and protection of convoys in the pre-coastal
zone. To a certain degree, it was probably a rational approach,
for there was neither a need for extensive efforts in anti-
submarine defense, i.e. there were not many submarines to oppose,




During World War II, most submarines were detected and
located because they had to expose themselves at the surface
(while underway to an operations area, to change or take'
position for an attack, to charge their batteries). Strictly
speaking, the World War II and first post-war generation of
submarines were merely diving boats; only nuclear propulsion
made them true submarines. In addition, high speed ceased to
be advantage of the" surface ships. Thus, advances in science
and technology clearly benefited submarines more than they did
the surface ships, and made ASW an even more complex problem.
Since the first Polaris submarine started its patrol, the
existing ASW forces of the Soviet Navy, mainly oriented toward
the defense of the fleet operational zone, were straightway
found inadequate. Built primarily around the surface search
strike group (PUG-poiskovo-udarnaya gruppa) supported by
mainly independent efforts of submarines and in cooperation
with the shore-based *ASW aviation (helicopters and not very
numerous BE-6 aircraft)
, the Soviet Navy ASW forces were forced
to operate in new zones which had become oceanic and of vast
dimension. Obviously, a complete reorientation of ASW efforts,
and more importantly, an accelerated build-up of forces in
different proportions was needed.
Contrary to a widespread belief (mainly as a result of

Krushchev pronouncements) concerning the Soviet Union purported
condemnation of surface ships, their construction ^and, what is
more important, efforts at their improvement and sophistication
never ceased. What the ASW problem did for the Soviet Navy
surface fleet was to create conditions which helped accelerate
its development. It was obvious that the forces needed to
combat modern submarines, particularly the Polaris type, had
to be a combination of submarines, aviation, surface ships, and
various fixed and/or floating detection sensors. The main
problem remains that of detection and classification, for'as
soon as a submarine is reliably tracked, the available weaponry,
particularly those which would be employed in a nuclear conflict,
can destroy it. In short, what was needed was a massive effort
combining heterogeneous naval forces and representing "a case
i no
of assembling quantity to counter quality."
Despite the considerable research and development efforts
to employ the other physical fields in submarine detection such as
thermal, electromagnetic, hydrodynamic, turbulent, radioactive,
the acoustic field continues to be most widely used. Shore
based ASW aircraft have been charged with the initial detection
of submarines in most of the remote areas. The concept of the
i
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combined, systematic employment of all ov *1 existing forces and
means for ASW has been irin«+ *ad°Pted as a major principle . "3
Correspondingly, all three main. *jor ^Pes of AS17 forces
submarines, aviflti^ 3 'tl0U aQd SUrfa0e S"P3, were improved,
particular duriag the secoud me 1960s when new
classes of submarines new „„* -
'
and 1MPrOVed ve"i°"s of long-range
-craft, and a nuraber Qf _ ciasges
..
iiace ships entered




- ". new Moskva-classAW cruiser with helicopters aboard in
'
o , commission since 1967
as "a fundamentally new ASff ship to fi-hV .P 0 lS t submarines in the
remote areas." -174
«°skva, a sophisticated combination of detection se^^cixo nsors
ana weapons system to n +
" P1
'eSent **»»•* «- best Soviet ASV,ship and probably one of the best it *
'
lf °0t the b^t, ASff surface
ship in the World n»t +h- ,
""a
M. Bu this does not mean that Moskva meets
re<,UirementS *~ »» 4-1 by nuclear submarines
— riy the Polaris type, and.it ,s hardly possible that






P^icularly in such'»«»ed basins as Mediterranean (where th. h • u
"USht have
* certain marginal anti pm
__
" -Polans capability. ia
173
^HassaLSbojnik »»,. 10
, 1970< pp> 16_23.
.
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addition, this type of ship might be deployed to provide the
ASV/ capability of a task force underway or during .a fleet
operation assuring deployment of the submarines.
As is the case with any major navy in the world, the
problems associated with the anti-submarine warfare have become,
during the decade of the 1960s, one of the majdr preoccupations
of the Soviet Navy, and a combination of forces have been
under development. Moreover, ASW was a factor necessitating
175
the forward deployment of the Soviet Navy forces.
The new tasks of the navy and the new armament of its forces
generated the necessity for the revision of theoretical
principles of the naval art. There was an initial application
in the late 1950s of the first types of new armament and ships
to the "provisions of the operational art and tactics", but as
the latter were based on past experience, it was of relatively
short duration. The Soviets most likely realized that the
existing theory of the deployment of naval forces (with the
exception of submarines) was a naval variant of the Maginot
Line, while the capability of their opponents could produce
the effect similar to Ludendorf 's maneuver. But this was just
175
Vice-Admiral A. Sorokin and Capt. V. Krasnov, Anti-
submarine Defense, Nauka i zhizn * (Science and Life), No. 1,
1972, pp. 48-55.
1 O ' '1^0

one more proof that history teaches what should he avoided
rather than what must be done, and a prolonged debate and a
vigorous seareh for "new, original and extremely effective
'
nethods for conducting the armed struggle with a powerful
"J
*T/^
enemy at sea" was needed.
The debates, initiated in .the early 1960s, continued for
several years and resulted in a considerable revision of the
naval art and a reexamination of naval missions. The content
of such well known principles as concentration, cooperation,
.
and maneuver was adjusted to the new conditions of missile -
nuclear war .^ Aocordingly) ±t ^ ^^ ^ ^^.^
should be achieved not by concentration of weapon carriers
(ships, submarines, aircraft) but by the concentration of
«re through the manuever of trojectories. The power of the force
should he achieved not by the number of missiles fired, but by
the yield of the nuclear warheads used.
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While recognizing the desirability of cooperation
between homogeneous forces at the tactical level, the cooperation
of heterogeneous forces has not been considered necessarily
obligatory and in certain cases not even desirable. It
was claimed that the power of nuclear warheads permits the
solution of various tasks independently by a limited number
of homogeneous carriers. Cooperation on the operational
level, under the condition that the vital principle "nobody
waits for anybody" be observed was found desirable and necessary.
A high degree of operational and strategic cooperation among
various Soviet fleets was found obligatory.
Under certain conditions of c^mb^t, .-^.rouvctr was also
found of limited value; hence, the maneuvering of forces could
often be replaced by the maneuvering of trojectories thanks
to the increased range of missiles. The role of the various
naval missions has been also revised. For example, such a
traditional mission eff the Soviet Navy as the support of the
maritime flank of the army has been reduced in importance and
has acquired a different meaning, to include the situation when
the navy has to exclude an attack from the sea by the enemy's
naval forces. In short, when supporting the Army, the Navy
would be involved in purely naval operations far from the
shore and therefore the Army "will not see the naval units
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involvoil in its support". * '
The importance of action against sea lines of
communications was said to be diminished, although the necessity
to be ready for such action under certain conditions was
stressed. A new approach was taken in regard to amphibious
operations. Previous claims that the role of amphibious
operations in a nuclear war has diminished was dropped, and the
necessity to have specialized forces appropriately equipped
and supported, emphasized. In this regard, the first edition
of Military Strategy, 1962, which negated the role of amphibious
operations conducted by the Navy, was strongly attacked by a
leading Soviet admiral for such an oversight. 179 Admiral
Alafuzov strongly critized practically the whole treatment
of naval matters by the authors of Military Strategy
, but he was
in complete agreement withthe authors in their recognition
of an "independent type of strategic operations conducted by
the Navy" and the potentially decisive importance of naval:
forces in local wars.
•n. / ' I *lhe overwhelming importance of nuclear strikes launched
17<
°Vu. Panteleyev, p. 31.
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by naval forces against enemy territory has been constantly
emphasized. While recognizing the diminishing role of the main
force in combating the enemy naval counterpart, that role
has been found even more important for the remaining naval
forces, because of the enemy's ability to launch strategic
strikes against Soviet territory and hence the .necessity for
180
the Soviet Navy to prevent it. In this respect, combating
enemy ballistic missile nuclear submarines and attack aircraft
carriers was found to be of utmost importance for the reasons
previously discussed, and the necessity for forward deployment
of naval forces, recognized. ^
Continuing to recognize submarines and naval aviation
as the main striking forces of the Navy, the Soviets developed
renewed interest in surface ships equipped with new armament,
particularly for air defense, and capable of operating without
air cover in remote areas. It was emphasized that the new
ships armed with SAM -complexes and automated rapid-fire guns
would shift the previously extremely unfavorable odds between the
ship's PVO and attacking aircraft in favor of the former. As
a matter of fact, the necessity for the air defense systems to
combat enemy weapons, i.e. missiles, and not only carriers, i.e.
"I no
° Admiral N. M. Kharlamov, "Trends in Naval Development",




aircraft, was stressed as predominant. The necessity and
the possibility for even small surface ships to have a reliable
air defense in the form of compact SAMs was emphasized. 'It
is remarkable how closely these theoretical conclusions were
carried on into practice by the consequent development of the
Soviet Navy. On the other hand, it can be assumed that when
these theoretical articles were written, the decision to build
corresponding forces had already been made, and the articles
were just preparing the Navy for such forces and were stimulating
the development of tactics for their deployment.
Now we shall briefly examine the development of various
forces of the Soviet Navy after the mid-1950 decision.
181Rear Admiral V. Sysoev and Captain V. Smirnov, Ant i-Air








As was noted previously, Soviet naval construction' started
in the late twenties with submarines. In spite of considerable
economic and particularly industrial difficulties, the serial
construction of L, Shch, M, S, P, and K classes" of submarines
was mastered in the decade of the 1930s. Particularly productive
was the year 1936, when the Soviet shipbuilding industry
delivered to the navy the largest number of submarines. The
tempo of submarine construction was such that, once in the
summer of 1936, the Soviet Navy commissioned a whole brigade
182
of submarines (6 to 8 units) . The development and alleged
construction of submarines with closed-cycle engines was started
183
prior to World War II. During the decade of the 1930s, the
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G. M. Trusov, p. 338. Except for the source, no
confirmation or denial concerning the closed-cycle Soviet submarines
during p re-World War II period could be found. However, during the
first three post-war years, an intensive test of closed-cycle
submarine No. 401 was conducted in the Baltic. This, however, coiild




Soviet shipbuilding industry delivered 206 submarines to the
Soviet Navy and 52 more were commissioned during £he war. 184
The World War II experience of foreign and Soviet
submarine operations were carefully studied in the Soviet
Union. As a result it became clear that submarines were in
need of serious improvement in greater range and submerged
speed, submerged depths and in secrecy. During the second
half of the 1940s, the Soviet Union constructed a considerable .
number of small modernized M-class submarines, while maintaining
basically the submarine fleet of pre-war construction. However,
starting with end of the 1940s, a new series of submarines of
improved quality, the W-class (Project 6137 ana Z-cIass (Project
611), were built. The diesel-powered W-class submarine was
originally produced as an attack submarine armed with torpedoes
184Morskoy Sbornik No. 9, 1971, p. 29
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and eouipped with dock-mounted guns which were later removed.
Close to 200 units were built altogether; many were transferred
to other countries but most, although aging, still remain, in
commission in the Soviet Navy. As is the case with all Soviet
torpedo submarines, the W-class is capable of minelaying.
Through various types of changes a true familyof classes has
emerged from the W-class. Apart from various conning tower
shapes (of which there are at least five) , the most important
modifications of the W-class were in 1956 or 1957, when the
first submarine of that class was converted into a guided-missile
submarine. An erectable cylindrical housing for a guided
missile was installed on the upper deck, and the new class
183
received the NATO designation of W single-cylinder class.
In 1958-1959 several other Y/-class submarines were outfitted
with twin launchers for guided missiles, resulting in the
socalled Twin-Cylinder-class guided missile submarines. Another
major conversion of W-class submarine produced the Long Bin class,
a guided missile submarine carrying four missiles in its modified
tower. A few units were converted to radar early waring submarines
designated the Canvas Bag class.
n Of!
Siegfried Breyer, Die Sow jetischen U-Boo te der "W"-
Klass als Typfamilie (The Soviet Submarines of the W-Class as




The Z-class dicscl powered submarine, of which a few
dozen units were built, was originally built as an ocean going
long-range torpedo attack submarine. Although several modifications
of this class are known, the most important was a conversion
to ballistic missile submarines known as the Z-5 class. It
was undoubtedly a modified Z-class submarine from which the
first surface launching of a ballistic missile occurred in
September 1955 , Somewhat later, between 1956 and 1957,^ several
units, each carrying a pair of surface-launched Sark ballistic
187
missiles with a range of 300-350 nautical miles, were produced.
Starting in 1954 a few dozen diesel powered, closed-cycle
propulsion system submarines, Q-class (Project 615) were built.
This small (around 700 tons displacement) short-range submarine
was intended primarily for anti-submarine warfare and carries
four bow-mounted torpedo tubes. The closed-cycle propulsion
system, at least during the first three to four years of operation,
was less than satisfactory and dangerous to operate.
The second half of the 1950s and the beginning of the
1960s produced considerable changes in Soviet submarine
construction. In contrast to the first post-World-War-II decade,
187Lt. Com. Robert D. Wells, USN, The Soviet Submarine
Force, IT. S. Naval Ins t itute Proceedings, August 1971, and S.
Breyer, Noue and modernisierte Kriogsschi f f typen. der Sow jet-
Flotto. (New and Modernized Warship Classes of the Soviet Navy)
,
Soldat und Tcchnik, No. 11-, 1970, pp. 628-635. .
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when, despite considerable qualitative improvements in the
W, Z, and Q classes, emphasis
.as still on quantity
, the second
generation of post-war Soviet <^-,,-i~4- t. . *v s Soviet submarines was narked
by drastic qualitative chances both in }^o+%yfa
'
DO n l boats performance and
the armament systems installed. Recognizing the considerable
improvements in conventionally powered submarines, the two most
important factors were the beginning of construction of nuclear
powered submarines and the wide introduction of both ballistic
and guided missiles. Construction of nuclear powered submarines
.which was initiated in 1953 on an experimental basis, was"
authorized sometime in late 1955 or early 1956. It was obviously
part of a program which visualized the construction of nuclear
powered torpedo attack N-class and ballistic missile H-class
submarines. A nuclear warhead for torpedoes was successfully
tested in i957. Conventionally-powered ballistic missile
G-class and torpedo attack F-class submarines were built
simultaneously. Later the program was augmented and the
'
construction of diesel-powered torpedo attack R-classsubmarines,
nuclear powered guided missile E-class, and diesel powered
guided missile J-class, submarines was authorized. It should
be noted that the Soviets first built ballistic missile
submarines (G and H classes), and two or three years later, they




concept has boon tested on V/-class conversions. Technological
problems, possibly associated with the development of submarine
launch cruise missile system, notwithstanding, the strategic
importance attached to the ballistic missile submarines armed
even with a short range (originally 350 n.m.) missiles is obvious.
Construction of conventionally powered oceangoing torpedo
attack F-class submarines displacing over 2,000 tons (submerged)
and carrying 20-24 torpedos started in 1956. The submarines of
which 45 units were built have been assigned ASW and anti-shipping.,
role.
Between 1958 and 1961 about 20 conventionally-powered l
medium-range R-class torpedo submarines were built. As an
improved W-class design, the R-class most likely has been used
188
primarily for ASW.
Nuclear powered N-class hunter-killer and attack submarines
were built about 1957 and the early 1960s. More than a dozen
units were constructed, making the N-class the first Soviet
nuclear powered submarine to be produced in series.
Conventionally-powered ballistic-missile G-class
submarines were constructed during approximately the same period
138-por characteristics of Soviet submarines see Jane ' s
Fighting Ships
,
1971-1972 and earlier editions; U.S. Nava l
Institute Proceedings
,
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as the X-class. Originally armed with three surface-launched
SS-N-4 Sark ballistic missiles (350 mautical mile range) , many,
i
if not all, G-class submarines were later refitted with three
underwater launched SS-N-5 Sark ballistic missiles (650 nautical'
nile range) . Close to two dozen units were built.
Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile H-class submarines
were constructed during approximately the same period as the
N and G classes, and were originally outfitted with the same
Sark missiles as the G-class (a variant known as the H-l)
.
Later, H-2 class submarines carrying three Serb missiles were
produced. Less than a dozen H-class units were built.
During the last two days of February 1972, a US Navy
plane spotted a disabled Soviet nuclear H-class submarine
surfaced about 600 miles northeast of Newfoundland. A photo
appearing in the Washington Post shows an unusally long sail
with five or six hatches clearly visible on the top of the sail.
This would represent a third modification of the class and would
be designated H-3. The type of missile carried by these
submarines, conversion of which was said to have been accomplished
just a few years ago, is the object of conjecture.
After the engineering feasibility of submarine launched
cruise missiles had been tested and approved by the conversion of
a few W-class submarines, the Soviet Union in 1960 or 1961
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initiated the construction of a new type of nuclear-powered
guided-missile submarine, the E-1-class, which car.ries six
Shaddock surface-to-surface cruise missiles with a range 'of
between 300 and 400 nautical miles In 1962, the construction
of E-2-class submarines each carrying eight Shaddock missiles
,and a number of torpedoes was initiated. A total of about
30 E-class submarines were built.
Practically simultaneously with E-class was initiated
the construction of the conventionally-powered guided-missile
J-class submarine. About 16 units were built, each carrying
four Shaddock missiles.
Similarities in basic designs of hulls and propulsion
between nuclear powered N-class and H-class as well as between
conventionally powered F-class and G-class are considerable,
and testify to the Soviet utilization of basic concept designs
and serial production methods to build a multi-purpose submarine
fleet. Also, characteristic of Soviet naval development has
been the practically simultaneous outfitting of the submarines
with radically different propulsion systems with the same
armament package (G and H, F and N, J and E) and with consequent
modernization upon the availability of better systems.
Utilization of existing submarines to test new concepts and
armament systems (Z-5 for ballistic missiles, W-class for cruise
13fl

missiles) has also been characteristic.
Somewhere in the mid 1960s, possibly in 1963, a new
program for the construction of at least four, and perhaps five,
classes of new submarines was authorized. The submarines "~
built under this program started to enter service toward the
late 1960s, and represent a powerful addition to the Soviet
submarine fleet designed for multiple tasks, ranging from "
strategic deliveries of nuclear weaponry to AS1V and patrol in
coastal waters. Three out of four new known submarines are
nuclear powered and one is conventional. The most important
have been the Y-class ballistic missile nuclear-powered
submarines, which iq CAm «,v, n 4. • . -,*«^o uACH s somewhat similar to tho ttc v+u a-,-,U d z tne US Etnan Alien SSBN".
They are equipped with 16 missiles which reportedly have a range
of 1500 nautical miles. The construction of Y-B-class submarines
which carry 16 missiles with a 2,400 - 3,000 nautical mile
range was reported. 189 The annual rate of production originally
estimated at 6 to 8 units was recently corrected upward, to 8
to 10 units. By April 1971, 17 units were operational and 15
".ore under construction. Even with an annual rate of construction
of 8 units, the Soviet Navy would have more than 40 Y-class





submarines by the beginning of 1974. 190 The subraari)
displacing over 8,000 tons (submerged) has somewhait greater
horsepower than American Polaris submarines and its submerged
speed is reportedly close to 36 knots.
Another new submarine which appeared in the late 1960s
is the nuclear powered cruise missile C-class. * This fast
submarine is armed with eight underwater launched short-range
cruise missiles of a new generation. The range of C-class
missiles eliminates the necessity for target acquisition by
other sources and permits quick response based on the submarine's
own sensors. Both an anti-shipping and an ASW capability of
C-class submarines and the possibility of a mixed package of
missiles, i.e. against surface ships and submarines, have to
be assumed.
The third is the V-class nuclear-powered torpedo armed
submarine, the apparent successor to the aging N-class. The
submarine most likely' has both ASW and anti-shipping capabilities.
The fourth new submarine, the B-class, is conventionally
powered and is apparently intended for operation in coastal
waters. The possibility of a closed cycle propulsion plant
190At the beginning of 1972, Secretary Laird stated that
there are 25 operational Y-class submarines and 17 more under
construction. Washington Post




should not be excluded.
Presently there are 350-360 submarines in the Soviet
l
order of battle of which 85-90 are nuclear powered. It i's by
far the largest and most diversified submarine fleet in the world.
Approximately 15% of the Soviet submarines carry ballistic
missiles. In spite of the growing number of the Y-class SSBN's,
the majority of the operational units are still represented by
the H class and G class, although the Y-class submarines are
already carrying more missiles than the total of the others.'
Cruise-missile submarines comprise approximately 20% of
the total, and play a very important role in the Soviet concept
of submarine operations, particularly against surface forces.
The residual role of cruise-missile submarines against land
targets located along the shore line and in support of amphibious
operations should not be overlooked.
The remaining Soviet submarines, approximately 65% of
the total force, are torpedo attack type. Armed with long-range




torpedos, these submarines are also capable of minelaying. A
considerable portion of this group is undoubtedly employed in ASW.
Thus, in two decades of post-war submarine fleet development,
the Soviet Union has built several hundred boats of at least







If the numerous modifications and conversions (such as Z-5,
twin cylinder, Long Bin, Canvas Bag, H-l, H-2, G-l, G-3 , E-l,
E-2, etc.) were added, the number of classes built would 'exceed
25.
The Soviet submarines are designed to perform a multiple
number of tasks some of which, such as cruise-missile attacks,
are capabilities which so far are unique to the Soviet Navy.
In addition to construction of new submarines with improved
characteristics and armament, the Soviet Navy had to solve
another problem, that of training its submarines crews. Soviet
submariners had to master not only new hardware in its
oualitatively different performance (speed, depths, armament)
but during the decade of 1950s they had to cross the psychological
barrier of cruise duration. As has been openly admitted by the
Soviets, during the decade of 1950s "the technology was basically
ready for long cruises, but the men turned out to be insufficiently
ready psychologically"
. Submarine commanders in making off-shore
cruises light heartedly run down their batteries on a simple
maneuver, navigators lost their skill in celestial navigation,
and the proximity of the bases had an effect on the careless
191Good examples are provided in an article by Rear Admiral




attitude toward fuel consumption. Such deficiencies in training
were basically overcome during the decade of the 1950s when
considerable emphasis was placed on not only prolonged cruises,
but snorkeling technique. The task was set to stay on snorkel
days and weeks and to cover thousands of miles.
Arctic and under-the-ice navigation of Soviet nuclear
powered submarines assumed importance immediately after
commissioning of first SSBN. During the 22nd Party Congress
(23 October 1961) it was reported that Soviet missile submarines
had mastered under-the-ice navigation and could reliably reach
their launching position. 192 m July 1962 the nuclear powered
submarine Leninskiy Komsomol made a voyage to the North Pole.
On 29 September 1963 another Soviet nuclear powered submarine
surfaced exactly at the North Pole and hoisted the flag of the
Soviet Union and the flag of the Navy there. 193 Both were N-class
submarines, and their cruises were undoubtedly generated by ASW
interest. A claim was made that "underwater combat, including
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During the first carter of 1966, a group of nuclear-powered
missile submarines under the command of Rear Admiral A.I.
Sorokin made a submerged cruise around the world; in 45 days
the submarines covered almost 25,000 miles without once surfacing
.
195
Soviet submarines are now often observed at various remote areas
of the world ocean, and reports on very prolonged cruises of
some of them are common phenomena. It appears that the praise
heaped on them by the Russian media is well deserved.
Soviet submarine development during the post World War II
period, and especially since the mid 1950s, seems to testify
to an acute awareness, even a conviction, of the Soviets that
the balance between surface ships and submarines has shifted
in favor of the latter. 196 The size of the Soviet submarine
fleet, the multiplicity of missions and tasks, the variety of
submarine types and armament packages all make it a major threat
in practically any confrontation. Further technological progress
would seem to benefit- submarines even more than other naval
forces, and the gap between ASW forces and submarines, despite
the considerable progress of both, would be widened in the
195VIZ (Military Historical Journal), No. 7, 1970 p 31-aad Morskoy Sbornik No . 9 , 1971, p . 29
.
196
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foreseeable future even more in favor of submarines. Even a
major breakthrough in ASW, and it would to come in the problem
of detection first of all, would not nullify the many advantages
possessed by the submarines, which are benefitting from
technological progress much more than their hunters. This
fact seems to be well understood in the Soviet Union and the
further development and sophistication of their submarine
forces is proof to it.
Recognizing the fact that they do not possess either a
monopoly on technology nor are they necessarily far ahead Tn
its application to submarine construction, the Soviet Navy has
maintained a respectable number of boats in commission, obviously
utilizing the advantage of numbers. In this respect, it is
interesting to note not only the Soviet Navy's maintenance of a
considerable number and an even larger percentage of conventionally
powered submarines, but their continued construction. For
certain tasks and regions there is no pressing need for nuclear
submarines. A number of tasks, including ASW in areas where/ i
enemy anti-submarine surface and air forces can be reliably
excluded or their effectiveness greatly reduced, protection of
convoys in restricted areas and coastal patrols can still
successfully be performed by conventionally powered submarines.






coupled with the increased capacities of batteries, not to
mention closed-cycle engines, permit their presence in the patrol
area for a considerable time. The cost of conventional '
submarines compared with nuclear powered is considerably lower,
several conventional boats can be constructed for the price
of one nuclear powered submarine. *
Greater emphasis on the forward deployment of Soviet naval
forces should force them to increase the ratio of nuclear
submarines, but this does not mean the gradual elimination of
conventional submarines for the immediate future. The fact
that the Soviet submarine construction program presently
underway initiated an obvious reevaluation of their submarine
force requirements for the current decade seems to warrant such
a conclusion.
While it is relatively safe to predict that current and
future submarines will be quieter and deeper-diving than their
predecessors, speed is another matter. While certainly needed




it might not be essential (especially under optimum
selection of propulsion plants and tasks) for other types,;
i
!
including some hunter-killer submarines. The first generation
of Soviet nuclear submarines, particularly the first mass
i




30 knots. Even at 25 knots they are faster than the early US
nuclear submarines. 197 However, there is a price for speed,
and most Soviet nuclear submarines are reported to be noisier
than their American counterparts.
The practically simultaneous construction of 3 (N, H, E)
classes of nuclear submarines in the late 1950s* and early 1960s
and of 4 conventional (F, G, J, R) classes seems to testify to
the Soviet confidence in the existing technology and that the
time from 1953 to 1957-1958 had not been wasted. Soviet
nuclear submarines of the second generation built since the'
mid 1960s have even better characteristics. In that regard '
Admiral Rickover stated, "From what we~ haw been able to learn
during the past year, the Soviets have attained equality in a
number of these characteristics (weapons, speed, depth, sonar,
quietness, and crew performance) and superiority in some". 198
It was reported that the number of submarines launched
per year with the initiation of construction of more sophisticated
boats appeared to have dropped, but a one-shift annual capacity to
197Norman Polmar, "Soviet Navy Pulls Even in Nuclear
Sub Might", Washington Post
, October 4, 1970, pp. Dl and B4;
Izvestiya
,
October 9, 1971, claiming the existence of "quite a
few" nuclear powered Soviet submarines had also called them the
fastest in the world.
19 Washington Post




built up to 20 nuclear powered submarines exists. 199 Due to
the retirement of older classes of submarines built in great
number, the total Soviet submarine order of battle might 'decline
to 250-300, but numerically they would still be far ahead of
any other navy in the world and greater even than the combined
submarine force of NATO. In overall balance, the present
potentials of Soviet submarine force are considerably greater




At the time of fateful decision of the mid 1950s
concerning the development of the Soviet Navy which emphasized
the submarine
- aviation nature of its main striking forces,
the complex problem associated with surface ships (i.e. does
the modern navy need surface ships and if so what kind; what
missions should be assigned theisuand what place in general
should they occupy in the navy) remained to a large degree
unsolved. Two aspects of the problem should be emphasized.
The first is connected with the role of surface ships, especially
capital ships, as the main strike forces of the navy. By
199Naval Institute Proceedings
. August 1971, pp. 60-62.
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delegating this role to the submarine and naval aviation, the
decision automatically solved this aspect of the problem.
The Soviets arrived at this decision through a careful examination
of the past, present, and future role of capital ships in a big
war. The big, world war of the future was seen only as a
nuclear one. Past experience had been projected into the
future, and the fate of battleships compared with the aircraft
carriers. The continuing preoccupation of Western navies,
particularly the American, with aircraft carriers, was compared
with the outdated Japanese approach during the preparation and
execution of attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. It
has been claimed by the Soviet specialists, including leading
admirals, that the Pearl Harbor attack aimed mainly against
American battleships, viewed by the Japanese as a main striking
force, and launched not by the Japanese battleships but by
aircraft carriers, which then were viewed as supporting forces,
was a major mistake demonstrating an absence of foresight and
dialectical considerations on the part of the Japanese naval
command. It was concluded that, as the era of battleships was
replaced by the era of aircraft carriers during World War II
and the first post-war decade, the role of the latter as a main
strike force is on the decline and the future belongs to the
submarine-aviation forces armed with missiles as their main
149

armament. It should be repeated that all these considerations
are applied by the Soviets only in respect to the large war,
the nuclear war, and to attack aircraft carriers, (CVA) . ' In
relation to the small local wars where major powers are not
opposing each other and which are conducted with conventional
armament, the continued role of attack aircraft carriers has
never been questioned. If one separates the propagandists
rhetoric concerning the underdeveloped and small countries'
lack of modern means of armed conflict to repel the attackers,
the attack carrier role as the main naval force in such wars
has been recognized by the Soviets. It should be also stressed
that at the time of rejection of attack aircraft carriers as
the main striking force, the Soviet Navy had neither a single
carrier in commission nor any experience on how to build or
operate them. The economic and technological feasibility to
build aircraft carriers were clearly present in the mid 1950s,
but it would require V to 8 years before the first group of
those ships and the aircraft for them would be developed, built,
/
and initial operation experience acquired. However, the early
and mid 1960s were seen by the Soviets as a period when various
sophisticated missiles tipped with nuclear warheads would
dominate the naval armament and, coupled with greatly improved




would have no chance to survive an attack against her. The
tragic experience with the battleship Novorossiysk, formerly
the Italian Guilio Cesare, sunk by a conventional World Y.'ar II
mine with the loss of over 600 men in the middle of Sevastopol
Harbor in October 1955 soon after expensive modernization, was
a painful example in the minds of the Soviet leadership of how
easy a large ship can be sunk. The loss of Novorossiysk was
a hard blow to the Soviet Navy, and it gave to its opponents
one more argument on how vulnerable ships are.
The second aspect of the above problem dealing with other
classes of surface ships was resolved differently. It has always
been well understood in the Soviet Union,, in. spite of some
loud pronouncements in favor of submarines and aviation, that
surface ships of various displacement acting independently or
in cooperation with other combat arms of the navy are irreplaceable
for a variety of missions. Because of the changing conditions
under which those missions would-be accomplished, the problem
arose of the compatibility of armament and the tasks to be
solved. The majority of the surface combatants of the Soviet
Navy during the second half of the 1950s were, owing to the
nature of their opponent and by the type of their armament,
ill suited for their assigned missions. Moreover, the missions
themselves had been gradually changing, and a degree of
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uncertainty about them most likely existed toward the end of
the 1950s. In this respect, Khrushchev's denigrating remarks
about surface ships made during his trips to England in 1956 and
to the United States in 1959 were aimed at large conventionally
armed ships, Svedlov-class cruisers included, and obviously did
not mean the negation of the surface ship's rol-e, particularly
in the future. The construction of surface ships has never
ceased in the Soviet Union. The greater or lesser intensity of
construction during the second half of the 1950s and beginning
of the 1960s can easily be explained by the availability of
the armament, uncertainty in the regard of operational concept
due to changing requirements, and the search for an optimum
armament package
.
K What is unmistakenly clear was the Soviet decision in late
1950s to concentrate practically exclusively on the missile
armament of the surface ships. This truly revolutionary concept
did not compete with but rather supplemented, in a variety of
ways, the Soviet main naval striking forces, submarines and
naval aviation. The Soviets became convinced that missile
ships of any displacement, including missile boats, can
successfully engage any surface ship at sea as soon as it comes
within the range of their missiles and that many advantages




conventional weapons have been nullified by the missile-anr.od
ships. Not all missile ships built by the Soviets in last
fifteen years turned out to be unouestionable successes.' The
first few classes were built on the basis of old operational
concepts and did not produce drastic qualitative improvements
in the Soviet surface forces. However, the great majority of
the newly created ships had been laying down the foundation "for
the oualitatively new surface fleet forces which started to
emerge toward the end of the 1960s. Moreover, Soviet missile
ships have started to produce corresponding, but unfortunately
belated, reactions in the Western navies. It took a relatively
minor (compared with the potential of missile ships) engagement,
the sinking of the Israeli destroyer, Elath by the Egyptian
Navy using Soviet built missile boats, to speed up the process
of the realization that to measurethe naval strength of a country,
and sea power in general, by the number of stacks above the
surface and the amount of smoke they are producing is to live
i
dangerously in, the 1 past and to overlook the present, and
especially future, realities.
|
The immediate result of the mid 1950 decision was the
cancellation of further construction of Sverdlov-ciass cruisers
(out of 20 ships laid down only 14 were completed)
, and the





The Sverdlov class was the last conventionally armed cruiser
auilt by the Soviets. While continuing the construction of
Skory-class destroyers, 71 units of which were built during
the 1948-1952 period, a single unit of the first Soviet
:lush-deck destroyer of the Tallin-class (Neustrashimyi) was
milt and tested during the 1950-1952 period. .'The class was
lever put into serial production, but served as a prototype
;or a large family of hulls, the Kotlin, Kildin, and Krupnyi
dasses and their modifications. It was found necessary to
:orrect the design by augmenting the anti-aircraft armament and
•educing the displacement. The resulting Kotlin-class destroyer
as put into serial production in 1952, and about two dozen
nits were built. The Kotlin class turned out to be the last
onventionally armed destroyer built by the Soviets. 200
.
After construction of 6 to 8 units of the 1,900-ton
ola-class destroyer escort, production was switched in 1952
o the somewhat reduced tonnage (1,600 tons) and armament
3 100 mm guns instead of 4) of the Riga-class, of which close
o 50 units were built. The further development of this type of
hip by the Soviet Navy resulted in a stronger tendency toward
2°0„
ivlorskoy Sbornik No. 12, 1966, pp. 16-21; No. 3, 1967,
p. 18-22; and Jane's, 1971-1972 edition.
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SW ship. The construction of the Pctya class in the late
ijs and early 1960s in two modification:; war; followed by the
itruction of the Mirka class, also in two modifications,
t during the first half of 1960. Both classes are propelled
ombined diesel and gas turbine propulsion plants. 201
The following other conventionally armed Soviet ships should
rmtioned: PT-boats of the P-6, P-8, and Shershen classes;
weepers of the T-43, T-58, Yurka and Vanya classes; a
br of classes of patrol boats, auxiliary ships, and support
[i. The total number of all these types and classes runs
202
1 into the many hundreds of units.
Toward the spring of 1958 L.:e ilrst Soviet missile-armed
E.ce ship, the Kildin-class destroyer built on the basis
islightly modified Kotlin-class hull and equipped with one
iher for the Strela surface-to-surface guided missile, was
1. Four units were built. From 1958 to 1960, 8 units of
rupny-class surface-to-su-rSace guided-missile destroyers
ped with two launchers were constructed. The construction
3e two classes might be viewed as a classical example of










ater denounced by Gorskhov. As both ships had only conventional
;
uns for anti-aircraft defense, they were poorly suited for
.istant operations at sea requiring fighter support which could
e provided only by shore-based aviation. Yet, the availability
f missiles increases the striking power of surface units by
00 to 150 miles - a quite respectable distance" particularly
mportant in closed seas, which would include the Mediterranean.
n the late 1950s the Soviet Navy developed the Komar-class
issile boats armed with two short-range (about 20 miles)
tyx cruise missiles. In the early sixties, Osa-class missile
Dats armed with four Styx missiles were built. Three
edifications of the Osa are known.
-
During the decade of 1960, the Soviet Navy was reinforced
Lth variety of missile armed ships. Four Kynda-class guided
issile cruisers were built between 1960 and 1964. The Kynda
is the first surface ship armed with both surface-to-surface
laddock missiles (2quadruple launchers) and surface-to-air
>a missiles (one twin launcher)
. Additional armament includes
: (2 twin) 76-mm guns, 6 (2 triple) ASY/ torpedo tubes and 2
H-barreled ASW rocket launchers. There is a helicopter platform
i the stern. Construction of the Kashin-class guided-missile
•stroyer, which the Soviets call a large ASW ship, also started








so far. The Kashin class is armed with 2 (twin GOA) surface-
tO-air-(SAM) missile launchers, 4 (2 twin) 76 ma guns, 4 ASW
rocket launchers and ASW torpedo tubes. The Kashin was the' •
world's first gas-turbine-propelled ship of its size.
J
As a result of the Soviet concern for the anti-aircraft
defense of their surface units, certain classes of ships were
converted during the decade of 1960s and armed with surface-to-air
nissiles (SAM). Dzerzhinskiy
, a Sverdlov-class cruiser, was
inverted around 1960-1961. The third 152-mm triple gun turret
us removed and in its place installed a twin SAM launcher for
hiide-line missiles, used by the Soviet air defense troops. -
.ong-range but heavy missiles did not prove to be well suited
:or naval purposes, and the experiment did not continue.
Hiring the 1962-1968 period a number of Kotlin-class destroyers
'ere converted into SAM ships. One surface-to-air missile
auncher was installed instead of the main twin 130 mm tureet.
During the second half of the 1960s at least three
i
rupnyi-class ships were armed with SAM launchers instead of'
/ " | "
&• originally installed surface-to-surface launchers, and j
ere given the NATO designation of Kanin class.
|
In the mid 1960s a new class of Soviet guided missile
raisers, the Kresta, emerged, and a total of 4 units were




allistic missiles: 2 twin Shaddock surface-to-surface missile
aunchers, 2 twin Goa SAM launchers, four 57 mm (two twin)
ati-aircraft guns, 4 ASW rocket launchers (2 12-barrel and
6-barrel) , and 10 torpedo tubes (2 cuintuple) . The ship
Lso has a helicopter hangar, the first Soviet ship so equipped.
lis 7,000-ton multi-purpose ship has no counterpart in
astern navies as of the early 1970s.
Toward the end of the 1960s at least 2 modified Kresta-
lass ships, designated Kresta II, were built, with the following
;ianges from the Xresta I: Instead of 2 twin Shaddock
irface-to-surface missile launchers, two quadruple new short-
imge surface-to-surface missile launchers (possible suited for
:>me long-range ASW weapons as well) were installed: 2 twin
aunchers for GOA SAMs were replaced by 2 twin launchers for
:>w surface-to-air missiles; 8 (four twin) highly automated
:)mm guns were added. The remaining armament is the same as
i
ii Kresta I. 203
In 1967 the existence of a large ship variously described
/ I "
k the West as a helicopter carrier or a combination helicopter
203For the further details on the described ships, see
fine's Fighting Ships, 1971-1972 ed., pp. 615-620; and earlier
Editions; "New and Modernized Ships of the Soviet Navy" are !








guided missile cruiser was revealed. The Moskva class,
hich two units, Moskva and Leningrad, are presently in
:ission, is designated as an anti-submarine cruiser in the
204
ret Navy and that undoubtedly is what she is. Displacing
>t IS, 000 tons, the ship is exceptionally well armed for its
-ose and fit with extensive electronic equipment, including
•e-dimensional (three-D) surveillance radar (also installed
resta II) and variable depth sonar (VDS) , both firsts aboard-
ret ships. The ship armament includes one twin. launcher for
'missiles (which might be intended for surface-to-surface
;iles as well) , a new Soviet weapon; 2 twin launchers for new
-3 surface-to-air missiles, 2 250-mm ASW rocket launchers,
ubes each; four (2 twin) ASW torpedo tubes, 4 (2 twin)
•a guns. The ship also carried about 20 XA-25 ASW helicopters
'Moskva class is the world's largest warship designed for
}
Towards the end of 1960s, Soviet Navy efforts to have
slip with as .small displacement as possible for a given
/ !
iliaent and mission resulted in the development of Nanuchka-class
.
i
^lacing about 300 tons, the Nanuchka is armed with six (2 triple)
'ace-to-surface missiles, which seem to represent a new-vintage
i
204






;jipon. In addition, a photograph published in the Soviet
|ss reveals provision for the installation of a SAM launcher
„< the existence of a retractable one) which would have to be
.small dimensions (smaller than the GOA SAM or SA-N-3)
. The
^P most likely is a successor to the Osa class and is considerably
iter suited for operations in a more remote areas:
Soviet development of ships with new propulsion principles
|
armament have accelerated during the deoade of the 1960s. After.
:ensive tests in the late 1950s of hydrofoil,
-gas turbine/ and
sel propelled boats, were developed and placed in service in" the
1960s. Toward the end of the 1960s, there were approximately
Dzen Pchela-class hydrofoil patrol boats. 206 The same approach
:
been taken with xthe air-cushion ships. At least four, obviously
Omental types, one of which was armedwith a Styx-like SSM, were
207
va. One class of air-cushion boat has been used by the naval
mtry since at least the spring of 1971.
2°8
A greater role for ships with uem propulsion principles
Krasnaya Zuezda
, 6 August 1971.
206
ERXBNNUNGSBLATTER
, May 1970, p. 135.
207
SudostroyeniyeNo. 2, 1959 and No. 8, 1969.





d their combat employment were theoretically justified by the
>viet Navy in mid-1960' s
.
20D
in June 1971 a brand new Soviet missile ship, the Krivale-class
,
Ued the Atlantic via the Danish Straits after tests in the Baltic.
::h a displacement of only 3,500 - 3,S00 tons the ship's armament
eludes: four surface-to-surface (and probably long-range ASW
epons as well) missile launchers; reserve space (or concealed
"
OW the deck) for two installations of new SAM launchers similar
the Nanuchka class; 4 76-mm automatic guns (2 twin turrets); ' -. -
l ASW rocket launchers, 8 ASW torpedo tubes (in 2 4-tube installations)
.
Krivak-class is equipped with sophisticated electronics and has
.
It is obviously a multipurpose ship with a strong ASW inclination,
is possible that after extensive tests this class of shiP will
produced in considerable number. With no counterpart among the rest
:he world's navies, the ship surprises with a variety of armament
called on a platform of such a modest displacement. 210
Thus, the decade of the 1960s witnessed a gradual increase
eviet Navy interest in surface ships, sophistication of tiJir
=ment, with practically exclusive emphasis on missiles as the
"
2°9 i
•ice Shi'o^.n ^J?' TUf '
"Surface s"es Are Really Becoming ,ips
,
Morskoy Sbornik No. 10, 1936, pp. 22-25.
210
Soldat und Technik No. 7, 1971, o. 373- a-d v„ in ' ta-ri>S4-^oQ- vv>" v^v^T.^r-;;:',-,-,;- ' ' ** ^'•-'i ..a .NO. 10, 1971,"J
'
J




hip's main weaponry. A number of classes of Soviet built ships so
ar have no equals among the major naval powers. Many, newly-built
urface ships were eouipped with gas turbines, thereby eliminating
oiler rooms, providing more space and provisions for the automation,'
ad reducing maintenance requirements. Other navies of the world
tarted to emphasize the advantages of gas turbine propulsion towards
jl* end of the 1960s; in fact, all new British surface ships will bo
„ 211
;) ecuipped.
Starting with the 1957 installation of an after helicopter
jatform aboard a Xotlin-class destroyer, the Soviet Navy has ~
continued this practice which resulted in a permanent hangar for one
Cf two helicopters aboard Kresta-class ships. The employment of
hlicopters by many Soviet surface ships for ASW, extended over the
Sjrizon target detection and classification, cruise missile course
:rrection, relay stations and perhaps future anti-ship missile
ifense has represented to a large degree the light airborne
ilti-purposo system (LAMPS) presently being evaluated by the US Navy. 212
Toward the end of the 1950s, when they started to arm their
/ ' r
^face units first with surface-to-surface missiles and to employ
•km within the framework of an already outdated operational concept,
211Naval Institute Proceedings
, October 1971 ' p->. 111-112.
212
US Naval Institute Proceedings
, December 1971, pp. 27-29.
i S9

ilts realized the need for improved anti-aircraft defense of
;le ships and undertook appropriate remedial action, eruipping
,'units, starting with the Kynda, with SAM missiles as well,
uch as the Kashin-class) were built with predominantly
missile armament and more were converted into SAM ships,
a class and probably the Krivak class represent the ships
balanced armament, the ships which so far have not been
213by any other navy. Admiral S. Gorskhov words about




rhe birth of Russian naval aviation dates back to the year
b the first seaplanes arrived in the Black Sea Fleet. Up
he naval aviation units were equipped primarily with foreign-
planes. During World War I most of the aircraft were Russian
he M-5 and M-9 designed by D. Grigorovich, the Sikorskiy-10
l'ya Moromets designed by I. Sikorskiy, who after the
n left Russia and continued his work in the United States.
Muromets, which was the first multi-engined aircraft was
213
See Admiral Xharlamov, "Ships and Their Armament", Ncdelya
?68, p. 8.
214
S. Gorshkov in Prayda, 14 February 1963.
163

iicularly well suited to meet the requirements of naval
•nuaissance. In 1915 the Baltic and Black Sea fleets aeouired
raft earriers. They served as a base for 6 to 10 seaplanes, which
•
lowered to the water by special cranes. At the beginning of.^
'
,
10 seaplanes from two Black Sea Fleet aircraft carriers made a
essful attack against the Turkish port of Zonguldak. Dropping
ombs, the planes sank one steamship and several small vessels. 215
js the October 1917 revolution, the Soviet Navy has always had an
grated naval aviation. By the mid 1930s, aircraft designed by -
irigorovich (flying boats M-24, ROM) and Tupolev (MDR-2, MIC-i,
design bureaus were delivered. During the secondhalf of 1930
|tly modified aircraft built for the Soviet Air Force, P-5, TB-1,
DB-3, reinforced naval aviation. When the war started (June
,
the Soviet Navy had 2,581 aircraft distributed among its
'fleets of which 10% were torpedo carriers, 14%, bombers, 45%,
ers, 25%, reconnaisance, and 6% miscellaneous. During the war the
aviation received considerable number of fighter aircraft and
rs (particularly PE-2 and TU-2)
.
216
The post-World-Y/ar-II period witnessed the steady growth
val aviation. But this growth up to 1955 followed the familiar
kt and wartime pattern, exclusively land-based aircraft with
215
S. Berdnikov, "How Naval Aviation was Born" 2fc>r<?kov
fJCNo. 10, 1970, pp. 59-55. ; "
*' V
216
Morskoy Sbornik No.' S, 1971, pp. 18-23. " r

aVy emphasis upon fighters and the virtual absence (with the
ccption of a few TU-4s) of long-range aircraft. la addition to
rious types of MIGs, IL-28s in light bomber, torpedo carrie'r, and
:onnaisance versions were delivered. In 1955 the first regiments
TU-16 Badger medium-range bombers were transferred to the Navy
>m Long Range Aviation. During the second half of the 1950s, the
/y received a number of long-range TU-95, Bears. In 1960 all '
;hters were taken away from naval aviation and transferred to the
lutry air defense (PVO)
, which became the sole provider of air
ev for Soviet naval units in the coastal zone. This step reduced
numerical strength of Soviet naval aviation from about 3,500
217
craft to 800.
The removal of fighters from the Navy simplified the
ining and maintenance problem and did not handicap the effectiveness
ship and convoy protection in the coastal zone. The Soviet Navy
a well developed system of shipboard fighter control (KPUNIA)
,
ch, in close cooperation with the shore based units of the PVO, has
a charged with the responsiblity of providing fighter cover for
218
p units and convoys at sea.
217
S. Breyer, Guide to the Soviet Navy
,
United States Naval
titute, 1970, p. 181.
218
See lor example, D. Fomin, "Covering Single Ships at Sea




The decade of the 1960s represented the most interesting
nd important period in the development of Soviet naval aviation,
hich, organizationally is divided among the 4 Soviet fleets,
t is also centrally controlled from Moscow by the Office of the
3mmander of Soviet Naval Aviation. There are three major combat
ranches: Reconnaissance, Missile-Carrying (Strike), and
iti-Submarme. The number. of aircraft incorporated into
"
;ese three branches exceeds 1,000 (including helicopters).
iere are also naval transport and training aviation, which total
'veral hundreds of aircraft. 220
Also of extreme importance in any consideration of the *
le of Soviet aviation at sea is the close cooperation between
e Navy and Long Range Aviation (LRA) discussed previously,
ch cooperation provides the Navy with a considerable number of
ag-range aircraft under the operational control of the Navy for
honnaissance and strike missions. The principal aircraft of
t LRA participating in the maritime role, are: the 4-engine
rboprop TU-95 Bear; the 4-engine jet Miasishehev Bison; and
i 2-engine supersonic jet TU-22 Blinder. All can be refueled
the air. The aircraft of the naval missile carrying aviation
010







include the 2-cn-ino jet TU-1G, llacltfur; Lhu TU-OS, TH-aa, 1 iuh1
perhaps the Bison. During the first hall of the }960a all Navy
3adgers were modified for in-flight rofuoling. '
Naval reconnaissance aviation employs the TU-95, TU-16 and
possibly a M-4 modification. A small number of AN-12 Cub, a
modified version of a 2-engine
-turboprop 'transport aircraft, and
the IL-18 May, a 4-engiue turboprop commercial aircraft modified
for patrol and ASW are also employed. The anti-submarine
aircraft are: The BE-6 Madge, which are being rapidly replaced by^,
2-engine turboprop flying boats; the BE-12, Mail; MIL-4 Hound
helicopters; and KA-25 Hormone helicopters. The old IL-2S s
Beagle twin-jet has been used to carry ASW torpedoes. It was
reported that some TU-95 and Bisons (M-4A) were converted to the
221
ASW role. Modified Bisons and TU-16 aircraft are used as tankers
for air refueling. The TU-16 tankers are an integral part of
•missile carrying aircraft units. For example, an air regiment
has two squadrons of strike aircraft and one squadron of tankers. 222





No. 1, 1971, pp. 29-31. For characteristics
of aircraft see also Jane's All the World's Aircraft
,
1969-1970
and 1971-1972 editions'] :
222OXFAN - Manuevers of the USSR Navy Condu cted in April -
May, 1970








to Boar-D. It is the longest range Soviet aircraft and l.'wldoly
used for various naval roles. The TU-22 Blinder so
;
far has been
the only supersonic aircraft in naval aviation delivered cfuring
the second half of 1960. After its first showing in the 1961
soviet Air Show, the aircraft electronics was considerably
.aproved and an in-flight refueling capability, added. A *
portion of the Blinders in naval aviation, however, are still"
ithout an air refueling capability. The Blinder is the most
ogical aircraft to replace the aging Badger. If the development
t wing-wing Backfire is as advanced as has been claimed, delivery
o naval aviation should be expected. 223
|
The Soviet practice of the last 15 years of concentrating
j*
heavier, long-range aircraft in the development of their ' !
aval aviation can be only partically explained by the absence '
t aircraft carriers. That absence was definitely a factor '
jring the post-World-War-II period up to the end of the 1950s,
jring the decade of the 1960s, however, the development was j
ictated by the, conscious rejection of the attack carrier concept
|r the reason discussed earlier, and in turn, the conscious
'cognition of the great maneuverability and striking power of
avy aircraft armed with missiles in naval warfare. At least
US News and World Report




initially, the combination- of missile . ,
Bl, H
is ues with nuclear warbeacis
P ayed an important rolo in th, ^m e development.
The Soviet Navv full,,y Ully
^cognized the potential n-r • -
for-atir.no
PQ^o . of surfacel ca ons, especially those withl °arriers f^ anti-aircraft
defense. They had also were aware of diffic „•01 ulties for bombers
using free-fall bombs, even tha,ose armed with a nuclear charge
>o penetrate the defense and to hitQ s n a maneuverable tar-et As
1 result
'
^ssile carrying aviation • u-
,
wnich is immeasurably more
missiles which can hit S11 ,f,n sur ^ce and shore target- W it hrt *tti t>^ts without even N
atering the anti-aircraft *«+
^^ *°M
'
Was b°- ^ developed.
«•» Colander of Baltic Fleet Avi,faataon wrote in 1S55;
"&val
ssxle
- carrying aviation armed with n-s^l ra
-s iles with nuclear
^ads can use its powerful weapon outside th.¥ u u a e operational
QSe of shipboard surfo^ +facc-to-a.r missiles and almost beyond
POt°ntial ^'e Of •«.„*.„ direct6d against .d& o these aircraft
"S PenaitS miSSile
—^ns aviation to effectived I
^
xx cxively carry but
1
miSSiOQ °f destroying enemy warships and * ' "1PS
^ansports at sea,
-ardless of their anti-aircraft * *defense systems. Modern
' al aviation has great possibilities f«, « !D or conducting successful
°at
^^tions not only a-ains- i a/ e t large surface warships but
T









in many instances aircraft' have advantages over surface combatant
ships and even over modern submarines. With their great rango
and speed they can strike quickly against enemy forces found at
sea. Aviation units and forces can be transferred to other
operational areas quickly (for example, large groups of aircraft
can be redeployed from one continent to another in less than a
224day, without any loss in combat capability)."
Air refueling, widely practiced since the mid 1960s gave
Long Range Aviation and many types of naval aircraft a practically
'
unlimited range within the framework of naval tasks. During the'
large-scale Soviet naval maneuvers Sever-1968 and particularly
Okean - April-May 1970, it was claimed that air refueling
resulted in "substantial qualitative change converting long-range
aviation into global range aviation which mastered all the world's
oceans". During the Okean maneuvers alone, more than 500 Soviet
long and medium-range aircraft were observed in the Atlantic and
Pacific. In a period of 24 hours alone, 200 sorties were recorded.
Close cooperation between ASW aviation and other ASW forces
/ i
"
have been widely practiced. Of great interest is a Soviet claim
22^
Lieutenant General S. A. Gulyayev, "The Role of Aviation
in Combat Operations at Sea Under Contemporary Conditions",
-
Morakoy Sbornik No. 6, 1965, pp. 36-43.







-t cooperation not only betweea Afflf^^ ^^^
,t between long-range recomuissaace ^^ ^
'
,as been established ia action .n aSainSt Various kind- of ouWy
aval forces. 6 ' "*-^
It appears that all three co.bat branches of land-based
-let naval aviation have been developed into
operative and emotive a™. the Soviet Nayy
. ^ ^.^
j
Soviet shiphorne aviation is an interesting subject,
j
-
safe to clai-n that no attack aircraft carriers
.ill he
'
bUt, that Soviets have no great need for the,, and hence/no
-rait for such ships are require., the need for other types
>
shiphorne aviation is another matter. There has been a
:-ving nunber of tasks which might be assigned to either
jc-wing aircraft or helicopters. The most attractive type of




Aa0ng possible tasks assigned to such
<* of shiphorne aviation are participation in air defense of
surface units, primarily in anti-crui«> „<<,=.• ., „j A.i duu se missile defense*
Set acquisition, classification and, if necessarv niri
potion of cruise missiles; support of an amphibious landing;
•^cipation in anti-sub.arino defense of surface force. The
226.,
...orskoy Sbornik >To in iacr, , ^,
"
=!£' "^-+^cy Publishing House, I970~ "
1 "71

possibility of such future use of shipborno aviation by the Soviet
Navy should not be excluded.
The development of reliable VTOL aircraft and further
sophistication of helicopters might serve that purpose. The
experimental VTOL aircraft Freehand shown at Demodedovo in 1967
»
was the beginning, and the work has undoubtedly been continue_d
since that time. During the celebration of Soviet Army -Navy Day,
February 23, 1972, it was claimed that VTOL aircraft had 'been
developed and there is no reason to doubt the Soviet technological
capability to do so. Assuming, however, the availability of VTOL
aircraft, their most probably employment a-t. sea would be from a
relatively small carrier, accommodating just a dozen or so VTOL
alone or together with helicopters. It seems that the possibility
of development of shipborne aviation by the Soviet Navy along
this line should not be excluded, but again this is far from the
attack-carrier concept for which Soviet skepticism, if viewed
within the framework of a military conflict involving major
naval power, seems to be largely justified. Some specialists in
the West share the Soviet skepticism concerning the aircraft
carrier, and see its declining role. The importance of shore-based




striking roles, is viewed as growing. 227
Secretary Laird in his annual defense report to Congress
in February 1972 mentioned the possible use of the 3-52 to help
the U.S. Navy control the sea lanes, for minelaying, ocean
surveillance, or for dropping listening devices to detect
228
submarines. Whether this is an attempt to utilize surplus
heavy aircraft or the beginning of something similar to what the
Soviet Navy has been doing for over 15 years remains to be seen.
Shore Defense Forces and Naval Infantry
The Russian Navy and later the Soviet Navy have traditionally
had sizable and well-organized shore defense forces. The major
element of this force was represented by gunnery units deployed
along the extensive Soviet shore line with heavier concentrations
around naval bases. Some areas, particularly the approaches to
Leningrad, Vladivostok, and Sevastopol, had been protected by the
system of forts with heavy caliber long-range guns since long-
before the Revolution. The Soviet Navy, while improving the
/ ° :
hardware, changed little up to the late 1950s, when the gradual
227
' An interesting book analyzing the problem and claiming
the shift turn of naval aviation uc the shore-based long-range
maritime aircraft was written by Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezler,
Aircraft and Sea Power ", New York: Stein and Day, 1970, 370pp.
228,Washington Post, February 24, 1372.
173

introduction of shore-based fixed and mobile surfaco-to-surfaco
missiles started. At present, the Missile-Gunnery Troops, as
they are called, are still in existence, although the majority
>f naval heavy guns were replaced by the missiles and the total
lumber of conventional medium and small caliber guns were reduced
|
Another major element of the shore defense, force had
een the infantry. Historically, there have been 3 distinct -
ypes of units often simplistically grouped under the term
aval infantry (fcprskaya Pekhota)
:
(1) rifle units, incorporated in to the shore defense"
:Drce and used often together with units of the army in defense
(f naval bases and shore installations, on land fronts and
ati-amphibious defense;
(2) units formed only during a war from the crews of sunk
c- damaged ships and naval shore installations (like training
enters, armament test grounds, etc.) and called naval battalions,
aval brigades, or just naval rifle units;
I
i
(3) Naval Infantry proper, the exact equivalent to the
/ ';
J S. Marines-, specially organized and trained units whose
!
Umarily missions are amphibious landings, defense of naval:
I
*jses and other special assignments.
i
The Naval Infantry has a long history interrupted by
i






deactivated in the Russian or Soviet navies.;. It viuh horn in
1705 when, on the order of Peter the Great of 16 November, the
229
first naval infantry regiment was formed. At the time o*f
Peter's death in 1725, there were 50,000 troops of naval
infantry in the Baltic. During the reigns of Peter's successors
the strength and importance of naval infantry fluctuated.
rlowever, it was extensively and cuite often successfully used"
in numerous wars, particularly against Turkey in Meditermean.
Some students of Russian naval history have found that
'Tsarist Russia conducted a respectable number of assaults
md landings from the sea against fortified positions. For
unphibious operations the Tsarist government developed a suitable
230 s
chicle, a lead force and a functioning doctrine."
After the Revolution, a considerable number of rifle
nits were incorporated into shore defense forces. The first
nit of naval infantry, however, the Independent Special Rifle
rigade, was formed in* the summer of 1939 on the basis of the
ronstadt Rifle Regiment. In June 1940 the brigade was renamed
s First Special Brigade of Naval Infantry, thus reactivating
231
hese special troops in the Soviet Navy.
"
229
Xh. Kamalov and others, Morskaya Poxhota -(Naval Infantry),
ilitary P. H. , Moscow, 1957, p. 7.
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See for example, Dr. R. V. Daly ,. "Russian Combat Landings",
arino Corp Gazette, June 19.39, pp. 39-42.
••»
231Xh. Kamalov, p. 53.

During World War IX, the. total number of porsonnol cn-acod
in the land fronts was close to half a million, but, only a small
part of this was represented by actual naval infantry. Trio
others were units organized from ship's personnel, coastal defense
units, and other naval establishments. They were formed into
naval infantry brigades, special regiments, battalions and
detachments, subordinated to the respective army commanders in
the area of operations. Most of these units were called naval
rifle units as distinguished from naval infantry units, but the
term commonly used in' reference to them by army commanders and
the press was "naval infantry". This fact was probably responsible
for the widespread belief of the existence of a large Soviet naval
infantry corps. All these naval units were extensively used in
nost critical battles of World War II, and took part in the
iefense of Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad.
Towards the end of the war, all naval infantry units and
:ost naval rifle units 'were given the guards designation.
)uring the course of the war, the Soviet Navy conducted four
mphibious operations and 110 tactical landings. The distribution






Xinber of landings 13
























5»urce Rear Admiral K. A. Stalbo , "Naval Art in Amphibious
Landings of Great Patriotic War", Morskoy Sbornik
No. 3, 1970, pp. 23-30.
(Lose to ouarter of ail Soviet amphibious landings were under
232
ie command of Admiral Gorshkov. Soon after the World War II,
233
,ie Soviet naval infantry was abolished.
The period of Soviet Navy development since the mid
950s produced a new interest in the naval infantry. A number
f published works refer to the uneven development of naval
nfantry throughout history and its' abolition during certain
leriods in peace time, necessitating its reactivation during war.
Imphasizing the specialized nature of these troops, the need for
232Rear Admiral X. A. Stalbo, "Naval Art in Amphibious Landings
it Great Patriotic War", Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1970, pp. 23-30.
233
:,Iorskoy Slovar (Naval Dictionary), Military P.K. ,




i.-olonged training and special landing equipment, these works'
;idircctly indicated that the army alone would not be able
D conduct successful amphibious landing. 234 In the fail of '
]>57, the final Baltic Fleet exercises were joined with a
j.rge amphibious training exercise conducted by the units of
5»viet Army. A number of top military men, including Admiral
Grshkov and Marshall Bagramyan, were present. Analyses of
lose exercises have 'shown that army units could not
sccessfully conduct such operations, and that particular
dfficulties were observed in the advanced party and in the",
frst waves. It is probably from that time that the Soviet
nlitary began to consider reactivation, of the naval infantry.
3fore the decade of the 1950s was over, the first two "classes
d amphibious landings ships, the MP-2 and MP-4 were built.
3 course, the Soviet military was not alone in its skepticism
lout the importance and even the possibility of amphibious
ladings in the nuclear age. However, after the initial
"nthusiasm" over nuclear weapons as a panacea to all military
tsks disippated and the discovery was made that the Soviet Army
culd not do everything alone" with the help of missile-nuclear
vaponry, the attitude towards the naval infantry changed. It
2°^




as quietly reactivated somewhere in 1962 or 1963 and, starting
ith 1964, after its existence was officially rovoa^lod, tho
lorification campaign was begun. Soviet naval specialized .^
iterature produced a number of important articles theoretically
ustifying the need for naval infantry and the importance of
235
mphibious operations.
During the decade of the 1960s a number of classes of
mphibious ships were built and placed in service. The >\IP-6,
olnochny, Vydra, and Alligator classes of amphibious ships
ere produced in considerable number. The largest of them, the
.lligator class, has a full load displacement of close to
;,000 tons and has been used in all major Soviet naval exercises
if the late 1960s and 1970s, and is often seen in Mediterraean
, + . 236
.nd otner areas.
In spite of the frequent claims by the Soviet leading
idmirals that the naval infantry is armed with specially created
235The existence of Soviet naval infantry for the first
;ime was reported in the July 24, 1964 issue of Krasnaya Zuezda.
:he Soviet Navy periodical, Morskoy Sbornik , has devoted increased
ittention to the problem, printing in September 1963 ".Modern
\mphibious Operations'* by Captain Vyunenko; March 1964, "Special
features of Contemporary Amphibious Operations" by Captain Sveislov
md Skimkevich; and the June 1964 "Role of Amphibious Operations
in a Nuclear War", by Rear Admiral Tuz
.
236For the characteristic of Soviet amphibious ships
see Jane '
s
1969-1970 to 1971-1972 editions; and Sol dat und
rechnik No. 12, 1971, pp. 696-699. _
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anient, with tho exception of a slightly modified PT-76
pibious tank, nothing different from the standard army
tiiaent can be found in the material published by the Soviet
.;s. Recently the supplying of the naval infantry with
i-cushioned vehicles (ACV) started, and during the Navy Day
nde in Moscow one such vehicle with naval infantry men aboard
i;icipated in the landings. A claim was also made that there
237
emore in the Baltic Fleet.
The naval infantry basic landing tactics, which is a
actional first wave assault, seems to be quite similar to
e tactics used by Western navies, including the US Marine
r>s. The absence of carrier-born:? aviation in the Soviet
v is definitely a limiting factor, for the air assault
port in most cases has to be provided and is being provided
;hore-based Soviet Air Force aircraft. However, the Soviets
e convinced that aviation alone supporting landings cannot
e
rent missile strikes by the beach defenders, and thus "it is,
e-efore, expedient to include submarines, aviation, surface
t>s, and even land missile units, in the attempt to destroy and
uralize missile installations, air defense means, and airfields,
237
Sotsialisticheskay a Industrie a (Socialist Industry)
,
Tuly, 1970. It is still impose- 'jlo to say either ACVs are





i the beach defense zone.""00
The wide use of missile firing submarines and surface
sips in preparing a beachhead for an amphibious landing, as
dscussed previously, has been viewed as essential. Usually,
te amphibious landing by Soviet naval infantry is accompanied
fcj parachute and helicopter landings of Soviet airborne or
amy units in the rear of the landing areas to capture key
psitions on the avenues of approach of enemy reserves, and to
envelop the defenders.
All present naval infantry units are guard's units
ad most likely maintain their traditional brigade organizations,
/brigade consists of 3 to 4 battalions, one of which is tank
Uttalion. The basic assault unit is the battalion reinforced
ath tanks (most likely a tank company) . There probably are 7 to
\
brigades distributed among four Soviet fleets: 2 or 3 in
he Baltic, about 2 in the Black Sea, one or 2 in the Pacific,
ad one or 2 in the North. The total strength of the naval i
afantry is 13-15,000 men.
The Soviet naval infantry is an elite, highly specialized
orce with high espirit. The mottoes, "Remember, the fundamental
aw of him who makes the assault is advance, advance, advance,
here is your victory.", is printed in the walls of naval infantry
238
Morskoy Sbornik No. 8, 1966, pp. 92-94.
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arracks and recreation rooms. There is even a Ballad of the
lack Beret, an official sons, of the naval infantry. 239
.Major
i
eneral P. Mel'nikov, in charge of the combat training of the
aval infantry, emphasized that future naval infantry officers
re selected from among "best graduates from the army military
,
240
chools (academies)". Another general from the main naval
eadquarters, after being asked "What kind of troops are our
aval infantry men?", andwered, "They are a special kind of
roops. Emphasize this! Our marines can do everything. They
an blow up bridges and remove mines from harbors. If necessary,
ast two of them can disrupt an entire platoon in the rear of
be enemy. They can also jump from parachutes. They can climb
Duntains like mountaineers. And they make excellent snipers." 241
Obviously offensive-oriented, the Soviet naval infantry
5 certainly capable of conducting small-scale landing operations
/ themselves and assuring small to medium landings of army units
l seizing the beachhead and holding., it until the army units
ive landed. There is strong emphasis on the high degree of
239See Lt. Col. F. C. Turner, USMC, "The Resurgent
>viet Marines", Marine Corp Gazette
, June 1969, pp. 29-32.
240
Ncticlya, No. 46, 1968.
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ability of naval infantry and the necessity for the wide
itroduction of new means of transportation. Air-cushion
»
242
chicles and skimmers have been mentioned in particular. '
\ addition to its employment in a classical amphibious role,
[;e Soviet Navy capability to use naval infantry as a reaction
Erce or in the role of interposition should not be excluded.
;e rapid growth of this relatively small force in the immediate
jture is unlikely because it has to be in conjunction with a
^responding development of the Navy's surface forces, and
'
irticularly its landing ships. A gradual increase in the"*
irength of the Soviet naval infantry up to a level of
243
:;-30,000 men during the decade of 1970s is quite possible.
Science and Armament
The close dependence of armament, especially its quality
rl modernity, upon the science, technology, and general level
i industrial development is well known. However, traditionally,
I
nRussia and the Soviet Union, at least up to the recent past
/
|
a maybe even up to the present, there has been a gap between
J achievements of science in the field of basic and applied
242
Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, p. 29.
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For a detailed analyses of the subject see Charles G,
rjtchard "The Soviet Marines", US Naval last:, cute Proceedings
,







research, inventions or discoveries, and the ability oX the
existing technology, industrial base, to implement them. It
is not to say that the Soviet Union has been unique in this
aspecx, but that gap has been wider, compared with e.g., the
United States, because of the lower Soviet technological level.
The number of Soviet scientists employed in defense work and
correspondingly their role in the development of Soviet
armament have been substantial, and probably proportionally
have exceeded those in most other countries. Defense research
and development and allocation of industrial capacities for-
the production of armament have always been items of first
priority in the minds of the Soviet leadership, and that
attitude goes back to the first years of Soviet power.. The
Soviet Navy has been receiving its share of both.
In 1923 and later, the naval research and development
efforts were directed by the Scientific Technical Committee
>f the Navy (NTKM) created by a special decree of the Revolutionary
Iilitary Council. In 1032 the departments and sections of the
ITKM were organized into independent Scientific Research
•nstitutes of the Navy (gunnery, mine-torpedo, navigation,
Communications, etc.). The Soviet Academy of Sciences and its
•umerous institutes have been working in close cooperation with
•he naval scientific research organizations. Tor example, welding
84

methods for ships and particular!,, ,ticularly submarine construction were
developed at the beginning 1930s *« * hg U.O m the welding institute
now named after the then head P™*Professor Patton. A crucial role
was played in the development of defense Ma i measures against
magnetic mines, includ-ino- ,*«clud ng degaussing methods by the institute
headed by academicians V S ffni^v - •. .. ^ulebalun and A. P.. Aleksandrov in
-chatov. a future leading Soviet nuclear soieatist) acwveiy
-ticipated in this wo* and beaded a speoial group^
ith the Black Sea Fleet.
Since 1925 the development of scientific-technologicalprs associated with radio electronic, including tele-
pnics (remote controX) and Xater cybernetics, was Xed by '
^ician, Xater Sngineer-AdmiraX, and Assistant
.Minister of
3'fense A. I aP « CT T + .**• a. xsoxg. it was Ber°- who o<= f,„ v i«c Ao r.o as tar back as 1923
•kexoped a theoretics analysis of the probXem associated withjUo communications with submerged, submarines
, eMpaasi2ing
}
necessity of developing Xonger-wave transmitters to increase
J
-ge and depth of underwater reception. Since the late
,0s the scientific group headed by Professor A. P. Shorin
jrfd to develop remote-controlled aircraft-torpedo boat
j*». After successful research during 1930-1035, the first
'"PS of remote-controlled torpedo boats and aircraft (one
'

aircraft per pair of boats) were delivered to the Baltic and the
Pacific Fleets.
>
The mathematical apparatus has been widely employed
by the Soviet scientists, and, in a number of cases, they
were literally ahead of their time in its application. Tor
example, the works of L. V. Kantorovich "Mathematical Methods
of Organizing and Planning Production" (1939) and "Further
Development of Mathematical Methods and Prospects of Their
Application in Planning and Economics" (1943) actually already
contained the basic ideas of the mathematical theory now widely
known as linear programming. Methods for the approximate
solution of non-linear problems were developed in the works of
Academicians N. M. Xrylov and N. N. Bogolyubov. A leading
contribution to the development of the theory of random processes
was made by Academician A. N. Kolmogorov.
The application of the mathematical apparatus to the naval
art has been considerable. The work of Professor Vice Admiral
L. G. Goncharov, "The Beginning of the Theory of Probability
in an Application to Questions of Naval Tactics" published in 1921,
expounded on certain methods of operational research.
When World Y/ar II broke out, special defense committees
headed by leading scientists were organized in the Soviet Academy
of Sciences. The Naval Scientific Technical Committee, headed by
186

Lcademician A. F. Ioffe, made substantial contributions to' the
;olution of various problems, and the organization .served as an
mportant coordinating body between the Navy and the scientific
ommunity
.
The theoretical works of Nobel Prize winners N. G. Basov
nd A. M. Prokhorov were important to the development of lasers,
oth scientists were named as" participants in the solution of
arious radioelectronics and communications problems.
The story of Soviet naval armament starts in 1321, when
he Special Technical Bureau (Ostekhbyuro) charged with the
evelopment ofnaval weapons was established. Following the s
:ussian tradition and the dictates of a purely defensive naval
olicy, considerable attention was devoted to the development of
lines and torpedos. Special decisions of the Soviet Government
.ssued in 1937, 1938, and 1940 called for the accelerated
244
.tor more on the subject of Soviet scientists and the
kvy, see (1) Vice Admiral G. G. Tolstolutskiy , "50 Years of
Omraunications in the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. 5, 1S67, pp.
5-22, and "Communications in the Okean Maneuvers", No. 11, '1970,
p. 22-25; (2) Rear Admiral B. V. Nikitin, From the History of
Iblemechanics Development in the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. |4,
-
t>69, pp. 80-83; (3) V. Volodkovskiy , "Scientific Technical I
fogress and the Navy", Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, pp. 88-73;
]0 Yu. Skorokhod, "The Soviet Navy and Cybernetics", Morskoy
jjornik No. 7, 1965, pp. 62-68; (5) Rear Admiral N. Boravenkov,
'Scientific Organizations for the Development of Naval Armament",
brskoy Sbornik No. 5, I9 60, pp. 69-73; (5) Professor Engineer -
fee-Admiral it. A. Krupskiy, "The Development of Communication









development of nine and torpedo armament and considerably increased
the production base. Prolonged research and development initiated
in the 1920s resulted in the successful development of the first
Soviet influence mine, which entered service in 1939. When the
war started, the Navy had in service the following 5 types of
nine: M-26, KB-1, Mirab, R-l, M 08/39. During 'the war the
following 6 types were added: AGSB, PLT-G, AMD-500, AMD-1000,
245
XPAB, EP-G.
In the post War period, the Soviet Navy continued to make
its mine armament more sophisticated. Particular attention was
devoted to the development of influence mines, both bottom and
moored, and, according to principle on wfrxcrB rhe ^ines- operated,
whether magnetic, acoustic, or pressure. Various combinations
such as magnetic-acoustic mines, as well as multi-channel mines
were also developed. From the predominantly defensive employment
of mines, a gradual shift toward utilization of the offensive
characteristics of the* weapon has -been observed, and submarines
and aircraft started to be considered as the main mine carriers.
The development of a deep-water mining capability has been a long
time preoccupation of the Soviet Navy.
5A. B. Geyro, "Naval Mines", Morskoy Sbornik No. 5, 1971,
pp. 83-91; and Vice Admiral B. D. Xostygov, "Mine-Torpedo Weapons




The importance of nine weaponry was clearly demonstrated
during the Korean War, when the North Koreans, using mainly
»
obsolete Soviet nines as well as Soviet technical and tactical
supervision, laid a few minefields off Wonsan. Those fields not
only delayed the American landing for eight days and caused the
loss of a few minesweepers, but were responsible for a message
received in the Pentagon stating, "The US Navy has lost command of
246
the sea in Korean waters".
A continuously exercised' fleet and an all-Navy competition
for minelaying in the combat training of the Soviet Navy are
evidence of the importance attached to the mine warfare.
Advances in science and engineering kave already resulted in new
models of mines which can be planted very deep and are made of
non-magnetic materials, of self-propelled mines, and rapid
propelled surfacing mines. Mines with fuzing mechanisms utilizing
ultrasonic, optical, thermal, and other physical fields have
definitely attracted t-he attention^of. the Soviet Navy, and their
appearance can be expected.
Prior to the war, a variety of 45 cm and 53 cm torpedos
for surface ships, submarines, and aircraft were developed. All
246
0. V. Shulman and B. A. Stlimanyuk, "The Mine as a
Weapon under Contemporary Conditions", Morskoy Sbornik No. 12,
1937, pp. 39-43; and Cagle and Sanson, The Sea War in Korea
,
1957, p. 142 ;Soldat und Technik No . 4 , 1972, pp. 191-195.
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,voro gas-steam torpedos and particularly commonly used wore
53-3S and 53-39 models. The wakeless electric torpedo, 2T-30
.
successfully used by the Northern Fleet, was introduced in 1942.
L number of aviation torpedos for both parachute and free fall
/ere also developed.
Work on the torpedo self-guidance (homing) system interrupted
>y the war was resumed in 1944. The sinking in July 1944 of the
erman submarine U-250 by a Soviet submarine chaser provided the.
oviet Navy with a rare opportunity to learn about three new ^
erman torpedos, the T-V, G7A , and G72 . Particularly important
ere the homing systems of torpedos and two previously unknown
247
aneuvering devices, FAT and LUT. After the German capitalation,
ractically all her existing arsenal aad research work on torpedos
2came known to the Soviet Navy and made a sizeable contribution
d the further sophistication of Soviet torpedos. Better electric
orpedos, new jet RT torpedos and improved guidance systems were
eveioped soon after the War.
The improved anti-submarine defense and the arming of
>rpedoes with nuclear warheads forced the Soviet Navy to j -
i:ceierate work on' long-range torpedos. In the second half of
iq 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, a few types of long-
247
"The 2nd of the U-250", Morskoy Shornik , No. 5,




range homing torpodos v/oro developed Darin.u> ur.mj; approximately the
same period, t,o soviet Navy concents on the UevoXoPWo„t o,
better ASW torpodos, in Waich it definitely lasged belW the
Western navies. It now aDoearq no +v .
""^ '
pp s as chough a number of ASY/
torpedos for submarines, surface shin<, a«* *•
,
. c ps, and aircraft were developed
and are presently in the armament of the Soviet 'Navy.
in the missile field 'the Soviet Navy approach turned 'out
to be different from that of the «.=+ n -r *>,. rest of .he navies. A comparison
otwoen the Soviet Navy and the US Navy in their approach to the
evelopmcnt of three different missiles - ballistic, surface-to-
urface (cruise), and surface-to-air (SAM) - is very revealing
The development of a naval ballistic missile system, or
attaer the adaption of available land ballistic system to be
pched from submarines started quite early in the Soviet Union,
ad in September of 1955 a ballistic missile was launched from
surfaced submarine. Either for lack of an innovative approach
'• for reasons of technological difficulties, the first Soviet
Marine-launched ballistic missile system with which both
^ventional and nuclear submarines were armed in the late 1950s, had
o Shortcomings: it was of short range and had to be launched
P* the surface. The American goal from the beginning was
'f*erent, and the Polaris system developed over a short period
time has been of much greater range and with a submerged launch
1S1

capability. Through three successful modifications (A-2, A-3,
Poseidon) the initial range of the Polaris syste* was raore than
doubled, and was finally made suitable for MIRV (Multiple '
independent Reentry Vehicle)
. Moreover, all Polaris missile
."""
submarines carried 16 missiles, while the Soviet submarines
carried only three, until the Yankee class made its appearance.
Starting in the early sixties, the original Soviet ballistic "
missile SS-N-4 Sark was replaced with the SS-N-5 Serb. The Serb
system has double the range of the Sark and can be launched from
the submerged position. During the second half of the 1960s,
a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the SS-N-6, with a
submerged launch capability and more than double the range of the
Serb, was developed for the Yankee-class submarines. It was
also reported that another new ballistic missile, the SS-NX-S,
with a range of close to 3,500 miles, has been under development
and may be presently already operational. 248
The shorter range of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic
missiles compared with those of the US has not necessarily been
as much of a drawback as might appear at first glance. The great
concentration of important targets along both US coasts, the
243
^
x Characteristics of Missiles can be found in Jrre's Ml
5jgl_cl Aircraft, 1970-1971 ed.
, pp. 565-571; and Weapon S^st e-s,
19/0-1971. See also In ter^ a^onal^ Defense Review v. 5 .\To . 1 '
February 1972, p. 20 and Washing ton I-cs;, March 22". 1972, "US
Analysts Puzzled by Soviet Sub Missile".
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warfare have presented tho Soviet's ballistic
missile submarines with th« „
-
the opportunity to inflict no less
damage than tho more numerous US submarines arae(J^ ^^
number of missiles (prior to MIKV introduction to Poseidon)
would on the Soviet Union.
The Surfacti-tn-.->" v.-?/ , -,** oe to .wrtwe cruise missiles are a different
story. The start of the program in both navies was either close
in time or perhaps the US Navy was evea ahead
_ ^^ ^^
missile was launched from a submarine in 1953 and in mid-1954
the system became operational. Two submarines, ten aircraft
carriers, and four- cruiser, were capable q£ ^.^ ^ ^^
I hy 1957. Towards mid-1958 a bigger and faster missile, Regains
H, was developed, but after a single operational test, the whole
Program was terminated in late 1958. It should be emphasized
that the Eegulus system was intended to be fired against land
targets, i.e. loP strategio delivery) and ^ successful
development of the Polaris system, initially tested in spring of
1959, quite logically replaced the Regulus.
The Soviet development of surface-to-surface missiles
has been taking a different approach. From the beginning, it
was oriented toward the development of a primarily anti-ship,
and originally anti-aircraft carrier, surface-to-surface cruise
1 Coo

tailo. Obviously a system designed to operate from a moving
itform against another moving Platform can, if the necessity
rises, be used against land targets within its range, three
yes of firing platforms have been adopted for a variety of
jjiet crnise missiles, the submarine, surface ships, and
L craft.
The first to be equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles
j
aircraft of Soviet naval aviation (early 1950s Kennel)
. in
;3-1957 two cruise-missile systems were developed, strela for
c surface ships and the long-range Shaddock for submarines,
jla used to be a universal system employed by aircraft, >
iface ships, and shore missile units, SUatftfecS? originally
coyed ^oy the submarines, found its first application on surface
is in the Xynda-class cruiser. Also during the second half
he 1950s, Shchuka, an extremely low-altitude guided missile
iched from aircraft against surface targets, was developed.
be late 1950s the" Styx, a missile system for
-the Xomar and
nissile boats, was developed.
Such widespread application of cruise missiles by the
j* Navy introduced a qualitatively significant change into
f
warfare. From the point of view of naval combat (ships
-st ships, particularly) the missiles erased the advantages





making them to a largo degree obsolete (with the exception of
for shore bombardment tasks under certain condition). The
possibility of delivering a multi-missile salvo, particularly
one fired from various directions with the missile approaching
at different altitudes and homed in by various guidance systems
employing various frequencies, made the defense of major ship
formations an extremely difficult task, even when a considerable
lumber of aircraft and ECM devices are employed. Multi-missile
Launch systems of Soviet surface ships and submarines and the
jroup attack pattern of missile carrying aircraft bear testimony
;o a possible saturation technique by the Soviet Navy.
The original Soviet concentration on a long-range missiles
lictated by the requirement to counter aircraft carriers
;ertainly imposed some limitations, as it demanded target
.cquisition by the support forces and occasional mid-course
orrection, and reduced the space available for the defensive
rmament. Moreover, 'the long ranges of the early Soviet cruise
issiles imposed a certain limitation on their speed, for most
f them have been subsonic. Gradually the above shortcomings-
ere overcome, and shorter, horizon-range missiles with supersonic
peed were developed. ' In the case of the C-class submarines,
submerged launch system has been added. The altitude shimming
rajectories of most Soviet cruise missiles added to the armament
1S5

[luring the decade of 1960s have further improved the missile
penetration capability and further complicated the already
i
difficult problem of defending against them. Early warning for
launched and approaching surface-skimming missiles can
1
in most
cases, come only from the air, and hence the role of shipborne
aviation in the anti-cruise missile defense. If a missile carrier
has not been detected and destroyed - not an easy task in case of
a submarine and even a small surface missile carrier and low
flying aircraft - the only defensive means available are those
against the missiles themselves, i.e. disruption, principally
by jamming; deception, by jamming and decoys; destruction, by
anti-missiles and highly automated rapid-fire coventional guns.
The SAM systems presently available to Y/estern as well as
Soviet navies are poorly suited for the anti-cruise missile
defense. 249 Smaller faster SAMs, a sort of "mini SAM", are
needed.
The Soviet Navy., after a decade of employing PVO SAMs
(mainly GOA) , appeared to be turning toward more compact SAM
system which, in addition to an anti-cruise missile capability,
can be installed aboard smaller ships, and/or makes it possible
249?or elaborate discussion of the problem,. see Desmond
Scrivener, "Defense Against Anti-Ship Missiles", international
Defense Review No. S, 1971, pp. 539-543; and US Naval





to carry more missiles aboard. The Soviet Navy's preoccupation
with anti-missile defease has been evident since the summer of
251
1971, when a number of such exercises was reported. '
The development of Soviet naval guns indicates a trend
toward highly automated lighter-caliber systems. Not a single
surface ship built during the decade of the 1960s has been
equipped with guns larger than 76 millimeters. Host of them
have 57 millimeter 'rapid-fire guns, and recently, starting
with Kresta, even larger ships have been equipped with 30-
millimeter guns in twin automatic mounts, a trend indicating
252
an increased awareness of the threat from the air. Unquestionably
the small-caliber guns are installad mace: for defense against
the cruise missile in the terminal stage than for the anti-
aircraft defense. Even recognizing that the angular error
increases rapidly at the ranges where the kill probability
builds up sharply, the guns can still deliver something against
missiles in their final stage of^approach which is better than no
defense at all.
250
The demand for such systems was expressed in the mid
1960s. See for example, Vice Admiral V. Syehev, "Missiles - The
xArmament of Ship", Krasnaya Zvezda , April 20, 1966; and Morskoy
Sbornik No. 3, 1966, pp. 32-38.
251Krasnaya Zvezda , 15 June 1971.
Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 October 1971.
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The wide introduction of cruise missiles by the Soviet
avy undoubtedly aggravated even wore the already t complex problems
f anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defenses with their often
onflicting requirements. Submarines again gained most from the
ruise missile armament, for they received the capability to
ttack surface ships and formations from a 360° circle, while in
he case of torpedo attacks, their firing positions had been much -
ore restrictive.
»
It may be surprising, but almost a decade and the sinking ^
f the Israeli destroyer Elath was needed before the potentials
f cruise missiles were recognized by the West. Not until
.967 did the defense ministries ci Germany and France started
. crash program to develop a medium-range ship and air-launched
.nti-ship missile. The French company has developed the Exocet
"Flying Fish") missile while the German company has concentrated
>n the air-launched version of the same weapon, named Cormoran.
l number of short-range cruise missiles were developed in the
late 1960s by other countries (Norway, Israel).
It can be concluded that out of three types of missiles -
ballistic, surface-to-air, and cruise missiles - only in the latter
las the Soviet Navy had almost a monopoly for an over a decade.
)f course, ballistic missiles are a part of a strategic delivery





















war, in which case the value of co— --ou'-j " t
' at sea could hard 1 " *-J dc
called important. Of course, any Qavy having^^^
submarines is responsible for their successful deployment
However, the execution of the task or i+= »,*," ,t lts
-ailure would depend
,pon the more conventionally understood naval power, whore the
»ployment of cruise and surface-to-air missiles, as well as
torpedos, mines, and guns, are crucial. Concentrating on the
fevelopmeut of various cruise missiles deliverable by submarines,
surface ships, and aircraft, the Soviet Union built a qualitatively
•ew navy, powerful enough to leave its traditional, mainly"
oastal, zones of operations and to enter the areas of the world
cean where it had not been seen until the recent past. This
ecame possible thanks to the coordinated efforts of Soviet
dentists, industry, and the Navy. The recent testimony of
efeuse research head Dr. John S. Poster before the House
jpropriations Committee indicated that the Soviet Union presently
|s a research effort larger than that of the United States, is
ending more and in the^ future may gain technological superiority
j« the U.S. military. 203 How accurate the estimates have been
I an open question, but the innovative nature of the Soviet
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Party Control and Personnel Policy
Party control of the Soviet armed forces was established
luring the first days of their existence. ' In the summer of~^^ •
LOIS, political departments started to be organized in the amy
mits. The Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 ordered the
creation of a Political Department headed by a Central Committee
aember as a part of the Revolutionary Council. In May 1919 the
iepartment became the Political Administration (PUR) , and the
mified system of the political organs of the armed forces_was
established.
The naval department of the PUR was organized in March
L922 by a decision of the Party Central Committee. In 1938
the Military Council of the Navy and the Political Administration
254
pz the Navy were organized.
Throughout their history the political organs have undergone
the traditional Soviet shake-ups and reorganizations, but have
invariably maintained their importance and general structure.
The Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and the Navy,
having rights of the Party Central Committee Department, is in
charge of all political activity in the armed forces. The
Political Administration of the Xavy, subordinated to the Main
254
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Political Administration, is charged with political work in the
Navy. In addition, there is the Military Council, of the Navy.
The Chief of Political Administration of the Navy is a member
of the council. Hence, the official title of Admiral Grishanov
is Member of Military Council of the Navy, ChioX o£ Political
Administration. *
Each fleet in its turn has a Fleet Military Council and
Fleet Political Directorate, and the chief of the latter is also
a member of the former. In addition, the local republic, region,
or district First Party Secretary also serves as a member of the
Fleet Military Council. At the top, one of the leading members
of the Party Central Committee, and often a member of Politboro
is a member of the Navy Military Council (historically, such
important figures as Zhdanov were either members of the Military
Council of the Navy or, like Brezhnev in 1955, chiefs of its
Political Administration) . Sub-divisions and units of fleets
such as flotillas, fi'eet aviation, and naval bases have political
departments. Commanders of ships starting at destroyer escort
and larger have a deputy commander for political affairs (Zampolit)
In the case- of smaller
' ships, such as minesweepers, missile and
torpedo boats, the Zampolit is assigned to each division or
aircraft squadron. Commanding officers of large departments of
aajor ships, such as missile-gunnery and engineering departments
901

of cruisers, also have deputies for political affairs.
The Political Administration of the Navy, Political
Directorates of theFleets, and Political Departments are'' in
effect staffs with their own units and sub-units and are manned
by a considerable number of professional political officers, or
political workers in official Soviet terminology. The political
organs of the Navy are in charge of the activity of the Party and
Komsomol (Young Communist League) organizations from the top to.
the bottom. The organizations are created if there are three or
more Party or Komsomol members. Because about 90% of the naval
personnel are either members or candidate-members of the
Communist Party or members of Komsomol, such organizations exist
practically in all navy units down to the smallest. .The crews
of the nuclear submarines which made the submerged round-the-world
voyage in 1966 consisted completely of members of the Communist
255
Party or of Komsomo 1
.
i
In a like maimer, Navy leaders, admirals and officers, are
elected to the, bureaus of local civilian Party organizations,
/
republican Party central committees and even the Central Committee
of CPSU. Thus, a sort of interweaving of military and party
leaders is taking place where, of course, the Party leadership is
preserved.
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The Party leadership considers the moral-political and
spiritual potential as being the most important element of the
state military power, and its significance has grown immeasurably
under contemporary conditions. The
.Marxist-Leninist ideology^
being viewed as the foundation of thispotential, and the Party
leadership directly and through political organs of the Array and
the Navy is trying to increase the political awareness and a
fommunist world outlook of the servicemen. The indoctrination
>f the armed forces personnel in a spirit of patriotism and
preparedness for the defense of the fatherland under the ~
condition of modern warfare is among the major goals of political
/ork in the Soviet armed forces. The Party obviously considers
/ell presented Party and political work as one of the most
•nportant ways to influence the development of the Army and Navy.
'he daily activities of the military councils, political organs,
ommanders, and party organizations are concrete examples of the
arty control of the
-armed forces, but the bulk of the political
ork is performed by the political workers, those numerous chiefs
x the political departments, instructors, propagandists, and
'
articularly the. Zampolits, and Party and Komsomol secretaries.
hey have been labeled "true engineers of the sailors' souls". 256
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Admiral :.l. N. Sakharov, The Autority of the Ship's Politic--
.«*-, .uorskoy Sbornik Xo. 1, January :.970, pp. "41-46; and krziy
^eral A. A. Yepishcv, The Indispensable Pounclation cf the Soviet
^loary Structure, Xrn5:uaya Zvozda
, November 30, 1967.
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Of all those "engineers" the Zampolit is, of course, the most
important figure. Strictly speaking, even Army General Yepisbev
is the Zampolit of Minister of Defense Marshall Grechko and
Admiral Grishanov is the Zampolit of Navy Commander-in Chief
Fleet Admiral Gorshkov.
These so called Institute of Zampolits has a complex history
in the development of the Soviet armed forces and even more so
in the development of the Navy. Before the Institute of Zampolit
was finally established, there were three periods during which
the Institute of Political Commissars existed. When the Soviet
armed forces were organized, and the need for political control
arose, trusted Party members were assigned- as political commissars
to each unit. They were responsible not only for political work,
but were required to countersign each order given yoy the commanders
If a commissar considered an order counter-revolutionary, he had
the right to negate it. Thus, in effect, a duel command system
existed. The first introduction o£ system of one-man command
(Sdinonachaliye) occurred during the second half of the 1920s.
In the Navy, the introduction of the system was delayed for the
reasons discussed previously by at least two or three years. Under
the Edinonachaliye system, the Zampolit (Deputy Commander for
Political Affairs) was introduced, and replaced the commissar.
But if the commissar had ee,ual rights with the
C \J T"

commander, the Zampolit was his subordinate, and the commander
was fully responsible for the units condition, including its
socalled moral-political and spiritual potential, not to'mention
combat readiness. The Institute of Political Commissars, however,
was introduced twice again, first during Stalin's purges in 1938,
to be replaced again by the Institute of Zampolit in 1940 right
after Finnish - Soviet War; and in 1941, right after the German
attack on the Soviet Union, to be replaced, this time definitely
in 1942, when it proved to be unworkable.
While officially proclaimed, the Edinonachaliye was "not
immediately exercised in all services and units. In the Navy,
particularly in submarines, the commissars survived longer than
in any other service or branch. However, the post-war period
witnessed a genuine strengthing of the system of Edinonachaliye
without weakening neither party control nor the intensity of
party-political work. Marshall Zhukov, while Minister of Defense,
went a step further in the implementation of the Edinonachaliye
system. The number of political workers in the units was reduced,
criticism of military commanders during the Party meetings,
prohibited, and the political workers were made responsible not
only for the state of affairs in the area of their immediate
responsibility, i.e. party-political work, but for the state of




from his post in October 1957, Marshall Zfaukov was particularly
severely criticized for the above steps and accused of attempting
to undermine Party political work in the armed forces. '
Until recently, and to some degree even today, the gap
between line naval officers and political officers in general
education, professional knowledge and popularity among enlisted
personnel was considerable and in favor of the line officers.
Even in the ability to explain purely political and ideological
matters, the line officers often have been more capable and
effective than the political officers, who frequently had "to limit
themselves to dogmatic repetition of slogans and citations.
Moreover, contemporary Soviet professional naval officers, who
represent a privileged group in Soviet society and are a sort
of elite compared with other services, having been brought up under
the Communist form of government and being themselves members of
the Communist Party or of Komsomol (junior officers) , have
accepted the regime and are unquestionably devoted to- the
fatherland. Party and Komsomol membership are necessary
prerequisites for advancement in the ranks and for promotions.
In the Soviet Navy, command of a unit cannot be given to an
officer who is not a Party member. Moreover, all naval officers
know that fitness report includes considerations of his




firxism-Lcninism and the political-moral state of the unit he
onimands
.
Thus, the commanders themselves, under; the system of
iinonachaliye, at least in part, represent those channels through
tiich Party control is being exercised.
Although recognizing the loyalty of the officers, the Party
till finds it necessary to maintain the separate channel of
ommunication represented by the political organs, via which any
eviation from the "True line" can be reported up to the Central
ommittee. The importance of political organs of the Navy is ^-
een by the Party leaders also in the necessity to improve the
ffectiveness and increase the intensity of party-political work
rider conditions of the socalled intensified ideological struggle
etween two opposing systems. The expanded scope of navy operations,
hereby its personnel are more exposed to possible subversive
nfluences of alien ideology and non-Soviet ways of life, create
dditional demands upon political work which are openly recognized
y the Soviets. As was recently^dmphasized by member of the
Military Council and Chief of the Political Administration of the
;avy Admiral Grishanov, the situation "makes it incumbent upon
.11 Communists to be tireless carriers of our Party's line. Not
•inging phrases but business-like work is needed so that every
'arty organization and every Party member fulfills to the fullest





ctho CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and in the
iree of the CPSU Central Committee of 21 January 1967 "On
i
i
proving the Party-political work in the Soviet Array and Navy."
257
The 1967 decision was an important one for the political^
rans. First, the position of company and equivalent Zampolits,
Iminated under Zhukov, was restored thus increasing considerably
h number of political officers in the units. Second, the
-stature
fall schools training political officers has been elevated
>higher schools with a four-year period of training. The
:viously unsuccessful efforts to elevate the prestige of the
)itical officers, to improve the quality of their work were
lensified. Army General Yepishev wrote, "In accordance with
i Central Committee demands steps were taken recently to further
trove Party work in all sectors of the armed forces, to raise
ij activeness and militancy of party organizations and to
rease their influence in all aspects of troop life and
• • ,,258Ining."
The necessity for the political officers in the Navy to
f naval matters was emphasized by Admiral Zakharov in the
•Lowing way: "It is unthinkable today that a political worker
i have authority without deep knowledge of the equipment and
257
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aponry with which our submarines, modern surface ships and
;?et air units are outfitted. This is well understood by deputy
comanders for political affairs. Many of them arc qualified to
(imand a ship. They stand undex'way watches and fly in the
nacity of pilots and navigators in combat aircraft. Constant
:Litary training permits them to work better With the men, and
(influence them more effectively."
The Admiral, however, warned political officers against
o much involvement with professional naval work: "While
csistently raising the level of their military-technical
nwledge, political officers must not under any circumstances
cget about their basic duty. They need first-rate military
uining in order to better educate the men more concretely,
cbe able to speak out together with party bureaus, committees,
i the bureaus of the Komsomol as military organizers of Party
c.itical work. It is necessary to speak about this because,
fortunately , certain deputy commanders for political affairs
cisider the standing of underway watches or good qualifications
sof paramount importance and forget about their primary
e;ponsibilities. Usually party political work suffers in such
259
a;es, sometimes even becoming a mere formality."
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Oa the other hand, the political training of Soviet line
fleers is never completed, and the political officers must
sjre that standards are met. Groups of Marxists-Leninist
uation are organized, and lectures and seminars, conducted,
tndance is obligatory, although the officer may decide for
nklf which group he prefers. Each officer must attend 50
iijs. of service time each year for Marxist-Leninist studies alone..
as studies are supplemented by theoretical conferences,
)jtes, and lectures conducted after regular duty hours.
Listed personnel must attend three hours of political instruction
Jl week in addition to two or three socalled "political
icmations" of 20 minutes duration each.
Thus, the Party's desire for a sort of conversion in the
« of ideology, knowledge, and professionalism between the
iiical and line officers while they maintain their main efforts
ne areas of primary responsiblity is being gradually exercised.
-J political officers and line officers may disagree over the
at of political control, as was evident in the past, there is
evidence that the latter are seeking disengagement from it,
mder the Soviet regime, they could not even if they wished.
riction between the two revolves around the large amount
f-me party-political work consumes, often to the detriment





w indoctrination produced by party-political work upon ship
ompanies; good morale and stronger discipline can and do result
rora skillful indoctrination, and the occ.^ional disputes over
uplementation of party-political work methods and time allocated
) it do not testify either against the loyalty of the Soviet
avy or the firmness of the Party control. Along the line of
ommand, the top military leadership have constantly stressed
fie necessity for effective political indoctrination. Marshall
(rechko stated recently that "one of the most important
onditions for successfully solving the tasks confronting the
;rmed forces is to raisethe ideological maturity and Marxist-
260]jninist conviction of all our servicemen." It may be
oncluded that in general Party control is accepted, and many
ine officers even might find it beneficial for their career and,
bing themselves Communists, skillfully use it in command.
While Party control and ideological indoctrination of
^rvicemen by a system of political organs, may keep the Navy
a a desirable political track, they will not, however, maintain
ne Navy as a combat entity, for regardless of Communist claims of
:;s universality, Marxism-Leninism will not control propulsion
^/sterns, navigate the ships, or keep the armament ready for the
260
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4nbat use. To that end are needed professionally trained and
>perienced personnel, and first of all the officers corps, the
:dre, appropriately educated and trained, a fact recognized
L the early years of Soviet power. The Revolution destroyed
iny things in Russia, but not the naval officer educational
sstem, which, after the years of revolutionary and civil war
;rmoil, resumed its functions with the majority of teaching
jrsonnel, buildings, and laboratories inherited from the
!perial Navy.
The contingent of cadets had obviously changed. V/hile
;(e former Naval Cadet Corps, presently the Frunze Higher Naval
ihool (the equivalent of the United States Naval Academy at
>;aapolis)
,
accepted only sons of nobility, the Soviet version
..itially accepted only workers and peasants. The education
I Soviet naval officers started in September 1913 with accelerated
imrses for the fleet command personnel. In July 1919 the
;urses were converted into the Fleet Command School with a
;lree-year course of training. In 1922, the Fleet Command School
m renamed the Naval School (present Frunze Higher Naval School)
,
ill the Naval Engineering School (present Dzex*zhinskiy Higher
f;/al Engineering School) was opened. The leaders and professors
>: both naval schools were former Imperial naval officers and




of "Tovarishch" (Comrade) was common to the great confusion of
261
the cadets. In 1939 by decree of the Council of People's
Commissars of the USSR both naval schools were elevated to
institutions of higher learning.
The accelerated expansion of the Soviet Navy prior to Y.'orld
War II and the growing demand for officers produced a corresponding
expansion of naval schools. The Pacific Higher Naval School,
the Baku Higher Naval School, the Naval Communications
>
Schools, and the Gunnery School were established. The curriculum ^
,-.
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in all naval schools was extended to four years.
After graduation from higher naval schools, officers N
received one year of additional training- in higher special officer
classes, to which they were sent after having completed from two
to three years in their first assignments. Graduates of the
classes were assigned as heads of departments. Thus, training
of shipboard officers took five years (four years in school and
one year in the classes), but tha-re was a break of from two to





For the details of Naval Training Development, see
Admiral N. I. Vinogradov, Training Officers Cadres for the Navy
,
Morskoy Sbornik No. 8, 1967, pp. 25-31; Vice Admiral V. A. Krenov,
Forge of Naval Officer Cadres
,
Morskoy Sbornik No. 1, 1971, pp.
17-24; and KPSS i stroitol ' stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzaonykh Si l
(The CPSU and Development of the Soviet Armed Forces) , Second
Revised Edition, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1967, 464 pp.
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Also in 1939 several Special Naval Schools were organized
vhich served as preparatory schools, graduating cadets at the
ligh school level. In the summer of 1944 these Special Naval
Schools were merged into the newly organized Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School with a three-year high school curriculum,
'he special and preparatory schools were similar to Valley Forge
[ilitary Academy with the significant difference that the
raduates of the Soviet Naval Special and Preparatory Schools
ere guaranteed continuation of their studies in higher naval
chools. Also, in 1944, the Nakhomov School, an extended "type
f preparatory naval school with up to a seven-year curriculum,
as organized.
The post-war Soviet naval construction generated an additional
emand for naval officers and a number of new naval schools were
rganized in Leningrad, Sevastopol, and Kaliningrad. In 1967
ill of the higher naval command schools as well as some of the
i
agineering schools (ordinance and radio-engineering) were;
inverted into higher naval command and engineering schools with
•to
/
:ive and five and a half years curriculum. Today's young Soviet
uval officers in the shipboard complements are graduates of
"iese schools. They all hold diplomas as engineers with full
i
uion c-ualifications. The longer duration of training has been





general scientific, technical, and special fields and the 1
necessity not only to maintain, but to improve, the quality of
aaval and command training. 263 Under the present system;'
significantly more time has been set aside for the practical
training of midshipmen. During his five years of training
the cadet spends almost ten months on board ships and in units
)f the Navy.
The Soviet Navy has at least ten higher naval schools,
:ive of them in Leningrad, two in Sevastopol, one in Kaliningrad,
me in Baku, and one in Vladivostok. In addition, there is a
{aval Higher Political School in Kiev, an Auxiliary Fleet
laritime School in Lomonosov, a Naval Department in Volk'sk,
i Rear and Supplies School, a Naval Department of the Medical
.cademy , and the Nakhimov Preparatory School. The curriculum of
'akhimov school was reduced to two years of study. Selected
;enior officers (line officers, engineers, and naval aviators)
•eceive advance training in the Naval Academy. A small percentage
£ naval officers from the positions of commanding officers of
estroyers, submarines, and their equivalent and higher are
ppointed to the Academy. Senior political officers are trained
y the Naval Department of the Lenin Political Academy.
The officers for naval aviation are educated in the Air




orce higher schools and appointed to the Navy, where, after
.dditional training in special centers, they are assigned to the
nits of naval aviation. Officers for the Naval Infantry are




All Soviet naval officers are volunteers.- Since the
id-1950s preference in admission to the higher naval schools,
ithin the framework of competitive entrance examinations, have
een given to qualified servicemen. Civilian candidates and
raduates of high schools, after satisfying academic requirements
or admission, are sent for extensive shipboard training, where
inal judgment on their fitness.to.be aavs.! officers is made.
he third source of naval school enrollment is the Nakhimov
chool, graduates of which are assured entrance to one of the
igher naval schools, often of their choice, without an entrance
xamination.
-
The quality of 'education ire naval schools, is generally
od. The cadets receive broad knowledge in mathematics, physics,
hemistry, and a large dose of engineering, ordnance, and
lectronics. Despite all efforts to graduate well trained"
rofessional naval officers, while the graduates of Soviet naval
Xrasnaya Zvozda, 18 February 1972; Morskoy Sbornik No. 3,
'369, pp. 69-72; and Komsomolskaya Pravda, ],l+rch 1, 1972.
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ihools possess a good academic knowledge, they are obviously
Icking in practical experience This shortcoming in wo.U
i
^cognized, and corresponding measures are provided for tho
neediest training of young officers aboard ships Accelerated
jiientif ic-technical progress, which produces the most rapid
cianges in armament and equipment, probably justifies the Soviet
Hvy ' s accent on broad academic knowledge for young officers
viich provides with relatively fast mastering of practical
jjquirements of the billets they are assigned. The important
Jict is that the great majority of Soviet naval officers are
^aduates of naval schools and holders of professional diplomas.
Practically all graduates of Soviet naval schools are
assigned to shipboard duty, and, in general, sea duty is
eiphasized and encouraged. The natural selection process
hs been the standard practice, whereby the best fitted are
f'ovided with a continuous opportunity to serve in fleet operational
uits, and cases of an officer spending twenty out of thirty
yars of service aboard a ship are quite common A recent Pravda
E'ticle stated that in spite of all hardships of sea duty it
i; difficult to find enough naval officers for the shore duty,
265
bcause prevailing desire to be assigned to ship billets.
265Pravda, March 30, 1972
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Moreover, sea duty provides the Soviet naval officer with
better promotion opportunities and faster advancement in rank in
addition to considerable higher pay than in shore billets. For
example, all personnel aboard operational ships receive a 30%
bonus above basic pay; submariners receive 20% more, for a total
of 50% above basic pay The pay of e.g. an average Soviet
lieutenant commander is four to five times greater than that of
the average worker. In addition, they are supplied with free
uniforms, free food, paid transportation during their leave,
rest homes and sanitoriums. The retirement system is quite
similar to the United States Navy system. However, quite often
sea duty and service in the remote areas provide officers with a
bonus calculation for retirement; for example one calendar year
is counted as a year and a half, or even two.
Shipboard duty billets, particularly for the leading
officers, represent a relatively prolonged assignment. For
example, the recommended duration of a tour for the head of the
department of a destroyer or a cruiser is three years, the
commanding officer of third rank ships (destroyer escort, large
minesweepers, etc.), three years, the commanding officer of
second-rank ships (destroyers, most submarines) , four years, and
the commanding officer of first-rank ships (cruisers and nuclear
submarines), five years. The billet an .officer occupies and not
18

the rank is wore important in the Soviet Navy. Cases where a
commanding officer is a lieutenant commander and his executive
i
officer a commander, or a vice-admiral commands a fleet where
a member of the Military Council is a full admiral, or both,
esr a commanding officer and his subordinates are equal in rank are
quite common. The position of commanding officer in the Soviet
Navy is the most respected. Considerable attention is devoted
to the selection of future commanding officers and to their
training
.
The total number of young naval officers graduating annually
from the Soviet naval schools probably exceed the sum total of
all graduates from naval academies, of NATO countries, including
the United States. For the greatest majority of the graduates
the naval service becomes a lifetime career and there is practically
no officer retention problem. The naval reserve has been in
existence for a long time in the Soviet Navy. Graduates from the
maritime schools of the Soviet merchant marine, fishing and river
fleets, certain engineers and scientists, are kept in the naval
reserve with occasional short tours of active duty for training.
However, since 1968, when the new Universal Military Service Law
became effective, young naval reservists who were formerly
excused from military service while in school are now obligated
to serve two years. The present policy is to select best and to
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drsuade them to enter the regular navy. Ju o < rii
pblished in the Soviet press an unknown number of reserve officers
d just that. Article 61B of the Universal Military Service
L\v, which entered into effect on January 1, 1963, provides that
te Council of Ministers can call up reserve officers to active
dty in peacetime for periods of 2 or 3 years if the officer's
secialty is required. In short, it seems that while the Soviet
Nvy educational system is capable of providing the Navy with
rasonably well trained professional officers capable of employing
te latest in naval weapons and equipment, the service itself
povides the officer with substantial material and other benefits
t create not only a privileged group in the Soviet society,
r.ich the naval officers definitely are, but an elite within
te framework of the Soviet armed forces.
All enlisted personnel of the Soviet Navy, sailors as well
a; petty officers, are draftees. Up to the mid-1950s, the
ctration of service was for 5 years, and between January 1955 and
3)68, 4 years. In compliance with Article 132 of the Soviet
/ i(institution, Article I of the Universal Military Service Law
£)ecifies that "military service in the Soviet armed forces is
lie honorable' duty of citizens of the USSR." Further, Article
::i states, "All male citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of












iiporty status must undergo active service in the runkM of Lii
iiied Forces of the U.S.S.R." The new law reduced the draft age
j>ia 19 to 18, and established new terms for active service, i.e.
; /ears for navy personnel, with the exception of naval aviation,
- 266
/fere service is for 2 years.
Pre-draft training requirements for all young men has been
iitablished. That training begins at age 15 at school and special
iurs are reserved for it. The law also obligates the leaders
(•enterprises, educational establishments, collective farms,
:2. to create conditions for such pre-draft training and be
(Sponsible for its quality. One-year pre-draft training of
lacialists for the armed forces is provided by the Voluntary
i'Ciety for Assisting the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) .
'e DOSAAF is assisted by the corresponding services of the
iviet armed forces in this training, which starts at age 17.
After completion of service, all service men are placed
. the reserve. Afte.r completion of active duty, qualified
i listed men, upon passing a special examination, can be promoted
; reserve officer status. A twice-a-year draft has been
;tablished by the new law.
26S
For a comprehensive analysis of new law see, Capt.
jorge Grkovic, U3N, Soviet Ur.i versa". Military Service , US Naval




The shortened duration of service forced the Soviet Navy
to reexamine and reduce from 9 to approximately 6 .months the
training of Navy specialists in a number of training detachments.
'
There are two types of training centers, one is Moscow controlled,
and the second, controlled by the fleets. Future Navy specialists
trained in such centers, under revised programs which place
greater emphasis upon practical 'training and programmed teaching *,
methods, are sent upon graduation to shipboard duties, where, after »
one or two months, they have to pass an examination and are then ^ ::_
appointed to the billets. It has been claimed that the higher
educational level of draftees, the good quality of pre-draft
training and improved methods of aavjr- training nave made it
possible to obtain good specialists even with the shorter term
of service. The Soviet Navy has traditionally received better
quality draftees, and continues to be selective in accepting
personnel. An article in the official Soviet Navy magazine,
.lorskoy Sbornik
,
opened with the-.- follow-ing statement: "Even a
person who holds to the opinion that 'even hares can be taught to
Light matches' will hardly deny that not every person can become
*. good navyman."
°'Capt. First Rank R. B. Radushkevich , The -Selection of
Specialists in the Navy - On A Scientific Basis
,
Morskoy Sbornik,
Jo. 8, 1970, pp 53-55; see also Capt. First Rank 0. L. Kufarev,
Inder New Conditions - A New Training Method
,
Morskoy Sbornik No. S,
-970, pp. 34-37; and Rear Admiral A. F. Nadezhdin, Results of Work
Jnder New Conditions ,' Morskoy Sbornik No 2, 1971, pp 13-19 .
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Potty officers of the Soviet Navy • repn d
,y two categories of sorvicomon, potty oi'l'ieoi'H i- n.wi i ...i r,
.he enlisted ranks and reenlisted potty officers. Au a matter
if fact, practically all reenlisted personnel of the Soviet Navy
lad petty-officer rank. Two methods of training petty officers,
>n duty and in special schools, have been widely exercised.
The November 1971 decree of the Supreme Soviet abolished
;he Institute of Reenlisted Personnel and, accordingly, there
vill no longer be any reenlisted petty officers in the Soviet
favy after completion of their present terms. The same decree
introduced the Institute of Michman , a grade practically exactly
268
equivalent to US warrant officers. rhus~, in the future all
Soviet petty officers will be from enlisted personnel selected
from the best sailors and will serve the same three years of
active duty
.
Judging from the numerous articles in Soviet military
press, which even seems to try to high-light the shortcomings, as
well as from the extensive operations of the Soviet Navy, it
appears that the personnel problem has found a satisfactory
solution, and a degree of professionalism has been achieved.
Moreover, through an increased number of calls at foreign ports
268
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jtnd official visits of Soviet ships to foreign countries, the
Soviet Navy can demonstrate not only its advance hardware, but
the good behavior and disclipine of its crews which, in ;he final
malysis, are no small asset to the Soviet government's foreign
policy in the area concerned.
•
Forward Deployment
As indicated previously, the initial forward deployment
vas literally imposed upon the Soviet Navy by the nature and
:haractor of potential opponent forces, and the strategic
situation therefor existed at the end of the 1950s and beginning
3f the 1960s. It was necessary to go forward, to the high seas
in the areas of the most probable combat employment of aircraft
carriers and later of the original Polaris submarines in order
to strike the former before they reached their launching positions
ind at least try to handicap, if not prevent the latter from the
unopposed launching o'f ballistic missiles. With the further
sophistication of Soviet naval hardware and considerable revision
r£ naval theory, including the strategic use of the Navy, in the
framework of the latest versions of Soviet military doctrine and
strategy, the meaning and nature of forward deployment has been
changing and acquiring more important significance far exceeding
the original, generally defensive, measures. Starting in the
224

f^weigaix and Mediterranean Seas and selected areas in the
>:ific, Soviet naval units later appeared in the Indian Ocean.
?:)longed cruises and foreign visits have become a common
p^nomenon. The logistic supply of the Soviet Navy, a must for
sustained operations in the remote areas, initially primitive, ha^
aen improving. Sophisticated combat
' training » and large scale
i;/al exercises in the remote areas of world ocean are becoming
.-utine in Soviet Navy life. Both the Sever and Okean naval
)})rcises, during which the Navy demonstrated its muscle, are
HJLte illustrative.
iditerranean
In 1948 Stalin reportedly demanded that the Yugoslav
Jmmunists stop their support of the Communist led uprising in
niece on the basis "that Great Britain and the United States,
;b United States the most powerful state in the world, will not
icmit a break of thdir line of communication in the Mediterranean
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!u, and the Soviet Union has no navy". The first deployment
>: Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean on a permanent basis
:ok place in 1958, when a brigade of W-class submarines was
;ansferred to a newly established submarine base in Vlone , Albania
2 C 9w Milovan Djiias, Conversations "": ' gt j 1:. •' (New York
ifcourt, Brace and World, 1962), p. 181-182.
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The permanent presence in the Mediterratiean of Soviet intelligence
collection ships started approximately at the same time. The
submarines were based in Ylone until 1361, when the Soviet break
vith Albania occurred. Since 1963-1954 Soviet navy surface
units have been deployed primarily from the Black Sea Fleet, and
the submarines, from the Northern Fleet. ' Thus, the newly formed
270
.
lediterraneanean eskadra whose strength was gradually built
ip has become an important element in the mediterranean,
Particularly in the eastern part. Originally, the Soviet Navy
.sed to withdraw a considerable portion of its forces from" the
.editerranean during winter months, reinforcing them again in
he spring. While the seasonal fluctuation of forces seems to
e continuing, after the Sixth Day War a considerable higher
inimum level of forces was established, and the average strength
f the eskadra, increased. An improved system of logistic supply
oupled with the availability of ports in some Arab countries have
ade it easier to maintain the increased number of Soviet ships,
'he Soviet Mediterranean eskadra does not make extensive use of
/ . !
bore bases/ Instead, a supply train of oilers, tenders, and
ther auxiliary ships have been replenishing the combatants. The
otion of using Soviet merchant ships in addition to the Navy's
270Eskadra - a combined naval forces unit, just a step




auxiliaries is available nnH ~o a d occasionally has boon exercised.
The present average strength „* *u „
°
S £ th of the Soviet Jjcditerraneau£2^ is about 50-60 ships, including 12.14 ButaaplBO, ; Qf^
2 or 3 are nudear. Not only submarines, but surface snips as
well from the Northern Fleet ana the Baltic Fleet are deployed
together with the Black Sea units. 271
While the defensive role of +h« ct the Soviet
.Mediterranean eskadra
i.e. ASW and anti-carrier, which has been particularly strongly
emphasised by the Western specialists, has definitely remained
the composition of the eskadra and the nature of its employment
nave clearly indicated the eskadra role in support of Soviet
foreign policy. Since the six Day fcr rf 1967 ^^^
has been demonstrating to ii-o a^^v. i •"n„ ts Arab clients that it could offer more
than moral support, and the Soviet ships in Egyptian ports during
the conflict were definitely an inhibiting factor against the
continuation of Israeli air strikes The Soviets themselves like
to emphasize this point. For example, Admiral. Sysoyev, the Commander
of the Black sea Fleet, in his recent speech to the Ukranian
C~s^arty Congress discussing the growing role of the Soviet
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^-> Jfetf, View from the Bridge of thp fit'-, vi oa *i' lan-jjhi n fix =; v.,.., i T ~Z~r~. ———J^_L ^__>-^e o a ^ ieet
iaUrr2 ' i w Val Instlt"te Proceedings j£brS5Tl972~'~s£1— 3); and Washington Post
. November 30, 1970
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I
Wy in international events and repeating a Soviet standard
ciim that "imperialist domination of the high seas has ended
firever" , stated that "Israeli aggression in the Middle East
.iated and supported by the USA could be even more impudent
272
1: there were no Soviet combat ships present in the .Mediterranean".
\lhen the Y/estern press emphasized the growth of Soviet
ir/al power in the Mediterranean and its maturity from a presence
t< a challenge, the challenge directed first of all toward
educing the influence of the US 6th Fleet and to ending the
^dominance of American power in the area, Soviet propaganda
iswered with an array of articles. It was emphasized that the
5(/iet Union as "a Black Sea power and consequently a Mediterranean
Kver is closely connected with all problems" in the area, and has
u "irrefutable right" to keep naval forces there, "to promote
rxbility and peace in the area which is in direct proximity
t<j the Soviet southern borders", and "not allow the American






March 20, IS 71.
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L. Kolosov, Me di te r ranean P roblems
,
(Izvestiya, November
I, 1968); Vice Admiral N. I. Smirnov, Soviet F leet in the
Waiter ranean, (Krasnaya Zvezda, November 12, 1968); V. Ermakov in




The Soviets obviously were irritated by the NATO decision
o establish coordinated aerial surveillance of the Soviet fleet
n the Mediterranean and the creation of a new NATO command,
aritime Air Forces Mediterranean, effective November 21, 196S.
he permament deployment of the eskadra produced the emergence
f the Soviet Union as a true Mediterranean power, producing the
ituation where since the late 1960's there can be no single
laimant to the control of the Mediterranean. By maintaining an
npressive number of missile armed ships which can be rapidly
Binforced from the Black Sea Fleet, and with numerical
;jperiority of submarines over the::6th Sleet, all th.?.t the Soviets
jxck is the carrier-borne air power which is the backbone of the
th Fleet. With no point in the Mediterranean more than 200
iiles from land and the availability of air bases in a number of
-rab countries for the Soviet aircraft, the overwhelming dependence
<£ the 16th Fleet upon its carrier,, aviation for its "combat
inability" are not very convincing. The rapid redeployment of
;:>viet aircraft to the network of air bases in Arab countries as
fell as direct employment of Soviet aviation from the south-
astern regions of the Soviet Uniou and Warsaw Pact members, at




s a distinct Soviet capability. '* Admiral Kidd, former
:ommander of the 6th Fleet, recently wrote that "the growing
loviet naval strength in this area has caused many to question
he capability of the US 6th Fleet to perform its stated mission".
he admiral continued, "the fact is that under existing pressures,
e are walking a tightrope of adequacy; at some points, the rope
s beginning to fray. Our still formidable fleet is being forced
o accommodate to a new environment far different from the one
275hich it dominated for almost a. quarter century." The
dmiral also described the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean
.s "a have fleet" which has new ships, modern weapon systems,
ell trained and highly motivated personnel. Staling "that there
s no longer a permissive enviroment where once the 6th Fleet
loved at will" the admiral described the situation during the
"ordan crisis in October, 1970, during which the Soviet naval
'orces in Mediterranean were quickly reinforced and appropriately
lositioned. From the chart accompanying the article showing
listribution of forces of both fleets, it is impossible to tell
'ho surrounded v;hom. Soviet ships followed all major 6th Fleet
274
John Marriot, The Air Situation in the Mediterranean
,
'International Defensive View, Vol. 4, No. 5, October 1971,
>p. 429-432); also see the New York Times, May 13, 1370, "US 6th
'leet Concerned Over Sovie t Navy in the Med ", and Time, June
IB, 1971, " Soviet Thrust in the Mediterranean .
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' US Naval Institute Procecdj , February 1972, p. 19.
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ips and as the 6th Fleet watched and waited, the Soviets
.so watched and waited, giving no evidence of stress but a
trmal and restrained behavior which Admiral Kidd described
follows: "There was none of the nonsense of their ships
nning in and around our men-of-war at close range. It was
Ident the Soviets were under the direction of a seasoned
aman who not only knew well the capabilities and limitations
ihis equipment, but also was sensitive to the potential
276
Piousness of the situation."
When King Idris of Libya was overthrown in a coup in"
Member of 1969 the behavior of the Soviet Mediterranean
;adra was very similar to that during Jordan crisis. While some
)iet ships took positions along the Libyan Coast, others
idowed the 6th Fleet units. It was a sort of indirect warning
) to attempt a repetition of 1958 Lebanon landing, which for
•
practical purposes cannot now be repeated. Such actions are
.ling political capital for the Soviets and the new Libyan
imminent publicly expressed gratitude to the Soviet navy for
/
Is support". The reported presence of amphibious ships and
Ks of naval infantry with the Soviet naval forces in the
cterranean and occasional landing exercises performed under the










tgainst any attempt at intervention from outside" raises the
luestion as to whether the Soviet forces themselves might not one
lay be involved in the situation similar to the 195S Lebanon
ole of the US 6th Fleet.
As a significant commercial and maritime power, the Soviet
nterest in the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal is under-
tandable. The closure of the Canal seriously hurt Soviet merchant.
flipping, including its supply routes to North Vietnam, The
importance of the Middle East and Mediterranean region as a route
) the Indian Ocean and Far East is obvious. Most of the Soviet
ati-Chinese moves in Asia should be supported by maritime power,
ad the Mediterranean-Suez Canal route—is saast convenient.
Emphasizing the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean
a "necessity" because of the presence of the US 6th Fleet
tere, theSoviet Union expressed its readiness to consider the
r'moval of these forces. A widely propagandized June 1971 speech
bi Brezhnev during the Soviet ele-ction campaign-emphasized the
anormality of the situation when great powers keep their navies
fir from their shores, and expressed the readiness "to solve
277
tfe problem but on the equal basis", i.e. the mutual withdrawal.
lanwhile, the Soviet Union is very sensitive to any change in
,
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he status quo in the Ltorranoan. A roccnl
»ii the new naval base lor the 6th PL prod cud : ill .• vt i I
;n addition to the Soviet government statement with the warning
>f "appropriate counter-action", a number of articles sharply
criticizing "Pentagon bases strategy" and the US and NATO efforts
'to widen and strengthen their position" in the Mediterranean,
278
;ere published.
In the realm of international politics, the Soviet naval
presence in the Mediterranean definitely altered the balance
t>f forces in the region and increased Soviet influence in 'many
Mediterranean countries. By projecting a major military,
political, and economic presence -..txtCv/tho- ..'Mediterranean basin,
the present Soviet leadership has accomplished what the Czars
and Stalin failed to do.
Indian Ocean
In the spring of 1968 the. first detachment of Soviet Navy,
headed by the cruiser Dmitriy Pozharskiy , appeared in the Indian
Ocean. The cruise lasted 80 days, and the Soviet ships visited
ports in India, Somalia, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Ceylon. In
addition to interest of combat training, the stated purpose of the
273
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cbise was to make "friendly contacts" and to produce "favorable
279
jpressions". Since that time, the frequency of Soviet naval
aits appearing in the Indian Ocean increased, and at the beginning
o the 1970s the more or less permanent presence of rather modest
fjree has been established.
The vacuum and balance of power theories ^originally tied
u the Soviet appearance in the area with the British government's -
dcision to withdraw from east of the Suez. It looked as though
te Soviet Navy was just waiting for such a withdrawal, and soon ^
t|e decision was announced to fill "the vacuum". Such arguments
i not warrant a lengthy analysis, and the British might in the
scond half of I960 could hardly be given such a deterrent role.
Ydely rumored Soviet attempts to acquire bases in the Indian
Dean were categorically denied by the local governments allegedly
ivolved in such deals, and at the present, there is no Soviet
ose in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval units in the area nave
teir own supply ships, and the use of local facilities has
aparently been minimal.
The previous absence of Soviet naval forces in the Indian
Gean could probably be explained not by the lack of interest,
wich was strong even in pre-revolutionary Russia (allegedly one
279




of the naval projects of Peter the Great involved the annexation
of Madagascar)? 80 but by the luck of opportunity and, more
important, the means. Post-war political development in 'the area
and disintegration of the colonial system resulting in the
creation of numerous newly formed independent states, many with
unstable regimes, presented the opportunity. The economic
development of the Soviet Union, the growth of its foreign trade,




lQ ensi iea development of its
merchant marine paralleled by the naval development, produced
the means and elevated the importance of the Indian Oceanic the
Soviet Union. A sizeable Soviet fishing fleet has been operating
in the Indian Ocean since the decaxle o^tbe 1950s- and the annual
catch toward the end of the 1960s was about 2 million tons.
Soviet commercial shipping via the Cape in 1970 was represented
by 3,900 transits or more than 25% of the total. In addition
to a permanent presence of alarge fishing fleet, there are
^proximately 100 Soviet me rchan^anips- in the- Indian Ocean at
281
my given time. Soviet oceanographic and space support
ictivities in the Indian Ocean have been considerable. Thus,
the Soviet Union is simultaneously involved in a multiplicity
~
_
Orbis, V. XIV, No. 1, Spring 197O. These alleged Russianimbitions were recently "massaged" by the Chinese - see Washington
lost, December 30, 1971. fe
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i maritime activities in the Indian Ocean: in showing the flag
hich, at least chronologically, confirms a case of the flag
ollowing trade; it is involved in active shipping, fishing,
ilitary assistance, political support, and economic aid to the
2 S2
on-allied nations of the area.
Military, particularly naval, aspects of , the situation in
tie Indian Ocean are still in the embroyonic stage of development
ad in spite of the' fact that during last couple of years, a number
c: new steps have been initiated by both the United States and
tie Soviet Union, the outcome is not clear. When an agreement
btween the US and Australia concerning the installation of a
T;ry Low Frequency (VLF) station on Northwest Cape was disclosed
i. the mid-1960s, the Soviets probably concluded that the Indian
2 S3
Cean would become an area of operations for Polaris submarines
.
Een before A-3 Polaris and Poseidon missiles became operational,
te Arabian Sea could already provide Polaris submarines with
;od coverage of targets in the southern part of the Soviet
J ion. The introduction of longer-range (2,500 n.m.) missiles
ito US submarines brought target areas from the Soviet western
orders to Central Siberia and as far as Moscow within range.
p pp
For a view on the Soviet activity in the- Indian Ocean,
sc i T. B. Millar, Soviet Pol-'
'
Jos, South and Zast oi Suez
,
ign Affairs, October 1970, pp. 70-31.)
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Vhethcr US Polaris submarines arc- deployed at present in the
Indian Ocean or not makes no difference to the Soviet Union,
for the major factor to be considered in the Soviet naval plans
is the possibility of Polaris missile submarine deployment.
Regardless of what type of ASW forces are selected by the
Soviet Navy (major emphasis on submarines supported by the surface
forces seems- to be obvious) a standing naval force for the Indian
Ocean would be required. The degree of effectiveness of ASW
forces against Polaris missiles submarines is to a certain degree
irrelevant here, for the choice has to be made between unopposed
and opposed operations.
The rejection of the Soviet proposal of December 1964 co
make the Indian Ocean a nuclear - free zone probably made the
Soviets even more convinced that the deployment of Polaris
submarines was under consideration. Of course, the Soviet
proposal represented an attempt to get something for nothing, i.e.
to close an area for 'the U.S. strategic employment which has no
value to the Soviet Union. The deployment of Soviet naval units
in the Indian Ocean might be viewed also as an attempt to show
Soviet determination to meet the potential threat by force, and
to create pressure for the reconsideration of the Soviet proposal
which, together with vaguely defined security measures for Asia,
continues to be mentioned by the Soviet -press. It was reported

.hat, at the end of April 1971, a committee of the US National
;ecurity Council was considering proposing an agreement with the




Meanwhile, the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean
as continued, and the US has stepped up its naval activities in
he area as well. In addition to the construction of a naval
ommunication center and air strip on the strategically located
sland of Diego Garcia and the agreement of December 1371 to take
ver from the British the naval base at Kahrain in the Persian
ulf, a Pentagon spokesman emphasized the 7th Fleet capability
p operate more in the Indian Ocean, particularly as the
"ietnamese War is being wound down.
When the Indian-Pakistani War broke out, the Soviet naval
:>rces in the Indian Ocean which comprised approximately 10
nits were quickly reinforced to about 15 ships. The US sent
task force headed )5y the nuclear carrier Enterprise to the Bay
: Bengal. Thus, a variant of a Mediterranean situation was
upeated in the Indian Ocean, although on a smaller scale.
284Survival, November 1971, p. 372.
2S5
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Prolonjo d cruises and foreign vi
:; J^ of the Coviet Navy
during the decade of 1960s have become a common phenomenon.
The Atlantic cruises, particularly in the Card >bean strea', have
been of special interest and have produced controversial publicity
It was reported that the Soviet naval detachment which visited
Cuba in the summer of 1969 conducted unprecedented ASW exercises
in the Gulf of Mexico with the participation of ono tf«ol;\sa
286
submarine. At the end of 1970 Defense Secretary Laird
emphasized the Soviet Navy's continuous operation in or near the .
Caribbean. Pie added "I think that this is further evidence of
the Soviet's determination to expand their naval interests into
the Western Hemisphere, just as they nave in other parts of the
2S7
world". The U.S. Defense Department announcement concerning
the construction of new Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos and
the Soviet government's denial of this by Tass, October 12, 1970,
were generated by the presence of a submarine tender and the
suspicion that the Soviets may be' developing- facilities similar
to those the United States has at Holy Loch, Scotland, and Rota,
238
Spain, to service the submarines. While the alarm generated
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Washington Post, December 6, 1970.
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Washington Post . September 26, 1971, Cuba Scceor Field
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Lit a possible base for submarines in Cuba sei ... to be
_
rounded, the Soviet Navy's familiarization with the area is
significant. From July 1959 to July 1970, the Soviet NaVy visited
2S9
3 countries.
The visits provide the Soviet Navy with an opportunity not
cly for combat training while underway in ofter. unfamiliar
ajeas and for showing the flag, but they are extensively used
fr propaganda purposes. The detachment of ships conducting
fie visit is as a rule accompanied by a fleet theatrical group
c orchestra, selected performers, a team of athletes which
ocasionally incudes a complete soccer team. During the visit,
ie activities of the crews are planned accordingly. As a result
:i most cases visits of Soviet ships to foreign ports have
290
roduced favorable reactions.
Logistics did not represent a serious problem in the Soviet
avy up to the late 1950s due to a nature of employment of the
aval forces. The ships at that time represented forces which
ere occasionally employed from the basesfor a short period of
ime and returned to them to be replenished and repaired. Forward
leployment of the Soviet Navy units, however, in the absence of
289
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joviet bases in the area of their operations, presented anoth c
roblem. It should be emphasized that Soviet combatants were
eady for forward deployment Ions before the Soviet Navy'
ogistic system could cope with it. The main problem was the
bsence of suitable support ships; tankers were very small
nd not fitted for side refueling, and supply and depot ships
ere practically non-existent. Gradually, during the decade of
;he 1960s a considerable number of support ships of the Don, Lama,
iskoi, and Ugra classes were built. Larger tankers and supply
;hips were introduced, permitting a gradual switch to the" side
•efueling and supply method, which is definitely more productive
md expedient. The Boris Chilikiu-class support ship, which
recently entered service, is a good illustration of the progress
>eing achieved by the Soviet Navy in the solution of logistic
291
problems. In addition to the Soviet Navy's own support
mits, the ships of the Soviet merchant marine can be, and are
often, used. When docking facilities are available in a number
Df friendly countries, the use of the merchant ships to bring
supplies to those ports where Navy support ships can be re-
plenished provides the. Soviet Navy with additional advantages and
permits the number of support ships required to be reduced.
291





By developing a supply procedure similar to the US Navy
leet train system, the Soviet Navy has reduced the requirement
>
or naval bases. Of course, the fleet train system is vulnerable
o enemy attack and requires considerable protection. Naval
ases on the other hand also have become one of the most preferred
argets, and are very vulnerable. Naval bases ^on foreign
erritories, in addition, can cost dearly in material and
olitical terms, and depend to a considerable degree upon the
.evelopment of a political situation in a host country. Despite
;he marked improvement in the Soviet Navy logistics, it is "an
txtremely difficult task to supply a number of naval units v/ith
lodern armament far away from the bases. This matter is openly
-ocognized in the Soviet specialized press, where the great
292lifficulties associated with the process are discussed.
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The recent large-scale Soviet naval exercises, on one
ocasion involving all four Soviet fleets, on the one harld
rs resent a new phenomenon in the Soviet naval development, but
on the other is a logical consequence of the process.
The joint command and staff exercise, code named SEVER
(i\>rth) , took place during the "period of 11-19 July 1968. The
participants in the exercise were the Soviet Baltic and Northern
?:?ets and the Polish and East Germany navies. Involving
i:?as in the Northern Atlantic, the Baltic, the Norweigan
id the Barents Seas, Sever was at once the first major naval
jprcise of the Warsaw Pact and the biggest naval maneuvers
l to that time in Soviet history. While the Polish and East
Jrman navies played a significant role with the Soviet force
L the Baltic, including participation in a joint amphibious
..nding , only Soviet forces were involved in the major events
iich took place in the North. The East Germans, however,
lose to emphasize a much greater scale of cooperation stating
iat "the Sever exercise represented a new level of cooperation
itween the combined (i.e. Soviet Baltic Fleet, Polish and






Admiral Gorshkov emphasized that it was an ''exercise of
he ocean navy which has everything necessary to conduct
uccessful combat activities far from its bases". While all types
i Soviet naval forces participated in the exorciso, the submarinow
.nd naval infantry were particularly glorifiod. In addition to
.he submarine's role in strategic delivery, demonstrated by an
mderwater launch of missiles, the ASW role of the submarines
-as highlighted: "Battles of submarines with submarines is not
iiction or the imagination of a visionary, but is actual
294
reality". The importance of a second, amphibious landing in
;he North, on Rybachiy Peninsula, executed exclusively by' the
soviet Naval Infantry and being larger than the Baltic landing,
vas an obvious desire of the Soviet Navy to demonstrate mobility
apparently over a considerable distance, for it is most likely
that the naval infantry force participating in the landing came
293An interview with the Commander of the East German
Mavy, Vice Admiral Ehm, published in Gstsee Zestung, 29 July 1953.
The same interview emphasized Kosygin's evaluation of the political
significance of the exercise. In his 13 Ji\±y press conference
in Stockholm, published in Pravda on 15 July 1963, Xosygin noted
chat "the exercise was an emphatic answer to the intensified
policy of aggression on NATO's northern flank clearly demonstrated
by the Polar Express maneuvers"
.
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from the Baltic. However, as later became ev ... the Sever
exercise was a rehearsal for the Okcan (Ocean) manouvoru, durliiK
which the major events of the Sever exercise were ropea Cod on a
larger scale.
The Okean maneuvers were held from 14 April to 5 May 1970
under very adverse weather conditions, particularly in the
North Atlantic. The area of the maneuvers included two oceans,
the Atlantic and Pacific, and several seas including the Barents,
Norwegian, North, Okhotsk, Japan, Phillipine, Mediterranean,
Slack, and Baltic. A detachment of Soviet ships headed by" the
missile cruiser Admiral ITokin was in the Indian Ocean. All four
Soviet fleets participated in those, world-wide maneuvers, which
were called unprecedented by a Pentagon spokesman, "a first for
anyone in the history of the naval art" with the emphasis that
"no navy has had anything like this on this scale and this
scope
. Even the maneuvers code name Okean was depicted as
symbolic not only in .referenceto the scale, but also in that it
related to a former Tsarist yacht, renamed Okean during Lenin's
time. The name was seen as an omen and an expression of Lenin's
295
In addition to the hints in the Soviet press, the
independent Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Shipping on
19 July 1968 emphasized that a sizeable unit of amphibious forces
moved from the Baltic in two groups, one of which followed the









j-sire to have a strong ocean-going navy in the future. 297
Hundreds of Soviet naval ships and aircraft ^particii .ng
ji the maneuvers were employed in a seemingly realistic scenerio
isualizing a strong experj need enemy Ln a m , r oX lodon
situations) in which the readiness of the Soviet Navy to fuli'iiJ
tie tasks assigned to it was checked. The following tasks were
onions t rated in the maneuvers:
the deployment of submarines, the main striking force
k the Soviet Navy, and the creation of combat conditions
ssuring their most effective combat use;
extensive ASW against Polaris submarines, and for the n
jrotection of Soviet's own naval forces, including missile-
arrying submarines;
anti-carrier operations in order to prevent carrier
arcraft from attacking naval and shore installations, and to
oduce enemy "combat stability" by eliminating carriers from
arious (including ASW) formations;
operations against enemy lines of communication, including,
/ -
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All important Soviet newspapers assigned their special
orrespondents to cover the maneuvers and extensive information,
oviously on a selective basis, covering major events of the







and others. Following the
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attacks against its shipping;
to assist the Soviet Army on its maritime i'luiikrj,
including use of amphibious landing and missile strikes from
submarines and surface ships.
Not all these tasks are of equal importance to the all
Soviet fleets, and they vary in the individual theaters. The
major events during the maneuvers took place in the Atlantic
Ocean and the adjoining seas, where more than half of episodes
were played. The Northern Fleet as -well as the Baltic 'and the
Black Sea Fleets were more actively involved in the maneuvers
than the Pacific Fleet.
The maneuvers were conducted in a nuclear enviroment, and
the use of the missile armament of the Soviet Navy included
combined missile strikes of naval aviation, submarines and
surface ships, the launching of ballistic missiles and underwater
and surface launching of cruise missiles by the submarines, and
combat employment of SAMs against both individual and group air
targets. The extensive use of in-flight refueling and the long
duration and long distance of the flights were special
i
characteristics of the air operations. Very extensive air
reconnaissance was conducted and close cooperation of naval
aviation with Longe Range Aviation was evident.
n • 7

Amphibious landings were conducted by all four Soviet
feets. The Baltic landing against an area "strongly fortified
i -depth" clearly imitated an operation against the Danish Straits.
Te landing in the north on the Rybachiy Peninsula by forces of
Nval Infantry from the Mediterrnean (Black Sea) , Baltic, and the
Nrthern Fleet was of a considerably larger scale and was
oserved by the Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the
Nvy. The Naval Infantry demonstrated improved skill and
sphistication by landing on difficult terrain after a relatively
lng voyage under adverse weather conditions.
The two newest ships of the Soviet navy, the ASW cruiser
Mskva and the sister ship Leningrad, were active participants
i the maneuvers together with many classes of missile and
cnventionally armed ships. The ability of the surface forces
t defend themselves against air attacks was emphasized.
The time of the exercise, the early spring months when a
cnsiderable number of young sailors trained according to provisions
o the new Universal Military Law were aboard Soviet ships, and the
etremely unfavorable weather conditions, can be viewed as testimony
t the satisfactory solution of the personnel problem and the
mturity of the Soviet Navy. In the command and control field,
te wide use of computers in the decision-making process, the




, and the effective work of the
;rious staffs were emphasized. Satellites wore most llkoly
<;d in communications. *
The high degree of combat readiness of the Soviet Navy
il its alleged ability "to go into action at any moment, even
iler the most unfavorable conditions and circumstances" were
tessed. Soviet Navy leaders emohasizedthat the preceeding
cade of combat training was "a process designed to master the
can" and the Okean maneuvers "the final stage of the process,
h Navy's final exam, which it passed successfully" demonstrating
t readiness "to execute strategic missions and to counteract
trong naval foe" in. defense of the "national interests of the
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oiet Union and other Socialist countries".
To explain the Soviet Navy's forward deployment as dictated
ay by the necessity to counter the strategic nuclear threat
: a the Western, mainly US, naval forces would be an ovcr-
iiolification. Initially this threat played an overwhelming,
vq singular, role and is still important. But, during the second
a'.£ of the 1960's, when the Soviets started to speak about the
•eossity of its navy to protect the "spreading interests" of the




Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, p. 4; and Marshall
laJaarov in Sovetskaya Rossiya, 19 June 1971.
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the future was added. This new mission of the Soviet Navy
required its constant presence in the "remote areas of the world's
oceans previously considered the zone of control" of Western
maritime powers. The presence of substantial Soviet naval forces
does not exclude the support for a friendly regime threatened either
by internal turmoil or foreign intervention or in direct assistance
to newly born regimes more favorable to Soviet interests, as for
example the 1969 Libya revolution illustrates.
What was exercised by the Soviet Navy during the 1968
seizure of the Pueblo by North Korea might be classified as an
299
attempt to employ the strategy of interposition. When it was
unclear what the US would do, and a carrier task force was heading
toward North Korea, a detachment of Soviet ships appeared in the
vicinity. The Jordan Crisis of September-October 1971 provides an
example of another situation, discussed previously, when the
presence of Soviet naval forces in the proximity of the US forces
could be viewed as a restraining factor.
j
|
Finally, showing the flag through frequent foreign visits and
299The strategy of interposition is employed for the
purpose of denying an objective to an opponent and usually
without actual use of force. Interposition does not necessarily
require superior forces of interposer. By placing his forces
between the opponent and the opponent's object the interposer
increases the opponent's risks and presents him with choice to




and displaying; muscles by large-scale maneuvers and exorcises
in remote areas are a demonstration of po.or and maritime
mobility. At least in their statements, the Soviet military
ieadersbip appear to be confident that their navy has "mastered-
tfc. spaciousness of the World ocean and possesses everything which
is required for the simultaneous and prolon3ed conduct of combat
.. .. 300
activity on several oceans and seas."




about 360 submarines, nearly 90 of which are nuclear powered;
two ASW cruisers, each with about 20 helicopters;
! 23 cruisers, including at least 9 armed with missiles;
about 100 destroyers and equivalent ships, many of which
ire missile armed:
about 130 escorts;
about 270 coastal escorts;
about 320 minesweepers;
about 130 missile boats;
over 300 torpedo boats;
about 200 amphibious ships and landing crafts.
Support ships, auxiliaries, and service craft according to Jane's
'run into the thousands". Naval aviation has about SCO combat
300
Marshall Grechko in Prayda
, 23 'February 1971
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aircraft. Numerically, it is the largest navy in the v/orld.
Its personnel strength is about 500,000 officers and cen.
»
Most ships are of recent construction, are fully manned
and operational. The percentage of ships, primarily older ones,
in reserve is small.
BThe main strength of the Soviet Navy, hoy/ever, is not in
number of ships it possesses or in the total displacement, but
in the armament. In addition to the ballistic missile submarine's
contribution to the Soviet strategic delivery, which is close to
600 missiles, there are a variety of surface-to-surface, air-to-
surface, and surface-to-air missiles which constitute the main
armament of the Soviet navy's forces, submarines, naval aviation,
surface ships, and shore defense units. At the present, no one
navy in the world approaches the Soviet Navy in total number of
such missiles, the variety of their carriers, the scope of ranges
they cover (long and horizon range) and methods of launching
(surface, air and submerged) and perhaps even in quality (propulsion
systems and various guidance methods employed) . The latest edition
of Jane's Fighting; Ships started its remarks on the Soviet Navy
with a statement that "by any standards, the Soviet fleets now
represent the super-navy of the super-power" . The continuous
appearances of new classes of missile armed ships, submarines and




novelty has been emphasized.
Soviet naval power is divided among four fleets, the
Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific and one flotilla; the
Caspian. In addition, the deployment of naval forces in tho
.
Mediterranean, a main responsibility of the Black Sea Fleet, but
also utilizing ships and particularly submarines from tho Northern
and Baltic Fleets, constitute in effect a fifth Soviet fleet,
although it continues to be called an eskadra . The further
build-up in the Indian Ocean might in the future produce a
situation similar to the Mediterranean, with the bulk of the naval
forces coming from the Pacific Fleet. The size of the Pacific
Fleet, in addition, will also be influenced by general developments
in relations with China and Japan and in turn the subsequent
development of their naval forces. The bulk of ballistic missile
and cruise missile submarines are based in the two most powerful
fleets, the Northern and the Pacific, in order to have easier
302
access to the oceans. •
In addition to a continuing intensive submarine building
program, the construction of new surface ships with an improved
"301jane's Fighting Ships, 1971-1972 ed., p'p. 80-S2,
590-593; The Military Balance, 1971-1972, The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, London.
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For the details of the distribution of forces see
Erickson, op. cit., ^i?. oe-57 and V/EHR, Politishe Information




nse, mainly anti-aircraf t capability, tin huprovort AHW
Jability and horizon-range missiles (not requiring
target
iuisition and mid-course correction from an outside
source) ^is
iBg on. These submarines and surface ships will gradually.
luce the remaining conventionally armed and aging units
built
i large series in the 1950' s. Although
modernization involved
Sme classes of submarines and surface
ships, it does not appear ..
t be among the most favored measures
of the Soviet Navy.
The fleet of support ships is being reinforced
with larger ^
lips equipped for side replenishment. It is
probably still
adequate in size, bnt with the help of the Soviet
merchant-
Mine, it has managed to supply Soviet Navy
operational units with
U the essentials. The system of naval bases on .Soviet
territory
ppears to be under expansion. It was
reported that one of the
iggest complexes of naval and air force
bases in the world is
^
Lder development in the Soviet North,
including Novaya Zemlya.
Lough not a balanced navy in the Western sense,
primarily because
L a lack of aircraft carriers, the Soviet
Navy appears to be not
;1uch disturbed by the fact.
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After the mid-1950's, Soviet naval
303Vfashinston Post , October 16, 1971.
3°4
The term "balanced navy" appears to
be
^f* ^
indiscriminately, without a :tempt to
define M*™?
navy should be in the composition 01 * In - 80 000-ton carrier
"balanco" seo,, to be « lered acn.
a ^
-J^ng those
is surrounded by a protective sc > » ^
armed with five-inch guns of Wort * "
- *°«
displacement of another 80,000 tons.
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wory did not embrace cither a traditional eaiplo; . of naval
cer in a quite non-traditional international situation or
ac.erence to the established hardware with the emergence of
qiilitatively new military technology. What ^s seen today in the
vrious areas of the world ocean is an innovatively developing
ttiy which appears to be well aware of its limitations and
strength and which is trying ."in different situations to perfect




The role of maritime power in general and naval power in
prticular continued to be debated and analyzed in the Soviet
J ion. An essay "Navies in Wars and Peace" by Commander-in-Chief
d the Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. Gorshkov
:.y turn to be a modern Soviet version of "the influence of sea
306
pwer upon history". Emphasizing the increased importance of
::eans and naval combat, the admiral gives a comprehensive
::ouomic, political, and military analysis of the role of the sea
a historical development and recalls Peter the Great's statement
bich compared a state with only an army to a person with one hand
305
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet
dmiral V. Kasatonov in Soviet Military Review No.. 7, July 1971, p. 4
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At this writing, only three installments of what appear
o bo a sizeable work have been published in the Soviet Navy
agazine,
__
_,v Sbornik No. 2, 1972, pp. 20-29; No. 3, pp. 20-32;




ad a state with both an army and a navy, to a person with two
b.nds. The historical peacetime use c. . navy as an instrument
c foreign policy, which can demonstrate the "oconomic i Litary
B,gnt of a state beyond its borders" an J. whe fact that "navies
:>r many centuries have been a single service of armed forces
apable of defending the interests of a country far away from its
lorders" were viewed as important features of the naval forces.
.lalyzing "Russia's uneasy path to the sea", the Admiral attacks
alien propaganda inspired and actively conducted by England" which,
llegedly, had been concerned by Russia's drive to the sea
nitiated by Peter the Great. Strong attacks are made against
igh Tsarist officials, who on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War
tried to persuade the Tsar that there was no need for the navy
.n the Pacific". Modern foreign propaganda allegedly inspired by
;he US was said to be using the old British argument that the
Soviet Union is a land power and, hence, its military requirements
ire different. As an 'example, President Nixon's speech of August
'"'
1, 1970, was cited.
Russia's unfavorable maritime geography, which historically
complicated the development of the navy, is fully recognized. The
Admiral's treatment of "Russians in the Mediterranean Sea" is of
great interest. Analyzing the long history of Russia's naval






^kiral draws several conclusions. Acco~- iorically,
wjsn the threat of attack against Russia's southwestern borders
eerged, the Russian Navy appeared in the sea and "demonstrated
t the whole world that the .Mediterranean is not somebody's forbidden
sace or closed lake and that Russia is a Mediterranean power".
Te current presence of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean in
Grshkov's view is substantiated not ^nly by the geography, but
b many centuries of the presence there of the Russian Navy; it •
i| playing an especially important role in the defense of the
ountry and "blocks the violation of the peaceful atmosphere there
ajid plays a role of containment". If nothing else, this work
c:monstrates that Soviet naval thought is not merely working,




Soviet naval develops titia half cent 7 ago
us initially accompa.._^ ,. by -cui revolutionary slogans en the
<ie hand and conservative, unrealistic att :s to oronote
<JLassical naval theories en the other. Such dichatomous views
\2re interpreted by seme Western students of Soviet naval
;cfairs as testimony to the e::i.^ jo of uwo c; .;: ;inj schools
:i the Soviet Navy involved in a perpetual struggle to influence
i^viet leadership. In reality, however, without seriously -
ojecting to debates, and occasionally even encouraging them,
.ie Soviet leadership was quite pragmatic in its approach to
:aval construction. It could not be otherwise, I'or the economic
oaditions of the country and the defense requirements as seen
y the Soviet leaders for all practical reasons excluded any
ther approach. This is not to say that the Soviet leadership
xpressed a deep understanding of naval power and skillfully
implemented it, but the available options were very limited.
While World War I , the Revolution and the Civil War
nflicted severe losses on the Russian Navy, resulting in its
isinte^ration, and produced economic dislocation in the country,
number of factors favored t -ehabili .-._.:.... »£ the Navy:





eception of the Tsusima disaster, was generally glorious;
the remaining ships and personnel, particularly a considerable*
amber of former Imperial Navy officers, who, without necessarily
acepting the Communist ideals, joined the Soviet Navy and,
icved by patriotic feelings, worked hard;
rather extensive naval shipbuilding experience and
considerable shipbuilding capacities, which could be and were
r stored; the Soviet leadership's preoccupation with the defense
c the country. Long before the first Soviet tractor was
fc.ilt, the Soviet shipbuilding industry was gradually restored
a.d the construction of naval ships, and first of all submarines,
s.arted.
The accelerated industrialization of the country, strongly
Lased toward the defense sector, permitted the initiation of
£ number of shipbuilding programs, including the 1937 program
vsualizing the construction of a "mighty high sea navy worthy
c* the Soviet Union". This program was far exceeded what the
ountry could afford. A continuous shortage of metal, of machine
Uilding, and of other industrial capacities created the
onditions wherein the implementation of the program was to the
etrinient of the other services, particularly the. army. As a
onsequence, a minor v/er witl- -7 ~: - revealed the backwardness




need for urgent measures to correct the B<tun^ *bo 1<W
pro-ran was sharply curtailed and the construction of lar2e curiae,
ships, stopped. However, reallocated capacities and resources
did not affect either the sub——-. ~- e«,n „„,—
i
Q Qjm small surface combatant
construction. Considering the cond 4 «-ion »* **,« c-.,,»,i*c w^,
— -j. Oj. v^c Soviet economy
before World War II, the variety of z^zs
t and -particularly
submarines, built and under construction at the beginning of the
.war was substantial' and no-ate the notion of the Soviet leader-
ship's neglect of the navy.
The employment of the Soviet Navy during the war was"
-eiuhor brilliant nor disastrous. The Lund war threatened the I
existence of the Soviet Union as a state. The composition of
the enemy forces neither created conditions
' for the application
of classical tenets of naval warfare nor was the Soviet Navy
ready for it or was there any need for it. On the other hand,
the employment of Soviet naval forces, particularly during the
initial period of war, was oftea, marked by not very imaginative
tactics and was handicapped by the lack of forces, a considerable
portion of which were involved in the land struggle. The war
revealed a number of serious mistakes made in the process of
naval development, ^-q Northern Fleet was the weakest, and its
reinforcement was slow. The Soviet Navy had no amphibious snips,
and the formation of naval infantry was delayed. r::-.- Soviet Navy
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was la-inS behind in the development of —y c g 0I influence mines and
the means to combat them. The ant* ,,-„ n*»o anti-aircraft defense of the
Soviet ships was inadequate due to an ilWH- •A insufficient number of
automated and multi-purpose guns
. The top . .w«y ecnexon c^ ^g Soviet
naval command. eli"-im^^ *a, minated during the 1S37-1938 Stalin purges,
v/as replaced by young officers w^o , id „«< , •W?° dl aot faave chance to gain
experience. Moreover ±h« o«-~~ t., t e atmosphere of terror had to produce
suppression of initiative and fear o- halt < •s ^ oo d action, resultin- ia -
reluctance to commit important -•»« <-. w *^u: ^u; fleet ups+e -*-o, ^^~-« jl.w * i s uo comoat, as was
particularly evident ^ +k^ »-i , —/ a s xn the Black Sea Fleet.
After the war en^-' j-u^ oded, the Soviet Union wasted no time in
resuming naval construction, &Qs^ t~^
,
ae^t© wne considerable destruction
-o the economy inflicted v>», <-v~jr j.^x J»j.c»,eu ey the war. A.t fi>e+ «u • •>at x rst, snip designs of
-he pre—war a^r1 "»o »-•> io.i^4 *t ..a xa te 1940 periods were h»n+ ,•«"* ^uii^ ^n considerable
mmber, repeating the "practice ^-? -*
-
pra 01 .ae second half of the 1930's.
*e orientation of Soviet naval theorv fln , ..V"A cn y a a practice in both
i* Pre-war period and first P0?,,.wai. decad& wag ^^
"
tensive, althouSh a -considerable number of supines and ' "
eUUvoly well developed naval aviation provided the Soviet
'
avy with a limited offensive caoabilitv i„ + ,^p^e vy m tae peripheral waters.
•Utical, and particularly economic, realities for all practical'
.j-cven^en wne Soviet Zfavy from fv--,-^.«** // x OD*,aining any other
^abilities. Even reop-ranhv ,hj. ai1w , .
-
g graphy, although improved as a result of
2C1

Ibrld War II, has continued to be unfavorable, and tho cc'nturi* i
dd problem of the Straj..., remained, Y.'iti; tho oxception oX an
imecessarily large number of conventional cruisers and destroyers
Uilt up to the mid-1950' s, the remaining naval forces developed
uthin the means of the Soviet Union did correspond to the role
^signed to the Soviet Navy. *
For a few years after Stalin death, overwhelmed by the
ictories of Y/orld Y/ar II and particularly by the consequent
svelopment of nuclear weaponry and missilery, some influential
oviet military leaders, represented by the marshalls whose
xperience and outlook was limited hy army operations, clearly
uderevaluated, and to a certain degree, neglected the role of
he navy. Soviet naval theory, on the contrary, even under the
ondition of severe limitations on the available hardware imposed
iainly by the weakness of the economy and availability of
.llocated resources, continued to be quite active and modern.
Various theoretical groups on the fleets, the academy, and naval
schools encouraged and supported by a more imaginative navy
/
Leadership worked out a number of original and innovative
proposals concerning the further development of the navy under
lew strategic and technological conditions. Strategically, in
the post-war period, the Soviet Union l:as been facing opponents
of which the majority have been traditional maritime nations
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haded by the US and which have possessed strong navies.
i.reover, military geoS raPhy has changed, elevating the importance
& naval warfare.
On the technological side, it was claimed that the
envelopment of nuclear weaponry, particularly coupled with the
i.-w means for its delivery — missiles and the 'progress in
c.ectronics, all of which the- Soviets have termed the "scientific-
ichnological revolution in military affairs", made the.
r.vy particularly suitable for the application of these new
c.ans of warfare. The mid-lSSO's decision of the Soviet
leadership to drastically alter the course of -aval development
is testimony to fee success of the Soviet Navy's persuasion
:id probably of the military-political leadership's understanding
i the problem.
A far looking approach taken in the course of the
.-cision-making process, which rejected any plans to construct
;tack aircraft carriers and to fight the opponent with its own
capons, approved the orientation of further naval development
ward the missile armament and emphasized the prevailing role
: the submarines and naval aviation, seems to have been the.
>st possible under the circumstances for the Soviet Navy. The
slatively rapid adjustment of both t le Soviet Navy and the






The first stage of the development of the new navy, lasting
little past the mid-1930' s, revealed its orientation toward a
uclear war. The tasks of the Navy's main striking forces,
uclear delivery, anti-carrier operations, and anti-Polaris ASY/,
dearly required the employment of nuclear weaponry and to a
arge degree were directed against it.
While it is safe to assume that a nuclear war has been
•uled out as an instrument of Soviet policy, a number of factors
iave contributed to the nuclear orientation in the Soviet
lilitary, including the naval build-up. First, with the
ippearance of new weapon system, any military establishment would
iave a tendency to increase its stockpile, and often up to an
mreasonable level. The notion of deterrence has implied a
;endency to promote the armament spiral. Mutual suspicion and
fear of "inferiority" (real, implied, or imagined)
,
particularly
In the atmosphere of occasional pronouncements of "strategic
superiority" by the adversary vV have, definitely p-layed an
important role. The fact that, above a certain level, superiority
in numbers ceased to produce strategic superiority, but is
capable only of maintaining a deterrence balance, seems never to
bother either side. The socalled theoretical field has not been
very helpful, for a myriad of academic bachelors, masters, and
doctors in the US and lieutenant-colonels, colonels (ca "..dates
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nd doctors of philosophy) of th« - V1L c ,,liIi t.iry-poli, Llca.L
pparatus contributed he^iv t-~ ^u^ a eav ly to the confusion of x the still
ittle understood nature of nuclei Warfa™u cxear w re and the associated
trategy
.
The naval contribution to the strategic deUvery, originally
k possession of only the US Kavy in the form of the attach
aircraft carriers woe *> ,• *,«.*. -.^^iixcis,, as iirst suoolerasntpH o«^ i x«yyienL ed and later practically
-Placed by ballistic missile submarines. The original Soviet
.stem with surface Xaunch and a 350-mile ranSe was gradually ^
proved, and it required almost a decade of effort to produce
s submerged-launched 1, 500-mile range system. A longer-range
baarine-launched ballistic missile system, whose range has
:en variously estimated at from 2,500 to over 3,000 miles, has
jportedly been under development. Correspondingly, the launch
.atform was improved also, from the 2 to 3 missies carried by
e original Z-class and E-class submarines to 16 on the Y-class
bmarines.
i
Paralleling the growth of the naval strategic delivery
stem, a rather sizeable construction of more conventional
rces, but quite unconventionally armed, has been observed
roughout the decade of 1930's. Besides continuing the
*Oyment of f„ rces and the conduct of o::ercises i lJt.«..t







i.rces of the Soviet Navy and first of all, its surface fore
live permitted the Soviet Union to initiate the second stage
c: forward deployment which, while explained originally by the
-cessity of defending against the same aircraft carriers and
Claris submarines, in effect was the application of Soviet naval
pwer to "protect the interests of the Soviet Union" and to
sipport,its foreign policy. The nuclear balance of the mid-1960*
s
aready had all the essential elements which led to parity,
sufficiency, equality, or whatever term is preferred over mutual -
(/erkill capability.
Such a state of affairs originally permitted the Soviet
Uion to deploy her naval forces in the area where the opposing
iarces were stronger and still have a credible instrument to
upport her policy. The Mediterranean deployment during the
:irst 3 or 4 years was a classical example of this. Gradually,
articularly after the crisis in the area had sharpened and
;ore and better units were built and became operational, the size
f the permanently present forces has been increased, creating
he condition where neither side could claim superiority (with
he exception perhaps of some naval pilots, who, as soon as they
re airborne and feel the three-dimensional freedom of skies,
ave a tendency to project that feeling into the notion of
uperiority)




brces can receive substantial reinforcement on rather short
.otice, including land-based air power. The oft repeated
soviet dependence on the good will of the nations controlling
;he Straits seems to be no re wishful thinking than an objective
evaluation of the situation, for it is doubtful that, short of
i major conflict in which both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would
je involved, the Straits would be closed. The ability to have
superior forces in the area of confrontation, while not necessarily
Leading to an ability to control the sea, can certainly provide
its possessor with a number of advantages and considerably
increased chances for the favorable resolution of the conflict.
The presence of Soviet naval units in the Indian Ocean
aas appeared to be an embryonic variant of the Mediterrnean
situation. The behavior of the Soviet detachment during the
India-Pakistan War in a sense was not much different from that
in the Mediterranean during the Jordan and Libya Crises or during
the Pueblo incident in the Sea of Japan. It appears that the
employment of the Soviet Navy for what might be termed selective
containment of the US Navy, still in restricted situations
and carefully selected times and places, is being progressively
intensified.
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For an evaluation see R.D.M. Furlong "St rater; 5 P :. v
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v
In The Indian Ocean" , international Defense ;vov_ .0. 2,
-. 1372, pp. 133-140. ;
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It can be assumed that technically the Soviet Navy can
be employed in gunboat diplomacy. If one accepts Mr. Cable's
>
definition of gunboat diplomacy: "the use or threat of limited
naval forces, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure
advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within
the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state",
it might be concluded that the Soviet Navy has all the necessary
elements for its application on a selective basis. The political
validity of such an assumption is another matter, and, in most
cases, the Soviets are bound to lose more than they gain.
Soviet Navy support for an established friendly and legitimate
government, threatened internally and particularly under
circumstances where the blame for the turmoil can be placed upon
the "intrigues of the imperialists", is another matter, and its
possibility should by no means be excluded.
If the concept x>i an "all-out war at sea" seems to be
questionable, at least for the foreseeable future, a controlled
war on sea communications under certain circumstances cannot be
ruled out. However, it would not be in the form of unidentified
submarines sinking ships, but in the form of mutual retaliatory
John Cable,
j _ '^Z-SlL 1 Political ppl :ations of
Limited Naval Force (Institute for Stra >tic ies - Studies
in International Security : 16) . New York: Praeger Publishers,
251 pp. , 1971, p. 21.
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trikes. Possessing the world's largest submarine fleet, a
oasiderable portion of which is well suited for the attack
ole, the Soviet Navy technically and operationally is capable
if conducting such a war. However, ±i would inevitably bear
.he fruits of growing into ;x general war and, hence, Ls extremely
remote
.
No picture of the Soviet Navy, even such a sketchy one
is presented in this paper, should be considered complete if
viewed in isolation, for in the final analysis, showing the
flag is only one profitable side effect of navies, which are
built and maintained to be engaged in naval warfare. An
obvious choice, and a singular one, for general comparison
might be only the US Navy. Only the most general type of
comparison of trends in the development of the two navies can
be made here. If, for the sake of analysis as well as for the
practical matters of naval warfare, one isolated ballistic
missile submarines, what remains in the two navies would be a
composition of forces which have been built for naval warfare
and which are navies as they have always been understood.
The Soviet Union's decision of the mid-19 50' s not to
build attack aircraft carriers was a correct one, considering
•the peculiar nature of the Soviet Navy at the time of the
incision, the trend in the development of naval warfare, andc
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Soviet policy. The US y, on the contrary, has -'or a loi
tine considered aircraft carriers as the nucleus of its naval
forces, which, to a large degree, have been developed to' support
carriers. The Soviet Union's rejection of the idea to fight
[carriers with carriers for a while denied their navy a number
of options. This probably still holds true in 'relation to a
number of situations in which, however, the Soviets do not likely
want to be involved. A diversified anti-carrier force developed
by the Soviet Union includes attack submarines, both cruise-
missiles and torpedo, land-based missile carrying aviation, and,
marginally, missile armed surface ships. While capable of
fighting carriers, they are hy no means a complete substitute
for them, although in the attack role at sea they might be more
effective.
The Soviet striking forces, as platforms for weaponry,
have a higher utilization of offensive armament. Aircraft
carriers, being high 'value targets, have to share a considerable
portion of their weapon capacity with the needs for AS1.'/ and
anti-aircraft defense, and many of them in effect become
siulti-purpose platforms. The question naturally arises whether
a package of diversified forces which may even cost less, can
perform the same tasks and bo lo^s vulnerable? Y/hile it _~




should remember that the concept itself was born in order to
increase the survivability of the CVA portion of \i. Moreover,
the size and large tonnage of ships have ceased to play any
significant role in the age of missiles and sophisticated control
systems, "compressed" in size and "inflated" in performance by
the power of explosives and microelectronics. 'While ship-borne
aviation's role in combat at sea will not only survive, but might
be even elevated, the attack carrier concept, particularly in
relation to the Soviet Navy, is not very impressive. In the
decade of the 1970' s the advocates of SO, 000-ton mammoths,
particularly when they demand an increase of their number, bring
to mind Santayana's remark about fanatics who redoubled their
efforts as they lost sight of their goals. So, in relation to
the US Navy, the Soviet Navy is not much worse off at the present
without attack aircraft carriers.
The appearance in the future of carrier-like ships not
exceeding 20,000-30,000 tons displacement and serving as a
platform for VTOL aircraft in the Soviet Navy should not be
excluded. In general, both type of na\ral aviation, shipborne and
land-based, seem to be needed and will be developed. Heavy
land-based maritime aircraft are extremely maneuverablo „ requiring
less defense than any surface ship, and are capable of carrying
a considerable load in flights of prolonged deration, they Will
2'^1

continue to be employed in a variety of . ions. The Soviet
levy's emphasis on such aviation was initiated by i necessity,
tt turned out to be beneficial. '
The Soviet lead in submarines today is overwhelming.
A least numerically they have held this lead since the second
hit of the 1930«s. But only during the postwar period, when
te Soviet Union built close to' 600 submarines, were the majority
them designed for long-range operations. Submarines, with
pactically every known type of propulsion systems and armament,
sme unique to Soviet submarines, were produced. Ballistic-




vy augment both countries strategic delivery systems
prticularly the second - strike capability. Llany of the
rinaining submarines, particularly in the Soviet Navy, are
alti-purpose boats whose role in the future would probably be
s.panded. At the present, submarines represent the main striking
tree of the Soviet Navy, the role they undoubtedly will retain
t the foreseeable future. The long nurtured idea that the
ijbmarine is a weapon of the "have-not" navy is archaic, if it
1 any time was valid. In spite of the US Navy's long and, in
i'B limits of technological possibilities, somewhat productive
>forts to have an effective anti-submarir.c defense system, the
ijture of the problem, the budgetary limitations imposed u^on the
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size of the ASW forces, and the size of tlie Soviet submarine
force, which under certain circumstances can afford even
saturation tactics, seems to create a situation where it would be
extremely difficult to cope with Soviet submarinos.
Besides, ASW is a two-way game, and the hunter quite often
himself can be attacked, not only by the object of the hunt,
the submarine, but by the forces supporting the submarine or
cooperating with it. This is why just installing sophisticated
search equipment aboard ASW ships is not enough. Modern weapons '
to defend the ASW forces from various types of attacks are
needed. It seems that the submarine at the present is the best
ASW platform, and a considerable number of them are needed.
Whether the Soviet Navy has enough submarines for a variety of
missions is hard to tell, but it has considerably more than the
US Navy.
The size of the Soviet surface force, which is capable of
being deployed in remote areas, is obviously smaller and less
diversified than that of the US navy. However, there is a growing
number of Soviet Navy surface ships armed with a modern missiles
presently absent in the armament ox the US Navy ships. Certain
classes of Soviet surface ships have no counterparts in the
US Navy, and a unit-by-unit comparison is meaningless. Today,
there is no reason to consider the Soviet ffavy either as a
273

"ne-shot navy" or a "first-strike navy", because, for ....
foreseeable types of conflict, it seems to have more than one
sot, each one with a high degree of probability of hitting an
asigned target, and its defense of surface units is no worse than
oher navies, the US Navy included. The vulnerability of Soviet
srface units varies from area to area. Considering the
cordiua-ved system of naval warfare, however, other forces can
waken the opponent's ability to strike, (at the present mainly
v;th carrier-borne aircraft) thus, making the defense ability
c Soviet surface units more effective.
The amphibious capability of the Soviet Navy is very marginal
ompared with that of the US Navy with respect to the size of
te force and the size and range of operations. The important
i.ct is the emergence of such a capability coupled with the
i.pid growth during the 1360 's of Soviet airborne troops, which
i; testimony of the Soviet military orientation reward mobility,
deluding that at sea. While a ra.pid increase in size of Soviet
aphibious forces in the near future seems to be unlikely, it is
^gical to expect the sophistication of lauding means, including
$tter amphibious tanks, air-cushion armored personnel carrier,
'ie employment of helicopters, and appearance of specially designed
:Lre support ships armed with long-range guns and missiles.
In the field of tactical armament,- the Co vie t Navy scored
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able :^cco:^ by emphasizing the d feloj lent of sr
LBiiiles since the ^ic 1950*s.' ?or some reasc- which is difficult
o explain satisfactorily the US Navy apparently neglected this
ype of armament. The traditional preoccupation with carrier-
orne airpower, which in the words of US Navy Captain Smith
previously cited)
,
put "too many eggs in too few baskets'* and
ater the budgetary limitations imposed by the Vietnam war,
bviously do not explain the whole story. There should be no -
uestion that the US is technologically capable of building
ine cruise missiles, and thus avoid the situation where in the
ords of Vice Admiral K. G. Rickover, "our gun-equipped surface
;hips are considerably outranged by Soviet surface-to-surface
;ruise missiles and would suffer severe attrition in an
309
engagement". Some anti-ship capability of certain US Navy
>A2.is can hardly be compared with the capability of the Soviet
cruise missiles. The wide adaptation of cruise missiles permitted
;he Soviets to increase the range of an engagement by many
;imes, and to change the nature of defense, so that instead of
lighting the weapon systems carrier (ships, submarines, planes)
,
It became necessary to fight the weapon itself. In the early
L9C0's Soviet Academician Admiral-Engineer Berg advanced the
.'a a Post, May 31, 1971.
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iea that the task in the scientific . of
tjo systems is not to try to catch up, but to out ;ance,
lave behind, without catching (£ regnat ' nye '^V.
I seems that in relation to a naval engagement and ':he role of
ajtack aircraft carriers in it, the Soviet Navy followed that
avice and leapfrogged the traditional carrier 1 stage in its
dvelopment, and, by concentrating on cruise missiles, created
is own "carriers".' To a certain degree, 2, C and ether classes
c cruise missile submarines and Kynda, Xresta, Krivais, and
^
Nnuchka-cla.ss surface ships are carriers of robot-kamikaze
.
The effective deployment of naval forces is presently
i conceivable without reliable ocean surveillance to assure the
umost effective employment of missile armament and to minimize
a. opponent reaction time. The intensive activity cf Soviet
rconnaisance aviation above the oceans, demonstrated particularly
dring* the Okean maneuvers and the reported launching of
aditional satellites during the India-Pakistan war are evidence
Soviet recognition of the importance of surveillance. The
Sviets emphasized the necessity for a wider application of *.
ir.cro-electronics and laser technology and the creation of
diensive means, not against already operational offensive
£ stems, but against potentially possible ones, "the appearance
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[countries of the opposing camp", Th •:... • assurance by
Marshall Grechko that "the Navy will bo su] i ith mc re
sophisticated technology and pcwer_ aL .. lonstrated
the Soviet Union's deter. ..Ion to keep its navy apace with
t
technological progress.
The prime mover behind the rapid and quite sizeable advance
of the Soviet Navy during the last fifteen years, however, was not
Soviet technology, which, in spite of the heavy emphasis on the
defense sector and obvious advances in certain fields, is no
better than US technology, and most likely behind it. The
imaginative thinking of the Soviet naval circles which did not
hesitate to break with established concepts, but worked out and
applied new ones has to be given major credit. In the United
States Navy, apparently, there are a number of people justifying
US Navy Captain Smith's statement that "out-of-date thinking
even more than our publicized over-age ships is our problem".
Often heard references to Mahan's basic concept, command of the
sea, which, as it is well known, is supposed to be gained hy a
decisive battle won yoy a superior navy, can hardly be called
valid in the nuclear age, and its advocates seem to continue to
live in "a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan
CIA
G. A. Kadomtsev, ' "On t! - I •. . ot
scientific foresight", i Sborj - No. 11, I960, p. 5.
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j prophet, and the United States Navy the only true c
ris way of thinking leads to over... thusiastic cc tts conc<
bdrofoil patrol ships as "able to take- . . - floats",
irface-effect (air cushion) ships employed in up to small
c.rrier size and changing "the whole power' relationship at sea",
ad small carriers labeled "sea control ships". While indicating
je propulsion modes of the visualized ships, most of which
re still in the drawing board stage of development or at best
re being tested in boat-size prototypes, very little is said
bout the armament packages which, in the final analysis, together-
lith tactics are the main thing, and the ships are only platforms
o carry them. Surprisingly, there is not much talk about
surface skimmers, and yet the Soviet Navy seems to be interested
in them.
Recently the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet ground
forces concluded his Navy Day greetings with the assertion that
the Navy "can count on the efficient and the effective support
of ground forces", which represented a considerable change from
the not so old view of the Soviet Navy as "a reliable helper
of
the Soviet Army." The independent nature of Soviet Navy
operations, its alleged ability "to solve strategical tasks
directly" and, hy its presence in remote areas "to contain
.
aggressive actions" claimed by the Soviets, cannot any
longer
bo rejected off-handedly or lightly. How efficient the Soviet
27'

jfavy would be in the claimed capability might be debatable, bat
:heir firm understanding of the effective use of the Navy seems
511
to be beyond any doubt.
The overall capability of the Soviet Navy and, more so
,
its intentions, might be debatable as are conclusions concorning
the Soviet naval policy and the nature of strategic employment
Df the Soviet Navy. However,, the Soviet Union's determination
to break away from her recent naval inferiority, to go beyond
the customary closed seas and coastal waters, to employ a
considerable portion of its imaginatively renovated navy in the
world's oceans for the "protection of state interests" and to
exclude the mistakes and misfortunes of the past, is obvious.
The following quotation illustrates: "For many decades almost
continuously warring among themselves, the European colonial
plunderers unanimously aspired to deny Russia access to the
ocean — by force, by diplomacy, and even by 'scientific'
argumentation. A "theory" was devised and circulated to the effect
that historically Russia was a purely continental state, and that
/
therefore it was neither necessary nor possible for it to have a
powerful navy. Influential mercenary supporters of this theory
It was reported that during India-Pakistan War, the
Soviet ambassador to India, -.'. M. Pegov, assured Indian
officials ":.. .: a Soviet fleet is now in the - san, and
that the Soviet Union will not allow the US Seventh U"i^ ., :o
intervene". Pnrado
,
February 13,1972, p. 8. .
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vcrc found in the Tsarist government, the consequences are
312
veil known — it is enough to recall the Tsushima' trade^y."
«
One wonders if the political goals of the Tsar jovernment
.vhich led to Tsushima are not shared and pursued by the Soviet
(government.
Cl-'o ? n-Maneuvo rs of the Soviet Na.vy in, April-May 1070
,




History of Development, Plans
and their Implementation
At the beginning of World V,rar I, the Russian mercantile
:Leet numbered 1,040 ships with a total cargo carrying capacity
if 912,000 tons; many were old, slow, technically obsolete
teamships and sailing vessels. Although three quarters of
ussia's foreign trade was carried 'oy sea, only 7% of it was
arried on Russian ships.
Foreign (German, French, British) interests owned a
onsiderable percentage of the joint stock companies.
As a result of World Y/ar I , the chaos of the Revolution
.rid particularly the civil war, many merchant ships were
.ost-sunk, taken overseas by the White Guards, or confiscated
)y foreign states. The total loss amounted to over 400,000
cons, or more than 40%. For example, in the Black Sea-Sea of
\zov basin in addition to combat losses, 2C4 ships with a total
cargo capacity of 200,000 register tons were tak&n away in
1
Vodnyy Transport, 20 June 1970.

920 by the retreating White Guards, The majority of the
emaining ships were in poor technical condition, land many were
ailing ships.
The February 1917 Revolution generated alarm among foreign
tockholders of Russian steamship companies. There were attempts
o hold Russian ships in foreign ports under various pretexts,
he October Revolution just accelerated the process. In order to
revent it, the Soviet government issued the decree of 24
ovember 1917 concerning "prohibition of the sale, hypothecation -
nd chartering of Russian merchant ships by foreign citizens
.nd organizations". All transactions concerning the transfer
if ships abroad conducted prior to November 24, 1917 were declared
2
'oid, and the sailing of ships to foreign ports prohibited.
.'he socalled "workers control" of steamship lines through
specially organized committees was established. The decree
)y the Council of People's Commissars on the 23rd of January
(February 5) 1918 nationalized the whole Russian mercantile
fleet. The newly organized Baltic company, Transbalt, in 1918
candled 160 Soviet and foreign ships in the Port of Petrograd,
out the Civil War interrupted even such modest activity.
On ilarch 15, 1920, Lenin stated: "I repeat, that our
destiny depends on the forthcoming water transport c, ipaign
"::or3ko'/ Plot Mo. 1,-1967, pp. 5-7. .,
f. c> <->£01

3fcrhaps more than on the forthcoming war with Poland". In
iy 1920 the decree signed by Lenin gave the Sovnarkom (Council
c: People's Commissars) exclusive right to permit the sale of
nips and to enter into charter party agreements. 4
The resumption of foreign trade was badly needed to ease
;ie economic dislocation of the country and to 'start the
^storation of industry, and at least a small number of
oerational ships was required for that purpose. Eecause of the
evil war, the only area from which the ships could operate
ad carry foreign cargo was the North. In May 1920 three sunken
slips and, during the summer of 1920, several more were raised
ii the White Sea. The newly organized Directorate of Sea
1-ansport for White Sea - Murmansk (Belomortran) collected 23
s;eamships (some with the ice-reinforced hulls) and 23 sailing
vssels. Because of the shortage of coal, the latter were
5
onsidered of a special importance. The first Belomortran ship,
£ibbotnik, left Archangel on the 16th of August 1920 with foreign
t*ade cargo. In 1921 the Belomortran was reorganized into the
Viite Sea District of Sea Communications (BOMPS) , and in 1922 the
Northern State Steamship Line Company was formed.
3
V. I. Lenin, Complete Works', Fifth Edition, Vol. 40, p. 213
Sorskoy Plot No. 11, 1067, pp. 2-3.
5
iorskoy Flot No. 3, .1963, pp. 3-10. .
o o ^

In the Black Sea, the salvage of ships started in the
:ond half of 1920. After one year of salvage and extensive
air work, the Black Sea Steamship Line Company resumed
o e ration.
In the Baltic, the Baltic State Steamship Line was organized
i 1922. The company immediately started to caTry foreign cargo.
Mney earned by charter permitted the Baltic Company to repair
sips and thus to increase their number and total tonnage.
A'ter one year the company had 30 ships with a total tonnage of
6
J, 590 tons. After 1922, the shipbuilding industry speeded up
nip repair and soon began the construction of new ships.
With the introduction of the NEP (New Economic Policy) in
D21, all steamship companies started to operate on a self-
upporting basis; they were no longer financed by the state.
n order to attract private capital, the joint stock shipping
ompanies Dobroflot and Sovtorgflot were organized. In addition,
oreign capital was attracted through a number of mixed companies.
for example, in May 1921 the Russian-German company, Derutra, and
.a 1923 the Norwegian-Russian Steamship Company were organized,
.'he mixed companies, besides bringing in needed foreign capital,
vere viewed as a device for avoiding the blockade of Soviet foreign
b _MA y»oV/~ t? TV 1 -"-*- '*V- 1 ' TOR7 nn — 7uitji . sKuy x .'.>..' ... fto . X , — > ^j I f yjtf . »-» * •
7
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,
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rade cargo and for gaining experience in operating steamship
ines. There was a strict "division of labor" between joint
took and nixed companii;:;; tho formor w< •/ • .. llnwM i., . .,,,
:argo between Soviet ports in coastal navigation and the latter
>ere used for the transportation of foreign trade cargo
8
.'xclusively. With the growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine
md improved relations with many foreign states, both types
9
)f company were liquidated.
In 1925 the restoration of the majority of ships was
iompleted. The Soviet yards started to build new ships and,
In addition, ship procurement abroad was initiated. The merchant
aarine program visualizing the construction of 698,000 tons of
10
ships was approved by the Counsel of Labor and Defense in 1925.
In 1928, prior to the first Five Year Plan, about 80% of Soviet
Merchant Marine ships were more than 20 years old. According to
the first Five Year Plan (1928-1929/1932-1933) , 10 billion rubles
of capital investment were planned for Soviet transport, 3.6
times more than the 2.7 billion rubles for the previous five
years. It v/as further planned to complete the restoration
of Soviet Merchant Marine and to increase cargo sea transportation
8
MorsVoy Flot Xo. 11, 1967, pp. 2-3.
9
March 1930 Decision of the Soviet Government t . .:oy
Flot No. 1, 1937.
10
For details, see Chapter entitled "Shipbuild g".
/
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re than four times, port cargo turnover two tir.es, and total
tjanage of ships more than two times.
During December of 1930 and the first few months of 1931,
te Soviet transportation system, which was lagging considerably
chind the increasing demand, became the object of the special
onside ration of the Party and the government, 'which led to a
nmber of decisions to improve the situation. The decision to
cganize the People's Commissariat for Water Transport was made
12
a January 30, 1931. On April 14, 1931 another decision "on
<)a transport" demanded an improvement in the efficiency of the
iranch and approved the organization of six merchant marine
drectorates: The Azov, Baltic, Caspian, Northern, Pacific, and
Hack Sea.
Although the first Five Year Plan was not fulfilled, the
erchant marine received 136 new ships with a total cargo capacity
f close to 500,000 tons (more than half were Soviet built). In
932 the total cargo turnover of the Soviet Merchant Marine
13
eached the pre-revolution level.
The Party directives for the second Five Year Plan
1
Morskoy Plot Ho. 2, 196S, p. 3.
1?Up to that time the Soviet Merchant Marine was subordinated
o the Ccii cit of Railroads. The new Co^-ii^sarir. b of Yi'ater
'ransport included the merchant marine and the river fleet.
1°
Morskoy Flot T.o . i, 1967, pp. 5-7.
p p

(1933-1937) visualized an accelerated development of Soviet
Merchant Marine. A total of 26.3 billion rubles were planned
for the development of Soviet transport. Although the figures
for the merchant marine were not published, .judging from
previous practice, 6 to 8 billion rubles would be a fair
assumption. In reality, however, the merchant *marine received
only 23 new ships during 1933-1934, with a total cargo capacity
of 130,000 tons. The remaining three years of the second ?ive
Year Plan witnessed a sharp reoricniaiion of Soviet industry
toward military production. "In shipbuilding, Navy orders
became predominat, and construction of merchant ships practically
stopped. Partial reinforcement of the merchant marine was
14
conducted through the purchase of ships abroad."
Instead of ships and port modernization, the Soviet
Merchant Marine was fed with decisions. According to a decision
of the CPSU Central Committee in 1934 the political directorate
of Water Transport and political departments in steamship
companies were organized. Their functions were defined as "to
assure fulfillment of Party directives for the improvement of
all activities of water transport, to increase political
15
education and training of personnel, to elevate vigilance".
14
Morskov Flot No. 2, 1987, p. 4
.
15
Morskoy Flot No. 2, 1967, p. 5.
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anwhile, the shortage of Soviex tonnage forced the greater use
o the chartering of foreign ships. • l
The Spanish Civil War presented the Soviet Merchant Marine
v.th an additional burden. The Soviet supply to the Republican
culd be delivered only by sea, directly to the Spanish ports,
c through France. A number of Soviet ships were detained by
Panco forces, and three, the Komsomol, the Timiryazev, and the
Eagoev, were sunk. The weak Soviet Navy could not provide the'
bviet Merchant Marine with effective protection.
The 18th Party Congress (March 1939) directives for the
tiird Five Year Plan for 1939-1943, visualized the acceleration
c: the merchant marine development. According to the plan, the
nrchant marine role in the country's transportation system was
") be increased, new types of ship were to be built, ports
:aproved, and the Northern Sea Route mastered. A considerable
16
ncrease in capital investment was planned. In reality, however,
espite a modest increase in civilian- shipbuilding <, little was
Dne to improve the merchant marine prior to World War II. By
940 the tonnage of the USSR Merchant Fleet approached 2 million
ons, but qualitatively the majority of ships were obsolete and
a no way able to satisfy the needs of sea transportation, either
a peacetime or during the war.




Vn>on the war started or. June 22( : C .;i, a UUKbor of merchant
ships wore taken over zy the Soviet Kavy. The activity of ail
steam-ship companies was immediately subordinated to the 'needs
of the military
.command, and firm m-m-*-o~„ ~~„+ -
,
«uu una ilitary control over them was
established. In the Baltic the merchant fleet was used to
evacuate retreating troops, military hardware,
-some industrial
machinery and civilian personnel' from the Saga, Tallin, and 'later
the Khanko. In the fail n-P iq/i -.., , ,i j.1 oi 1941 the whole remaining fleet was
blocked in Leningrad, where it remained to the end of the war.
In the Black Sea, the merchant ships v;ere used to supply aid,
later to evacuate, the Odessa garrison, to supply the defenders
of Sevastopol, and to assist the Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet
Army during the defense of the Caucasus. In the north, the
majority of available 40 merchant ships were used for transportation
of Lend-Lease cargo and raw materials (in western convoys and
also along the Northern Sea Route). Twelve ships were lost.
In the Pacific, merchant ships participated in the transportation
of Lend-Lease cargo from the U. S. and continued to provide sea
trasnportation for Far Eastern region, and along the Northern
!
I
Sea Route. In the Caspian Sea, the tanker fleet was used
extremely intensively, delivering Baku's oil.
The war took a heavy toll c^ the Soviet :.:V. . .O
— v^




remaining ships were badly rep; rs.
collected all the Axis shipping it could as rep ons. A
number' of ships, mainly Liberty
-class, ware obtained under
Lend-Lease. Decrepit was the term describing the condition of
small old ships built in various countries during previous two
to three decades. /
The war caused considerable damage to Leningrad, Murmansk,
and a number of other ports, while such large ports as Odessa,
Novorossiysk, Nikolayev, Tuapse, Tallin, and Riga were destroyed.
The plan for the restoration and development of the Soviet
economy approved in March 1943 envisaged, for the merchant marine,
the delivery of 400,000 tons of ships, accelerated repair of
suitable ships, capital reconstruction of major ports, 2.2 times
greater cargo turnover in 1950 compared with 1940, and a 2.5
17times increase in production capacity of ship repair yards.
Actually in 1950 the Soviet Merchant Marine transported 33.7
million tons of cargo with a total cargo turnover of 21.4
billion ton-miles. The promised tonnage was not delivered,
»
although the repair facilities were improved and port restoration
had begun. The inability of the mercantile fleet to fulfill
the plan was recognized in the Counsel of Ministers Decision of
17 June 1947 "on measures to improve the operation of -jhe merchant
1?
Morskoy Plot No. 5, 1967, p. o.
2c

•i:ic and fulfillment of the St • -
argo in 1947". While this "= + ,-~i-» . .m stick intensified somewhat an
:Lready tense situation in the induct™, ,• +n
~aa s ry, it could not and did
ot produce drastic improvements.
Directives for the fifth Five Year Plan (1951-1955)
,
clopted by the 19th Party Congress in October i9 52, devoted
considerably greater attention to the merchant marine. The"
cfpital investments were increased, somewhat larger facilities'
»r new constructions allocated, an intensified procurement of
sips abroad approved, modernization of existing and construction
c new shipbuilding yards and ports, planned.
During the 1951-1955 five-year period, the growth of the
Sviet Merchant Marine exceeded that in the previous five-year
pried by 63.8%. More than half of the new ships received were
Sviet built. In addition, many ships underwent major repairs,
tje last time such an approach was used on a large scale by the
'
Sviet Union. In 1955 the Merchant Marine carried 53.7 million
Aw of cargo with total turnover of 37.2 billion ton-miles. 18
The XX Party Congress directives for the sixth Five Year
'an, (1956-1960), envisaged a ..-..-chant fleet growth by 1,600,000
t (to be built mainly hy the Soviet avid Comecon country yards)
d increased participation of Soviet ships in transportation of
13
Morskcy




.reign trade cargo. The Soviet North - led out as a
piority area for merchant marine development. The timber
ejport there was carried out mainly by foreign ships (85/6%)
chartered by the Soviet Union. By 1959 only 70% of the Northern
S.eamship Company tonnage was powered, including 77.5% still
20Liming coal and only 22.5% using liquid fuel. *
While the sixth Five Year Plan was never fulfilled, (it
v:s replaced by the 1959-1965 Seven Year Plan)
,
the measures
provided in it did play an important role in the development"
c: the Soviet Merchant Marine. While not contributing much,
drectly, the Plan did set a definite trend, building up a
jrerequisite for the future accelerated development of the
i^rchant marine. In effect, it was the first plan which was
arried out during its initial three years as it was visualized:
ore funds were allocated and spent for ships at home and abroad,
ad more domestic shipbuilding capacity was allocated and
tilized for civilian' construction.
During the Seven Year Plan period (1959-1965) , the Soviet
/
.erchant Marine underwent a truly unprecedented development.
he plan for the merchant marine was revised twice, each time with
, considerable increase in tasks. The first revision came after
~'J
.Morskoy 71ot No. 8, 1967, p. 7.
20




tje 22nd Party Congress (October 1961), when it was decided to
acelerate even more the already fast growth of the merchant
ojrine for the reason that the plannedgrowth of the cargo
cpacity of the fleet was lagging behind the growing demand of
te foreign trade, and, consequently, a considerable expenditure
u.s required to charter foreign ships. The second increase was
ii 1963, for the plan was fulfilled two years in advance. The
increased tasks set for the Soviet Merchant Marine in 1963 were
iso over-fulfilled towards the end of 1965, again an unprecedented
nenomenon in Soviet planning practice.
According to the original plan, the cargo turnover was
•) increase by 220%, but the actual increase was 360%. In
958 the Soviet Merchant Marine carried only 6.6% of the total
argo turnover for all types of transportation in the country,
'bile in 1965 it carried 14%. In foreign trade, the cargo
urnover increase was 480%. The total cargo turnover increased
rom 57.4 billion ton'-miles in 1953 to 209.9 billion tons in
965. The merchant fleet tonnage grew from 2,845,000 register
ons in 1953' to 7,150,000 register tons in 1965, or 2.5 times,
n 1953 the Soviet Merchant Marine had about 250 ships suitable
or long hauls while in 1965 there were over 800 such ships,
he average cargo carrying capacity of the dry cargo shd
.




.;• tankers increased 180%. The Soviet Merchant Marine jumped
;iW the 12th place in world ranking in 1953 to 6th place in
LS5, becoming one of the youngest fleets in the world with
.liost 30% of its ships built in the previous ten years. Towards
;b end of the period, the Soviet Merchant Marine sharply
21
.creased its participation in the charter market.
The Seven Year Plan resulted in the complete elimination
i coal-burning ships, which at the beginning constituted 77.5%.
lithe total ship inventory of the Northern Steamship Company
ii:ered by way of example above. The average age of ships was
icreased from 14 to 8 years, while the average speed increased
'»m 8 to 14,5 knots. As a result, the amount of export timber
STied on Soviet ships increased from 14.4% to 195S to 32%
vl965. In 1962, the Northern Steamship Company was receiving
iij new ship per month, and in 1G65, two ships per month.
though completely retiring old ships, the company nevertheless
22
.creased its tonnage* by 1.7 times.
The phenomenal growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine during
its seven year period attracted the attention of world shipping
sWunity and press. For the first time in its history, the
Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 9-14, and No. 3, 1967,
). 6-8.
22
Morskoy Plot No. 3, 1967, pp. 3-10.
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Sviet Merchant ' c /oil as a • i
ad effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy
.i
2**
Directives for the 1966-107C Five Year Plan approved
V the 23rd Party Congress in April 1933 provided for a 50%




:i total cargo turnover, and a 40% increase in port productivity.
.:cording to the plan, the average ship operating time toward
le end of period was to reach 320 days per year for dry cargo •
25
;nips and 325 days for tankers. ^•
Although the plan was not fulfilled, actual performance
as close to the planned figures. The fleet was augumented by
40 new ships totalling 4.5 million dwt, an increase of 42% over
five-year period. Total cargo turnover in 1970 amounted to
54 billion ton-miles, an increase of 70% over 1935. (In foreign





See Reporter , February 10, 1966, pp. 24-23.
24
Morskoy Plo t No. 6, 1968.
Morskoy riot No. 11, 1967, p. 8 and No. 2, 1970, pp. 3-5.
26
The socalled Cuban Sea Bridge and the closure of the Suez
Janal contributed considerably to this Soviet index. Day-in and
lay-out the Soviet Merchant Marine has had some hundred chips on
:he Cuban run, where total tonnage deli 197C exceeded 3
million tons. The Sovi- . ~ - Vietnamese linos were served in
L970 oy more than 150 ships. The 1970 cargo carried to ..';.. h
Vietnam was sale to be equivalent no about 1,000 trainloads.
few Times No. 10, 1971.
90s:

During those five years, 730 million tons of cargo and 167
million passengers were carried by the Soviet Merchant Marine.
I 1970 Soviet ports handled 1,300 million tons of cargo,' a
27 "^ -
fifteen percent under-fulfillment of the plan. Average ship
aerating time increased for dry cargo ships from 310 days in 1965
tj 331 days in 1970, and for tankers from 311 days to 322 days.
28
_
A'erage "speed" of dry cargo ships grew from 235 miles per day
ii 1965 to 315 miles per day in 1970, and tankers, from 327 to
C.!3 miles per day. At the end of 1970, the Soviet Merchant
Mrine had established 65 foreign lines including 33 with a *
jiblished schedule. In addition, there were many lines in coastal
nvigation.
Reporting to the Collegium of the Ministry of Merchant
;*rine, Minister Guzhenko stated that the Soviet Merchant Marine
uring 1966-1970 "assured the complete fulfillment of the cargo
rausportation requirement in coastal navigation, the independence
f Soviet foreign trade from the capitalistic charter market, and
ssistance to fighting people of Vietnam, Egypt, and other
29
ouutries". First Deputy Tikhonov added that, by satisfying
27Ibid.
28
Morskoy Flot No. 3, 1971, pp. 3-7.
29
Vodnyy Trar port, '11 7o;:^uary -07.:.
OOP

requirements of the Soviet .. t ........ economy,
lafine fulfilled "the century-old dream of Russia's leading
legators"
.
The following table illustrates the augm< ition of the
iciet civil fleet. It can be seen that, while total annual
pjwth has been around 1 million tons, not all *shi^^ ~clong
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The Five Year Plan for 1971-1975, directives .for which were
.proved by the 24th Party Congress in April 1971/ provides for a
3
.Vther increase in Soviet Merchant Marine tonnage of 5 million
As. It is planned to increase total cargo turnover by 35%,
Ale increasing cargo carriage '^y 40%. The plan provides for the
instruction of new ports and modernization of existing port
:.;ilities. The deep-draft dock areas in the Soviet ports are to
30
jc increased by 37%.
It is planned to increase container carriage and to replenish
:b merchant fleet with ships carrying 40, 200, 300, and 700
xitainers. Special container terminals in Leningrad and
f&hodka, utilizing the latest container handling techniques, are
:c become operational. The introduction of ships of 5,000 dwt
ill 25,000 dwt with stern ramps as well as LASH (lighter aboard
sifl.p) ships, each designed to accommodate 40-50 lighters of
20-400 tons each is also being planned. The Soviet Merchant
Urine is supposed to receive a number of large bulk carriers
y. 23,000 dwt,, 50,000 dwt, and at the end of the period,
/
.'(-30,000 dwt, combination tanker-ore carriers of up to 120,000
IV;, and large, 150,000 dwt tankers. More intensified long-haul
*ory service", most of which will be suitable for .ice navigation
o 0,,forskoy .Flot No. 3 and .:o. 4, 1971; _ > Times No. 10, 1971
/

a the Far Fast, the Baltic and the Caspian Seas is visualized. 31
The merchant fleet is to be augmented according to following
pproved principles: new constructions will have an increased
argo capacity "up to rational limits", with increased speed,
otimum minimization of number of ship types built in series with
nde introduction of automation and crew reduction. It is planned
d increase the profit from Merchant Marine operations by 29%,
ad the net profit from foreign runs by 28%.
The development of the Soviet Merchant Marine in the more
2mote future," during the second half of the 1970s and the"
aginning of the 19S0s, although not validated by any announced
Ian, is being discussed by leaders and specialists of the Ministry
ad can be visualized as follows:
(a) Ships - The process of ship specialization already
ell unaer way will not only continue but intensify, coupled
ith the increased size (tonnage) of ships. Bulk carriers of
0-100,000 dwt and larger as well as tankers of about 200,000-
50,000 dwt most likely will be built. The number of general
/
argo ships,' so numerous in the present Soviet Merchant, will
eiinitely be reduced. Considerable attention will be devoted
o containerization, which will be particularly intensive during
be second half of the 1970s, when the port facilities and other
31
Mor • Flot No. 0, " 70; N .- •:: ' -.;os ::o. 10, 1971; and
oyctskay a , :^;ssiya, 25 May 1971.
\J v-' J

<|>des of transportation sho . be ready for it. Dur
hlf of 1970s, containerized car-.. . I exc the
ital. The speed of ships will be increased gradually, .or in
i>st cases a drastic increase in speed is not yet warranted
:>t only technologically but it would require the modernization
c: ports, particularly their cargo handling facilities.
LASH and Roll-on/ltoll-of f ship types will be introduced
:i considerable number during the 1975-1930 period. The process
(L ship automation should not only continue but will most likely
12 intensified. New types of crews composed of specialists
(Lviaed into two groups - control and maintenance - will man
iighly automated ships. Wide introduction of submarine transports,
arge air-cushion and hydro-foil ships during 1970s is unlikely.
;sw methods of handling and transporting bulk cargo, such as
'atering down the cargo and loading or unloading it through
ose-pipes, combined with 90-95% enrichment of ores, will
robably be introduce'd on an experimental basis towards the end of
he 1970s.
(b) Ports - Initially in large ports (Zhdanov, Murmansk,
akhodka, Novorossiysk, Ismail) and later in others, more highly
utomated cargo processing devices will be installed, and there
hould be a four to five-fold increase in productivity of loading
'.ad unloading operations. More deep-channel approaches to the
o c 1

Arts will be dredged and dock arc d \ ... increased. Spec. zed
clicks (terminals) for handling containers and packaged (unitized)
ergo will be built in Leningrad, Riga, Il'ichevsk, Odessa,
Vldivostok, and Petropavlovsk. Specialized docking areas for
kndling chemicals, ores, coal, and similar cargo will be built.
(c) Management
- Wide introduction of a 'computerized control
astern (ASU) will succeed the initial, present basin and
seamship companies computer centers. Towards the end of the -
])70s the automation of control in the Soviet .Merchant Marine
sould be completed.
Coupled with the further increase in line shipping with
lie employment of specialized, automated, series-produced ships
ad improved port facilities, the measures most likely will
jjsult in a considerable improvement in the over-ail efficiency
32
<f
the Soviet Merchant Marine.
Those are the main stages in the development of the Soviet
erchant Marine and the most probable trend of its development
aring the decade of the 1970s. It can be seen that despite
36 numerous attempts, mainly through unrealistic plans approved
y the Party, to speed up the growth of the Merchant Marine and to




4 August 1070; Literati] \ayg Sazeta
,
January 1971; Morskoy Plot No. 12, 1970, pp. 4-7 and Xo . 7 ,
971, pp. 3-5.

d for a variety of reasons (mainly the priorit: • to th
Ltary production) that goal was not achieved uo to the middle
oi 1950s. Starting in 1956, but particularly during the' 1958-
IfO period, not only did the Soviet Union for the first time
ci^elop an extensive and realistic program of merchant marine
Mansion but, more important, for the first time was able
t<j implement it. In fact, speaking about the plan, it, too,
,;5 imperfect, for 'it was revised at least twice, but. in this
esse, upward.
The foregoing decisions and figures do not tell the
cmplete story of Soviet Merchant Marine development. Moreover,
tey do not reveal either the reasons for the decisions or the
mchanism producing the figures. The rest of this chapter will
fc: devoted to an examination of the factors which necessitated
tie decisions and the ways they were implemented; the present
cganization and the management (control) of the Soviet Merchant
hrine; the Soviet Me'rchant Marine research and development,
ducational institutions, and the personnel policy; ports and





The Ne ed for t '/.,.• M .- ' Marine
Up to the middle of the 1950 's the development of the
Sviet Merchant Marine was dictated mainly by the internal
economic needs and demands of Soviet foreign trade, which was
33
nt substantial. Since that time, however, there has been a
*
onsiderable increase in Soviet foreign trade and in the development
a Soviet program of economic and military assistance. The
ped of the Soviet economy for sea transport between Soviet ports
primarily associated with the development of new economic.
2gions, in many of which land transportation is practically
bscnt) has intensified. The events in Cuba, Vietnam, and the
iddle East have not only increased the demand for shipping -
o transport armament, equipment, and goods - but, in turn, were
o a certain degree influenced by the cargo.
Since 1955, the growth of Soviet foreign trade has out-
gripped the growth of the Soviet economy. The growth of
,
:ransportation of foreign trade cargos in turn exceeded the growth
>f the foreign trade. For example, during the period 1955-1907
/
the transportation of foreign trade cargo grew 4.2 times, while
34
the value of the Soviet foreign trade grew only 2.8 times. In
33
See Appendix II, Soviet Foreign Trade. Economic and
Military A j d,
34
N. D. Mozharov, "C of Socialist Coi "- \s :.:-.
the Area of Sea Transportation" , Transport, Moscow, 1963, p. 62.
OvJH

.•oo years, 1959-1961, sea transportation of foreign trade cargo
i creased more than two times, reaching 5S.5 million tons in
161. ' .
The reasons for such rapid growth are both political
aid economic. On the political side, the obligations assumed by
tje Soviet Union toward a number of Arab countries, Indonesia,
c.d India during the second half of the fifties were of definite
importance. During the same period, trade with China continued
i> grow, and a considerable portion of it was carried by sea.
iward the end' of the 1950 's and the early 1960*s, what the
oviets call "the process of disintegration of the world colonial
:/stem" had intensified considerably. During 1960, for exa.mple,
b Africa alone, 17 newly independent states were established,
'he Communist victory in North Vietnam and particularly the
ictory of the Castro revolution in Cuba were of significant
mportance. Not all the above outlined events played an equal
ad permanent role in generating the demand for Soviet shipping.
tame, like Cuba and North Vietnam, left the Soviet Union with
lo choice; others, like Indonesia, had looked very promising, and
lence worth the gamble. The third category of country such as
the Arab countries, while in the majority ideologically alien,
presented the Soviet Union with the opportunity to undermine
Western positions in the region and hence with possible political
o r ~

met, in the future, maybe even economic gains. The break with
:hina in the late 1950's on the one hand forced the Soviet Union
;o reconsider its obligation toward certain countries, and as
l result, for example, sharply increase its assistance to India.
)n the other hand, the break relieved the Soviet economy of a
:onsiderable burden thus permitting more flexibility in trade
is well as economic and military assistance. 35 The traditional
OViet design "to free the country of the capitalistic shipping
larket" and to have greater flexibility in the support of political
;oals should be added to that set of factors.
The peculiarity of the Soviet economy plays an important
•ole, for, while the USSR is the second economic power in the
orld and produces sophisticated armaments, the overall level
if Soviet technology is still below that in most the Western
•.ountries. This factor has given a peculiar character to Soviet
foreign trade. While a positive balance of payments has been
—
While the ideological, historical, and nationalistic
.spects of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and break nave been investigated
n great detail, the economic aspect, with the exception of the
iifficuities the break created in China, has to a large degree
>eea neglected. It is a firm belief of this writer, 'chat
ihina's needs and the Soviet Union's economic possibilities,
trimarily industrial capacities, were incompatible. The break,
herefore, although producing clearly undesirable political
:onsequences for the Soviet L'aion, si.
.
iu ltaneously ' released
:onsiderable industrial capacities, permitting the Soviet




maintained in most of the years of Soviet power, the physical
olume of Soviet exports and imports has varied sharply. Heavy,
i
ulky, raw materials have dominated the cargo in Soviet export
hipping. The increased foreign trade in monetary terms has
een primarily with capitalist countries from which mainly items
f advanced technology have been important. In return, a very
ew industrial goods produced in the Soviet Union could be sold
n capitalist countries, and, hence, raw materials continue to
emain the main item of Soviet export to them. In the trade with
-eveloping countries, the picture is reversed. All this produced
.
situation whereby in 1967 Soviet export sea shipments exceeded
.mports by nearly nine times in physical volume, as can be seen
:rom the following table:
Soviet Foreign Trade Shipment (thousand tons:)











Export 84,376 (46%) 151,767 (52%) 184,563 ( %)38,765 79,088 98,459
Import 14,934,.^ 22,143, N 22,120, „ s
-57925(40%) 127749(57%) 107297(46%)
V ^ y* p "1 T
... uiia
a, o c •-Institute, 1968^ and N". D. Mozharov, pp. 62-33.
O r "7

Soviet Merchant Marine participation in assistance
3 North Vietnam goes back to .1954-1955, when two Soviet ships,
jrkhangel'sk and Stavropol', were assigned exclusively to the
SSR-North Vietnam "line". 36 With the escalation of the Vietnam
jar, the number of Soviet ships delivering cargo to North Vietnam
ncreased correspondingly: in 1964 47 Soviet merchant ships
37
eached North Vietnam; in 1965, 79; in 19S6, 122; 1967, 433.
The first Soviet ships, Arkhangelsk, Brats, Izhevsk, and.
olnechnogorsk delivered cargo to Cuba in the fall of 1959. ' The
sea bridge" to Cuoa was established in 1960, when the first
Soviet tanker, Cheboksary, delivered 11,000 tons of oil, followed
>y uninterrupted deliveries by other ships. In 1960, two million
;ons of oil were delivered and in 19-59, 5.5 million tons. At
present, the annual cargo turnover of the Cuban "sea bridge" is
xbout 9 million tons (7.3 million tons to Cuba, and 1.3 million
tons, mainly sugar and ore, to the Soviet Union in 1969). During
the 1960-1966 period,' Soviet seaborne cargo shipments between
the USSR and Cuba grew nearly five times and with North Vietnam,
3.4 times. Toward the end of the 1960 's the Soviets had 20-30
36Morskov Plot No. 1, 1971, pp. 3-4.
.
37Report to the U. S. House of Representatives, Committee




, Section 4, V • .t 'Marine , U.S. Govt. ?r—;ing , ,— ee,
December 1968, Washington, D. C.
38
yoi-skov 7 V; t No. S, 1970, p. 53.
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•lips on route to or from Cuba on any given day.
39
Seaborne- cargo shipments between Soviet ports and developing
ountries grew considerably during 1961-1965. With Socialist
ouutries it increased from 6.3 million tons in 1960 to 16.4.
illlion tons in 1967. The seaborne shipments between the USSR
ad capitalist countries grew about three times*, while with
,ipan, 5.5 times (6.7 million tons in 1965), with Italy, 3 times
3 million tons), and with West Germany, 7 times (3.1 million
ons) .
Shipping Policy
The foregoing factors and figures are definite testimony
p the importance of the Soviet Merchant Marine during the 1960's.
iit at the beginning of the decade discrepancy arose between the
lanned growth of merchant marine tonnage and the tonnage actually
squired. It forced the Soviet Union to increase considerably
He chartering of foreign - flag ships, which in turn "reduced the
ffectiveness of foreign trade" or, in simple language, cost too
41
uch and forced the Soviets to pay in badly needed foreign exchange.
V. G. Bakaev, "USSR na morskykh putyakh" (USSR on World
ea Routes ) , Znanie, Moscow, 1969, p. 16.
40
N. D. Mozharov, op. cit., pp. 63, 66 and ^.04.
41
Moreover, the shortage of ships imposed an added burden
pon the other, already ovc^-oaded, modes of Soviet tr.. . -nation,
articularly the railroad system.
O ^'

p i3 why at the beginning of the 1960's a review of the
iven-year plan for the development of oho Soviet Merchant Marine
ms made, resulting in accelerated shipbuilding at domestic
;3.rds and increased orders for merchant ships abroad. In 1962
le total annual increase in Soviet Merchant Marine cargo carrying
apacity was equal to the growth of sea shipments of foreign
rade cargo, and toward the end of the decade exceeded it. The
ptal tonnage of dry cargo ships increased from 2,107,000
3gistered tons in 1953 to 4,704.000 registered tons in 1965.
.a even more rapid growth of total tonnage was achieved in the
anker fleet: from 741,000 registered tons in 1953 to 2,446,000
42
egistered tons in 1935, or 330%. Major factors for such a
apid tanker fleet expansion were Cuba's need for oil, which had
o be shipped thousands of miles, boycott attempts (which only
artially succeeded) organized by Western oil companies, and the
rowth of Soviet oil exports.
The development* of foreign trade, particularly on the
•asis of the long-term agreement preferred by the Soviets, created
. more or less steady flow of cargo to and from certain geographic
.ud political regions. It permitted the Soviet Union to establish
'foreign trade cargo traffic directorates" and to establish five
;roups incorporating several such directorates, European, Middle
42




East - African, South Asian, Far Eastern, an J American.
The European Group
, where close to one-half 'of foreign
A
trade cargo is shipped, includes three directorates: the -^
Mediterranean (Italy, France, Greece); the Scandinavian; and
Continental (West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Great
Britain). Oil, oil products, coal, and timber are the main
cargoes (by volume) in this .group.
The Middle East - African Group includes five directorates
The Near East (Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus); the Red Sea
Countries; the Persian Gulf Countries; the North African
Countries; the West African Countries. The largest cargo flow
is to Egypt.
The South Asian Grou includes India, Pakistan, Ceylon,
Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, and Indonesia; The Fa r
Eastern Group, Japan, North Korea, and North Vietnam; The
American Group
,
Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Canada, the U.S.,
Mexico, and other countries of the Western Hemisphere.
Practically all major Soviet basins (Northern, Baltic,
Black Sea-Azov, Caspian, and Far Eastern) are participating
in more than one group through the steamship companies located
there. Some steamship companies of a particular basin have been
assigned to specific directorates, and also are specializing in




p a rticular ca rg o
.
The Northern Basin companies are specializing in ship-oats
f timber and minerals, mainly to the European -roup, as' well
s delivery of coal to the USSR from Spitsbergen.
The Baltic Basin companies are mainly involved in
bipments of industrial goods as well as coal and oil mainly
.o European and American (including Cuba) groups. The companies
if the basin are also participating in shipments to West Africa
rroups
.
The Black Sea-Azov Basin companies are serving all five
;roups and are carrying a considerable portion of Soviet foreign
trade cargo, mainly oil, coal, cement, metals, machines, and
sugar. The companies of Far Eastern Basin are serving the Far
Eastern and in part the South Asian and the American groups.
Up to 1965 the Caspian Basiu provided partial deliveries
of Soviet foreign trade cargo to Iran in addition to internal
transportation of oil from Baku. Staring in 1965, but especially
after the closure of the Suez Canal, it has been involved in the
/
growing volume of Iranian cargo to and from Europe.
With the closure of the Suez Canal, the length and the
duration of the North Vietnam runs from the Black. Sea and the
Baltic increased considerably, thereby requiring more ships to
maintain even the same volume of cargo. t?hile continuing North
312

letnam shipments from Euro? 5 j.ns, Far ....
is been gradually assigned the larger share of cargo for North
ietnam. Shipment via railroad a . the Northern Sea Route are
d have been increased corresponc gly.
The Soviet Merchant Marine has developed extensiv aer
ervice in four major categories: purely Soviet, operating jointly
ith other Socialist countries, jointly with capitalist countries, -•
nd jointly with developing countries. The economic advantages
f liner shipping are obvious, but their organization and
aintenance are possible only in the case of the availability
f a steady flow of cargo, at least in one direction. The
.learly established policy is to expand liner service, something
•elatively easy to achieve in internal shipping or in the case
)f lines operated jointly with Socialist or developing countries
[thanks to the planned deliveries and the absence of opposition for
i variety of reasons) . The initial Soviet attempts to join lines
run by V/estern countries, many of which are under the strong
influence of British shipping companies, ran into opposition,
rhe shipping conferences initially rejected Soviet steamship
AA
* A conference is usually formed by a number of shipping
companies agreeing to provide scheduled runs on certain routes at
fixed freight rates. Their customers often receive more favorable
rates as a reward for long business associations. The con .-. .ces
serve specific lines, many wi inounced schedules. The ships
participating in a line service are calledliners. The occasional
cargo, or c: L-go who^Q volume fluctuates considerably., is usually






ompany applications for membership. Of the various reasons
iven for rejection, the most common and important wore: all
oviet steamship companies and their ships are government owned,
nd the principle of government non-interference with commercial
hipping would be violated by acceptance of the Soviet companies;
he alleged fear that the Soviets were trying to monopolize
.heir own shipments, while infiltrating the Western lines.
The rejection of the Soviet application for membership
.n London's Baltic Exchange and in various Australian conferences
•esulted in not just a war of words, but certain deeds from the
soviet side. At least some Soviet business with the Baltic
Exchange was cancelled, and Soviet shipping companies organized
i number of "outsider lines" competing with the existing Western
Lines, often by cutting rates. Finally in 1969 a number of
Soviet steamship companies were accepted as members in various,
45
previously exclusively Western, shipping conferences. By the
45
Morskoy F lot No. 3, March 1971. For the detailed
description' of the Soviet "battle" with Western conferences,
see David Fairhall, "Russian Sea Power, pp. 119-148, Gambit,
Boston, 1971. Actually the first to accept a Soviet member, the
Baltic Steamship Company in 1960, was a passenger conference
controlling services in the North Atlantic. The Soviet rcacticn
.s expressed in an article which stated: "In these days, it is
a hopeless enterprise to discriminate against t! . Soviet anion,
and it is good t fc the A ;ralian conferences have f tally
understood . ,". zvej , 15 March 1969. The £ .: claimed
up to 1^69 they were paying over 1 million rubles an





4d of 1970, out of 65 Soviet lines, 15 were being operated
jiintly with Western shipping companies, and the number continue
ti grow. In April 1971 a joint Soviet-French line between Odessa
a.d Marseille was opened, and in May, the Japan-Mediterranean
46
Isa line became operational.
The growing importance of liner service can be illustrated
b way of the example of the Chernomorskoye (Black Sea) Steamship ..
Cmpany which in the middle of 1971 had more than 80 ships
asigned to all four types of lines. In order to increase the
efectiveness of the company liners, a special Department of
47
Iternational Lines was organized.
The conflict between Western shipping conferences and the
Sviet Merchant Marine has not been unique, for the conferences
peviously were involved in a conflict with the U.S. Maritime
Cmmission and opposed any attempts to impose shipping regulations
b the U.N. (UNCT.VJ - United Nation Conference on Trade and
48
Dvelopment)
. Sovie't efforts l.ave been directed toward reassuring
46
Vodny y T ranspo rt , S July 1971.
47Vo dny y Trans port , 13 September 1971.
48
The Soviet Union obviously prefers that UNCTAD play a more
important role in regulating international shipping, as is evident
fom a number of pre ounces » 2t Merc ': Marine officials,
ad particularly clear ^pressed in ... 'mer Merchant M rine




Western ship owners and demonstrating that once admitted, they
are faithful observers of conference regulations ,' which , in fact,
according to available information, they have been. The' Soviets
flatly deny the allegation that they desire and plan to monopolize
their own seaborne trade, emphasizing that it is a practical
impossibility and that the achievement of independence from the
world freight market does not mean monopoly.
Starting in 1962 there was a gradual increase in -the
number of Soviet ships chartered by foreigners, with correspondingly
greater earnings of foreign currency. In 1962, Soviet ships
carried 1.9 million tons of foreign cargo, in 1965, 8.6 million
49tons, and in 1967, 15.7 million tons. Simultaneously, the
number of foreign ships chartered by the Soviet Union has
increased, too. Chartering increased 4.4 times during the
1959-1967 period, and in 1967 59.7 million tons of Soviet goods
were carried by foreign ships, while the remaining 64.1 million
tons of seaborne foreign trade cargo were carried by Soviet
50
ships. Soviet statistics are vague concerning the balance of
/
!
charter in monetary terms, for they do not specify what percentage
of cargo carried by foreign ships was transferred by the ships of
CMEA countries. The Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine stated
49
V. Bakayev, op.cit., p. 25.
50






19C9 that between 1964 and 19G I the ....- :...,
f convertible currencies increased ten tiir.es. It is fair to
ssume that, at least in foreign convertible currencies
,'
the
carter balance continues to be favorable for the Soviet Merchant
irine.
The activity of the Soviet Merchant .Marine and merchant
arines of CMEA countries is closely coordinated in Section
i
j. 3 of CMEA Permanent Committee for Transport. The Soviet
conization, Sovphrakht, in cooperation with its counterpart in
tiEA countries, conducts a coordinated charter policy through the
barter Bureau. Cooperation in mutual use of tonnage, charter
f foreign tonnage, mutual use of ports, ship-repair bases,
xchange of information, joint policy toward international
emulations, etc. are well developed within the CMEA framework.
otal tonnage of Socialist countries at the end o£ 1970 was
1.4 million registered tons, or approximately 9.4% of the world
otal. It was argued that with its share of world production
utput in excess of 1/3 of the total, merchant marine growth
s not only warranted "from the economic and other points of
51
lew", but should be intensified. The effectiveness of CMEA
ountry merchant marines undergoes close examination during the
51
- f
orr;!:oy Plot No. 1, 1971, pp. 47-49, and __/vv
£*!H»22£i* 23 January 1971.
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r.athly .Moscow meetings of their representatives.'""
The Soviet Merchant Marine is maintaining a\few joint
Lies with developing countries which have been operating for
ay years. The joint line with India was organised under an
ii'eement signed between the two countries on 6 April 1956, and
.but 20 Soviet and Indian ships are now serving the line..
HJ joint line with Egypt was organized after the signing of an
53
ig-eement on 18 September 1958.
The Soviets have never failed to answer Western accusations
:acerning the Soviet merchant marine deliveries of cargo of
54
ie'eloping countries. The Soviet countercharges are usually
)">e£ upon the claim that up to recent times Western shipping
xipanies had no competitors in the developing countries, and
"iace dictated their own terms. Those companies have been
ujiused of "squeezing more than two billion dollars annually from
:t> developing countries for the transportation of their goods",
ul of being irritated at the "unselfish" Soviet assistance to
52
A. V. Voronkov, YU. V. Klemen'yev, Merchant Fleet of




p. 45, and New Times No. 10, 1971.
54
See for example, an article in July 1970 issue of U.S .
fos and vror ic; r
'"'i> ailc* Soviet Minister 0; mko's answer






lp devclopin ; countries.
As for the accusation that the Soviet Merchant Marine permits
is ships to carry cargoes of foreign shippers on their return
is at cut rates, the Soviet Minister admitted the charge,
dlling the practice "perfectly normal". He added that "many
:>reign shipping companies do the same and no o*ne has yet accused
tiem of engaging in economic subversion", and "it would be
isurd to deny that the Soviet Merchant Marine is interested in
fcrning foreign currency". In their counterattacks, the Soviet
preservatives accused the U.S. shipping cc":zz.:.Ljz of charging
ates "more than double the world's standard" and being subsidized
!y the government which, in addition, "have introduced
iscriminatory regulations", seeing in them an indication of a
risis in U.S. shipping. Admitting the economic competition
hich is going on today between the two systems in the maritime
ield, the Soviet Minister conduce .hat "socialism is demonstrating
ts superiority over capitalism", emphasizing that the Soviet
Merchant Marine is technologically more advanced than the
55
'leets of leading western countries, including the U.S.
55
New Times No. 34, 1970, p. 29
wo. J

Fleet C". '- •:.-
.
To implement the above outlined policies, the Soviet
erchant Marine has to have ships in appropriate number and of
uitable quality and assortment. Certain aspects of Soviet
olicy in this respect are considered in the analysis of Soviet
hipbuilding (the choice of rational, or optimum, sizes of
ry cargo ships and tankers; production, i.e. mainly series
onst ruction; selection of speed and type of machinery for the
arious ships, etc.). However, the operational aspects
nfluencing the fleet growth and composition and the employment
f ships under particular circumstances were not discussed. It
s appropriate to briefly consider these problems.
One of the major features of the Soviet Merchant Marine
s its serial composition. Large-scale standardization of ship
1
ypes was accomplished at the beginning of the 1960 's, when more
han 30 different types, which used to be produced for the
56
bviet Merchant Marine, were reduced to 11. The use of a
tandard design for ships and ship machinery allowed the Soviet
nion to build ships in large series, to improve the training
i crews and operation of ships and of ship repair facilities.
ong-term planning, although it did not always work smoothly,





haS be °^ a contributing factor to iaproving the composition
of the merchant marine and its performance, including expansion
of liner services. It has been claimed that the ccono.il gains
from the above measures are in the tens of millions of rubles.
During the last 12 years, Soviet Merchant Marine was
upplied with more than one thousand ships with total of 9.3
illion deadweight tons. Most of the new ships have speeds in
excess of 16 knots. The highest priority in the merchant fleet-
replenishment has been given to dry cargo ships, tankers, and
passenger ships.
Dry cargo, particularly general cargo, ships are in the
largest number in the Soviet Merchant Marine. Most of them are
of heavy tonnage, and can carry bulk cargos and heavy, and long
cargos. Many of them have removable hatches, making it possible
to open the deck wide. The advantages of that type of ship are
constantly being emphasized in the Soviet Union. In addition
to the conveniences they provide for loading and unloading
operations, they are the best suited for carrying a variety
of military cargos. The Soviet Union convincingly demonstrated
this when it used Poltava-class ships to transport missiles to
Cuba in 1962.
The di-y cargo ships-, which were built in lar
during the last decade, are by class: Leninskiy Koi
,




milt in Nikolaev and Kherson, • Lth 00 to. ...
speed about 19 knots; K / - ' nar ':o class, assent llj the
same design as Leninskiy Komsomol, but with a 12,300 hp diesel
Lnstead of a 13,000 hp steam turbine; Poltava class, built during
L960-1967 in Nikolaev and Kherson, with 12 , 000 dwt and speed
around 17 knots; Slavyansk class, with 12,900 dwt and a speed of
13 knots. One of the Slavyansk class ships has completely automated
control of the propulsion unit.
The dry cargo ship classes built in large series abroad
include the Omsk class, 14.9 thousand dwt, built in Japan, the
Beloretsk class, 14.9 thousand dwt, built in Denmark, and the : ula
class with 12.2 thousand dwt, built in Yugoslavia.
Other classes of ships built for the Soviet Union in foreign
countries are the Krasnodar class, built in Finland in 1961-1968,
the Murom class built in Poland, and the Vyborg class built in
East Germany, all between 12.4 - 14.9 thousand dwt and with a
speed of 17-18 knots. The Soviet Merchant Marine has about 300
timber carriers, which carry more than seven out of the ten million
tons of exported timber. The Soviet timber carriers are suitable
for carrying, and are being used to carry, other types of cargo.
Two series of large timber carriers, the gas-turbine propelled
Pavlin Vinogradov, 6,000 tons dwt, and the diesel-propelled




mall timber carriers of 3.3-4 and 1.4-2.4 t wt
espoctively were built in Soviet yards. In addition, a large
eries of Volgales class ships of 5.8 thousand dwt was built
n Poland, and of Kotlasles class ships, in Finland. Many Soviet
ry cargo ships have ice-reinforced hulls and are suitable for
avigation in northern areas with, and under certain conditions
57
ithout, ice breakers. The current Five Year Plan provides for
he construction of a number of bulk carriers and other. specialized
hips. A large ore carrier, Chernomory 'ye , 50,000 dwt, is under -
53
Dnstruction in Okean, one of the Nikolaev district shipyards.
Tankers constitute close to 40% of the total Soviet Merchant
arine tonnage. Although the average tonnage of the Soviet tanker
s still below that of the world's major maritime nations, it is
teadily growing. Besides, the size of Soviet tankers has been
ictated by the depths in home ports and in ports of the foreign
ountries with which the Soviet Union trades. Eighty-five percent
f the tankers were built during the 1360 's and have a speed of
ore than 15 knots. The Soviet-built Sofiya class ships of close
/
o 50,000 dv/t are at present the most advanced and largest Soviet
ankers. They have hull" reinforcement for ice navigation, and
57
A. V. Voronkov, op. cit., pp. 15-13.
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cijiic have been built for foreign sh: > o 1 Start in
]iG7, a large series of Velikiy Oktyabr' class tankers of 15.2
tiousand dwt v/as built. Also starting in 1957 a large series
c: small tankers, the Baskunchak class, of 1.6 thousand dwt,
Lmilt in the Soviet yards. LUit t ho tn.vjowi \ ^ I ;iovli ivhant
.v.rine tankers were built abroad. Between 1932 and 1965 Japan
elivered tankers of the Lisichansk class of 35,000 tons dwt;
ialy, the Leonardo da Vinci class of -19,000 dwt; Yugoslavia,
tie Split class of 20.5 thousand dwt; Poland, the Eauska class
c: 19,000 dwt and International, of 20,000 dwt; Finland, the
bvek class of 4,200 dwt. Several tankers were modified for
;:-fueling naval ships, and some tankers are used for delivering
uel to naval bases. The largest Soviet tanker, Mir, 150,000
ivt is under construction. The first gas carriers, the Kegums
lass, designed to carry 2,800 cubic meters of liquid gas, were
jilt in Japan in 1365, but no more ships of this type have
jen reported.
The present Soviet passenger fleet has about SO ships for
/
ixlimited navigation and several hundred small ships xor
oastal navigation, including hydrofoils serving local passenge;
ines. About 60% of the large passenger ships are less than
A. V. Voronkov, pp. 22-25, :oy Sbomik No. 7, D6o,
p. 9-1-1, and S^dost f^ "__:_-_-^i -'•° ' 4 > -- ^J > P* -"-"
6/Ji

;cn years old, and all are serially built. Thor< an ... ...
jhips of the Ivan Franko elass for 700 passengers) with a speed
>f about 20 knots; 19 ships of the Mikhail Kalinin class for..^
iOO passengers, and 9 ships of the j r rizstan class for 240
>assengers.
The Soviet passenger fleet now operates 15 international
Lines with a total length of 27,089 miles, linking the Soviet
Jnion with 37 ports in 24 countries. The Soviet General Maritime
5assenger Agency (v/o Morpa-rflot) has been promoting tourism
iboard Soviet passenger ships. In 1933 the Black Sea Liner,
Shota Rustaveli
,
made her first trip around the world. Mixed
uruises involving several modes of transport are now being
60
organized. Soviet passenger ships employed in international
Lines or under charter provide the Soviet Union with an important
source of foreign currency.





. n a ;
;
of the Soviet Mcrchar.w i.Tariric ;
.*
During its development, the Soviet Merchant Marine did
lot avoid the usual growing pa^ns. The Independent People's
Commissariat of Water Transport was organized in January 1931,
incorporating the Soviet Merchant Marine and river transport, but
prior to this, the Merchant Marine was subordinated to the
People's Commissariat of Transport Communications. In April
1939, the Independent People's Commissariat of Sea Transport
(Merchant Marine) was organized. In March 1953, right after.
Stalin's death, the Soviet Merchant Marine and river transport
were again united in a single Ministry of Sea and River Transport
Finally, in August 1964, an All-Union Ministry of Merchant
Marine (Ministerstvo Morskogo Flota) with the mission "to
61
supervise all sea transportation of the country" was organized.
The Ministry of Merchant Marine is subordinated to and supervised
by the Council of Ministers and its agencies. The Ministry
activity is coordinated with the Ministry of Water Transport,
Ministry of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Railroad, Ministry of
Shipbuilding, and others.
The Ministry of Merchant Marine is headed by a minister




:id a numoer 01 deputies. To ... i . he ;ter, to provid
';oliectivo leadership", there is a collegium consisting of the
:.nister as its chairman, his depu
, , and a number oi members '
£ the collegium including all the cl:iofs ci the main
./aist rat ions. The decide, oi the collegium are put into
Jfcct by order of the minister. The minister can overrule the
ollegium, but it in turn can appeal So the Council of Ministers.
here is a relative!}' clear distinction between staff and line
unctions. The function of the staff ia .Moscow is to plan,
oordinate, and control. The immediate economic management is
ainly in the hands of the basin steamship companies, which are
ie operating divisions of the Ministry. The Ministry of Merchant
.irine is also the agency of state supervision of mercantile
62
svigation in the USSR. It publishes regulations, instructions,
ad statutes which are binding on all ministries, departments,
ad organizations. The USSR Registry is within the purview of
he Ministry. The most recent changes in the Ministry structure
ook place in late fall 1970.
The Ministry is now comprised of two main administrations,
he Main Administration of Fleet and Port Operations and, the
ain Administration of Development and Capital Construction of
'Article VI, '_ ]Sl xt shi PP*ng Code -
> ' 611

oris, Yards, and Shore Facilities and several a< strations
ad departments. The most important is the Main Administration
f Fleet and Port Operations, which supervises the operations-^)*
5 Soviet steamship companies through three subordinate
dministrations.
The Administration of Fleet and Port Operations .of the
outhern Basin, Yzhf lot
,
supervises the operation of seven
teamship companies: Chemomorskoye (Slack Sea)
,
Azovskoe
Azov), Xovorossiyskoye, Gruzinskoye (Georgian), Dunayskoe..
Danube) , Kaspiyskoe (Caspian) , and Sredneaziatskoye (Middle
jsian) Steamship Companies. The Administration of Fleet and
ort Operations for the Northwestern Basin, Sevzapf lot , supervises
wo northern steamship companies, Severnoye and Murmanskoye
,
ad four Baltic companies, Baltiyskoye (Baltic), Estonskoe
Estonian) , Latviyskoye (Latvian) , and Litovskoye (Lithuanian) .
he Administration for Fleet and Port Operations of the Far
astern Basin, Dal f f lot , supervises three steam ship companies -
alnevcstochnoye (Far Eastern) , Sakhalinskoye (Sakhalin)
,
amchatskoye (Kamchatka) . The Northeastern Administration of
erchant Marine with headquarters in Tiksi is subordinated
irectly to the Ministry. The Middle-Asian Steamship Company
63
perates in the Aral Sea and en the Amy Darya River.
V -- Trans
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During the fal '0 reorgar tiou of the Ministry, the
Scientific-Technical Administration, incorporating the
:echnological Council, the Department for the Introduction of
Ldvanced Methods of Transportation and Loading and Unloading
operations, tne Department for Containerization and the Department
*
lor Analysis were established.
Each of the Soviet steamship companies is a large enterprise
•ith a vast area of responsibility, including not only "the
operation of ships but of ports, ship repair yards, salvage
ervices, etc.
To manage such a huge and complex enterprise as the
oviet Merchant Marine with its highly centralized structure
nd under the overwhelming priority of the Soviet plan, based
pon various economic as well as political criteria, is obviously
very difficult task. In spite of the greater emphasis upon
he economic independence of the major units of the structure,
radually introduced after the 1965 Economic Reform, the
lentral apparatus of ministry, its main administrations, and
he management of the steamship companies are in constant need
f receiving and supplying the flow of data concerning the
64
alfillment of the plan. The Soviet preoccupation with
.tistics is not for the' sake of statistics per so, but is an
64
V. G. Bakayev, op. cit., pp. 22-23
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bjoctive necessity uuder the system of management control based
pon central planning.
It now appears that the point has been reached where
jnning the economy under the existing principles and structure
3 becoming more and more difficult, and either the principles
liould be changed (and there is no indication of the leadership's
sadiness for this) or the methods should be adjusted to the
ituation without considerable modification of the structure.
'.ie Party approved state network of computer centers and the
lified automatic cdmmunication system, to bo gradually introduced
ithin the next ten years, appears to bear witness to acceptance
f the latter. The need for improvement in the- system of control
f the Soviet economy was labeled "the main problem of the Party
sonomic policy" in Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party Congress,
arty and government decisions stressed a need for the speediest
atroduction of a comprehensive system of automated control
*
ased on a network of computerized centers as a means of fulfilling
/
tie task. The All-Union Automated Control System (CGAS-
bschegosudarstvennaya Automaticheskaya Sistema Upravleniya)
ill incorporate the automated system of Gosplan, the Central
tatistical Administration, the All-Union Supply Administration,
he industrial bran c h e s , aad other cen t rally s v.b o r d : i .a t e d
i'encies , each having its own system called AST' (Av^oaaiokookaya
30

5istema Upravleuiya - automated control system). All
systems are based on a network of computer centers down to the
Large enterprise level. A number of such computer centers are
io\v in operation. The problem, however, is that the elements
)f the system introduced earlier were based upon various computers
vhich are in the main obsolescent and incompatible with one
Jther. Moreover, the installed computers utilized non-standard
programs. For those two reasons, they can not be linked
together even in the framework of one industry, not to mention
af an All-Union system. The Soviet Merchant Marine case
represents a typical example.
The Ministry of Merchant Marine, by virtue of its
activity and the availability of a relatively well-developed
communication system, was among the first where introduction
of the automated control system, ASU, was initiated. During
1962-1963 the TsNIIMP (Central Scientific Research Institute of
Merchant Marine) worked out computer programs for the
organization of cargo movement, distribution of ships on lines,
/
and the optimum fleet development. Since 1964 the optimum
lines schedule has been controlled with the use of the Minsk-22
65
Computer. In 1965 an experimental Calculating Computerized
65
TsNI IMP Transactions, Vol. 133, 1970, pp. 45-07.
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Center was organized in th Itic St Co -, followed
in 196S by two centers at the Black Sea SteamshipCompany
and the Far Eastern Steamship Company, la 1933 the Main
Computerized Calculating Center of the Ministry of Merchant
Marine was organized. The center's task has been to control
»
both the routing of ships and the flow of cargo and to plan and
regulate the operation of ships and ports, in cooperation with
steamship company centers, whose introduction into service and
operation the main center is supposed to coordinate.
The ASU of the Ministry of Merchant Marine, "Morflot", is
supposed to be developed on the basis of existing computer
centers utilizing a third generation of computers. The ASU
Morflot is being developed under the supervision of the Institute
of Control Problems, USSR Academy of Sciences, in cooperation
with various scientific research and educational organizations.
Two Soviet Academicians, V. A. Trapeznikov ("Scientific
Leadership") and N. P. Federenko ("Chief Economist") are in
charge of the system's development. The scope of the system
can be illustrated by the outline of functions the system is to
perform. Each function is tied to a corresponding sub-system,
as follows: 1. "Operational Control of Fleet (ships) location"
2. "Operational Control of Cargo Transportation Process"




3 : "Operational PI; I of Fleet . Port
1 "Current Planning of Basic Activity 'ine"
(utomates preparation of a economic calc." ...c^)
5 "Charter" (Automates flow of infor concerning the
darter market situation, analyses the economic effectiveness
5 charter transactions, determines optimum ship requirement)
5 "Technical Control of Fleet Condition, Ship Repair Plans, and
[plementation" 7. "Supply Planning and Stocktaking" • S.
'ookkeeping and Statistical Calculations, Zconcmic Analysis"
"Personnel". The ASU's of steamship companies, ports, and
Lrge shiprepair yards are to have similar appropriate sub-syste us
.
^unified system of documentation based upon computerized data
:ocessing is also under development. Those are the basic
fatures of the planned unified automated system of merchant
nnne control.
The system of communicat--<~.- existing in the Soviet ile reliant
Grille can hardly cope v/ith the fully developed ASU Morflot and,
Lerefore, there are plans to improve it "to the level of world's
est systems" over the current five-year period and in compliance
»..th the unified automated system of communications of the country,
63
llch is presently under development.
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The development of ASU Morflot
. y been >c
ith a number of problems. The computers installed dur
•ush to create more computer centers in steam ship companies
.re of various designs, and xy of them do not leet ... demands
i)f the system. There is lack of program standardization among
steamship companies, and the existing and presently ized
>rograms do not always correspond to the design cf the sub-
systems of ASU Morflot and hence have to bo modified and adjusted
;o the central system. In September 1971, the Chief of Far
Eastern Steamship Company Computer Center wrote "what at present
69
constitutes the ASU of the steamship company is not clear".
The Ministry was accused of trying to introduce first the sub-
systems for the center and of neglecting the interests of the
operating divisions (steamship companies) . The existing variant
of the system design was criticized for its complexity and the
excess of information flow it requires, which presumably "would
*70
overload the system".
The main problem, it seems, is not the amount of information
processed by the system, but its quality and reliability. V/hile
automation of the chain of information definitely reduces the
intermediate bureaucratic echelons "corrections" and the adjustment





yf figures required by the
.
., , such a possibility
. ... be
sompletely eliminated by computerizatic
., particularly at the
initial level (enterprises). An unrealistic report fed into
somputer does not change its quality, i.e. "garbage-in,
;arbage-out". Of course, the specifics ofmerchant marine
operations, the rather great dependence upon non-Soviet sources
>f information, and the need
-co analyze a set of objective data
(cargo, speed, weather parameters, time factor, ship capacity,
3tc.) seems to diminish the negative effect of traditional Soviet'
'adjustments" of the data and, hence, makes application of
automated control system more effective. Accepting such a
[lopeful assumption, one might conclude that the measures under
Implementation would increase the effectiveness of merchant marine
Management, resulting in reduced turn-around time, increased
Ship usage, and improved utilization of port capacities.
Personnel -Poli cy , Educat ional
ana ^-search ^ns\m. . . fces
/
In the course of developing a merchant marine, any country
faces two immediate problems: procuring ships and manning them.
Yhile the first problem can be solved during a relatively short
period of time hy building ships md buying them, the second
requires a considerably greater :oricd of time, for it takes
3 Q cU \J \j

years and even decades to educate an apj priate number of
specialists and to gain experience.
i
Pre-Revolutionary Russia had two maritime academies and
nine nautical schools. After the Revolution, the nautical
schools were transferred into specialized secondary educational
establishments, and two higher institutes to train engineers for
water transport were opened, one in Leningrad and another in
Odessa. Leading personnel of steamship companies and other,
merchant marine enterprises was trained in the Academy of . Y/ater
Transport. Drastic educational reform for the Soviet Merchant
Marine was introduced in March 5, 1944 by Decree of the State
Committee for Defense "on measures concerning the training of
command cadres of the mercantile fleet". Higher engineering
education for ship's officers was introduced. Educational
institutions of the merchant marine were enlarged and upgraded.
The decision was said to be motivated by the considerable losses
of personnel during the war, and the planned expansion of the
Soviet Merchant Marine. Three higher merchant marine academies,
/
Leningrad, Odessa, and Far Eastern, were organized in addition
to twelve nautical and one Arctic schools. In Soviet specialized
71
literature, the decision has always been referred as historic.
71
Morskoy "' 3t No. 3, 1969, .. 34; So. 10, 1967, pp. 7-14;
and Vodnyy Tr; rt, l.'^ --• 1969
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During the post-World War II
_ -ic ., the . a -
the size, of merchant marine educat:
In 1945 the Higher Arctic N sal School was org In
.1 the Arctic School was merged with the Leningrad Hij her
Maritime Academy into the S. 0. Makorov Leningrad Higher sring
Nautical School (Academy)
,
the largest Soviet Merchant .Marine
educational institution.
At present there are four higher and twelve ialized
secondary educational establishments, administered by the Ministry
)f Merchant Marine, engaged in training officers for an engineer
liploma in fourteen specialities and a technician diploma in ten
72
specialities. In addition to the Leningrad Higher School,
:.here are three more, Admiral G. I. Nevel'skoy the Far Eastern
ligher Engineering Nautical School; the Odessa Higher Engineering
tautical School; and the Odessa Engineering Institute of Merchant
iarine. All four combined have 5,000 full-time cadets and more
;han 4,000 correspondence courses and part-time students. In
iddition, three institutes are .raining engineers for shore
services and some of them, such as the Gor'kiy Engineering
institute of Water Transport, have departments for training ship
Officers. All higher schools have period of training of not less
79 ....
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han five years, and for some speciality 2 years
.nd six months. Secondary specializ* utical schools have
1
>eriod: of training of from three years to four years and three
73
lonths. The post-graduate training is provided by higher
;chools and two merchant marine scientific research institutes,
[ost of the graduates pursue full-time study.
The education is free, and the cadets receive allowances,
miform, and free board. But there are also part-time study
.rrangements with extended period of training, and correspondence
courses. Many sailors (unlicensed and sub-officer seamen) study
it both higher and secondary nautical schools by correspondence,
vuch studies are encouraged. The educational institutions
occasionally send instructors to serve on ships on long voyages
;o help correspondence-course students, and in large ports,
special student consultation centers have been set up. Students
In correspondence courses are given additional paid leave for a
Deriod of 20-40 days of year to prepare for and to take examinations
Approximately one-third of the Soviet seamen are involved in
studies at the higher or secondary educational level. The number
3f seaman correspondence-course and part-time students studying
in just the educational institutions of the merchant marine reached
23,000 in the 19C3-13S9 school year. In 1570 one out of four




men in the Soviet Mer ...
. . G _- ^_ higher
di- specialized secondary edu -..-.."_ >n ,....'
Cadets in higher and secondary nautical schools receive
good sea practice, which starts on sailing ships, and continues
bn special training ships assigned to the schools. In 1970,
the training fleet of the Soviet Merchant M ae consisted of
15 ships, and has boon growing since. A large series of B-SO
training ships (the Soviets call them "training-cargo snips'*
,
for they can and do transport cargo) has been under construction.
The original order for 3 ships fro- Poland was augmented in 1970
to a total number of 10 to be delivered daring 1071-1073. Senior
cadets are receiving practice aboard operational chips of the
Merchant Marine.
During the last five year period, 1965-1970, 32,179
engineers and technicians were trained, and 8,150 specialists
improved their qualifications in the merchant marine educational
76
system. The ship s officers of the Soviet Merchant .Marine are
relatively young. At the end of 1969 there were I, 6C0 licensed
captains, of whom 300 were between 31 and 40 years old, 750
between 41 and 60 years old, and about 40, more than 60 years old.
7S
.Morskoy Flot No. 11, 1971, p. ^
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i'he captains wore distributed as follows by nationality:
1,100 Russians, about 200 Ukrainians, 32 Georgians, 32 Jews, 23
77Azerbaijams. The Soviet Merchant Marina even has several
women officers, and at least three of them have been masters,
actually commanding ships. Of 1,600 Soviet licensed captains,
about 700 have higher education. On an average, in the Soviet
Merchant Marine it takes eight year^- for a graduate from a
higher nautical school and ten years for a graduate from a
78
secondary specialized nautical school to become a captain.
It is openly admitted that graduates from secondary nautical
schools have had a progressively growing feeling of a lack of
education, and many for this reason continue in higher nautical
schools by correspondence.
During the 1971-1975 period it is planned to increase
enrollment in the educational institutions of the Merchant Marine
Existing higher nautical schools in Odessa and Leningrad are
being expanded, and the decision was made xo organize a new
79
school, the Novorossiysk Higher Engineering Nautical School.
Apparently there is no lack of young men who desire
to enroll in nautical schools and become merchant marine officers,
77
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i 1971 there were from 3 to 5 applications (varying from school
) school) for each of the 10,000 openings available in higher
id secondary specialized merchant marine nautical schools. In
le Odessa Higher School there were 2,000 applications for 500
oenings. In the Kherson Secondary Specialized School there
80
<2re 1,200 applicants for 90 openings in the command department.
The Soviet Merchant Marine educational establishment
inducts an extensive public relations program. In addition
3 propagandizing merchant marine service throughout the country's'
igh schools, a number of higher and secondary nautical schools
re sponsoring extra-curricular programs in some of them to
tudy maritime subjects. A few schools went even further. In
rkhangelsk, for example, there is a high school which introduced,
Q addition to the regular study program, a maritime program
liich includes such subjects are navigation, radio communication,
arine engineering, etc. in the ninth grade. During the summer,
ale students involved in the program have au opportunity to
ail aboard nautical school training ships and obtain additional
raining. The Northern Steamship Company is sponsoring the whole
rogram.
As a result, the percentage of male graduates from high
chools maintaining close' ties with merchant marine organizations




applying to continue their education in nautical schools is
l
onsiderably higher compared with the high school graduates
81
vthout such ties. The foregoing permits the conclusion that
•iere is neither a shortage of applicants for merchant marine
uutical schools nor there is noticeable shortage of basic
:;ecialists required by merchant marine, and hence, the system




In addition to their educational role, the Soviet nautical
chools, particularly at the higher level, are involved in
xtensive research work. But the bulk of research work for the
oviet Merchant Marine is conducted by two very large institutes,
he Central Scientific Research Institute of Merchant Marine in
eningrad (TsNIIMF) , with branches in the Far East, Baku, and
[urmansk, and the State Design and Scientific Research Institute
,f Merchant Marine in Moscow (Soyuzmomiiproekt) , organized in
i960, with branches in Leningrad, Odessa, and Vladivostok.
The TsNIIMF was first organized as the Institute
of
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair in March 1929, assuming
its present
title and mission after the fall 1930 reorganization.
The
decision of the Ministry Collegium and Minister
of Merchant Marine
Order No. 475 of 2 December 1955 concerning
the intensification
81Vodnvv Transport , 3 October 1970
~- I i~v

f scientific research work in the merchant marine, allocation of
reater funds, construction of new buildings and laboratories,
tc, were important factors in the growth of the role of the
wo institutes and of their influence in the Ministry,
pparently this did not come about without the help of the
oviet Navy and the participation of its leaders, for at that
ime, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union, I. S. Isakov, one of
he most respected and best educated men in the higher echelon '
f Soviet Navy Command, assumed the position of the Deputy
inister of Merchant Marine for Science and Technology, and is
redited with playing a crucial role in the preparation and
82
he implementation of the decision of December 1955.
The scope of the work of the two research institutes is
>o broad that there is hardly any topic or aspect related to
;he merchant marine which it does not cover. The staff of
•esearch specialists in each institute numbers in the several
tundred.
It is difficult to draw a clear demarkation line between
;be specialities of the two institutes, for they have both 1 in
i number of instances been involved in research dealing with
;he same subject, for example, unitization and containerization
>f cargo or standardization of ship designs. However, the TsNIIMF




is primarily concerned with the mercantile fleet, its ships,
and problems associated with them. The Soyuzmorniiproekt , on
the other hand, is concerned with the economic performance of
the entire merchant marine, particularly over the long range, and
on the technological side, with shore facilities such as ports,
*
repair yards, and systems of cargo handling. Any given problem
is usually handled by one department of either institute. The
research findings and proposed solution for the problem are
reported to the Scientific Council of an institute which, after
approval, sends the recommendations to the Ministry for practical
83
application. During the past several years, both institutes
have produced a number of recommendations, including those
dealing with the automation of ships and management control of
the Ministry, which were accepted and have either been or are
being implemented.
There are fifteen nautical schools training unlicensed
and sub-officer seamen with a period of study of around one year.
These schools and a number of special courses from a few weeks
to 3-4 months in length supply the Soviet Merchant Marine with
a pool of qualified personnel. Many sailors discharged from the
Soviet Navy upon completion of their service as well as naval
83Examples of such recommendations are given in this chapter
as well as in other chapters, particularly the one on shipbuilding,
344

officers separated from the Navy for various reasons often join
the Merchant Marine, and thus increase the pooi of qualified
personnel. The romanticism of sea duty, a degree of adventurism
so common to the young, good pay (better than for shore duty),
and the possibility for advancement through education are but
a few of the factors attracting many Soviet young men to service
in the Merchant Marine. Soviet restriction on travel abroad
is also a definite factor in making sea duty attractive.
A system of material incentives is widely applied in the
Soviet Merchant Marine. In addition to free food, for which
30-49 rubles per month, depending upon area of operation, is
84
allocated, uniforms, better housing for families ashore, with
a network of kindergartens and nurseries operated by the Merchant
Marine, seamen are paid bonuses for the successful fulfillment
of plans and are provided with rest and recreation stays at health
and rest homes. More than 150 hospitals and 170 polyclinics are
run by the Merchant Marine Ministry, which employs more than
85
5.5 thousand doctors. New Soviet ships, which are in the
majority, have comfortable cabins for the crew and good
recreational facilities, including swimming pools in some ships.
A. V. Voronkov, p. 29.
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Practically all large Soviet ports have seamen clubs and cinemas
and some have hotels where families of seamen can 1 stay on visits
to the ports. The Ministry schedules regular radio programs
"for sea-farers", with good music and prescribed news and
propaganda and so called "radio letters" from relatives of the
seamen. Each ship has its own amateur musical and singing
groups, and some ships have orchestras. Athletic teams are
formed from among the crew members. All these groups and teams do
lot limit their activity to entertainment alone, which certainly
is a factor, but they perform while visiting foreign ports and
also participate in sports competitions with their hosts. This
so called "cultural and sport activity" of the crews is closely
supervised and directed to produce a favorable effect upon
foreigners.
The system of "political organs" in the Soviet Merchant
Marine, which at the ship level includes the Pompolit (Political
assistant to the captain) and Party and Komsomol (Young Communist
i
League) organizations, is responsible for the organization; and
/ . ! -
naintenance of such activity. Ship captains, most of whom',
together with the senior ship officers, are members of the .
y
:ommunist party, have to support that activity and probably
find it beneficial to the morale of the crew.






among crew, are designed not only to indoctrinate sailors in
Soviet Communist ideology but to make them effective
i
representatives abroad. That obligation of Soviet crew members
is openly proclaimed in the Soviet Merchant Marine, and crews
of Soviet ships are constantly reminded of it. There are now
4
more than 1,250 Soviet crews which are "collective members of
Soviet societies of friendship and cultural ties" with people
in foreign countries. Thus, one more form of "profitable"
employment has been found for the Soviet Merchant Marine. 8?
Shore Facilities
For normal and, even more important, for effective
operation, any merchant marine has to have well developed shore
facilities, particularly ship repair and port facilities. In
general, the development of shore facilities throughout the
world lags behind fleet development. There are very few ports
which can accommodate super-tankers, and the development of
progressive methods such as containerization is restricted by
the availability of ports equipped to handle containers. In
86
Vodnyy Transport, 19 October 1971. The article by Yu
.
Evfharestov, member of the Ministry of Merchant Marine Collegium
and apparently in charge of political work in the Soviet Merchant
Marine, gives a revealing ' description of the political role of





jeaeral, it appears easier to build a fleet to the appropriate
size than to develop the necessary
-shore facilities, particularly
Dorts, and the Soviet experience in this respect might be
considered typical. Even in the past, when the Soviet Merchant
,iarine was small, the existing shore facilities did not satisfy
the requirements. With the rapid development of the Soviet
-
Merchant Marine, the gap between th<? shore facilities and size
)f the fleet widened, not because shore facilities have not been
developed, but because the rate of their development has not
Hatched the rate of the fleet growth. Recognizing the problem,
the Soviets openly stated that the future profitability of the
Merchant Marine should not be bound to the emphasis on increasing
its tonnage, but would result from the harmonious development
of every branch of the industry. For the near future at least,
that harmony can be achieved only through the accelerated
87
development and improvement of ship repair and port facilities.
Ship Repair
The Soviet Union started specialization in ship repair-
just prior to World War II, when all large ship repair yards
were subordinated to a special department of the ministry, while
smaller ones remained under the control of steamship companies.
87
Morskoy Flot No. 4, 1970, pp. 6-10.
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I number of new ship repair yards were built before the war.
?he larger yards specialized in major repair as well as .construction
>f small series of auxiliary ships. The situation remained
mchanged after the war for over the decade. The three
jategories of repair, small, medium, and major, continued to be
Dracticed; the rationale for repair was dictated, by the need to
aaintain available tonnage and was not justified by economic
/alidity.
At the beginning of the 1950 *s, the rehabilitation of
existing ship repair yards and construction of new ones increased
the production capacity, 2.75 times over that of 1940. During
the decade of 1950' s the modernization of ship repair yards
continued, and a new yard was built in Nakhodka. As a result,
in 1960 the capacity of Soviet Merchant Marine repair yards was
3 times greater than in 1950 and 8.2 times greater than in 1940.
What appeared to be a phenomenal growth actually bears testimony
to how weak the ship repair capability used to be*
In 1959-1961, the research and design institutions of the
Merchant Marhe with representatives of steamship companies made
an extensive analysis of expenditures for ship repair and
developed the economic and technological rationale for some
types of repair. Optimum periods of service for various types
of ships and the approved schedules for allocation apd amortization
31+9

of funds for ship renovation were worked out. In 1961 new
regulations concerning ship repair were approved and introduced.
Major and medium ship repairs were excluded as economically
unsound, and only two types of repairs, a small and large,
which differ only in volume of work, were introduced.
In 1957 all ship repair yards were subordinated .to
steamship companies. Starting in 1962 the development of ship
repair facilities was accelerated, and capital investment for
1966-1970 was increased three times over that for the previous
88
period. Two new ship repair yards, one in Il'ichevsk (Black
Sea) and the second in Slavyansk (Far East) , are presently under
construction. When completed in 1972-1973, the Il'ichevsk ship
repair yards will, be Soviet Union's largest. During the last
five year period, 1966-1970, a number of ship repair yards were
modernized, and many were supplied with large floating docks.
The above measures, combined with the reduction in number of
ship types built and the construction of ships in large series,
i
considerably improved the ship repair situation in the Soviet
Merchant Marine. In addition, foreign ship repair facilities,
i
i
particularly in Poland and East Germany, can be and often are ^
i
used. Soviet ship repair yards are specializing more and more in




he repair of specific types and classes of ships enabling them
o be better supplied with parts, still in short supply, and to
ring the improved technology to bear. The modular replacement
ethod is being introduced, but owing to a lack of spare parts,
89
t is still not widely applied yet. *
The shortage of ship repair facilities forced the Soviets
;o organize and keep so called ship repair brigades (SRB) aboard
;he ships which were paid out of ship repair funds. Together
tith the base technical service (BTO) assigned to the ports, the
...
>RB performed about 15% of the total volume of work necessary to
laintain normal operation of ships and to prolong the period
)etween repairs at a ship repair yard. It is planned to increase
the BTO services to 22% of such work in 1975 and up to 37% in
90
L980 after wich the SRB will be disestablished.
The one reason the Soviet Merchant Marine is satisfied
with the goal of 330 days of ship operating time, compared with
i
340-350 days in most of the Western countries, is the still
i
relatively weak ship repair and maintenance capabilities, both
of which are slated to be strengthened.
89
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There are not many natural harbors iQ ^^ ^^^
» the European part. For this reason, most of the Soviet
'
harhors have to he protected by breakwaters. Port facilities Were
considerably expand prior to fforld War n> ^ ^^^
locations, with few notable exce*nt<„„=C Ptions, nor their cargo handling
equipment was good.- Durine World w,,- tt6 x i War II more than 70% of the
port facilities in the Baltic the D1 , , oie i a , Black Sea, and the Northern
Basins were destroyed. Many ports, including such large ones
'
'
as Tallin, Riga, Nikolayev, Odessa, were left without a single '
Pier or cargo storage facility. The only undamaged ports were
.
in the Caspian Sea and the Far East. For eleven years (1945-1956)
most of the funds allocated for ports were spent for restoration,
and not until 1956 was a new stage in the development of port I
facilities initiated.
j
The expansion of Soviet foreign trade and the beginning
of rapid expansion of Soviet Merchant Fleet forced the Soviet
Union to start a major port facility improvement program. The- .'
highest priorities were given to expanding bulk-cargo handling
'
facilities, the construction of deep-draft piers and approaches,'
bunkering facilities and wide introduction of mechanized
91Morskoy Plot No. 10, 1967, pp. 7-14.
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cargo-handling equipment (gantry cranes, fork lifts)
.
Construction of new ports such as Il'ichevsk, Wrangel' and
modernization of existing ones has been underway for years.- The
completion of the third stage of the Port of Il'ichevsk will
make it the second largest in the Soviet Union. The Port of
Wrangel', about 20 miles from Nakhodka, being built with Japanese
financial and technical assistance. The construction plan for
the Port of Wrangel 1 calls for it to be completed in 19*73. .The
.
new port will have 60 piers for deep-draft ships and a total
A
berthing length of 12 kilometers. Special container terminals
will be built, and modern cargo transfer equipment installed
(for example, the coal terminal will process 12,000 tons of coal
92
per hour)
. The Port of Nakhodka was gradually built up in the
post-World War II period in an area 100 miles southeast of
Vladivostok. The port benefits from the Japanese Current, and
completely ice-free the year round, while Vladivostok sometimes.
freezes. A special extension of the Trans-Siberian Railroad




called a satellite of Nakhodka, but the Ministry of Merchant
i
Marine disputes the term, emphasizing that in the 1980* s it will-
be proper rather to call Nakhodka a satellite of Wrangel', as





the latter will have facilities four times as great and will
l 93become the largest deep-water port in the Soviet Union.
,
There are now 8 extra class, 21 first class, 17 second
class, and 19 third class ports in the Soviet Union and about
100 small ports. All together, they processed close to 300
94
aillion tons of cargo in 1970. However, the construction of
lew ports and the modernization of existing ones has not been
seeping pace with the rapid expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet,
ind the port facilities have become a major hindrance to the
;fficient operation of the whole merchant marine.
There is nothing unusuai in the present situation, because
for many years the main attention of the Ministry and its central
)lanning organs had been devoted to developing the fleet and
.ncreasing its tonnage. In the ten year period 1959-1968,
japital investment in the fleet exceeded that in ports by more
;han 7.5 times. While the Soviets have obtained a rather modern
nd to a large degree diversified fleet, their ports are incapable
f serving it properly, and the ships are losing a considerable
/
ortion of their operating time in ports waiting to be processed.
I
or example, in 1968, 57% of the total operating time of dry-cargo
93














;hips was spent in ports. Besides the low capacity for processing
hips there are deficiencies in planned scheduled arrivals of
t
oviet ships, further increasing the time loss.
A ssw^v-UM^MN MUV Ifctffcigft kttdJrfcS is striking. For example-,
n 1968 Soviet ships lost 268 ship days in foreign ports waiting
o be loaded or unloaded, which constituted 1.6% of alJL time
ost in unproductive waiting. In the Soviet ports, they lost
,341 ship days, or 27.5%, i.e. 24 times as much as in foreign
torts. In foreign ports, longshoremen await the arrival of ships,
?hile in Soviet Union ships wait until longshoremen are free to
mload them. As a rule, longshoremen in foreign ports work only
>ne shift, while Soviet longshoremen work three shifts, yet
according to Soviet calculations the transfer volume in Soviet
ports is only 2% higher than in the foreign ports.
There are two major reasons for such low performance: the
degree of mechanization in Soviet ports is still below that in
foreign and there is a labor shortage. For example, during
1966-1968 the volume of processed cargo in Soviet ports grew
/
, L
by 14.7%, but the mechanical equipment increased only by 1.1%
95
and the number of workers by only 2.8%. This is why at the
1










number of port workers, a request which is uulikely to be
satisfied. On the other hand, the Soviet love for bookkeeping
and statistics has produced a huge bureaucracy in the ports,
resulting in a situation where there is more managerial and
96clerical personnel than longshoremen and port workers.
The remedy is seen not in reducing the flow of information
and the bureaucracy, but in automation, i.e. introduction of
the automated system of control, the ASU. Meanwhile, the
bureaucracy is at work, and the delivery of each piece of ._
machinery to a port is accompanied by more and more, quite often
completely unrealistic, norms for loading and unloading operations,
which in turn increased the amount of fine a port must pay for
the time wasted by ships while waiting to be processed. A
paradox situation is created, where the port administration quite
often resists the introduction of new technology, preferring to
97
operate according to established norms.
i
As stated previously, the problem of disproportionate
I




and certain corrective measures, initiated. Already in 1971
thanks to the measures taken, the time lost by ships in ports
96
Vodnyy Transport, 29 August, 1971.
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was reduced, in some steamship companies by as much as 00%, but
the gap between the cargo carrying capacity of the fleet, and
the capacity of ports remains a serious problem, particularly-,
in the Far East.
During the current five-year period (1971-1975)
, it is
planned to build more deep-draft berths, particularly
.in
ports handling export-import cargos, to gradually replace most
of the general purpose cranes with specialized cargo handling
'
equipment with a high rate of productivity, to improve the..
scheduled operation of the fleet and to introduce more automatic
equipment. Ports are viewed as the main point of application
of the Merchant Marine in its drive to improve productivity.
The greatest expectations of the Soviet planners in
realizing this goal lie in the broad introduction of unitized
cargo processing systems, particularly containerization. The
development of a universal cargo containerization handling system
has been called a technical revolution in commercial shipping.
Eliminating the traditional pier-side sorting, warehousing, and
'
repackaging of goods, containerization offers vast savings to
shippers, tremendously increases the productivity of specialized
ships and ports, handling through specialized terminals. The
leaders of the Soviet Merchant Marine are well aware of the
advantages of containerization, and are planning appropriate
357





The overall importance and magnitude of the cargo handling
problem in the Soviet Union can be illustrated by the .following.
According to recent data, the number of workers involved in cargo
handling in the USSR in 1970 was eight million, after increasing
at the rate of 250-300,000 annually. 98 The Soviet Institute of
Transport Problems states that the total cost of load-and-storage-
99
operations is approaching 15 billion rubles per year. The
annual consumption of some packaging materials in 1969 amounted
to 600 thousand tons of steel, 48 million square meters of lumber,
100
and 450 million square meters of fabric. Bulk transportation
of cargo has produced tremendous annual losses, including 2




The Soviet Union has developed an extensive package-handling
98
Vodnyy Transport , March 16, 1971.
99
Ibid.
Deribas, A. T. Transportation of Cargo Y/ithout Reloading
,
Moscow; Znaniye , 1970, p.' 4.
Deribas, op., cit., p. o.
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system including the handling of containers. In 1970 there
were more than 900,000 continers in use, but most were the small,
102
three-ton size. The number of large containers meeting "^-^ '
International Standard Organization (ISO) specifications is
small, and as of 1970 these containers were not being mass
103
produced. Moreover, the Soviet transportation system is not
yet prepared to handle ISO approved containers.
The problem faced by the Soviet Merchant Marine is even
more acute due to the rapid introduction of containerization
among leading maritime powers and their successes in the highly
competitive charter market. Containerization was introduced
into conferences of which the Soviet steamship lines are members.
Due to the absence of specially built container ships, the only
commodities left for Soviet ships in the conferences to transport
were small amounts of irregularly scheduled and low-rate cargo
unsuitable for containerization.
The experimental use of containers by ships of the Poiava
102
The greatest owner of containers in the Soviet Union
is the Ministry of Railroads, which possesses 724,000 units of
1.25, 3 and 5 ton capacity.
103
The International Standards Organization (ISO) in
1968 has adopted as standard dimensions for containers an
8 £ foot height, 8 foot width, and lengths in 10 foot increments
up to a maximum of 40 feet.
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class and Lininsky-Komsomol class was initiated by the Soviet
Merchant Marine in the Black Sea in 1967. The use of containers
i
was also developed along the Northern Sea Route during the same.
104
year. The emphasis on the Northern and Far Eastern Region is
-ogically explained by the short navigational period along the
Northern Sea Route, prevailing climatic conditions, a lack of
covered storage facilities, and the shortage of port facilities.
Beginning in 1969 several Soviet steamship lines began n
to build up an inventory of their own containers. Utilizing r.
these containers an unspecified amount of cargo, usually expensive 22




countries. In spite of using small containers, the Soviet ~.
Merchant Marine's volume of containerized cargo in 1970 reached ~
600,000 tons. Starting in May 1970, ships of a Baltic line,
using Leningrad as one terminal and a suitable European port as s:
another, were carrying 10 and 20 foot ISO standard containers -
106
leased from foreign countries. The transit of containers
via Trans-Siberian Railway from Europe to Japan has been established zz.
and a regular container line between Nakhodka and Japanese ports :_
104Morskoy Flot No. 3, 1968 and No. 11, 1970.
105Morskoy Flot No. 1, January 1970.
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was opened m the spring of 1971. Also, during summer of 1971,
\ 108the container line between Il'ichevsk and Bulgaria was opened.
Along the Northern Sea Route and in the Northeastern Regions of
Soviet Far East, special self-propelled barges (Sever type, 14-ton
cargo capacity and the improved Vostok type, 22-ton cargo
4
capacity) carried aboard ships are used for loading and unloading
. 109
unitized cargo and containers.
The Central Scientific Research Institute recommended
seven new general cargo ships, all of them capable of carrying
containers. The proposed new ships are designed to operate as
liners and are self sufficient for handling containers. According
to the Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine, during the period
1971-1975, container ships will be built with capacity of 40,
200, 300, and 700 20-foot containers. Roll-on/roll-off ships
and LASH ships designed to take on board 40-50 lighters of
110
200-400 tons each are under consideration. The construction .
of cargo helicopter carriers was also recommended. Among the
arguments favoring the construction of such a ship is the frequent
1Q7Pravda , 4 July 1971.
108
Vodnyy Transport , 28 August 1971.
109
Morskoy Flot No. 1, 1971.
Vodnyy Transport , March 16, 1971.
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necessity for unloading cargo at harbors or points on the shore
lacking cargo handling facilities. A converted A.\:GUEMA-class
with three KA-25 K helicopters and a specially designed Project
No. 567 A cargo ship with three MI-8 helicopters were considered.
Increased reliability of loading and unloading operations of
*
those ships was claimed owing to-, their relative independence
111
of weather conditions.
The first Soviet container ship, Svetlogorsk, built in
Vyborg in 1971, can carry 218 containers. East Germany and
Poland started to build container ships in the late 1970's/
Containerization is planned to be introduced in two stages:
the first stage, 1971-1975, "organizational-technological
preparation" will involve building up a container inventory,
the development of a maintenance-repair base, and experience in
container utilization. This preparation will parallel the
construction of container ships, of which 18 have been authorized,
The Ministry, considering this number inadequate, is arguing




The proposed cargo helicopter carrier in conjunction
with a containerized or unitized cargo system comprises the ,
major elements of the ship helicopter extended delivery system
(SHEDS) . In addition, most of the new ships proposed for ;
containierization will be self-sufficient. The two measures






capacity for use on short and medium range lines (USSR-Italy,
USSR-France, etc). In addition, there is a plan to buy from
East Germany an unspecified number of ships carrying 40 containers
each (for lines between Germany, Bulgaria, and the USSR). The
Ministry of Merchant Marine plan envisaged 23,000 20-ton (or
*
equivalent) containers by the end of 1975.
During the second stage, 1976-1980, "containerization will
become the main means of transportation for general cargo". The
fleet of container ships will be considerably enlarged to include <
an unspecified number of specialized container ships with a
1,200-1,400 container capacity and a speed of 23-25 knots, 20-30
ships with a 700-container capacity, and 25 ships with a 300-
112
container capacity.
Meanwhile, the absence of specialized container ships
in the Soviet Merchant Marine, and all the consequences thereof,
was said by Minister Guzhenko to be "the result of the short-sighted
»
technological policy" of the two main administrations of the
113
Ministry. Even a partial solution of the containerization
problem will improve the situation in the Soviet ports somewhat,
but most of the problems will remain, and the Soviet port
112Morskoy Flot No . 4 , 1971, pp. 2-6.
113Vodnyy Transport, 14 July 1971.
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facilities will for years to come still be a major obstaclo
in the Soviet Merchant Marine's course to greater efficiency.
Some Economic Aspects of the
Soviet Merchant Marine"
In spite of the apparent similarities between the
»
operations of the Soviet Merchant Marine and the merchant marine
of any other maritime nation, it is an extremely difficult task
to compare their performance in economic terms. In fact, such
basic categories as ownership and the objectives of operation
differ so drastically that they as often the sole reason for
rejecting any attempt to compare the performance of the
Soviet Merchant Marine with its Western counterparts. The
centralized planning and control in the Soviet Merchant Marine
are often pointed out as another reason for the impossibility
of such a comparison, and the rationale of fleet utilization in
the Soviet case might' be completely different from the Western
rationale, profit making. According to D. Fairhall "some factors
/ !
are declared to be more rational than others and the nature^ of
the criteria applied to the planning might have very little in
114
common with the familiar Western criteria". What is implied
i









here is the possibility of using the Soviet Merchant Marine to
achieve purely political and military objectives, ;as certainly
i
might be, and occasionally has been, the case. As for the - ^
political purpose, the Soviets themselves do not deny the
importance of using their merchant marine to that end. Moreover,
«
the Soviet Merchant Marine is considered to be a part of a
unified internal transportation system and as such its performance
and utilization, if measured against the interests of the overall
system, do not necessarily coincide with Western standards of
efficiency.
In spite of the recent Soviet emphasis upon profit,
profitability, and the introduction of cost accounting in every
enterprise, when one examines current Soviet Merchant Marine
statistics, he will find continued emphasis on cargo turnover,
ton-miles, cargo processed, cargo capacity, etc.
On the other hand, allowing for the aforementioned
peculiarities of Soviet Merchant Marine operations, an impartial
observer cannot fail to recognize the existence of a pragmatic
j
understanding of its economic function by the Soviets. In.
addition to its satisfying the Soviet Union's shipping requirements,
"liberating the Soviet Union from dependence upon capitalistic
charter market", and assisting in the development of Soviet foreign
trade, there is a genuine drive toward greater efficiency in the
365

Soviet Merchant Marine which in essence does not differ wuch
from that in any other merchant marine of the world. They are
trying to increase the productivity of their ships, ports, ship,
repair yards, improve ship design, select better propulsion
units, install more productive cargo handling devices, introduce
automation, and reduce the administrative apparatus. They are,
in general, attempting to introduce the best from world maritime
practice into their merchant marine. Occasional rate cutting,
either to gain competitive advantages or to avoid returning,
empty, is not unique to the Soviet Merchant Marine, and has a
long history in world maritime practice.
The economic reform, "the new system of planning
(management) and incentives", launched in September 1965 was
gradually introduced into the Soviet Merchant Marine during the
period 1966-1968. First established in a number of pilot
enterprises, a Latvian steamship company, the Port of Riga, a ship
repair yard in 1966 and a Murmansk steamship company in 1967,
the reform gained momentum, and in 1968 the Ministry of Merchant
Marine completed the conversion of all its enterprises to the new
115
system. The introduction of the reform resulted in a greater
degree of enterprise independence from central control and permitted.
115
Communist of Armed Forces No. 21, November 1969, p. 47.
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wider application of economical methods of management. Profit
and profitability were applied as standards for measuring the
performance of ships, ports, steamship companies, etc.
The reform did not grant the enterprises complete control
over the distribution of profit and the portion left to the
*
industries varied. As for the Merchant Marine, 84.8% of the
1966 profit was left to the Ministry, of which over 70% was
117
reinvested. Planning and measuring of merchant fleet* performance.
in foreign runs in terms of profit was introduced even before the
reform, and high profitability of operations has been claimed.
The announced rate of return was 18.5% for 1968, 13.2% for
118
1967, 4.9% for 1960, and 3.7% for 1958.
In 1969 Minister of Merchant Marine Bakayev claimed that
the Soviet steamship companies' profits could be the envy of
"any ship company" in the world, that the profit covers not only
116
It has been constantly emphasized in the Soviet Union
that the Socialist state is not at all indifferent to how an
enterprise obtained a high profit. Not denying at all the
concept of profit, many Soviet economists emphasized, however,
that the high profit can be obtained "only through high prices"
(which, in fact, is a "general law" stated by Marx). Party
directives did not demand either the maximization of the profit
or the raising of prices. Increased labor productivity and the
reduction of production costs have been stressed as the main goals
117Morskoy Flot No. 6, 1968, p. 35.
118Communist of Armed Forces No. 21, November 1969, p. 48.
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operational expenses but capital investment for future development
as well, and that in 196S there was a net profit of 300 million
i
119
rubles. How much of the 300 million rubles was earned by
charter and how much by Soviet coastal shipping is not clear.
Bakayev became a strong advocate of a more rational
planning approach and further reduction and simplification of
system of indexes, at least in relation to the Merchant Marine.
He emphasized the peculiar character of the industry's operation,
the need for a greater sense of responsibility toward customers,
and broader application of the incentives provided by the reform
on the basis of a more rational establishment of funds for this
purpose. He also argued for better coordination of plans between
the Merchant Marine and its major clients, and the need for the
party responsible for a. delay to bear material responsibility
for it. The Minister emphasized the need to use only one index,-
profitability, as it is more objective and completely indicative
of efficiency in the shipping companies. The decisive influence
i
on profit growth of the rate of fleet expansion was used to.
/ i
justify the profit deficiency as an index. Profitability, on the








The profitability is calculated as the ratio of profits




The Minister was also against the application to the
Merchant Marine of group norms which are established for all Soviet
industries and which determine the economic incentive funds. .^
There is a lack of uniformity among the various Soviet steamship
companies which is caused by the specialization dictated by such
factors as geographical location (influencing navigation and
fleet composition)
, which is in turn usually linked to different
wage levels and material and fuel costs; the prevailing' cargo
and, hence type of ships; type of service, i.e. coastal or foreign'
shipping, etc. For example, even two companies, Murmansk and
Severnoye, operating from the same northern basin are different
in this respect. The average ship of the Murmansk Company is
30% larger, the average distance to carry a ton of freight is
40% farther, and the average wage for workers is more than one
121
and one half times higher. The importance attached to the
Soviet Merchant Marine has been acknowledged, and the majority
of requests of the Ministry were satisfied.
In comparison with wages in other Soviet industries,
Soviet seamen are well paid. In addition to wages and longevity
bonuses, there is a system of incentive bonuses determined by
the performance of the ship and contribution of the crew to it.
In the fall of 1971 a very important regulation for rewarding
121
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 25, June 1968, p. 5.
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ships operating at reduced manning levels was approved by the
Council of Ministers. of the USSR. The possibility for management
to eliminate excess labor was opened by the reform and first^ - -
tested on a wide scale by a chemical combine. In the Soviet
Merchant Marine, the experiment to man ships at a reduced level
(crew strength has often been in excess of the actual need) was
initiated in 1969, and it produced a very favorable result in
that productivity was increased by 11%. The main reason for
such a phenomenon was purely materialistic, for the remaining
crew members were paid better. All the wages of the relieved
members in rubles and 50% in foreign currency (crews on foreign
runs are paid in both Soviet and foreign currencies) were left
for distribution among the remaining crew members. As a result,
the average wage on such ships increased by 22% and crew costs
122
dropped by 11.5%.
The approved regulations not only sanctioned operations
with reduced crews (subject to approval by the Minister, providing
that the safety of navigation is not being compromised) , but even
improved the system of material rewards for the crew paid for
by the saved funds.
The 1971-1975 plan visualizes a 23% increase in labor
122
Morskoy Flot No. 8, 1970, and Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta
No. 39, September 1971, p. 7.
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productivity on ships, 12% in cargo handling operations, and




crew by 20-25% and in the more remote future by up to 50%.
Party control of the unions, the practical absence of
unemployment, and the shortage of labor produced a situation
»
where the workers not only permit, but welcome, the introduction
of any labor-saving devices. Surprisingly enough, it is the local
administration which tries to resist and avoid the introduction
of such devices, because of unrealistic increases in the norms
and indicies often accompanying them. As can be seen, apart
from a few obvious and often crucial differences, many other
factors determining the economic performance of the Soviet
Merchant Marine are quite similar to those operating in any other
merchant fleet.
123





The development of theSoviet Merchant Marine over half of
a century has been extremely uneven. Up to about the middle
of the 1950's it had not been distinguished either by the rate
of its development or its size or the characteristics of its
ships and what Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S.N., wrote at the end
of the last century " Russia has little maritime
commerce, at least in her own bottoms: her merchant flag is ^
124
rarely seen" remained generally true. However, the existing
merchant marine was able to, and to a large degree, did satisfy
a rather considerable dependence of the Soviet economy and certain
regions of the country upon sea transport. The size and
character of the Soviet landmark create such a dependence,
for in some areas, particularly in the Far East and the Northern
territories, overland transportation does not exist, and the sea





In the pre -Wo rid War II period, not until the first Five
Year Plan (1928-1932) was the Soviet Merchant Marine reinforced
by a sizeable number of new constructions. During the second
Five Year Plan (1933-1937) merchant ship construction was curtailed







in favor of warship construction. The attempt to correct the
i
situation during the third Five Year Planlost out to the, war.
After World War II and up to the middle of the 1950 »s ^~
there was very little new construction in the Soviet shipyards.
The procurement of ships abroad, though important, was not on
a very large scale either.
In 1956 the accelerated development of the Soviet Merchant
Marine was started. Considerably larger domestic shipbuilding
capacities were provided and orders for ships abroad increased.
For 15 years approximately 40% of the new ships were built in
domestic yards; about 50% were built in Socialist countries,
particularly Poland and East Germany, and the remaining 10% in
capitalist countries.
It is doubtful that the decision to accelerate the
development of the Soviet Merchant Marine, particularly as far
as rate of its development is concerned, was the result of a planned
approach. It strongly resembles a reaction to the existing
situation, when the requirements for sea transportation generated
by the relatively fast development of Soviet foreign trade and
the initiation of economic and military aid were far in excess
of the Soviet Merchant Marine's capability, and hence forced
heavy dependence upon the' charter market. The victory of the
Castro revolution in Cuba, growing foreign trade, and foreign
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economic and military aid sharply increased this dependence at
the beginning of the 1960's. Restrictive measures against
ships carrying cargo to Cuba initiated by the American government
and a boycott organized by Western oil companies against
non-Soviet tankers carrying Soviet oil to Cuba aggravated the
situation. The foregoing made an even faster growth rate
imperative, with the result that the growth for the period from
1961 to 1966 was labeled unprecendented by the Western 'press.
Jnprecendented or not, it was still a reaction to a situation
and not a planned activity.
The development resulted in elevating the Soviet Merchant
Vlarine role in the world shipping community. Prior to World
Var II, the Soviet Merchant Marine was in 23rd place in world
shipping, in 1960 it moved to 11th and in 1966 to 6th, the
place it continues to occupy.
Starting with the middle of the 1960 f s, when the situation
lad somewhat stabilized, one can validly speak, of the planned
development of the Soviet Merchant Marine, an assertion which is
particularly true for the current Five Year Plan (1971-1975)
.
Such benefits of a planned economy as the allocation of
shipbuilding capacities, construction of ships of approved types
Ln large series, and greater maneuverability of capital,
permitting emergency financing of ship procurement abroad, were
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certainly beneficially utilized. The Soviet claim that they
serve as an example of the development of a national mercantile
fleet can in general be accepted.
The present Soviet Merchant Marine is sufficiently large
and diversified to carry more than half of the Soviet foreign
trade cargo, to deliver military and economic aid, to satisfy
basic domestic needs in sea transport, and to earn enough
foreign currency to pay for the Soviet charter of foreign ships
and even supplement the Soviet need for foreign currency.
__
It is obviously in no position to dictate terms and determine
shipping rates in the world shipping community. While occasionally
providing real competition to ships from capitalist countries
and representing the commercial power of the Soviet Union on
the ocean trade routes, the Merchant Marine will for a long time
be preoccupied with the Soviet Union's own trade needs.
The Soviet Merchant Marine's share of the world shipping
tonnage is minor, and compared with the other nations in terms
of GNP, industrial output, and size, neither Soviet foreign
trade nor its merchant marine are really great. Of course,
there is room for growth in the latter.
In terras of ship composition, Soviet Merchant Marine is
not well balanced yet, in' comparison with major mercantile fleets
of the world. It has very few bulk carriers, is just starting
375






The smaller Soviet ships are well suited for trade with
smaller, less developed countries of the world, where modern
cargo handling equipment is practically absent and volume
(of trade does not require large specialized ships. In
containerization and cargo handling and distribution ashore, the
Soviet Merchant Marine is behind many Western countries-.
Disproportions between the ability of the merchant fleet to
carry cargo and ports facilities to process it is well understood
by the Soviet authorities, and measures to remedy the situation
are underway.
Liner service is being rapidly developed in the Soviet
Union. However, while the unusually high proportion of general
cargo ships provides the Soviet Merchant Marine with diversified
capabilities, it is becoming an obstacle and often leaves them
with a less profitable cargo and the necessity to resort to
tramp service particularly in international lines and in the
conferences of which they are members. The planned emphasis
upon larger specialized ships should improve the situation.
While membership in various international maritime
organizations, conferences, and agreements permits the Soviets to




advantageous to the world shipping community. In general, the
Soviets have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate, and
many countries understand this. It was reported that the U.S.
decided to explore ways to encourage more liberal U.S. -Soviet
commercial shipping arrangements, including greater access to
each other's ports and reducing ..the lengthy advance notice of
a ship's arrival (from 30 days to 14 days), thus making sea
125
trade between the Soviet Union and U.S. somewhat easier.
It has been recently proved that people sailed the seas
126
for trade ventures 9,000 years ago. Historically, the world
trade centers and sea routes along which goods have been moved
have constantly shifted. The main factor determining the shift,
however, is not the sea routes themselves or the availability or
absence of a merchant marine in one or another country or regions,
out the country's or region's industrial capacity, its ability
to produce, sell, and buy.
The import-export trade of the Soviet Union has been
jreatly increased, thanks to the economic development of the
country in general and industrialization in particular. Other
125
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developments, including the growth of Soviet Merchant Marine
itself, have been derivatives from these factors. X
The fact that more than half of the Soviet ships were
built abroad does not minimize the overwhelming role of Soviet
industry, whose development created the condition whereby goods
»
can be produced for sale, armament and equipment can be built
for military and economic aid and even natural resources exploited
and exported as payment for imported goods. Of course,' the
Merchant Marine is not a simple carrier of all these cargos,
but also produced effective feedback for further development
of the same activity, i.e. foreign trade, economic and military'
aid, for which, initially, it was built.
In today's world it is difficult to separate economic
power from political and military power. As an offspring of the
former the Soviet Merchant Marine is providing considerable
support to the other two. Its ability to move cargo anywhere
in the world and to be employed', on-, occasion., in direcc support.
of the Soviet Navy has definite strategic significance. The
decade of the 1960's produced three major crises, in Cuba in 1962,
in Vietnam, and in the Middle East, and in all of them the- Soviet
Merchant Marine played an important role. Moreover, it can be
said that without the Soviet Merchant Marine, the Cuban crisis







Middle East would be of a different nature.
The auxiliary role of the Soviet Merchant Marine for the
Soviet Navy is significant. The Soviet Merchant Marine personnel
policy, which is generally successful, is benefited by steady
supply of trained men from the Navy. Conversely, the Merchant
Marine represents a "personnel bank" of trained reserves for the
Navy
.
During Soviet Navy and Army exercises, a number of Soviet
Merchant Marine ships usually take part, and contingency plans
for speedy conversion of merchant ships into military transports
127
exist.
It appears that the economic (commercial)
,
political,
and military roles of the Merchant Marine are well understood
by the Soviet leadership, who are using it as an instrument of
Soviet national policy.
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The number of ships and the total tonnage of a country's
merchant marine and Navy are not necessarily indicative of .the
nation's maritime power or its industrial might. Liberia, for
example, has the world's largest registered merchant marine,
and Argentina and Brazil have sizable Navies; however, none
of these nations can be called maritime powers of magnitude.
The shipbuilding industry of a country is a better indicator
of a country's maritime development.
Pre-revolutionary Russia had a relatively well developed
shipbuilding industry, characterized by distinct eccentricities
(1) specialization in naval construction; (2) extensive
control by foreign capital; (3) dependence (and often far
beyond necessity) upon foreign technology. Naval construction
programs, often being more profitable, monopolized Russia's
shipbuilding capacity, resulting in very few merchant marine






total Russian merchant marine tonnage was comprised of foreign
1
built ships. The history of Chernomorskyi Shipbuilding Yard in
Nikolaev is very illustrative. Completed in 1897, the shipyard
was owned by a Belgian company. Starting in 1901, the yard
participated in the construction of a number of navy ships,
among them the famous Potemkin, and produced steam engines,
boilers, and turrets. In 1911, the yard became the property
of a French company and was awarded a contract to build, the
latest Russian battleship and to supply propulsion plans for -
another battleship being built by "Russude" (presently "61
Communars Ship Yard") . The growing demands of Russian naval
programs required the modernization of the yard, subsequently
accomplished by the British Vickers Company. In 1912 the
shipyard built the Krab, the world's first submarine-mine layer.
Ensuing pressure from the Russian mercantile banks forced the
company to sell a sizeable block of stock to the Russian
controlled International Commercial Bank; the resulting joint
stock company was named the "Society of Nikolaevsk Shipyards".
During World War I, the shipyards built a large number of naval
ships of various types and classes. In 1915, the Petrograd
International Bank, financier of both yards, centralized the
Sudostroyeniye (Shipbuilding), No. 11, 1967, pp. 31-37.
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administration and therein effectively monopolized the shipbuilding
2 iindustry in the southern Russia.
A considerably larger group of Russian shipyards, located
in Petrograd, was also heavily involved in naval shipbuilding
with a relatively minor allocation to commercial ships. Owing,
in part, to the naval shipbuilding orientation, the technological
level of the Russian shipbuilding industry remained comparable to
that of major European maritime powers. Supporting industries,
receiving less emphasis, were subsequently less developed and
hence, Russia's dependence on foreign deliveries, particularly
ship machinery. A number of types and classes of ships built
prior to the revolution were equal and some even superior
(eg. destroyer Novik) to comparable ships of the major maritime
powers. Commercial shipbuilding, to the contrary, was under-
developed; during the period 1905 to 1917, Russian shipyards
built only eight merchant ships.
The Russians did not hesitate to experiment, and at
the beginning of 20th Century the world's first tanker with diesel
propulsion, Vandal, was built in Sorraovo.
The chaos and destructiveness of the revolution and the
civil war brought the Russian shipbuilding industry's productive
2




activity close to nil, and most of the shipyards, fell into
decay. However, in 1921, the first southern shipbuilding yards
(Black Sea) and in 1922 the Petrograd shipyards began their
restoration, and gradually resumed the work. In January, 1922,
the shipbuilding trust was created in Petrograd to "organize
the work of the shipbuilding yards for the restoration of the
3
Navy". Again, as prior to the revolution, the emphasis was
placed on naval shipbuilding.
,
It soon became clear tha^t the
one-sided emphasis on naval construction was beyond the reach
of the badly damaged Soviet economy. The introduction of the
New Economic Policy (NEP) and urgently needed foreign exchange
for import payments forced the Soviet Government to reconsider
the shipbuilding industry priorities and to place greater
4
emphasis on the merchant marine. Additionally, the poor
condition of in-country transportation demanded the hasty
development of water transports. In 1924, the Soviet Government
decided to construct timber carriers, tankers, and refrigerators
5 |
immediately. /By the beginning of 1925, previously initiated
3
Shipbuilding No. 4, 1969, pp. 69-70; No. 4, 1970, pp,. 1-5
4
Shipbuilding No. 5, 1971, pp. 45-51. '
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efforts resulted in the complete restoration of all remaining
ships of the nationalized merchant fleet. Ships construction
began in 1925 simultaneously in Leningrad and in Nikolaev.
—
^
Early in 1925, the Special Committee of the Consul of Labor and
Defense presented the first five-year shipbuilding program for
the years 1925-1930 and the Central Bureau for Shipbuilding
was organized in Leningrad. The first four ships, timber
carriers, with a cargo capacity of 3,100 tons were laid' down
in the Baltic Yard in January 1925. 6 The first tanker of 10,000
dwt (deadweight tons) laid down in November 1925 in Nikolayev,
was ready exactly four years later. The relatively long period




as being a weakness of the industry, the necessity of utilizing
only available machinery, and a preoccupation with the naval
construction which continued in high priority.
In 1927, the first cruiser, Chervona Ukraina , whose
7
construction began prior to the revolution, was completed. In
1928, all of the suitable remaining ships of the former Russian
Imperial Navy, were either restored or completed and the Soviet
shipbuilding industry started to build new naval ships. The
6
Shipbuilding No. 11, 1969, and Shipbuilding No. 4, 1969,
pp. 69-70.
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first Five-Year Plan, 1929-1933, visualized construction of
216 ships for the Soviet Merchant Marine, 1 floating dock, and
16 harbor tugs. However, not only was this program not fulfilled,
but two combined programs, 1925-1930 and 1929-1933, produced
Q
only a total of 104 merchant ships. Throughout the 1930's, so
few commercial ships were built that the programs for their
construction are not discussed in modern Soviet specialized
literature. The 15 year period from 1925-1940, resulted in the
construction of 23 tankers with total capacity of 200,000 dwt. "
A large number Of river boats were built by secondary shipyards,
and priority programs such as the construction of a few ice-
breakers were fulfilled. The minimal performance of the ship-
building industry with regard to the Soviet Merchant Marine is
casually explained by "this period having coincided with the
9
beginning of intensive construction of the Navy". The third
Five-Year Plan, 1939-1943, devoted somewhat greater attention
to the merchant marine, but the plan never materialized because
of war. /
A number of innovative methods were introduced to the
shipbuilding industry prior to World War XX. In 1930, in a!
Soviet Far Eastern Shipyard, the first tug with ari electro-welded










hull was built. In 1932, Admiralty Yard, in Leningrad, while
building a timber carrier introduced the sectional method
of hull construction. However, those innovations were, seldom
widely used in commercial shipbuilding and were primarily *
employed for naval construction.
A program for shipyard restoration, primarily for purposes
of naval construction, was initiated prior to V/orld War II and
a number of new major shipyards were built. The Nicholaev's
Yard was modernized; the Sormovo Yard production capacity_was
extended (primarily for sectional construction of submarines)
;
two new yards, one in the north, Severodvinsk, and one in
Komsoraolsk on the Amur were built (both designed to build
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines) . Modernization of the
Leningrad shipyards had been started, but was interrupted by
the war.
During the war, the Soviet shipbuilding industry managed
to complete the construction of ships with a high degree of
prewar readiness; however, the industry was basically involved
in the repair and maintenance of ships of the Soviet Navy, some
yards built tanks and other items for ground forces.
The war resulted in the severe damage or destruction of
10
Shipbuilding No. 4, 1969.
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many of the principle shipbuilding yards, particularly in the
Black Sea area. Immediately following the war, the Soviet
shipbuilding yards were among the first enterprises to be
restored and many considerably modernized. The productive
capacities of many yards including Zdanov, Sormovo, Severodvinsk,
and later Kerch', were enlarged, and covered fabrication shops,
permitting year round production in the northern area, were
added. Former German yard in Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg) v , was
rebuilt.
The allocation of shipbuilding capacities in the Soviet
Union during the first post war decade reminds one of the prewar
situation; i.e., naval shipbuilding, intensified in 1947, had
received far greater priority in allocations, while commercial
shipbuilding was conducted on a residual basis. However, there
was an increase in the number of smaller yards and the portions
of the larger ones which were involved in commercial shipbuilding
Two major decisions made soon after Stalin's death altered
not only the nature of Soviet shipbuilding, but also affected
the allocation of capacities. The first decision was connected
with the beginning of nuclear submarine construction in 1953;
the second involved termination of the construction of a large
series of cruisers and conventional destroyers. A number of




construction, were subsequently vacated. Some of those previou
involved in cruiser construction in Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk
on Amur were gradually converted to the construction of nuclear
submarines; part of the others previously allocated to destroyer
construction were redirected to the production of diesel
submarines. The remaining vacated build-ways were allocated
(in Leningrad and the Black Sea Yards) to commercial shipbuilding,
thus initiating, together with increased orders abroad, *a rapid
development of the Soviet Merchant Marine. The accelerated
submarine building program definitely demanded an expansion
of the Soviet submarine building facilities which, probably,
11
took place during the late 1950 's and early 1960's.
At the present time, the Soviet Union has approximately
15 major shipbuilding yards, close to two dozen of medium sized
shipbuilding yards, and many small shipbuilding and ship repair
yards and shops, the total number of which probably approaches
a few hundred (including those involved in fishing fleet and
river fleet repairs) . The major Soviet shipbuilding .yards, the
type construction (naval or commercial) and geographic location
are as follows: (1) Northern area - Severodvinsk - practically
exclusive naval construction specializing in submarines. This
is one of the newest and most modern Soviet shipyard which,
~
11










according to a probably exaggerated statement by Admiral Hyraan
Rickover, has "several times the area and facilities of all of
i
12
the U. S. submarine yards combined." (2) Baltic Area - four
yards in Leningrad: Baltic and Admiralty primarily involved' in
commercial construction; Sudomekh - submarine construction;
Zhdanov - both naval (destroyers type specialization) and
commercial; and one in Kaliningrad specializing in escorts
construction and performing minor commercial construction; (3)
Sormovo - primarily submarine construction; (4) Black Sea
Area: Nikolayev -' both naval and commercial construction; Kerch -
' \
/
both naval and commercial construction; Kherson - primarily
commercial construction; (5) Soviet Far East - Komsomol'sk
on Amur - primarily naval (all types) construction; and Khabarovsk
both naval and commercial.
In addition to the above, there are a number of smaller but
nonetheless important yards located in Vyborg, Klaipeda, Riga,
Tallin, Astrakhan', Azov, Sevastopol, Kiev, Yaroslavl, Perm 1
,
Rybinsk. Most of these yards are involved exclusively in
j
i
commercial ship construction, and many combine shipbuilding and
extensive ship repair.
As can be seen, the major shipbuilding yards are widely
12
Fortune, August 1, 1969, p. 122.
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disbursed and all four Soviet Naval Fleets; Northern, Baltic,
Black Sea, and Pacific, have shipbuilding facilities capable of
satisfying their basic needs in all types of ship; this is ^
particularly true with the Soviet Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic
Fleets. The preoccupation of Severodvinsk Yard with submarine
construction does not seriously handicap the Northern Fleet
because its proximity to the. major shipbuilding center in
Leningrad and the existence of inland waterways, which facilitate
the distribution of ships among the other two fleets in the
European part of the USSR. A major Soviet submarine building
yard, (Sormovo) , lying deep inland, used to ship newly constructed
submarines in section by railroad. At present, the yard is
connected by the system of inland waterways with three European
Soviet Naval Fleets.
The sectional method of ship construction, mastered in
the 1930' s, received wide application in the post-World War II
development. Later, a large block construction method was added
which permitted the construction of large ships far exceeding the
I
capacity of a building way, through the joining of blocks while
afloat. In the late 1940 's, the riveted method of hull
construction was rejected completely. The advanced technology
of the full construction resulted in a 30% reduction in the nuiaber
x "13
of workers involved in the process, while doubling the output.
*
13




The deadweight of Soviet built ships is being constantly
increased. A series of Kazbek-type tankers of 11,800 DWT, built
at the beginning of 1950' s, was followed by the Praga-type with '
doubled deadweight and Sophiya-type whose deadweight reached
49,000 tons. Today, the tanker MIR of 150,000 DWT is under
construction. During the decade of the 1960's rather large and
sophisticated war ships of the Kynda, Kresta, and Moskva classes
were also built.
A degree of ingenuity and innovation was also widely,
exercised in the field of propulsion. In the first half of the
1950 f s as a result of a lack of large powerful marine diesels,
smaller diesels were employed in electric-diesel propulsion
systems. A typical ship for such a system was Dneproges laid
14
down in 1954. Existing and slightly modified steam turbines
were also employed for merchant ship construction. A dry cargo
ship, Pariskaya Kommuna, built largely on an experimental basis,
was fitted with gas turbine of 13,000 horsepower. The vari^le
pitch propeller found wide application aboard Soviet merchant
ships. The speed of many Soviet merchant ships, particularly
dry cargo ships, was raised to 19 and some to 22 knots. The
application of automation, particularly to control the main
machinery of the ships, started at the middle of the 60' s and is
14
Shipbuilding -No. 5, 1971, pp. 45-51.
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presently being widely expanded. The search for and experimentation
with new types of ships, such as katamaran, hydro-^foils and
i
air-cushion is continuing; number of ships built on new principals
are already being widely used by the Soviet merchant marine and
river fleets.
The importance of the Soviet shipbuilding industry was
recognized by the opening of the new permanent "Shipbuilding"
pavilion in 1967, at the Soviet Exhibition Fair in Moscow,
VDHKH, where many new and progressive methods of shipbuilding -
were proudly displayed. The wide application of new materials
including plastics in Soviet shipbuilding was evident. The
Soviet Government's support of the shipbuilding industry also
can be illustrated by the fact that each launching of a new major
merchant ship is widely publicized and treated as "a victory of
the labor".
Research and Development
The successes of Soviet shipbuilding industry would have
I
been impossible without a powerful support received from various
research and development institutions as well as the maritime
educational establishment. In addition to several dozen
scientific research institutes and design bureaus subordinated
to the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, there are a number of
332

scientific research institutes and design bureaus which are
subordinate to the Soviet Navy and which contribute to the
t
various fields of shipbuilding in a very substantial manner,
particularly for ship propulsion including nuclear systems. The
educational institutions, such as marine engineering institutes
and various navigational nautical schools are annually turning
out a considerably greater number of graduates (marine engineers
and naval architects) than any other country in the world.
The scientific research efforts in the area of shipbuilding
is coordinated by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Institute
for Complex Transport Problems. The major shipbuilding research
centers are located in Leningrad and Moscow, but the centers in
the Gorki, Black Sea, Kiev, and Soviet Far East areas are also
important. Among the best known Soviet scientific research
institutions are the following: Central Scientific Research
Institute of Merchant Fleet (TSNIIMF) ; Central Scientific Research
Institute imemi Academik A. N. Krylov; Central Diesel Scientific
Research Institute; Scientific Research and Project - Design
Institute of Sea Transport, Sousraorniiproekt; Central Design *
Bureau, Baltsudoproekt; and the Leningrad Central Project -
Design Bureau., The contribution of the Scientific Research





have also been considerable.
Over 200 scientists with Doctor of Science and Candidate
i
of Science degrees are working for two leading research institutions
of the Soviet merchant marine, Souzraorniiproekt and TSNIIMF.
In addition, more than 50 doctors of science and 400 candidates
of science are working for the higher educational institutions
of the merchant marine. Research work is also done by a number
of central project-design bureau and more than 30 specialized
16 ^institutes of shipbuilding and other industries.
The Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute is the largest Soviet
educational institution directly connected with the Soviet
shipbuilding industry. The institute has 44 departments, and
during the period of 1946-1967 graduated more than 12,000 marine
architects and engineers. It was organized in 1902 on the
initiative of the Soviet academician and ship builder, A. N.
17
Krylov. A number of Soviet universities and poly-technic
institutes have their own shipbuilding departments; the better
known among them is the shipbuilding department of Gorki
7
!
Polytechnical Institute, organized in 1920. The department 1 mainly
15 '
Central Scientific Research Institute of Merchant Fleet,
Transactions
, Vol. 133, Leningrad, 1970.
16
Morskoy Flot No. 7, 1971, p. 3.
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associates with shipbuilding yard Krasnoye Sormovo in Gorki,
and many of its graduates have occupied the leading positions
t
in the yard. Among the recent contributions of the research
work of department were detailed research on hydro-foil and
18
air-cushioned ships.
Some of the works by Central Scientific Research Institute
of Merchant Fleet demonstrate the scope and the influence of the
Soviet research institutions upon the decisions made regarding '
shipbuilding and general development of the merchant marine. — ^
The basic work for the typification of fleet and the selection
of minimum necessary number of types of ships was done in the
19
institute in the late 1920 f s and early 1930 f s. Immediately
after World War II, the world shipbuilding experience in construction
and exploitation of merchant ships was summarized and analyzed.
The problems of typification and the selection of the appropriate
technical - economic parameters of ships were among the main
outcomes of the study. During the 1947-1952 period optimum
typification of ship, the so-called "Network of Ship's Types",
was recommended and included eight classes of dry cargo ships,
five classes of tankers and a number of other ships. A 1955-1956
18
Shipbuilding No. 6, 1971, pp. 61-64.
19
The institute programs are described in its Transactions
through a number of years. Particularly descriptive for this
purpose is Volume 133, Leningrad, 1970. . *
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study resulted in selection of the optimum limits of propulsion
units for various ships and the recommendations to increase
i
the deadweight of constructed tankers, which resulted in the
20
decision to build the Sophiya class tanker.
During the 1958-1962 period, the institute worked out a
plan of general prospective development of sea transport for the
1959-1980 period. The recommendations of the plan serve as a
basis for further work in the designing and the construction of
larger ships with higher speeds, and further reduction in_the~
number of types of specialized and universal ships. During the
1961-1963 time frame, the recommendation for typification of
merchant marines of Comecon countries were worked out together
with the selection of types and basic ships parameters. As for
the 1971-1975 period, the accelerated construction and introduction
of fast dry cargo liners, container ships, and lighter carriers,
LASH, "capable of competing with any ships while working on the
international lines" was proposed and basic design of the ships
formulated.
The introduction of so called complex automation on the
i




strongly recommended. The measures to increase profitability of
i
i
the Soviet merchant marine, with emphasis on the efficiency: of
20 • /Ibid






cargo handling devices and containerization,
were worked out on
the assumption that "the sphere of
activity of the Soviet merchant
marine, especially in the transportation of
foreign cargo will., •
be widened considerably". The more
detailed plan for the future
development of the merchant marine for the
1971-1980 period was
worked out, where the basic types of ships,
their parameters, and
the rate of their construction were
determined and the basic ship
designs worked out. The further increase
in the proportion of
^
narrow specialized cargo ships, and the
further automation- of
diesel, steam, and gas turbines ships
were recommended. The
construction of transport submarines in
limited numbers was not
excluded.
Examining past programs and measures
proposed by the Soviet
research institutions and comparing them
with the actual ship-
building performance produces striking
similiarities, especially
in case of shorter range (usually five
years) programs.
Each major aspect of ship design, shipbuilding,
and naval




are separate institutes for hydro-dynamics
and ship construction,
welding, turbines, boilers, diesels,
electronics, naval missiles,
underwater weapons, etc. The observed
improvement in the design
of Soviet naval ships and growing
sophistication of their











marine, fishing and river fleets, experimentation and construction
of new type vessels (such as hydro-foil and air-cushioned) are
i
testimony that the research resources allocated to the Soviet
shipbuilding industry are producing significant results.
Shipbuilding Methods Employed
Because Soviet shipbuilding yards were built at different
times, they can be divided, according to layout and production
facilities, into three major categories. The first category
is represented by the yards built prior to the revolution and
among them are the largest Soviet yards. They have variety of
shops capable of manufacturing all necessary items for a ship
under construction. Some of these ship yards have the Soviet's
oldest and longest (over 200 meters) inclined end launch building
ways. Two of these yards, one in Leningrad, and the second in
Nikolayev, have custom building capabilities in facilities and in
skills. They certainly meet the demand for small quantities of
individualized ships, such as complicated research vessels or
sophisticated naval ships.
The second category of the shipbuilding yards, representing
the largest group, are those primarily built prior to World War
II and designed to build naval ships utilizing the components
provided by supporting industries. Straight line production flow •
398
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is utilized in enclosed, level building positions,
and each yard
has a ship dry docking capability. \
The third category is represented by ship yards
built or
modernized after World War II, yards of the most modem design
employing most productive production practices. Many
of ship
yards in this category are used for commercial
shipbuilding.
It is standard practice of the Soviet Ministry
of the
Shipbuilding industry to limit the assignment of
the construction
for each class of ship to as few yards as
possible and thus to
gain the greatest possible advantages from
specialization,
standardization, and series production. Often, the
development
of a particular yard has been planned with a
specific shipbuilding
program in mind. Those yards engaged in major production
programs
are designed, arranged, and tooled in such a
way as to assure a
smooth flow of series production of a particular
ship type.
The central planning of the shipbuilding
programs and the
production processes 'involved in their materialization
provides
for increased standardization and involves a
design process with
a major goal being to facilitate production. Highly
specialized
design bureau usually located in the vicinity
of or nearby j the .
shipbuilding yard are assigned to design a given
ship type which
will be produced by the yard.
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well spaced and conveniently located shops for fabrication,
sub-assembly and machining, employing varieties of conveyor
systems, transversers, and other devices. Some of the production
lines have been automated. The automation mainly involved steel
plate processing, fabrication, sub-assembly, and material transport
Practically all machinery is Soviet designed and built.
Some hot cutting machines are operating on a photo-electric
cell principle, and others are controlled by computer. The
Kristal hot-cutting machine has three modifications, one of
which employing plasma-arc cutting, or oxygen cutting. A number
of Soviet shipyards have mechanized the welding of joints and
framing connections. The automation of production processes
resulted in a considerable reduction in assembly and welding
time, and increase in output per square meter of working space.
The advantages of automated and improved methods of processing
and fabricating steel are further utilized in a number of methods
for hull assembly, resulting in cutting down building way times
and thereby increasing the number of ships turned out without
increasing the numbers of ways. Complete hull section assembly
method worked out a long time ago for construction of submarines,
is widely being used. A some-what modified method employs the
so-called "block technique". The hull is divided, for example,





three positions (each section is assembied fro™ three blocks).
Later the sections are transferred to the finaX hull assembly
line where they are joined together and launched. By using
these methods,, the production cycle of BMRT Mayakovskii was
21
reduced to 3.5 months.
Another sectional construction method called the "Island
Method" is employed for construction of larger ships. The hull
.
is divided into blocks,' or islands. These islands are constructed
simultaneously on the building ways with sufficient space
-between
"
them for the installation of machinery prior to final assembly.
The complete utilization of building ways working space is
achieved. Several variations depending upon a number of islands
exist for this method. For example, the three islands variation.
requires a building position long enough for a complete ship
Plus an additional island. Generally, the process starts at
the head of the building way with the formation of a stern, island.
When the completed hull that shared the building ways with I the
stern island^ launched, the stern island is moved to the (foot
of the building way. The second, the mid-ship island, is built
and joins the completed stern island, and simultaneously the third,
the bow island, is being built, and connected with the mid-ship
island. Meanwhile, another stern island is started at the head





of the way, and should bo completed by the time the bow island
is joined and the completed ship launched, after which the
entire cycle can be repeated. Employing the three islands
-~^^
method the construction time of the tanker, Geroi Bresta, was
22
cut from seven months to 3.5 months.
Another method of hull assembly presently being widely
introduced involves the launching of two separate whole sections
which later are joined together afloat. First introduced at
the Rybinsk Ship Yard while building a bulk carrier for river-sea
23
navigation, the method is presently employed in construction
24
of much larger ships, including tankers.
Most Soviet ships are built on level ship-assembly positions
from which the following launch methods are used:
a floating launch dock;
a controlled launch/ship transverser-fed facility;
a floodable basin/building dock combination;
All methods have a built-in ship retrieval capability. The
floodable basin/building dock combination includes building docks
which are connected by water-tight gates to a floodable launching
basin that has access to navigable water through another set of
22
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water-tight gates or caissons. Each building dock is equally
suitable for single, large hull construction or multiple, small
hull production. When construction is completed, the gates to
the dock are opened and the ship floats into the basin. The
level of the basin is then adjusted to that of the estuary.
After that, the outer gates of the basin are opened to allow
the ship to be moved to the fitting out area. In multiple hull
production, the dock gates are opened and the completed" ship
or ships are rolled out dry into the basin, leaving the uncompleted
hulls behind. The dock gates are shut, and the launching basin
is flooded to enable the hull to be floated to the deeper portion
of the basin. Then, the deep basin water level is adjusted to
the level of estuary and the new hull is moved through the gates
for fitting out.
The geographic location of the majority of the Soviet
shipyards requires weather protection and themajority of the
shipbuilding positions at major Soviet yards are enclosed in
heated buildings. A device permitting conventional method hull
painting and creating a sort of micro-climate on the floating
25
docks was introduced in Zdanov Shipyard in Leningrad. The
device, through a system of ducts, distributes hot air with
controlled temperatures through the working areas as well as
25
Morskoy Flot No. 6, 1971, p. 7.
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along the ships hull, creating better working conditions and
permitting paint drying during the winter. l
t
Propulsion Systems and Their Development ^~~^--
The continuous reduction in the cost of maritime
transportation, primarily resulting from the increased sizes
of ships, improved propulsion systems and the automation (resulting^
in the reduction of crew size) will take place in the future as
26
well and apparently along these same lines. •— ^
The reduction of hull resistance can also bring remarkable
improvement. The bulbous bow has brought with it, in recent
years, a marked saving either in power needed to propel a ship
of certain displacement, or in increase of speed. But in principle,
the problem is one of converting the flow around the ship's hull
from turbulent to laminar.
Friction resistance can be eliminated by creating an air
cushion between the ship's hull and the water surface, or by
using hydro-foils which lift the ship's hull out of the water.
But both methods suffer from a serious shortcoming, for they
26
Shipbuilding No. 4, 1968, pp. 11-15. Very interesting
and revealing discussion of this problem can be found in "Shipping
,
the Next 100 Years ", J. and J. Denholra, Ltd., 1967, and The
Journal of Commerce and Shipping Telgraph, 1967, 18/1, # 43393.
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require a very high-power output to remain underway (approximately
half of the main propulsion power generated by hoVer-craft is
expended in creating the air cushion, while speed has little
effect on this power)
. A hover-craft making 60 knots requires
100 horsepower per ton of weight, whereas a modern displacement
ship making 22 knots, requires only two horsepower per
displacement ton.
At the present time, the great majority of ships are driven
by diesel or steam turbine. Diesels are used almost exclusively -
when low and medium power is required. The steam turbines have
been used when high power was required. The recent years have
witnessed more and more diesels entering the high-power field.
If, in the early 1950's, 10,000 HP was the limit for a diesel,
today the limit approaches 50,000 HP, meaning that one engine will
develop all the Power a propeller can absorb.
In contrast to diesels, maximum power for the steam
\
turbines has never been a problem. Steam pressure in steam
I
turbines presently are around 40 to 60 kg/cm and the temperature
/ i
is 460°-500 <7C. The thermal efficiency of steam turbines is
not as high as that of diesels and presently is in the average of
j ,
25-27%. In certain cases, it was increased up to 30%, when steam
2 o 27pressure is 70-80 kg/cm and temperature 500-510 C.
27 /'
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The gas turbine might be a good propeller drive. There is
no problem with feed water or with condensers, bat partially
because of a still low quality of fuel, the efficiency of gas
turbines are in neighborhood of 30-32%. More technologically
advanced gas turbines using better fuels can probably raise the
efficiency to 40%.
The existing atomic reactors use a very small percentage
of the energy hidden in the atomic nucleus. The breeder reactors
are more promising. The energy obtained in the atomic reactors
can be used in steam turbines or in closed cycle gas turbines.
If and when the way to obtain electrical energy directly will be
discovered, it would result in the most efficient propulsion
system. Such has been the general trend in the improvement of
various types of ship propulsion systems.
Diesels
The first diesel was produced in Russia at the beginning
of the last decade of 19th century by Russky Diesel Plant,
where the production of diesels continues. However, while producing
a number of diesel types for the various modes of transportation,
the production of large powerful, contemporary marine diesels
did not start until the beginning of 1960 f s when a technical
assistance agreement signed in 1959 with Burmeister and Wain
40S

(Denmark) provided the Soviet Union the license to build the
famous B & M marine diesels. The production was organized at
*
the Bryansk Plant.
Prior to World War II, Russky Diesel produced DKRV 65/69
diesels of old design with 1,900 - 2,400 HP output, and 110-125
rpm respectively. During the decade of 1930's production of more
modern diesels, DKRV 68/120 type with 1,800 - 2,700 HP output
and 100 rpm was organized. Another plant, Kolomensky, built
28
less powerful diesels. After the World War II, diesel propulsion'
plants for the Soviet built ships were designed on the basis of
diesels manufactured by Russky Diesel of the following types:
6 and 8 DR 30/50 with 600 and 800 HP output (300 rpm) , 8 DR 43/61
with 2,000 HP output (250 rpm) as well as universal industrial
diesels, D 50 of 900-1,000 HP and D 100 of 1,800 HP.
The low power output of the Soviet built diesels presented
the shipbuilding industry with considerable difficulties. A
number of diesel-electric plants with 7,000 HP were designed and
29
built. The diesel electric propulsion plants utilized the output
of 2-4 diesel generators through a powerful electric motor driving
the shaft. This type of propulsion plant permitted the Soviet











Union to build the UL (reinforced for ice
navigation) class of
ships needed at the northern areas. ,
The B & W low revolution powerful marine
diesels (674 VT^
2BF - 100; Soviet code DKRN 74/160, and
DKRN 50/110) whoso
production was mastered by Bryansk Plant in
1961, played a very
important role.
3° The majority of the Soviet motor ships are,
propelled by foreign built diesels, and
ships over 15,000 tons
nave been using them exclusively. Many
of these "foreign built"
diesels are being manufactured by Poland,
(under licensing^ rem
Burmeister and Wain , Denmark , Sulzer -
Switzerland, and M.A.N. -
West Germany) and Czechoslovakia.
The first powerful 9,500 HP marine
diesel of the Soviet
design was built by the Bryansk Plant
in 1969." In 1971, the
21,000 HP marine diesel of unknown
origin was built for the first
-,.,„+
32
Tt is fair to conclude that without
time by the same plant. I l
„-e jio^K the Soviet merchant marine
the foreign deliveries of diesels,
xn
3°Soviet Government permission to buy
the
^f^J^es
diesel apparently was notobtaiued.ithou
a strong intervene
S^^S&^^VbS Lk Pla.£J.--^rationTZLtt*?X^~'£ESZ r/dieTels",
31
Prayda, 28 February 1969.
32 Izvqstiya, 24 May 1971.
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(84% of ships are diesel powered) would be hard pressed for
propulsion plants installations and many ships would either not
be built or the rate of the merchant marine growth would be
slower.
The naval diesel propulsion installations went through a
somewhat similar process of development. Of course, the naval
requirements have been of different nature as for the size,
power, and rpm. The demand for the reserve power have often
excluded diesel as the main engine on the combatants.
Initially in the late 1920's and early 1930's, slow speed,
four cycle, solid injection diesels of several sizes were
produced. They were used as main engines in auxiliary ships
and as generator drivers. Later on, two types of four cycle
diesels for naval installations were built. The first of these
were rated at 1,100 and 1,400 HP at 460 rpm and had specific
weights of 22.7 and 18.9 kg/HP respectively. The second type
was lighter (13 kg/HP) rated at 600, 800, and 1,100 HP at 600
rpm. Two cycle diesels with loop scavanging rated at 4,200 HP
33
and 6,000 HP were also produced in the pre-war years. Serial
production of the 30-D and its successor, 40-D diesels was
organized. The 40-D engine rated at 2,500 HP had a two stage
33Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 76-83.
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super charging system. Compared with the 30-D, the 40-D power
was 25% greater, its fuel consumption reduced and it was 20%
34
lighter. A definite success in the post war years was serial
production of the Type 61 diesel, a two cycle, 6,000 HP engine.
The Type 61 diesel, having 1,200 hour service life prior to major
overhaul, can be used as a pure diesel or in combination diesel-
gas turbine installations as- a sustainer engine. The M-50
diesel designed by a Navy bureau have been produced for* many
years and is now widely used in the Soviet Union. This marine
diesel is produced in 1,000, 1,100, 1,200, and 1,500 HP sizes.
Power changes are provided for by stepping up rpra and super
charging. The specific weight of the M-50 diesel is 1.4 - 1.7
kg/HP.
The big success for the Soviet diesel builders was the
development in early or middle 1960's of the M-503 diesel, which
have been in the serial production and widely used by torpedo
j *
'
boats, fast patrol boats, and light combatant ships. The M-503
I
I
diesel is 42 cylinder, 7-black star with 6 cylinders in each row.
/ I
It is equipped with reverse reduction gearing and is produced in
i
several modifications. The main modification develops 4,000 HP
I








consumption in the power range
from 10% to full is not exceeds
lW grams/HP/hour (the opting
value is 158) . The K-5C* i.
four cycle diesel ,1th
driving turbo-super charger
and has ._
limited permissible time of continuous
operation at maximum
power. The.engines basic
characteristics exceed that of many







If the majority of Soviet merchant *lV»
taW *b»V
propulsion, the majority of Soviet major combatants
have been
using steam turbine propulsion systems.
Prior to the revolution.
Russian built steam turbine plants
could not satisfy the demands
of the Navy and many installations
were imported.
The first Soviet built steam turbine
propulsion systems
.ere developed in the late 1920's
and early 1930's for escorts,
and for destroyer leaders. Many of
the Soviet first destroyers
had foreign built turbines. Later
in the 1930's, the Soviet
research work resulted in the design
and construction of steam
turbines for a second generation of
Soviet built destroyers.
After the war a modernized version of
pre-World War II design
steam turbines were installed on
Soviet Otlichnyi and SKory Class











parameters of those installations were 27-32 kg/cm and
420-450°C.
i
Just before World War II, the destroyer Opytnyi (Experimental)
with very productive, but not manueverable once-through boilers
35
was built. The extensive experimentation with this propulsion
system continued after the war. During the test runs in 1947
and 1948, the destroyer Opytnyi developed speed up to 42 knots,
but the system, because of its poor manueverability , was found
unsuitable for the war ships and the experiment dropped.
_
In the early 1950's, a new lighter, more economical and
raaneuverable system with partially automated controls was designed
for escorts (utilized on Kola and Riga Classes) . A two stage
reduction gear was used with the turbines. During the middle
1950's, a steam turbine propulsion plant, for the Kotlin class
destroyers, was developed. The further improvement in Soviet
built steam turbine installations dealt with the following: the
specific weight of the turbines, the condensers, and the reduction.
gears dropped considerably; the turbine blade periferal velocities,
rpm and load on the reduction gear increased. All this made
possible the reduction of the specific weight of the installation,
while almost doubling the power of the aggregate and simultaneously
35
The boiler was designed by Professor Ramzin, a well known
specialist, accused leader of so-called Industrial Opposition,




increasing its efficiency. The auxiliary mechanisms and'
heat exchangers were also improved. Obviously, the
best
i
available steam turbine installations were selected
for nuclear
powered submarines of the Soviet Navy.
The task to develop suitable steam turbine
propulsion plants
for serial production and installation aboard of
large dry cargo
37
ships and tankers was set up in 1954. Such
installations were
developed by Central Research Institute of Sea
Transport during
the 1955-1959 period and installed on Leninsky
Komsomol class .
dry cargo ships and Prage Class tankers, and
in 1963 on the tanker
Sophiya. The steam parameters of this installation
are 42 kg/cm
and temperatures 450-470°C. Demands for the
steam turbines with
higher parameters up to 80 kg/cm
2
and temperatures up to 515°C





For the specific characteristics of some
.Soviet boilers
and steam turbines, see Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp.
76-83.
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The necessity to build a propulsion system combining the
advantages of the turbine and the simplicity of using the opefi^-
heat cycle, i.e. the gas turbine, was well understood in the
Soviet Union even in pre-World War II times. As was also the
case in the other countries, the research and design work for
the creation of marine gas turbine propulsion system were
conducted in the middle and the end of 1930' s. The Soviet Navy
designers, particularly the group headed by Engineer-Captain First
Rank Professor G. I. Zotikov, worked out the theoretical
fundamentals, and certain design principles, for the naval gas
38
turbines.
The gas turbine advantages in the use as a main propulsion
engine or additional engine' (a sort of booster) are in the
following: low weight for large power in one aggregate; good
maneuverability and Immediate readiness to develop speed right
up to the limit; smaller number of auxiliaries; suitability for




After the war, research was conducted along two directions:
the utilization of the experience of marine steam turbine building
38
Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp.- 78-83 and Sudostroyeniye
No. 11, 1967, pp. 31-37
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and the adaptation of the experience of the aviation industry
where gas turbines produced a sort of technological revolution.
The aviation gas turbines were first to be used by the Soviet Navy
when they were installed as booster type engines on torpedo boats.
The experiments were conducted during 1956 and 1957. Soon, however,
better gas turbine were developed, built, and installed aboard
many Soviet Naval ships. During the decade following the initial
test, the power of gas turbines used by the Soviet Navy v increased
approximately ten times, specific fuel consumption was cut 1.5
39
times and engine life was increased many times. At the present
time, many Soviet Navy guided missile destroyers, various type
escort ships (some in combination with diesels) , and boats are
equipped with gas turbines as main propulsion systems. The
Soviet Navy occupies a leading position compared with other navies
of the world in its use of gas turbine propulsion systems
(definitely quantitatively and possibly even qualitatively)
.
The research efforts for the implementation of gas turbines
^40
in merchant marine ship propulsion systems started in 1956.
/
The first Soviet gas turbine driven ships were the series of
Pavlin Vinogradov class timber carriers built in the early 1960's.
39
Morskoy Sbornik No. 7, 1966, pp. 78-83.
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The French built gas turbine of approximately 4,000 IIP was used.
The first domestic marine gas turbine system, 13,000 IIP,
}
GTU-20,
designed and built by Leningrad Kirov Plant was installed oh^dry
cargo ship, Parizhskaya Communa, and widely tested since 1968.
The gas turbines of the GTU-20 type are expected to be improved
o
to a point when gas temperatures of 900 - 1,000 C will be utilized
41
and specific fuel consumptions of 165-175 gram/HP/hour achieved.
Nuclear
Besides the fact the Soviet Union has several classes of
nuclear powered submarines, one ice breaker, Lenin, (built in
1959) and the Arktika Class larger ice-breakers under development
and/or construction, very little detail is known on the quality
of the Soviet nuclear propulsion systems. Some information,
however, generally dealing with chronological data and theoretical
considerations of the system application, particularly to. the
merchant marine, have been published. Accordingly, the first
ship nuclear propulsion systems were worked out at the beginning
of the 1950' s and from 1953 the Soviet Union began construction
42










academician I. V. Kurchatov argued for the necessity of having
a "wide open road for the nuclear energy application for tho
i
transport purpose" and that "the initiative of the engineers
and the designers of ship building industry" should be encouraged.
During the 1956-1957 period, the Central Scientific Research
Institute made an extensive analysis concerning the feasibility
and prospectives for applications of nuclear energy in the Soviet
,44
Merchant Marine. In 1968, in the Institute of Complex Transport
Problems under Gosplan, the plan for developing nuclear power in
maritime transport was discussed and' the necessity to develop
economical atomic power installations for merchant vessels,
1.5-2 times smaller and 4-6 times lighter than the first marine
nuclear installations, stressed. In general, marine nuclear
propulsion systems are already beyond the experimental testing
stage. However, as for the merchant marine application, the
widening of the sphere of nuclear power was said to be dependent
45
on the cost of the reactor, fuel, service and repair. Nevertheless,
|
!
it was concluded that the wide application of nuclear propulsion
system to the merchant marine is a question of the near future.
43
44
Shipbuilding No. 4, 1970, pp. 51-58.
Transactions, Vol. 133, p. 42.
45
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The Central Research Institute tied the problem with the scope
of the application of nuclear propulsion systems / arguing that
widely applied experimentation with the nuclear propulsion »ystom,
even in the case that the systems will not be profitable at
46
the beginning, is needed.
47Other Soviet specialists, while recognizing the lower
limit of economically effective application of nuclear propulsion
systems as being in neighborhood of 50,000 HP, have emphasized
that in the next several years it will be difficult for a nuclear
propulsion systems to compete with those of the diesel or steam
turbine. In general, the Soviet pronouncements concerning the
wide introduction of nuclear power in maritime transport up to
1968-1969 had been more enthusiastic then that they are today,
whereas the cost factor has been mentioned as a major obstacle.
Nonetheless, the specialized ships for the specific tasks and
certain geographical areas, seem to be under consideration and




Vol. 133, p. 146
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Automation of Propulsion Systems
l
The automation of propulsion systems is relatively' well
advanced. Little if anything is published concerning tl*« ftUtO»aU*»
aboard the Soviet naval ships. However, already in the
middle
and late 1950' s, most of the propulsion plan of the
Soviet
escorts, destroyers, cruisers, and submarines, had
various degrees^
of automation. It is logical to assume that the
sophistication
of the automatic devices have been increased
together with the ^
scope of their application. As for the merchant
ships, the
TSNIIMF began to work with the problem in 1948.
The steam turbine
propulsion plant incorporating various automated devices
for





From 1958-1963 the efforts were directed to
achieve "complex
automation" of steam turbines and diesel propulsion
plants. A
special system for the repair and maintenance of
automatic devices
49
„as organized in the Ministry of Shipbuilding.
The system for
the first automated diesel ship, Inzhiner A.
Pustoshkin, was
. worked out in 1963. The system served as a
prototype for the





development of automated diesel propulsion ships (Novgorod
class)
.
A considerable degree of automation has been achieved
on the first gas turbine ship, Parizhskaya Kommuna.
At the end of 1960's the Soviet Shipbuilding Research
Institutes completed the study determining the "rational degree
of automation of propulsion systems" which presently serves. as
50
a guideline. In 1970 it was "stated that "in the USSR ships
of various types with completely automated diesel, steam turbine,
51
and nuclear propulsion are being designed and built". _
The scope of ship automation is being constantly widened in
the Soviet Union. The automatic stabilization system initially
introduced in 1955 to the Kotlin Class DD and since widely used
on many types of Soviet naval ships, has also been installed on
some commercial and scientific research ships. An automatic
transverse stabilization system installed on the scientific
52
research ship Akademic Kurchatov is typical.
An automated navigational system had been designed and
tested. A system for the automated electro-chemical protection

















data was published concerning its practical test.
As of the beginning of 1971, the Soviet Merchant Marine
had 15 motor ships with so called complex automation, and one^of
them, the Soviet built Svetlogorsk has an automated navigational
system in addition to the automation of propulsion plant.
Leaving aside the quality and reliability of Soviet systems
of automation, owing to the absence of any data upon which they
can be judged, it can be said that at least in quantative sense,
the Soviet Union is among the leaders in the application of ship
automation.
To summarize, a considerable research work has been performed
to determine the optimal types and sizes of propulsion systems
for the Soviet ships. However, the selection of propulsion
systems
did not always, and in early stages including the past
World
War II period, seldom corresponded to optimality due to
lack of
appropriate engines and in many cases boilers. Quite often what
is available instead of what is the best was installed.
At the
present, the situation has improved considerably and the
concept
of optimality is being applied to a larger degree.
Thanks to
the availability of larger diesel engines the upper
limit of their
use was elevated from 10-12,000 HP at the end of
1950's and the
beginning of 1960 's to 20,000-25,000 HP at the present.
High
pressure, super heated steam propulsion systems were also
introduced.
421






The Soviet Union considerations and preferences relating
to maritime propulsion for the decade of the 1970*5, particularly
i
for the 1971-1975 period, appears to be reflected in the planned
deliveries of ships which are as follows:
Universal dry cargo ships (4.5 - 13,000 dwt) , timber
carriers (1.5 - 12,500 dwt) , refrigerators (5,000 - 10,000 dwt)
will have propulsion plants whose power will not exceed 15,000 -
20,000 HP.
Increased number of bulk carriers which dwt will reach
80,000 - 100,000 tons, but propulsion plant will not exceed
15,000 - 20,000 HP.
Fast dry cargo ships with speed of 23-24 knots and large
53
tankers of 150,000 dwt with propulsion power up to 30,000 HP.
The majority of propulsion plants (up to 90%) will not
require more than 12,000 - 15,000 HP, and, therefore it is clear
that the low revolution diesel will continue to be the most
• i
widely used engine. The steam turbine systems will be used on
large tankers and probably on some fast dry cargo carriers,'
including container ships. The gas turbine would most likely
continue to be used on a wide experimental basis.
The Soviet Union will definitely start the construction of
i
larger tankers, bulk carriers, container ships, LASH, etc. in
53
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the near future, and the propulsion systems above 30,000 HP
would be needed, and gas turbine or steam turbine for theia have
to be developed. Most likely it will be the latter. In the^
more remote future, particularly the 1976-1980 period, the further
increase in power of ship propulsion plant is expected
(approximately 50,000 HP for one shaft ships and up to 100,000
HP for two shafts ships) . Power installations of 10,000 - 30,000
HP are expected for hydro-foils and 50,000 HP and more for
air-cushioned ships. The diesels evolution is not expected to
produce considerable increase in power output much above 50,000
HP and for this reason, it was proposed to concentrate research
54
on turbine driven systems: (a) steam turbines with intermediate
2
super heating and high steam parameters (80-100 kg/cm and
515-540 C with specific fuel consumption of 165-175 gr/HP/hour)
.
(b) gas turbines with prolonged service life and more economical
(about 175 gr/HP/hour) . Northern latitude navigation is viewed
as most favorable for gas turbines where the low air temperature
can help to achieve the most economical specific fuel consumption
of 170 gr/HP/hour and lower. In the more remote future, the gas
turbiue is viewed as the most promising. For the hydrofoils and




Vol. 133, 1970, pp. 145-156 and Morskoy
''lot No. 2, 1971.

water cooled nuclear reactors for steam turbines capable to compete
with the systems on the organic fuel, where power output of 50,000
HP or more is needed. Power output of above 60,000-75,000 HP
is considered already suitable for nuclear propulsion.
Soviet Hydrofoils
The Soviet Union occupies the leading position in the
world in the varieties and number of hydrofoils produced. The
chief designer of Soviet hydrofoils and head of the Sormovo
Hydrofoils Design Bureau is R. E. Alekseev (the winner of Lenin
State Prize) . His story is quite revealing in the history of
Soviet hydrofoils designs and construction. In 1941, as a
graduate student of the Gorki Polytechnical Institute, he
presented the unusual graduation (diploma) design - a hydrofoil
boat. The war interrupted further development and Alekseev
was sent to work as an engineer at Sormovo Shipbuilding Yard.
The yard, in its term, soon was switched to tank production. In
1943, however, while the city was still being bombed by German
planes, Alekseev was ordered to continue work with the hydrofoil.
After prolonged experimentation and testing, the first Soviet
hydrofoil of serial production, Raketa, was introduced for Volga
55
and other river navigation in 1956. After the Raketa, 110
55
Pravda, 14 July 1971.
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passengers Meteor, 300 passenger Sputnik, 150 passengers
'
Burevestnik, 50 knots Chaika, and sea-going 118 passenger
i
Kometa, sea-going 260 passenger Vikhr' were designed and built
in Sormovo. Other design bureau have also worked with hydrofoils.
In Leningrad, 12 passenger sea-going Nevka, 92 passenger Strela,
and 100 passenger sea-going Taiphun with automatically controlled
56
foils were built. Many Soviet built hydrofoils such as Vikhr',
Chaika, Burevestnik, were still (at the beginning of 1971) in the
stage of experimental exploitation and some were modified in
the process.
In 1970 the Soviet Union had five classes of hydrofoils in
serial production, and 150 passenger lines were served by them.
During the period of 1958-1968 the hydrofoils carried more than
57
30 million passengers. Recently, the Alekseyev Bureau designed
and built two more classes of hydrofoils - sea-going Voskhod,
58
and Tsiklon. The latter, instead of propellers, use water jets.
In May, 1971, modernized Kometa-M cruised from Yalta, Black Sea,
59 I
around Europe to Helsinki, Finland, with intermediate stops in
many major European ports.
Taiphun has two sets of engines and propellers - for slow
and high speed and special start foils.
57
Sudostroyeniye No. 4, 1970, pp. 37-41.
Pravda, 14 July 1971.
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The idea of air-cushioned motion is not new. The ~-\^
theoretical consideration, some with great details, began to
appear in a number of countries in the 1920' s and 1930' s. In
the Soviet Union, the idea was first developed by K. E.
Tsiolkovskii. The initial work of Tsiolkovskii was continued
by Professor V. Levkov, from Novocherkassk Polytechnical Institute
and since 1930, its director. The air dynamic laboratory of the
institute started to test a model of chambered ACV in 1927 and
later (1930) the test continued in the air dynamic tube. In
1933, a special design bureau headed by Levkov was organized
with the task of building and testing ACV. The first test of the
60
air-cushioned boat, L-l, was conducted in 1934. The L-l
developed speed of 135 kilometers per hour (over 70 knots) . More
powerful and heavier L-5, was built and tested in 1937. Both
L-l and L-5 were capable of riding over different types of ground.
Some more models of L type ACV's were built; the largest weighing
15 tons. A naval version of L type ACV existed and was tested
in the Gulf of Finland in the late 1930' s. The war interrupted
the work.
6QSudostroyeniye No. 7, 1971, pp. 55-56 and
Socialisticheskaya Industria, 29 November 1970, p. 4,
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After the end of war, Levkov continued his work with
ACV's, but in addition to difficulties with design, the Soviet
economic situation, particularly the low level of technology
and lack of appropriate engines, did not warrant the success.
With Levkov* s death in 1954, the experiments discontinued. In
1957 an ACV of original design by a student at Gubkin Petroleum
College, G. Turkin, was built- but the test was never concluded by
the designer who died in 1959 overwhelmed by the problem.
The decade of the 1960's witnessed a number of attempts
to solve the problem by various Soviet agencies. The attempt
to develop Turkin 's idea was undertaken at the Chelyabinsk
Tractor Plant and its design bureau; it was a failure. The
same disappointment awaited the attempts of Volgagrad Plant, of
the Tsagi Research Institute and elsewhere under various
ministries and departments. By 1962, most of the projects were
discontinued because, according to the State Scientific Technical
Committee under the Gosplan, of "poor prospects for hovercraft
61
and low technical characteristics of the experimental models."
/
!
In 1963 the work on ACV v/as resumed at the NATI's Chelyabinsk
j
affiliate only to be dropped in three months time, whereupon, the
i
i
the USSR Ministry for Tractor and Agricultural Machine building
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handed over the project to the USSR Ministry for
Chemical and
Petroleum Industry. In the mid-1960's,
apparently, the work with
ACT in the Soviet Union could be described
by a single word, a
mess. A battery of articles, some being
very critical, appeared
in the Soviet Press arguing for the
urgently needed machine (ACT) ,
and requesting the resumption of design
and experimental work.
"Where are the air-cushioned machines"
became quite a common
leader in many Soviet newspapers,
particularly professional




The poor development of the Soviet
ground transportation
system, particularly highways is commonly
known. la Siberia,
Tumen' Oblast, where the oil fields are
under intensive
development, in 1969 there were only .014
kilometer, or 14 meters,
of paved roads per each 100 sq.
kilometers (in India there are
33 kilometers). Nearly half of Siberia's
territory is known
to be occupied by impassable swamps.
The cost of 1 kilometer
of road is from 340,000 rubles to
1.5 million rubles. The jnumber .
of roads which had been built was 14
times as little as the average
for the country. Western Siberia
was called the "ideal testing
ground for grinding out conventional
road transport". Even heavy
duty trucks and tractors were wearing
out after one year of use;
special vehicles, being used in the oil
land, had to.be discarded
/
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after a few months service for broken carriers. Helicopters
were being used at an hourly cost ranging from 2*60 rubles (MI-4)
CO
to 1,700 rubles (MI-6) . ' The river transport plays a very
important role in Siberia, but the rivers are frozen during the
winter from five to seven months. The cost of transport amounted
63
to 17% in 1959 and 26% in 1967 of the total cost of oil drilling.
Air-cushioned vehicles under the circumstances were found
even in the second half of the 1960's to be superior in every
aspect to the transportation facilities which were employed in
Siberia, and some even called ACV "singularly prospective and
universal under the circumstances". The passenger transportation
along the thousands of rivers does play an important role too,
and in many cases can be provided only by air-cushioned boats.
The ACV proponents recommended the creation of a united center
on hovercraft research which, in addition to experimental uork,
would have the production facilities as well. But for a while the
State Committee for Science and Technology under the Gosplan
I
i
and a number of ministries resisted the idea referring to 'the
fact that "up to now, the acceptable technological solutions
eliminating existing problems of the machine (ACV) have not been
62








found neither in our country nor abroad". Toward the
end of
the 1960's, however, the proponents of the ACV
proved that not
the idea, but the attempted ways of its implementation
were
defective and this was the strongest reason for intensifying
the research and further experimentation. At that
time (1969)
the proponents had a good argument supporting their
battle and
they did not miss the opportunity to use this in
the following
statement claiming that: "our country is being considerably
behind the contemporary level of ACV development reached
abroad,
65 ..
particularly in England", which the opponents could not
easily
refute, for more than technological the matter now could
easily be
interpreted from the position of international prestige
and,
hence, acquired a political overtone. No one in the
Soviet Union
could dare to ignore such a factor and, suddenly,
the green
light for the ACV was open and its bright future
"discovered"
at the top of administrative technological bureauocracy
and the
same State Committee for Science and Technology
recommended to
the Gosplan "to include air-cushioned ships in the plan
of country's
economic development", and also recommended to the Ministry
of





65Vodnyy Transport , 11 January 1969
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industrial production of a party of such sbips".
The ACV
Sormovich was singled out as a "particularly
promising type".
in all fairness it should be emphasized
that the arguments of
opponents, particularly from the State Committee,
were not as
ridiculous as presented by the proponents of
the ACV. First,
in overall, the research of the
air-cushioned principles, though
not centralized and conducted by various
institutions and agencies,
nevertheless was relatively extensive, and a
number of experimental
models performing rather satisfactorily were
produced (Neva,
Raduga, Sormovich). Second, the technological
solution leading
to the construction of well performing
machine was not found and,
probably, the Soviet industry was not ready
and capable to assure
argued mass production of the air-cushioned
machines.
A powerful support to the ACV proponents
was probably
given by the Soviet Navy which have bad
definite ACV interests,
and a number of models, shown during the
Navy Day Parades in the
late I960', and in 1970, were developed.
The Navy's version of
ACV was used as a means to discbarge the
advance party of naval
infantry during an amphibious operation and for
other slmilir
purposes.
The following air-cushioned vessels were
designed, built,
and tested:
88Shipbuilding No. 2., 1970.
/
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So rmovich - first built iu 1965, 50 passenger, 100
kilometers per hour, is being viewed as promising \and recommended
for production; ...^
Orion - average speed 60 kilometers per hour, 80 passengers,
also recommended for serial production;
Gor'kovchanin - 50 passengers, slow, around 30-35 kilometers
per hour, but viewed as very promising and is being produced
in large number. All the above ACV's are for inland water
navigation. The navy version, shown in Moscow in 1970, was a
sea-going ACV with approximate capacity for a platoon of naval
infantrymen.
In spite of the obvious interest developed in the Soviet
Union toward ACV of a rather conventional type, the future, and
hence long term research orientation is viewed to belong to the
other type of "flying vessels" - "ekranoplan" (thereafter referred
as skimmer, surface skimmer system, wing-in-ground vehicle).
The interest in such a system both from the Soviet Navy and
Merchant Marine has recently been clearly evident and expressed in
pry
the Soviet specialized literature. The various countries
1
,
including the Soviet Union, research efforts so far clearly
indicated the two design approaches to the problem's solution:
N. I. Belavin, Ekranoplany , Sndostroyeniye , 1968;
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(a) "wing" (flying wins, wing-in-ground) vehicle,
with which
the overwhelming majority of research efforts have been
associated,
including experiments of the Odessa Institute of
Engineers of^
Merchant Fleet, and (b) fuselage, of which the
Airfoilboat
X-112 is typical.
68 Most of the wing-in-ground vehicles designed
so far followed to a large degree the Katamaran
principle, and
have a carrying wing with two floats on the
ends. Presently,
the aero-dynamic characteristics of the
skimmers are apparently
low, and, combined with the power plants used,
are keeping down
the speed achieved (about 50-80 knots) . But the ACT
requires
three times more power than a skimmer of the
same mass and
speed. Moreover, the skimmer speed is considerably
higher than
ACV. The major problem is presented by the start,
during which
all the above advantages of skimmer, because
of it's air-hydro-
dynamic qualities, are substantially reduced.
The hope for the
skimmer use in a rather broad spectrum of speed
(from 100 to
200-300 knots) and ranges, requiring only 20-70
HP/ton (presently
existing skimmers require 75-380 HP/ton) was
expressed. If on
a distance up to 2,000 miles all of an ACV
cargo capacity would be
used for fuel, a skimmer in addition would be
able to carry 500
tons of cargo.
69
With the increase in size, the skimmers
useful
Dane's Surface Skimmer Systems 1968/1969 - 1969/1970
69Shipbuilu.ing Ho. 3, 1971, p. 20.
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load is growing considerably while required power per unit
of weight is diminished. The Soviet development along this
direction would be quite logical. The appearance of a satisfactory
model skimmer prior to the middle of the 1970's is unlikely.
During the current five year plan, the Soviet Union will produce
a number of ACV types, most of them rather small and suitable
only for passenger transportation.
Some Factors Determining
Designs and Construction
Often, while analyzing Soviet shipbuilding, conclusions,
concerning sizes of the ships built, are associated with the
availability of ani sizes of building ways, experience, and the
general level of the Soviet technology. While all these
considerations are certainly valid to a large degree, the economic
factor, the profitability of a ship the Soviet Union plans to
build, its suitability to the planned environment of operation,
are often ignored. However, it was found that all these factors
are closely examined by the Soviet specialist and the economical
ones are often adopted; the search for the optimality, taking under
consideration as many variables as possible, is often conducted
with the finding used in the decision making processes. A very
70
Morskoy Plot No. 7, 1971, pp. 3-5
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demonstrative case is the Soviet Union's approach to tanker
construction and the composition of the tanker fldet. The
table below shows the economic performance of various sizes of
Soviet tankers and includes required capital investment and
operational expenditures determined on a concrete example of the
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For a 25,000 dwt tanker fleet the cost of transportation
of 1,000,000 tons of oil for 5,000 miles is 7,190)000 rubles.
i
The 50,000 dwt tanker fleet reduces this cost down to 5,470,000
rubles, or by 24%. However, the corresponding increase in size
of 50,000 dwt tankers fleet to 100,000 dwt tankers fleet produces
71
considerably smaller increases amounted to 10-12%. All data
representing Soviet cost and are correspondingly valid only for
the Soviet tankers. Operational realities, i.e. ports {cargo
handling capacity, their sizes, depths, storage facilities,
inland transportation, etc.) and requirements of the line(s)
(availability of cargo flow, demand for it, their stabilities,
competition etc.) are factors (variables) considered by the Soviet
specialist in the selection of required ships and their number
to be constructed or ordered.
During the decade of the lS60's the size of tankers
delivered grew from 20,000 dwt to 50,000 dwt.
/
71 !
U. A. Gnatkov, Giants of the Ocean Roads , Znanie P.H.,









1,000 tons H.P.) m -
Velikii Oktyabr'
(USSR) I5 -° y,y
Bauska (Poland) 19.0 7.8 15.5 9.2
Split (Yugoslavia) 20.8 . 12.0 17.1 9.2
mwv\ 30 5 19.0 18.5 10.65Warshava (USSR) ju.o
Leonardo DeVincbi 11 65
(Italy) 48.9 19.0 17.4
.
Sopbiya (USSR) 49.4 19.0 17.2
11.6
Source: M. A. Gnatnov,~op. cit., pp.
24-26.
At the beginning of 1969, the Soviet tanker
fleet was composed
of: about 20% of tankers with 10,000 d»t
or less cargo capacity;
about 30% of 15-25,000 Art cargo capacity
ships; and about 50%
72
of 30-50,000 dwt cargo capacity ships.
Meanwhile, the process
of average tonnage growth in the world
tanker fleet had started
during the second half of the 1950's. Most
of the giant tankers
i», tfe* fttlttuwtoe -^r^u^ (Crittli torn &*&&&** «* Jtoiftft****. feutf*
in the U.S.) were built in Japan:
Sinclair Petrole - 56,089 Tons - 1956
Universe Apollo - 104,520 Tons - 1959
Nissho Maru, 130,250 Tons - 1962
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This trend was accelerated by the closing of the Suez
Canal. With
more than 50% of the oil imported by Europe coming' from the
Middle
East, cheaper transportation bad to be found, and was. The
answer
was even larger tankers with huge capacities making it
economical
to go around Cape of Good Hope (approximately 11,000 miles) to
Europe or America. These tankers outgrew both the Suez and
Panama Canals. Even if previously announced plans to deepen
the
Suez Canal materialize, no more than 200,000 tonners would
be able
to navigate it. (In 1968, 326,000 tonners - Universe Island
were
built in Japan, 400,000 tonners were designed and a plan to
design
a 1,000,000 ton tanker was announced.) Such a trend, could not
help but influence the leader of the Soviet Merchant Marine
and its
scientific-research and design institutions, and subsequently
probably s,peed up the consideration for the larger tanker
construction
Initially, in 1968, the 100,000 dwt tanker was favored. Even
the name of the head-ship in the class, Moskva , was selected,
which
»
indicates the completion of at least preliminary design. However,
at the end of that year a number of articles appeared arguing
for
a larger tanker and debates under the general headline:
"What the
new large tanker shall be?", lasting a whole year, started.
Among
the participants were representatives of practically all branches
of the Soviet Merchant Marine, shipbuilding industry, and a
number
of scientific-research institutes and design bureaus. Many meetings
439

and conferences at scientific and technological councils of
\
I
various organizations., including the participation of hundreds of
officers of the merchant marine, designers and scientists, were
held. While tens of various conclusions and opinions which were
published indicated different approaches to the technological
details of the proposed ship, the same concerning the size and its
justifications were quite, and even surprisingly, similar.
Leaving the technological arguments aside, the arguments' of the
second group concerning the size can be summarized as follows:




- the tanker size and its draft should present no problem
in the passage of major canals (Suez, Panama)
;
- the tanker must be able to navigate through major straits,
particularly Bosphor, safely, without assistance from tugs and
interruption of other traffic;
- the ship should be able to profitably participate in
foreign trade, transportation of oil among domestic ports and 1
i
while being chartered.
The following arguments were submitted by the TSNIIM?:
73The approved Souzmorniiproekt plan visualizes the
increase of guaranteed depths of many Soviet ports, assuring
entrance of ships with the draft up to 17 meters. Morskoy Flot
No. 12, 1969, p. 20.
MQ

^ In spite of the fact that giant tankers will definitely
be built during the decade of the 1970' s and will carry a
substantial portion of crude oil, there is no reason to expect
that they will represent the basic nucleus of the tanker fleet
of the future, because "they are vulnerable during the war "
(emphasis added - N.S.) for their low speed, poor maneuverability
and the huge target area they-. present for the submarine and
aviation;
possibility of catastrophic consequences in case of
accident (damage or wreck)
;
they cannot comply with the existing International Rules
of the Road (they are not maneuverable at less than five knots,
cannot be stopped in less than two to three miles and hence/
can do little by themselves to avoid collision in the event if
another ship is negligent)
they can be used only among few ports, which are specially
equipped and require a depth of not less than thirty meters;
the losses of time for any reason are too costly;
the construction cost, per ton of deadweight while decreasing
with the growth of tanker tonnage up to 300,000 dwt, with further
increase in size begins to increase (because the necessity to
assure longitutlnal strength, non-optimum coefficients dictated




v The institute draw the conclusions, that during the 1970' s,
the basic deadweight of tankers will be between 100,000 to 300,000
tons. Tankers with 125,000 - 150,000 dwt will have the advantage
of passing the Suez Canal being loaded, while tankers up to
74
250,000 dwt will bo able to navigate it while in balast.
At the end of 1369, the Collegium of the Ministry of
Merchant Marine considered the arguments, and "mainly, on the
basis of economic considerations", selected the tanker designed
by the group beaded by chief-designer, N. N. Rodionov. The
main characteristics of the tanker are as follows:
150,000 dwt (about 180,000 tons displacement);
propulsion plant - steam-turbine, 30,000 h.p. with the
reduction gear and variable pitch propeller;
speed - 16.5 knots;
dimensions - L=293 meters; B=45 meters; L/B ratio around 6;
draft 16-17 meters;
endurance - 20,000 miles (80 days);
unloading time approximately ten hours, considerable degree
/ !




TSNIIMF, Transactions , Vol. 133, 1970, pp. 60-63.
i
Morskoy Flot No. 12, 1969, p. 20; Nedelya No. 48, 1969;
Izvestiya
,
4 December 1969; Len ing radskay
a
Pravda. , 1 January 1971;
Sovetskaya Possiya
,






The design incorporates the typificatiou of general
solutions and larger variations of the tanker, in definite limits,
f
can be built after experience in building and service is obtained.
This would probably not happen before the second half of the
1970's. So far, the MIR will be the largest ship ever built in
the Soviet Union.
A similar approach has been taken in consideration of other
types of ships, particularly ore carriers. The Soviet Merchant
Marine, up to the end of the 1960 *s, in reality did not have bulk
carriers. Their role has been assigned to the universal ships,
76
such as the 23,000 ton Zvenigorod class. The first relatively
large bulk carrier, Baltika with 35,800 ton cargo capacity v/as
built in the Soviet Union in 1968. The larger bulk carriers are
presently being built and bulk carriers up "to 80,000 tons are
planned.
In the dry cargo ships category, the largest ship up to
the end of the 1950 's, was the American built Liberty class.
i
During the decade of the 1960's in addition to foreign deliveries
i
(14,150 dwt Omsk class - Japan; 14,480 dwt Beloretsk class -
Denmark; 12,375 dwt Vyborg class - East Germany) , the Soviet
shipbuilding industry built several classes of dry cargo ships:
76
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v Leninskii Komsomol - 16, 080 dwt
Bozhitsa - 12,640 dwt
Kapitan Kushuarenko - 15,768 dwt x
Slavyansk - 12,680 dwt *
all with speeds of 17-18.5 knots. *"*""--
Both domestic and foreign built ships were produced by a
large series. The optimality concept, i.e. size, power, degree
of automation, determined by the concrete conditions of operation
with the goal to achieve maximum possible profitability, has been
77
fully applied.
In the never ending search for the improvement of various
modes of propulsion at sea, nature gives man a good indication
for optimality: among the many thousands of soa founa, none
lives permanently on the surface. At the present, there are
two general tendencies in the development of sea transportation
(the naval, carrying weaponry, should be included in such general
term) in order to increase speed and to achieve optimum utilization
of consumed power - to go up, above the surface, or down, below
it - both clearly indicating the attempt to break away from the
service. Following the first principles, hydro-foils and air-
cushioned ships have been under development. As for the hydro-foils,
tens h.p.'s per each ton of its weight is needed to maintain it
above the surface and there is no noticeable decrease in the
v
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specific power requirement with an increase in
the, size of the
hydro-foils. For the large hydro-foil ships hundred
of thousands,
and maybe millions horsepowers will be required
and the weight
of machinery and necessary fuel will exceed
many times the cargo
capacity of such ships. It is logical to conclude
that the
application of the hydro-foil principle will be limited
mainly
for passenger ships with displacement not exceeding
1,000 tons
or for small amount of valuable cargo, speedy
delivery of which is
^
required (including relatively light packages of weapon
systems
on board of naval hydro-foils)
.
A somewhat similar, although more promising situation,
exists with air-cushion ships whose initial specific
power
requirement per ton of weight does not differ much from
the
hydro-foils. However, with the increase in size and weight
of
air-cushion ships, specific power requirements are
diminishing,
raising the expectation that in the future, construction
of
relatively large air cushion ships can be achieved.
The second tendency in the development of sea
transportation
is more promising. To begin with, the submerged ships
are not
handicapped by weather, their propellers work under more
favorable
« conditions, and the propulsion coefficient is higher.
The low





comparison with the surface ships. The high cost of construction
of subnariae transports, particularly the cost of nuclear propulsion
systems and more complicated navigational equipment, coupled with
the absence of urgent need for high speed sea transportation for
the majority of cargoes, ai*e at the present the major obstacles
for wide application of submarine transports in the mercantile
practice. The situation, however, might be different 10-20 years
from now. Various pronouncements in the Soviet specialized
press give reason to believe that the Soviet shipbuilding industry '
is working on the solution of submarine transport navigation,
particularly for certain areas such as Arctic, and for highly
specialized ships, such as the submarine tanker, and perhaps
the submarine container carrier. An original proposal for the
solution of the pi'oblem was presented by Soviet scientist U.
Plenkin (Nikolaev Institute of Shipbuilding) for which two patents
78
were granted. Even the construction of submersible fish catching
ships is not excluded in the future and the concept has been under
79
1discussion accompanied by some drawings. As for the under the
surface submersible, in spite of the obvious attractiveness of
conventional power plant utilization and some savings in construction
78
Trud, 3 August 1968.
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cost, the large vet surface of such ships and considerable volume
of displacement requiring use of ballast greatly reduces the
propulsion advantages. In spite of the fact that the idea was^
80
discussed by the Soviet specialist, its application is doubtful.
In summary, the development of larger air-cushioned ships
and submarine transport can logically be expected by the Soviet
Union, and the appearance of .experimental ships of this kind
somewhere in the mid 1970' s would not be surprising.
The efforts of Soviet shipbuilding research and develop-
ment institutions is supported by a good experimental base which
includes some specialized ships. In 1968, a small 600 ton ship,
Issiedovatel' (Researcher) , made an equatorial voyage testing
various equipment in tropical climates. The results of the voyage,
according to a number of articles, exceeded all expectations and a
decision was made to build a "floating base for comprehensive
research Y/hich will permit sharp acceleration in the process of
introduction of new equipment to shipbuilding". Named Izumrud,
the ship was designed by Kherson Tskb (Central Design Bureau)
"Morsudoproekt" and built by the Nikolaev Ship Yard. The ship has
10 scientif ic-x*esearch laboratories, 27 research sections (groups) ,
and was designed to test main engine and auxiliary mechanisms,
80
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various electronic equipment, crew living conditions, vibration,
new shipbuilding materials, structures, etc. The ship is. the
only one of its kind in the world shipbuilding practice known to
81
this writer.
The specialists of the Soviet shipbuilding industry
presently are often used to provide technical assistance to other
countries' shipbuilding industries. The methods employed can be
well illustrated by the example of Egyptian Ship Yard in Alexandria -
a modern shipbuilding enterprise incorporating some of the latest
achievement in the Soviet and world shipbuilding practice - built
with Soviet assistance. The assistance was provided by a group of
Soviet specialists from various enterprises, but mainly from Kherson
Ship Yard. In addition, the main effort in the assistance was
devoted to the training of Egyptian specialists and workers
through three methods: by sending them to the Soviet Union for
training on the Soviet yards, educational and research institutions;
by organizing Alexandria's ship yard training center with the
capacity to train 600 people per year; on the job training (350 men
were trained in 1969-1970) . With the participation of Soviet
specialist, the first ship Alexandria (13,000 ton dry cargo ship)
82
was built over a two year period and launched 23 May 1971. Similar
assistance has been granted to other countries.
81
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Conclusions
The Soviet shipbuilding industry is centrally controlled
by the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry and builds naval,
merchant, fishing, river, and research ships. Historically the
Russian, and up to the middle of 1950' s, the Soviet shipbuilding
industry was heavily deviated toward naval construction with only
15-30% allocated for civilian* production. Starting with the
late 1950' s, considerable shipbuilding capacities have been allocated
to civilian construction and the appearance of a reverse trend is
unlikely. In addition to achieved levels of technology and
experience, the capacity of the Soviet industry in general and the
shipbuilding industry in particular have been playing a crucial
role in determining the output of the Soviet shipbuilding industry
in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense. The intensity
and the composition of the Soviet naval construction, in turn, has
been dependent upon the availability of weapons systems,
occasionally producing a temporarily available capacity for the
additional civilian construction. Orders abroad have been
crucial for the civilian, i.e. merchant marine, fishing, and
I
research ship construction, and in certain times important j
(particularly for propulsion systems) for naval construction.
Together with the Soviet Bloc countries, shipbuilding industries





Soviet Union with massive deliveries
of hundreds of various ships





corollary to this, the utilization of
foreign yard capacities-
seems to guarantee avoidance of a
possible future over capacity
of the Soviet shipbuilding industry.
The industry has a powerful
scientific research institutions supporting
it. A number of
innovative methods in shipbuilding,
production technique, and
original solutions have been implemented.
Future growth of both
naval and mercantile fleets should further
stimulate the production
and experience of the industry resulting
in the construction
of better and more sophisticated ships.
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Besides the number of geographical discoveries by, the
Russians, many of which were associated with commercial under-
•
takings, the first Russian expedition to study the northern and
eastern shores of the country and to describe the seas, the Great
Northern Expedition, was ordered by Peter the Great and conducted
after his death (1725-1730 and 1733-1743) . Around-the-world
voyages of the Nadezhda and Neva, under the command of Kruzenshtem
and Lisyansky (1803 and 1806 respectively) also produced





During the around-the-world voyage of the Predpriyatiye
(1323-1826) /the physicist Lents measured water temperature,
1
In the Soviet literature on the subject, the terms
oceanography and oceanology are used interchangeably and
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2
salinity, and density. The famous scientific cruise of the
British research ship Challenger (1872-1876) had a considerable
influence upon the development of oceanography and especially the
Russian approach to it. The Challenger expedition, in effect,
established a methodical approach which has been used in general
up to the present time. The Russian expedition aboard Vityaz,
in which a young S. Makarov .participated, was the first Russian
attempt to follow it.
The collection of data and facts mainly through expeditions
is still considered to bo one of the major tasks at this stage
of development of oceanography. Up to the quite recent past,
hydrography and meteorology were the two best developed
disciplines, for they were in fact the ones needed most for
navigation. The level of development of science and technology,
particularly the latter, had been the major limiting factor to
the scope of oceanographic work. The growing world population,
increased industrial output, the scarcity of 'various raw materials,
the rapid development of sea transportation, military requirements
and man's unrelenting drive to discover the new have been the
major factors stimulating the development of oceanography.
After "tforld War II, particularly during the'1950's, it
2
Medvedev , Suda dlya Issledovaniya Mi rovogo Okeana
(Ships for the Research of the World Ocean) , Sudostroyoniye
,
Leningrad, 1371, pp. 215.
!j52

became clear that in addition to making the traditional ocean
surveys to produce maps and charts, including those of the bottom,
oceanography had to find, or help to find, ways to solve a number
of problems: a fresh water from the sea, which contains 96-97%
of all the water on our planet; power from the sea, where
considerable energy sources (waves, tidal, nuclear - deuterium)
exist; protein to feed humans and animals; extraction of
minerals from the world ocean, where they have hardly been
exploited at all (with the exception of off-shore oil) . In
addition to the 36 different elements claimed to found in solution
in sea water in quantities known to exceed those in land deposits
(gold, nickel, silver, molybdenum, iodine, etc.), the surface
of the bottom is covered with a layer of iron-manganese nodules
(concretions) , estimated by some Soviet scientists to total
o
•3
hundreds of billions of tons for the Pacific Ocean alone.
It was also claimed that the world resources of cobalt
on land are about a million tons. There are about a thousand
i
i
million tons of it in nodules alone. The most logical *way ; to
/ !
reach the mantle is from the ocean plateaus, where the earth's
crust dwindles to five-six kilometers compared to 35-40 kilometers
4
oa the continent.
Academician L. Zenkevich , Th e Wealth of the Oceans
,
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The enormous effect of the ocean on the thermal conditions
in the atmosphere and, hence, climate is well known. By
comparison, the thermal effect of the surface layer of land is
negligibly small. On the other hand, the circulation of ocean
water depends to a great extent on the movement of masses of
air above the ocean. Many Soviet scientists call the climate
of the earth an oceanic climate. Man has started to explore
the expanses of both outer space and the ocean, inner space, at
nearly one and the same time , in the second half of the 20th
Century. It is safe to assume that the world ocean has greater
significance for the life of man than outer space.
The first International Geophysical Year of 1957-1958,
and particularly the second International Oceanographic Congress
held in Moscow (30 May - 9 June 1966) provided detailed information
on the scope of Soviet oceanography, and attracted world
attention to the Soviets' intensified efforts in the field.
During the Congress, the Soviet Union proudly announced the
creation of "the first system in the world which fully automates
the process of obtaining and processing oceanographic data right
on board ship". They refer to the new Soviet research ship,
Akademik Kurchatov. The reports by Soviet scientists on research
in the Arctic and the Antarctic dominated the Congress. Considerable
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relation to the Atlantic Ocean basin (particularly the- physical
oceanography of the Mediterranean, and the Black, 'North and Baltic
Sea), the Pacific Ocean arid, to a lesser degree, the Indian Ocean,
although the Soviet Indian Ocean expedition (starting with the
cruise of Vityaz in 1959) was among the first, if not the first,
5
to begin work in the Indian Ocean.
At the end of 1968, a U. S. Congressional source reported,
in somewhat alarmed tone, that in the Soviet Union "200-
oceanographic vessels are assigned to applied and basic ocean
research. Nine thousand scientists are utilized in a variety of
oceanographic programs". The continuing construction of new
scientific vessels by Soviet, Polish, and East German yards was
emphasized. The study also referred to the requirement for all
Soviet ships (naval, merchant, and fishing) "to contribute to
the country's overall oceanographic effort", a requirement as
old as sea navigation. One of the study's conclusions was
noteworthy; "The Soviets also have been in the ocean studies
business in a more serious fashion for a longer time than the
United States or its Western allies".
5Morskoy Sbornik
,
No. 8, 1966, pp. 74-78.
6
"The Changine Strategic Naval Balance; USSR vs. USA",
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 90 Congress,
December 1963, U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1968,












Soviet oceanographers were the first to collect data for,
and to publish a detailed bottom map, of the Pacific Ocean and
to prepare basic data for a biological atlas of the Indian
7
~^
Ocean. Extensive writings in Soviet specialized literature and,
more important the Party and government press, arguing for the
intensified exploration of minerals and oil from the ocean, and
the directives of 24th Party Congress for the 1971-1975 plan,
setting tasks for the work on the Continental Shelf, are
testimony that the Soviet Union is on the verge of extensive
efforts to explore the ocean wealth.
The Soviet Union is already engaged in researching the
super-deep areas of the earth. More than 20 wells over 5,000
meters deep have been drilled. Preparations are underway for
drilling five 15,000 - 18,000 meter wells; one of them will be
8
sunk in the Kuriles.
Soviet oceanography will be considered according to the
following outline:
(1) The development and major work of Soviet oceanography;
j
(2) Oceanographic vessels;
(3) Underwater research and equipment;
(4) Research and plans for the exploitation of minerals
'Nedelya No. 11, 1971.
Science and Technology - 71, APN, 1971, Moscow, p. 21.
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The Development and Major Yfork
of Soviet Oceanography
During the first few years of Soviet power, the activity
of Soviet oceanography was, for obvious reasons, very limited,
and centered around hydrography. The desperate food situation
»
in the country generated the necessity for Kara Expedition of
1921, the success of which was assured by a well organized
hydrographical support. In 1922 the Soviet flag was raised
over the first scientific research ship, the modernized schooner
Persey, which became the center of the newly organized Polar
Floating Marine Research Institute (Plavmornin) ..
Naval (military) hydrographers, whose corps was established
in Russia in 1827, fox'raed the backbone of early Soviet work
which was performed mainly in the northern seas. During the
t
summer of 1920 they performed a series of current observations
/ i
in the Kara /Straits and Yogorskiy Shar. In 1923 a polar
i
I
observatory on the shore of Matochkin Shar was opened. The use
j
of aircraft, in addition to ships, for ice observation began in
I
1924 along the track of the Kara Expedition. During the Second
i
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.YUHCttV&ii "\ra-s ocmiiuotad. b.y; the Soviet Uaioa. The study of the
White Sea by naval hydrographers resulted in the publication of
two atlases, Tidal Currents , 1929, and the second on the
9
Ice Conditions , 1932.
Work in the Black Sea started in 1923, where the Black
Sea Oceanographic Expedition was organized and conducted its
work up to 1935. The promoters and the first leaders of the
expedition were well known Soviet oceanographer Academician Yu.-
M. Shokal'skiy and naval hydrographer (later engineer - rear-.,
admiral) V. A. Snezhinskiy.
In the Far East, oceanographic research started in 1924.
In 1928 the work was enlarged, and a joint expedition of Soviet
Navy hydrographers and the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by
L. F. Rudovits, was organized. The expedition, using two ships
assigned to it, made oceanologic stations in various seasons of
the year in depths between 3,000 and 3,500 meters. In 1932-1933
the Bering Sea party of the Pacific expedition made instrument
measurements of the currents in Bering Strait to determine the
water exchange between the Bering and the Chukchi Seas. In
1936-1937 the expedition made the first hydrological survey of
the entire Kara Sea.
9
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resulting in the publication at tho end of the 1930' s of
tables and handbooks containing tho characteristics of tides
i
for all the tidal waters around tho Soviet Union. In 104
1
the Hydrographic Directorate of the Soviet Navy published lido
tables for all the oceans and seas in the world.
Soon after the war, Soviet oceanographic work began to be
intensified. In 1947 Soviet scientists began their work aboard
ships of. the Slava Whaling Flotilla during its operations in
the Antarctic. Almost 1,000 hydrologic stations were made in
Antarctic waters during the period 1947-1957. In 1943, the then
largest research ship, Vityaz, entered into service. In 1949
Vityaz operated in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Berlciug Seas. In
the following seven years, the ship made 3,500 oceanologic
stations, mainly in the Pacific.
Soviet oceanographic research in the North Atlantic
began in 1951, utilizing fishing trawlers. It was sharply
increased in 1954, when the observations began to be conducted
simultaneously by several ships, assuming the character of
oceanographic surveys. Soviet oceanography was very active
during the International Geophysical Year, 1957-1959. The
research performed from Vityaz resulted in detection of the mixing
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of the various layers of water in the Pacific Ocean, resulting
in an intensive propaganda campaign launched by the Soviet Union
t
against burying radioactive wastes in the deep water depressions.
The achievements of Soviet oceanography were noted at
•
the first and second International Oceanographic Congresses
(1959 and 1966 respectively) , where Soviet scientists were among
the most active participants. Congresses and various international
programs helped to extend the international scientific and
professional connections of Soviet oceanographers, who, thanks to *"
the extensive Soviet oceanographic work, were becoming more and
more authoritative and competent.
In 1959 the expeditionary ship M. Lomonosov discovered
the subsurface current named Lomonsov in the low latitudes of
12
the Atlantic' Later in 1963-1964 the study of the Lomonsov
current as well as of the subsurface Brazil current was continued
by the ship.
In connection with another international program, the
Soviet ships, Shokal'skiy, Gromova, and Zhemchug (later joined
by Vityaz) in 1965 began the study of the Kuroshio. The material
collected during the expeditions provided Soviet oceanographers
not only with vast amount of data, but it stimulated the
J ?
'The current crosses the Atlantic from west to east in '
the region of the Equator, is about 2,600 miles long and has a
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development of the theoretical basis of oceanography. The so-callcc
energy method for calculating tho elemonts of wind wavow, worked
out during the war, was further developed at the end of 1950's
by the addition of the statistical approach. The theory of oceanic
circulation was also implemented by a new approach, dealing with
the interaction of speed of flows and density of waters in the
ocean and the mechanism of their mutual accommodation, called
the dynamics of the sea's baroclinic layer. A number of basic
works was published, including N. Zubov, Dynamic Oceanology ; -"
Berezkin, Dynamics of the Sea ; Shuleykin, Physics of the Sea
(Third Edition) ; Morskoy Atlas (Maritime Atlas) , and the new




A method for computing the vertical distribution of the
speed of the tidal current (a mean vector from the surface to
the ship's keel) was proposed for application in shallow seas
as a practical aid to navigation. Later, an equation was
obtained for determining the vertical distribution of a tidal
current speed at any point of the seas as well as for determining
13
the speed and direction of ice tidal drift.
The Soviet contribution to the studies of the equatorial
system of countercurrents in the world oceans is considerable.
13
Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, p. 73.
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During the 1960*8, seven years of continuous study of the
Lomonosov current employing 94 buoy stations with \ automatic
current meters produced 1.5 million readings. About 1,000
deep-water hydrological stations, with observations at 22 levels,
14
have been established. In 1969 the research ship Akademik
Kurchatov observed a new powerful undercurrent more than 3,500
miles long moving in a southeasterly direction along the
Antilles Islands.
A method developed by A. Sarkisyan permits computer
calculation of stable currents (mean - annual and seasonal) . It
was reported that attempts to calculate the stable currents for
all the world's oceans on computers were made in Moscow, Leningrad,
and Sevastopol. The differential equation of mathematical
physics for an entire energy interdependent "atmosphere -
15
ocean-earth surface" system were used.
The findings of the oceanographic research effort also
have important military implications especially in undersea
warfare, where underwater acoustics continues to be the major
means for detecting submarines. The sound propagation in the
water depends to a large degree on the velocity of sound. The
14
15
Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1970, pp. 81-82.
Morskoy Sbornik No. 3, 1971, p. 81.
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velocity, in its turn, is a function of water temperature?
,
pressure (which increasos with the depths), and (salinity. WhJLlo
the salinity is more or less uniform through various layors.
of water and the pressure increases uniformly with the depths,
the changes in the temperature in various layers of water are
not uniform. So, the temperature is a major factor which in
certain layers violates the. general rule of increased density
with greater depths.
The surface (upper) layer of the ocean waters mixed
by atmospheric influences has a more or less even temperature.
The deep layer, not being subject to atmospheric influences,
also has a practically uniform temperature. Between these two
layers there is an intermediate layer, whose depths and vertical
dimensions vary, with a rapidly decreasing temperature, and,
correspondingly, rapidly increasing density. Russians call this
phenomenon the density jump, or density leap layer. It is also
known as the thermal barrier, thermal layer, and thermocline.
It has a complex multiple-stage structure, whose individual
sections, in which the density increases sharply with depths,
are mixed with sections having constant density values.
Knowledge of the depths of the upper limit of this layer, its
vertical dimension, or at least the thickness ox the ocean's








Soviet oceanographic expeditions have in recent years
collected considerable data on water density. A dense network
i
of temperature and salinity observations has been made for the
North Atlantic, the northern and southern regions of the Pacific
Ocean, the southern part of the Indian Ocean, and the Carribean
16
Sea. Based upon previously collected data and current weather
observations, the Soviet hydrometeorological center makes up
to two-day forecasts of the information necessary to determine
the depths of density or temperature layers in the various areas
17 —
of the ocean.
The systematic investigation of the Baltic Sea in
accordance with a unified international program began in 1964,
when a synoptic hydrological survey of the sea basin was first
made. The work continues in cooperation with several countries
(Finland, Sweden, East Germany, West Germany, and Poland)
.
Soviet expeditions are not only becoming more numerous
and of longer duration, but are involving sizable groups of ships
for the fulfillment of given tasks. For example, a 1968-1969
Soviet Navy expedition headed by Admiral Vladimivskiy aboard the
hydrographical ship Polyus lasted 273 days. During the 54,000
16





mile oruiso, the Soviotfl Pitnrlierl currents
( tli« chpfnJfsnl
composition of water at various depths, surface phenomena, winds,
raiu-squalls, etc., in many areas of tho world ocean.
During 1970 the Soviet Union staged an unusual experiment
at the center of the Atlantic Ocean, involving the simultaneous
participation of six ships, Akademik Kurchatov, Dmitry Mendeleyev,
Sergey Vavilov, Akademik Vernadskiy, Petr Lebedev, and Vilkitskiy,
representing various Soviet oceanographic institutions {the
Institute of Oceanology, Acoustics Institute, Marine Hydrophysics *'
Institute, and Hydrographic Service) . In the area of study,
which was 120 x 120 miles, seventeen buoy stations carrying
automatic instruments were anchored. Every 10 to 30 minutes, the
buoys measured the speed of the current and the temperature of
the water at various depths up to 1,500 meters. All information
was relayed to the computer centers of Dmitry Mendeleyev and
Akademik Kurchatov. The belief widely held prior to the experiment
of the existence of stable currents in the area, and particularly
i
of a current driven by the northern tradewinds was not confirmed.
/ !
A similar study on a smaller scale was carried out by
18
Soviet scientists in the Indian Ocean in 1967.
18
The experiments were reported in detail during a joint
assembly of the five leading international oceanographic
organizations which was held in Tokyo on September 13-25, 1970, and
also in Sovetskaya Rossia, 27 October 1970; New Times No. 42,
1970; and Pravda
,












Siuce 1968 the Soviet Union has been conducting research
under the Polar Experiment (Polyamy Eksperiment) 'program. The
Polar Experiment is an independent Soviet program within the
framework of Soviet participation in an international program
for the research of global atmospheric processes, and is planned
to continue for several years. The program, which is being
conducted in areas located north of the 50th parallel, includes
a series of general expeditions in the northern areas of Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans by the research ships of the Soviet
Kydrometeorological Service and other organizations, expeditions
to the central Polar Basin, satellites and aircraft observations,
and also standard observations from meteorological and aerologicai
10
stations of the Kydrometeorological Service.
It was reported that the Leningrad branch of the Central
Economic-Mathematical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science
and the Institute of Oceanology are working at cx*eating a
mathematical model of the world oceans. The basis of the model
is a system of special equations for determining horizontal and
vertical currents, temperature, and salinity of the water.
Initial tests of the model on the BESM-3 computer in 1369 produced
20
satisfactory results when checked against known paramenters.
19
Mo rskoy Flot No. 1, 1971, pp. 44-48.
20
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Satellites and orbital stations are destined to play an
important role in oceanography, in that they could determine the
4
state of the sea, the ice condition, the degree of water pollution,
location of schools of fish, etc. Thoir role in ocoan
reconnaissance and ASW may already be significant. The work
connected with the study of the oceans were performed during
21
flights of the Soyuz space ships. In 1970 the processes in
the ocean depths and in the lower and upper layers of the
atmosphere were studied simultaneously for the first time from
the Soviet research ship, Akademik Shirshov, by the crew of space
22
ship Soyuz-9 and the meteorological satellite Meteor.
During the last sixteen years the Soviet Union has been
involved in an extensive program in Antarctica. The Russian
expedition of 1813-1821 with two sailing ships, Vostok and Mirnyy,
commanded by Bellingshausen and Lazarev, claimed to have discovered
23
Antarctica. The first Soviet Antarctic Expedition took place
during 1955-1956, when the first Station Mirnyy was established.
Annual expeditions usually take place between November-February.
21
Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika (Aviation and Cosmonautics)






It is very difficult to prove or disprove the claim,
since, in addition to the Russian ships, American and British









In addition to Mimyy, the following stations were subsequently
established by the Soviet Union: Vostok, PionorsKaya, Oaais,
i
Sovetskaya, Lazarevskaya (later superseded by Novolazarevskaya)
,
Bellingshausen, Molodezhnaya, and Leningradskaya. As of the
fall of 1971, a new Soviet Antarctic Expedition, the 17th,
including three ships, the veteran, OB, an icebreaker, and
24
research ship Professor Vize had been under preparation. Not
all stations are manned permanently and the personnel are
replaced each year upon the arrival of the expedition. The
stations are well equipped and there have been wide use of
aircraft, helicopters, and sled trains.
While the overall scientific research in Antarctica is
supervised by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, a few dozen Soviet
scientific research institutions are involved in the work, of
which the Arctic and Antarctica Scientific Research Institute,
the Scientific Research Institute for Geology of the Arctic, are
the most active. The Hydrographic Service of the Soviet Navy also
sends its ships to participate in expeditions on occasion. Y/ide
ranging and apparently high quality research has been conducted,
and the Soviet rich experience in the Arctic has been put to
broad use.
24
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A certain degree of specialization was established among
the stations mentioned above. For example, Mirnyy Station
conducts extensive meteorological research and Molodezhnaya and
Vostok Stations, aerological research, including rocket probes of
the atmosphere. The meteorological data from the satellites,
related to the Mirnyy Observatory and the Molodezhnaya Station,
are being used. The data are- transmitted to Moscow and other
meteorological centers of the world. At Molodezhnaya in 1969
a study was made for the first time of the atmosphere's electron
density with the aid of artificial satellites. The glaciologists
and geographers at the Vostok Station carried out deep drilling
in the ice to a depth of 509 meters, obtaining unique samples of
ice said to be formed from snow which fell 30,000 years ago.
A quite extensive study of the Continental Shelf, the Continental
Slope, and the geology of the sea floor has also been conducted.
An assessment of mineral resources for future utilization was
probably done through geological prospecting. While doubting
Antarctica's immediate value for such resources, Soviet specialists
25
do not exclude their exploitation in the future.
Undoubtedly, some military application can be made of the
Soviet research in Antarctica. For example, gravimetric and
25











geodetic data collected can be of value to
missilery. Up to
the present, however, nobody accused
the Soviets of any violation
of 1960 Antarctic Treaty. The Soviet
Union research in
Antarctica (at least that selected to be
published) has been
26
widely publicized in various periodicals
and special reports.
in general, the research work in





The research in the Arctic has continued,
too, witb__the
largest Soviet expedition, Sever-22, being
made in 1970. A
study of the ocean floor which included
geological prospecting
was conducted from a drifting ice
field not far from the Pole
named the "Little Scientific Town on Ice".
Helicopters flying




Starting in May 1970, a group of skin
divers
participated in under-the-ice observations.
28
An air expedition,
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Sever-23, was planned for the end of 1971, which, in addition
to resupplying drifting stations SP-16, 18, 19, and 20, was to
1 29
establish twenty automated radioraeteorological drifting stations.
Oceanographic Vessels
The first Russian research ship, Audrey Pervosvannyy
,
was built in 1898 in Germany, for research in Barents Sea. Renamed
after the Revolution, Murman, and later Mgla, the ship was used
by Soviet hydrographers for more than thirty years. Two other
ships, Taymyr and Vaygach, were built domestically prior to the
Revolution to study the Northern Sea Route. The first Soviet
hydrographic ships, the Okean class, the Kamchadal class, and
the Ost class were built prior to World War II. At the beginning
of the war, the Soviet Union had 73 hydrographic vessels, many
of which were later used in combat for minelaying, amphibious
operations, and transportation of military cargoes. V/hile close
to fifty of them survived the war, the condition of most of them
30
was poor. During the 1950' s, many surveying vessels of the
Soviet Hydrographic Service were ex-German minesweepers, converted
ex-Japanese naval ships, and even a number of former United States






Sudostroyeniye No. 1, 1970, pp. 63-66.
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Soviet hydrographic fleet was considerably reinforced during
the decade of the 1960's. 18 units of the Samara class with a
displacement of about 1,000 tons and a speed of 16 knots were
built in Poland (1962-1964) . Later, 9 units of the Moma class




In 1957 the Mikhail Lomonosov was built in East Germany.
The ship, with a 5,960 ton displacement, is equipped with 16
laboratories and is operated by the Soviet Academy of Science.
"
The first oceanographic vessel designed and built in the Soviet
Union after the war was a naval hydrographic survey ship, the
Nevel'skoy. During the first half of the 1960's, a large number
of oceanographic vessels was built: three naval surveying ships
of the Polyus class, 11 oceanographic research ships of the
Nikolay Zubov class, and 5 or 6 hydrographic surveying and
research ships of the Zenit class. All were built abroad, mainly
32
in East Germany. The construction of the Nikolay Zubov class
series was of particular importance, for, regardless how the
ship is viewed, whether as a hydrographic survey vessel or as
an oceanographic research vessel, her laboratories and equipment
31
Soldat und Technik No. 9, 1971, pp. 522-524.
32
Soldat und Technik No. 8, 1971, pp. 460-464.
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permit a variety of tasks to be performed,, including measurements
of waves and currents, geological sampling and analysis,
meteorological studies, and hydroacoustic research.
In 1959, two expeditionary ships, A. I. Voeykov, and Yu.
M. Skokalskiy, were added to the Soviet Kydrometeorological
Service. The ships are suited not only for the traditional
oceanographic observations, but "for broad general meteorological
33
research as well".
The growth of the Soviet Navy, the Merchant Marine, and "
the fishing fleet required an intensification of hydrometeorological
research and better support from the Hydrometeorological Service,
34
which, in 1966, had little more than 40 ships. A series of
research ships of the Akademik class were ordered and at least
eight were built in East Germany. Originally called the Professor
Vize class by Soviet Hydrometeorological Service, which received
four of them, the ships have a displacement of close to 7,000
tons. Each ship can launch meteorological rockets and has 21
laboratories. The Soviet Hydrometeorological Service calls them
"weather ships", capable of conducting prolonged hydrometeorological
and aerological observations at permanently assigned points of
33
Vodnyy Transport , 26 June 1969
34




world ocean. Two such points were planned for the Atlantic
35
Ocean, two for the Pacific, and one for the Indian Ocean. In
addition, nine weather ships of the Passat class (3,700 ton
displacement) with 22 laboratories each were built in Poland. The
ships have complex electronic equipment and an automatic device
for launching meteorological rockets to altitudes up to 80
36
kilometers, and simultaneously perform hydrological observations.
All weather ships are also assigned to study air and water
pollution and have the corresponding equipment. . -*
An extended network of weather stations in the world ocean,
and the use of meteorological satellites and computers permitted
a computer-controlled weather routing system to be introduced
37
at the end of 1960's. It was claimed that during 11 months of
1969, 1, 120 merchant ships were tracked by the system with a
38
savings of 318 ship days and more than 5 million rubles.
A large number of specialized ships were employed since
the end of 1950* s, mainly by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to










Undoubtedly, it is used by the Soviet Navy in addition to
the Soviet Merchant Marine and is probably similar to the U. S.
Navy's Optimum Track Ship Routing System.
38
Vodnyy Transport, 7 February 1970. *
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study of the upper atmosphere and space and to observe
satellites. First were four Sibir' class missile 'range ships,
i
converted ore carriers. At the beginning of the 1960's two
Desna class ships designated as missile range instrumentation
ships were added. In raid 1960 the Soviet Academy of Sciences
acquired the following vessels: Dolinsk, Bezhitsa, Ristna,
Aksay , Kirishi and Borovichi classes, all of them either
converted former merchant ships or built on the basis of an
existing merchant ship design., Eight units of the Kirishi class ^
and four units of the Borovichi class were built in Soviet yards
39
on the basis of Vytegrales class timber carriers. In 1967,
the Kosmonavt Vladimir Komarov was added to the fleet. The
ship displaces 17,580 tons, is 140 meters long, and in addition
to 114 crew members, accomodates 126 scientific and technical
personnel.
In 1970 a new Soviet vessel, Akademik Sergei Korolyov,
was commissioned. The ship built in the Nikolayev Shipyard is
182 meters long and displaces 21,250 tons. Accomodating 300 crew
and scientific personnel, the ship is well equippedfor the
research of the upper layers of the atmosphere, independent guidance
of earth satellites and space craft, and launching of scientific
39





Akademik Sergei Korolyov did not i Ilong enjoy the title of
world's largest research ship, for durin , ..*' ° g the summer of 1971, a
new Soviet research shin vn ~p, Kosmonavt YUriy Gagarin, built in
Leningrad, joined the service and h„C became the flagship of the
Soviet expeditionary fleet R,m +. Built essentially for the same
purpose as Akademik Sergei Korolyov, the new .hu n s ip is more than
-ce as large





- she is by f
- *• -«-—t scieQtific ship BitSIvories and the aeWest equipment coming not f_ ^
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an. is capabxe of controIUng not OQly earth^^ ^
space ships flying to the moon- 41
Also, during the sumner of 197i the Sov . et ^^^^
-earch fleet was augmented by the „ sfaip^^
Vaiversitet (Moscow „niversity)
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the scientific research aboard the vessel. It was reported
that the Soviet Union is building or is planning io build a
special ship for drifting in the Arctic ice. The ship's hull
would be able to withstand the pressure of ice, and have a
high-capacity (possibly nuclear) propulsion plant, a number of
laboratories, rocket launching devices, and a computer center
42 -
.
as its main features.
Presently, there are no universally recognized standards
for research ships. There is tendency in the Soviet Union to
divide research ships into two broad categories, expeditionary
ships and so-called universal ships. The former are capable
of performing comprehensive oceanographic research in any area
of the world ocean, particularly in the less known areas. It
is recognized that such ships are very expensive and, apparently,
their number would be limited. The latter are divided into two
sub-categories: scientific- research and oceanographic ships. They
are said to be capable of performing both basic and applied
research according to a prescribed program. The main feature of
this type of ship is their equipment, which permits not only
universal application, but replacement upon the fulfullment the
task of a program. Apparently, cost considerations are forcing
42
Science and Technology, Znanie, APN, 1971, Moscow, p. 21.
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the Soviet Union to adopt a more ration.!al approach to the
allocation of fund«3 anH +~d to assure better utilization of existing
and future ships. A number of publish**01 ed proposals dealing with
the design and construction of research shm, „
43
ips bear good testimony
to that fact.
Xn general, there are two approaches to man's livlng aud
-
-Hang underwater for prolonged periods: adaptation to the
underwater enviroment or complete isolation from its iQfiueQce
-inly Pressure. Both approaches have a long history of
development, but only recent technological progress has registered
some noteworthy achievements. While the second approach has been
-Presented by the development of various sizes and designs of
submarines, the first approach essentially has been the
sophistication of various diving technics and e.uipment. The
-erican "Men in the Sea Program" is the most illustrative' of
the latter.
/
soviet experimentation in this field started in ^ ^^
o* I960. For years a number Qf ^^^ „uQderwater reseaJfa f
clubs were arguing for the need for such . n
—
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the Donetsk Club, built the underwater habitat Ikhtiandr-66
,
which was tested in August of 1966 off the Crimean peninsula
at a depth of 11 meters. Three aquanauts worked in this habitat
for a total of 168 hours. In the following year, a somewhat
44improved version, Ikhtiandr-67, was also successfully tested.
Simultaneously, the Leningrad Hydrometeorological Institute
in cooperation with Acoustical Institute of Soviet Academy of
Sciences built the underwater laboratory Sadko. The spherical
laboratory has a diameter of 3 meters and a volume of 14 cubic
meters, and is suitable for two men working at depths of up to
50-60 meters. The laboratory was tested in the Black Sea, 120
45
meters from shore at the depth of 42 meters.
During the summer of 1967 a more sophisticated underwater
laboratory, Sadko-2, was tested. Sadko-2 is composed of two
spherical bodies 3 meters in diameter joined by steel cylinder
with a hatch. The upper sphere is used as a compartment for the
aquanauts and the lower, as an auxiliary compartment. During the
initial test, /the laboratory was secured at the 25-raeter depth,
and two aquanauts spent six days in it.
The Sadko-3 laboratory, designed by the same organizations,
44Sudostreyeniye No. 1, 1968, pp. 26-28 and No. 5, 1970,
pp. 18-22.




was tested in October 1969. Compared to the previous two, the
Sadko-3 is more sophisticated and has more reliable means for
i
decompression as it permits docking with a decompression chamber
46
ashore. It has three chambers joined together, one above the
other, and accomodates four aquanauts. Three men worked in it
for four days during the initial tests, followed by two days of
decompression
.
During the summer of 1968 the southern branch of the
Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences tested another underwater laboratory, Chernomor, an
8.4 meter long horizontal cylinder with a diameter of about three
meters and an underwater displacement of 62 tons. The laboratory
accomodates five men and is capable of operating in depths of
up to 30 meters. Research was conducted within hydro-optical,
hydro-physical, geological and biological programs. Five crews
spent a total of 140 man-days in the laboratory, leaving it for
47
up to 3.5 hours to the distance up to 100 meters.
In the summer of 1969 an improved version of the underwater
laboratory, Chernomor-2, was tested. It was 12 tons heavier than
the prototype, the capacity of its electric batteries was 100
46
Sudostroyeniye No. 7, 1970, pp. 19-21
47
Sudostroyeniye No. 5, 1969.
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times greater (Chernomor-1 , due to the low capacity of its
battery, could sustain the work of the crew for only two days)
,
gas-mixture reserves were increased fifty times (Chernomor-1
had an oxygen reserve for three days) , and water reserves were *
increased six times.
The Chernomor-2 is a self-sustained underwater habitat
connected with a ship or the shore only by telephone cable,
which also can be abandoned and communication maintained via
radio buoy. The habitat can be placed under the water at depths
of up to 35 meters, but aquanauts can work down to depths of
60-70 meters. During August-September 1971, Chernomor-2 was
used for a 52-day experiment involving 4 men at a depth of 15
48
meters. It has been considered as a "lead prototype" which
can be mass produced. The cost of the first mass produced
habitat was given as 100,000 rubles, which would drop to 65-70,000
49
rubles in mass production.
. i
The opinion was expressed that the application of such
underwater laboratories or habitats is not limited to oceanographic
/ I
research. It was stated also, that, whenever underwater work at
i
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of labor, the use of an underwater habitat similar to Chernomor-2
is economically justified.
In August 1970 an underwater laboratory, Ikhtiandr-70,
/
was used for extensive tests on special diving suit designed for
a prolonged stay underwater. Medical physiological research
on the condition of divers during a prolonged underwater work
was conducted at the same time. A -special diving suit designed
for this purpose has a dual life sustaining system. The main one
sustains breathing by a hose connected to an external breathing
mixture source. The second, which is autonomous, is carried by
the divers and is incorporated in the suit. Special clothing
worn under the suit provides good ventilation of the body as well
as warmth. The diving suit incorporates a sanitary system as
well as a communication system. During the experiment, two
tests, one with a duration of 26 hours 15 minutes and a second
of 37 hours 40 minutes, were conducted. ^
Medical-physiological tesrts confirmed the possibility of a
prolonged (up to 38 hours) stay underwater in such a diving suit.
The opinion was expressed that such a diving suit system can be
used for underwater work for a period of two or three days, when
the installation of an underwater habitat is impossible or
economically not justified. A plan was announced to build and




will permit work at greater depths.
A number of submarine-like devices have also been developed.
t
Sever-1 (the Soviets call it hydrostat) is an apparently one-man
submersible which is towed by a cable from a mother ship. The
apparatus was used in the Barents Sea by the PINRO Institute
for extensive geological observation of the bottom. Maintained
at .5 to 1 meter from the bottom, the observer was able to
observe a strip 10-20 meters wide, to photograph it and' to take
geological samples. It was claimed that the experiment produced
rich results and is being used for the geological mapping of the
51
Barents Sea bottom.
Another Soviet underwater apparatus, Sever-2, was
developed in the late sixties, and was tested in the Black Sea.
During the test, the apparatus reached a depth of 2,185 meters.
The apparatus is delivered to the operations area by a parent ship.
It is self-propelled, and one vertical and two horizontal screws
give the apparatus good maneuverability, with a horizontal speed
of a running man. A crew of three can observe the enviroment
/ • ]
through several port holes, take samples by means of manipulators,
I
and store them in special extendable containers. The instruments
50Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya, 11 March 1971.
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carried aboard permit testing of the water, photography, and tape
recording of sounds emitted by marine life. The apparatus was
i
52
designed by the Leningrad Institute, Giproryhf lot . -^^
Another apparatus for the observation and photography of
underwater objects, the two-man AMS-200 with maximum submersible
53
depths of 450 meters, was developed by the same institute.
The AMS-200 appears to be a further development of Atlant-1,
54
widely tested in 1965-1966.
The underwater laboratory Bentos-300 has been under
development since 1966. Designed by Giprorybflot Institute, the
self-propelled laboratory is 20 meters long and displaces 360
tons. It has crew of ten (a 15-man crew was also reported) which
can stay submerged for ten days at depths up to 300 meters. After
being towed to the area of operation, the laboratory can
submerge independently, stay at the prescribed depths for
prolonged period of time or lay on the bottom. A battery-powered
motor provides a speed of 1.5 knots. A special compartment which
can be separated from the laboratory provides crew with an
emergency rescue capability. The Bentos-300 can be used for
52
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oceanographic research in cooperation with another submersible
apparatus, TINRO-1 or TINRO-2, designed by the Pacific Research
Institute of the Fishing Industry. Both were called submarines
by a Soviet source. TINRO-1 can reach the area of research
under its own power, while TINRO-2 has to be delivered by a mother
ship. Another apparatus, similar to TINRO-2 and called a midget
submarine, Gvidon, was developed by the VNIIRO Institute and
55
tested in 1970 in Black Sea.
The Moscow Aeronautical Institute also developed and built -"
a miniature submarine, MAI-3. A crew of two can conduct the
research in depths up to 40 meters. The apparatus is made of
aluminum alloys and plastic. Two propellers driven by battery-
powered motors can develop speeds up to three knots; the operating
56
time is 1.5 hours.
The design for an underwater automobile "Makrel", capable
of carrying divers and with a speed of 6 KM/h sustained over
several hours at depths up to 40 meters, has been developed by
Giprorybflot Institute.
The number of manned underwater apparatuses the Soviet Union
55Sudostroyeniye No. 8, 1965 and No. 2, 1967; Ekonomicheskaya
Gazeta No. 32, August 1967; Komsomolskaya Pravda ,- November 23,








has been developing is, to say the least, proof that the problem
has been recognized. Obviously, not all of them are either very
sophisticated, nor will they be mass-produced and find wide
application. But at this, still embryonic stage of the
development, the number of organizations involved and the variety
of models produced is impressive. Following the pattern of the
usual Soviet approach, it is logical to expect that the
development of such apparatuses will be centralized in a few
specialized organizations. The decision to centralize the
construction of the accepted apparatus in one ministry, the
57
Ministry of Shipbuilding, has already been made.
In December 1958, Severyanka, a W-class submarine converted
into a research submarine, became operational. The torpedo
compartment, converted into laboratory, has a number of port holes,
searchlights, and electronic sensors. The Soviet Navy has two
research submarines, Lira and Vega. Both are called hydro-
graphical submarines and are in extensive use. During the summer
i
.
of 1969, Vega, accompanied by a tanker and motor ship, made a
cruise of 2^9 days' duration through 8 seas, and the Pacific and
i
Indian Oceans. Apparently, the submarine is assigned to the
58 '












the Northern Fleet, was also involved in research cruises, one
59
of eight months' duration in 1970. ;
t
In the fall of 1970 the existence was reported of one_
more Soviet research submarine designed to be "mobile, autonomous,
independent of weather and service" underwater laboratory.
It is probably the result of the conversion of one more Soviet
Navy combat submarine into a research vessel operated by one of
the Soviet Oceanographic organizations. The crew of the vessel,
composed of "several tens of experienced specialists, the majority-
of whom -serve on submarines". The first (torpedo) compartment
of this submarine has a special chamber for aquanauts. A special
system of hatches and a lock permits the aquanauts to leave the
chamber and, hence, the submarine, and return to it. Aquanauts
used various diving suits, and during the experiment performed a
variety of tasks around the submarine and on the sea bottom.
The helium breathing mixture and all the power for the life
support system are supplied by the . submarine. The chamber is
also used for decompression, after which the aquanauts leave it
and enter the first compartment of the submarine. During
decompression, the aquanauts can communicate with the crew and,
through a special port hole in the chamber, can see their
colleagues and can be seen by them. The chamber accommodates
59Xrasnaya Zvezda, 21 July 1970.
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at least four aquanauts. Hot and cold food can bo supplied
from the submarine compartment through a special arrangement.
Apparently, the experiment was very successful and met all
expectations. The wide use of the submarines with similar
arrangements for aquanauts in the near future was predicted.
60
Concurrently with their own development, the Soviet
scientists are eager to obtain foreign technology. After an
unsuccessful attempt to buy an American research submarine, the
Soviets turned to Canada. An agreement was signed between
Sudoimport, purchasing agent for the Soviet Union, and International
Hydrodynamics Company, Canada, to build a midget submarine called
Pisces, capable of diving to 6,000 feet.
A variety of pew instruments for the oceanographic research
and apparatuses have been recently developed. Two devices for
measuring hydrophysical parameters, the LKI-3 and LKI-4, the former
for depths up to 200 meters and speeds up to 18 knots, and the
latter for depths up to 300 meters and speeds up to 15 knots, were I
developed by Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute.
62
At least two deep submergence apparatuses with television
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cameras and manipulators were developed. The first one, krab,
used primarily for examining underwater structured, was developed
63 '
in 1967. The second one, called Underwater Geologist, is used
primarily for geological sampling to the depths of 4,000 meters






a probe for depths up to 2,000 meters with "super-
sensitive instruments" for measuring hydrophysical parameters of
the water, was developed by the Marine Institute of Hydrophysics,
an affiliate of the Ukrainian Academy of Science. The readings
are instantaneously transmitted via cable to the Dnepr-1 or
65
Minsk-22 computers, where they are processed and stored.
The Special Design Bureau of the Sakhalin Scientific
Research Institute developed a number of automatic devices for
underwater seismological soundings. For example, an automatic
buoy station can either store the information or transmit it
to the ship, where it is processed. Considerable savings in the
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Many devices used by Soviet oceanography are powered by
radioactive element as energy sources. A number of such
generators, using Cesium-37," were built during the period '
67 "^^>
1963-1967. Another series of isotope generators using mainly
Strontium-90 was developed in the late 1960's. for example,
Beta-3, with a capacity of 880
.kilowatt hours, 'can be used for
ten years in areas with temperatures down to -70 degrees
centigrade. Another generator, Ephir. can operate in an
enviroment with temperature ranges from plue 60 to minus 60 •
68degrees centigrade.
Research and Plans for the
Exploitation of Minerals in the Sea
While the growing world industrial output has generated
an increased demand for minerals, only a tiny fraction of 1% of
them come from the sea. Off-shore extraction of oil, on the
other hand, already represents close to 20% of world oil '
production. In addition to the hundreds of millions of tons
dissolved in the sea water, there are known deposits of minerals
in the bedrock of the subsoil and right on the sea floor in
quantities estimated to far exceed anything known on land. Up
67„
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to the recent time, the level of technological development
represented the major obstacle. The present, and 'particularly
near-future, technology should be capable to provide accelerated .
process of extracting minerals from the sea.
The Continental Shelf is bound to be the first place
where there will be wide extraction of minerals. However, the
distribution of manganese nodules (concretions), is, in general,
beyond the Continental Shelf. Soviet oceanographers have been
'
working for years to determine the distribution and concentration "
of manganese nodules, particularly throughout the central Pacific
Ocean. These strange concretions, which look like tubers, are not
large, ranging in length from a fraction of a millimeter to 15
centimeters. The biggest sample found by the Soviet oceanographers
weighed 136 kilograms. Their concentrations on the ocean floor
are variously estimated to be from 100 to several hundred
billion tons. Copper, cobalt, and nickel are also found in
addition to manganese.
The Continental Shelf of the Soviet Union, representing
close to 1/3 of the world's total, covers 6.6 million square"
kilometers. What is more important, approximately half of it
lies in depths not exceeding 50 meters. However, the greatest
part of the waters over the Soviet Continental Shelf is frozen
over during the winter, and in some areas ice is found eight or
492

nine months out of the year.
During the last several years, research and development
on the exploitation of minerals in the sea has been considerably
intensified in the Soviet Union. Some initial steps toward
actual extraction have already been taken. Experimental
exploitation and enrichment oftitanium ore has been undertaken/
in the Baltic, and a marine geological enterprise scheduled
to start operation in 1972 was formed.% special expedition to
the Laptev Sea in 1967, after extensive prospecting, made""
experimental exploitation of cassiterite and its enrichment
possible. The decision was made to form a marine geological
enterprise for cassiterite extraction, with operations starting
in late 1971 or early 1972. To speed up the exploitation of
cassiterite, a special vessel dubbed "Floating Geological Combine"
was proposed which was to have all necessary equipment and living
quarters for workers
-aboard and be powered by nuclear energy.
The training of marine geologists in the Soviet Union
accelerated/odessa University in 1971 graduated the first group
of marine engineer-geologists. A special laboratory dealing with
problems of engineering geology was organized at the university.
Conducting experimental work on the floor of the Black Seal the
Izvestlya








scientists of Odessa University are using the theory of geological
similitude and modeling, developed by them. To improve methods
of geological prospecting, a model of the Black Sea Continental
70Shelf and computers have been used.
The Scientific Council of Moscow State University
'
coordinates tbe efforts of several departments 'involved in
geological research in the Pacific Ocean. A special laboratory "
of the Moscow Geological Institute is working on the solution of
technological problems connected with underwater extraction'of -
minerals, and is developing special equipment to that end. The
departments of 13 universities, the Ministry of the Non-Ferrous
Metal Industry, and several other Soviet institutes were
cooperating in this endeavor. A specially equipped vessel, tbe
Tura, which is suitable for experimental exploitation and
enrichment of minerals, has been used in the Pacific. Experimental
exploitation of cassiterite and gold has been conducted, and new
technology tested aboard the vessel. 71
j
In the Soviet Far East, a new research center, the
Sakhalin-General Scientific Research Institute, subordinated to
the Far Eastern Scientific Center, was organized and is very
70
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active in marine geology. 72
The need for clo<^ ^se cooperation between land 'and - igeologists hnc k« marinee-isx bas been stressed in +h« oa the Soviet Union t +
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An intensive search for oil Uo uhas been conducted in the Sakhalin
area for ten years. Directional h^itdrilling, a method of drilling
wells with a deviation from the vertira! ^m c l of up to several
thousand meters, was developed and is in wide use in northern - -
Sakhalin. The Gipromomepht Institute designed a special
Piece of eQuipment which would permit concentrating up to 200
'
wells made by directional drilling on a relatively small oil
island. A floating driUiQg rig> Khazap
_
for ^^^^^^ ^^
in sea depths up to 100 meters is being used]
in addition to the Northern seas, the Far Eastern waters,
and the Caspian Sea> certaln areas Qf ^ ^^ ^ ^^
Sea, and the Black Sea are viewed as promising for future oil
and gas exploitation. The resul+o ~*in ts of a number of test drillings
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The 24th Pnrt„ n~pa y Congress Directive *ctives for the Five-Year
Economic Plan included a call "to ie
"^ Pr°S^^ work iathe Shelf zones of sea^ a «,»and oceans for discovering oil and .„deposits
'- T"e "•«* goal seems t0 beM .. „ D to star t exploitationon the Continental Shelf at *. +u11 dePths where existing + u ,
^--4* technologypermits and over the next two h. „deC^S t0 PUSh exploitation onthe Continental Shelf to the depths of 9nna 200 meters, while
"™°°~ -—
, u„„ a„„«.The tidal energy of -t-h^
,st . +
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'
6 firSt Soviet ^dal powerf«lou. the 5000-KV, Kislogubskava n
.
e y , near Murmansk, was built. ;
•W Pr°Je0ted "—skaya tidal power station i^ ° s supposed to
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Ulinn „-, •
aUnUal °UtPUt Of 6
•Uxo kxlowatt hours. The potential tidal euer •
la area i,
SY 1U tbe Whites assessed at 36 billion kilowatt hours per year.™
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The overall coordination of Soviet oceanographic aha
related work is centered in the State Committee for Science^
.
and Technology under the Gosplan Tho rm.n t^""' lae Committee has a Scientific
Council for the study of oceans and seas and the utilization
of their resources. The Council, together with other specialists
of the State Committee, is directly involved in the coordination
of oceanographic research and its application. The research
itself, however, is directed by the Academy of Sciences of the
USSR, the Ministry of Fishing mdustry, the Ministry of Merchant
Marine, the Hydrometeorological Service mh th= u ,,6 v-io. o , and e Hydrographical
Service of the Soviet Navy. Basic research is conducted and
supervised mainly by the Soviet Academy of Sciences through its
Oceanographic Committee in the Earth Science Department.
80
Most of the basic oceanographic research is conducted
in various specialized institutes of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, such as the Shirshov Institute of Oceanology, the
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In 1967 the All-Union Scientific Research Institute
of Marine Geology and Geophysics was organized in Riga, Latvia.
The institute has 12 expeditionary ships incorporated in the
82
Baltic Expedition. A branch of the Oceanographic Institute
of the USSR Academy of Sciences was recently established at
Odessa with its own expeditionary fleet. The Institute of
Biology of the Southern Seas has its branch in Odessa, too.
Branches of the Hydrometeorological Service and of the
Hydrographic Service of the Navy are also found in all major
basins. Considerable applied research is conducted by the
fishing and the shipbuilding industries and the Merchant Marine.
The Geographic Society of the USSR, one of the oldest in
the world (it was founded on August 6, 1845) should be mentioned
The Society consists of the geographic societies of 14 union
republics, 160 branches and departments and three scientific
83research institutes, and incorporates 18,600 members. The
I
society has a/long record of association with the Soviet Navy.
/
!
During its Fifth Congress in December 1970, Commander-in-Chief
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of the Soviet Navy S. G. Gorshkov stated that "the problem
of studying and mastering the world ocean is becoming one of
the greatest scientific-technical problems of the 20th Century",
and that the Navy's direct link with marine geographic
research "is still far from complete". Several Navymen,
including Gorshkov, were elected to the Scientific Council
of the Society.
It can be seen that the extensive organizational network
incorporates numerous scientific, industrial, and operational




Between the Revolution and World War II, Soviet
oceanographic research, primarily hydrographic in nature, was
conducted mainly in the contiguous seas. Although not far behind
the world level of that period, Soviet oceanography did not
distinguish itself, except for the scope of the Arctic research
and the resulting knowledge. After World War II, however, the
Soviet Union gradually and steadily intensified its oceanographic
efforts, placing initial emphasis on expeditions and the
collection of much needed data. The Soviet research fleet has
been considerably enlarged. While the fleet was previously
composed of modified cargo, fishing, and ice-breaking ships,
during the decade of the 1960's a considerable number of specially
designed oceanographic research ships were built, and modern,
often unique equipment was installed in their laboratories.
The scope of Soviet expeditions was greatly increased, and Soviet
research ships are now operating in all areas of the world oceans
.
/
The expansion^ of both basic and applied research has been
accompanied by an increase in the number of scientific
i
organizations involved in it and in the number of scientific
workers employed and of those graduated from the educational




has probably been able to satisfy the demands of an expanding
navy, merchant marine, and fishing fleet. During x the last
decade, considerable attention has been devoted to the Continental
Shelf and the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources.
There are indications that efforts similar to the "Man-in-the-Sea"
program are underway in the Soviet Union.
While it is difficult to differentiate between what is
purely military and what is purely of civilian interest- in
oceanography, Soviet attention to particular ocean areas, the
participation of the hydrographic ships of the Soviet Navy, and
the nature of the research suggests the fulfillment of Soviet
Navy requirements, particularly for submarine operations. It
is difficult to judge whether the Soviet Union is ahead of the
United States in oceanography, but the near future will tell.
The scope of Soviet oceanographic research and their extensive
cooperation with other countries in the field have resulted in
wide international recognition, and have placed Soviet oceanography
in one of the leading positions in the world. There is every
indication that Soviet oceanographic efforts will be intensified






Fish has always been an important part of the Russian
diet. Prior to the 1917 October Revolution, fishing was rather
well developed in Russia, especially in the areas adjoining seas
and along large rivers and lakes. Expensive fish such as
sturgeon and fish products such as caviar were among the famous
Russian export items. Most of the catch was brought by individual
fishermen, though fishing by specially formed communes and
fishing villages was also quite common. The amount of "fresh
water" fish far exceeded "salt water" catch. Immediately
,
following the Revolution/the Soviet Government initiated a number
of measures Resigned to increase the supply of fish. By special
decree of the Council of People's Commissars, dated December 9,
1918, the Main Directorate for Fishing and the Fishing Industry
-own as Glavryba, headed by a special collegium, was organized.
Soon, however, due to the ineffectiveness of that organization and




Council of PcodIp'c r>~ jpe ple s Commissars of May 31 1901 14 ..u»^y ox, ly^l, liquidated the
state monopoly on fishing and eaVP nS g ve Glavryba greater independence
in the administrative, financial an * k .
,
, and business aspects.
Starting in 1926, Gosplan issued the first Vont , +]
^
x con rol figures"
for developing the fishing plaQ
. i»<so, the first Five Year
Plan for the development of *h» * • . •P t e fishing industry was worked out
Tne main goals of the plan were: accelerated catch growth,
reduced cost of fishiag
, developmeQt Qf ^^^ ^
complete removal of private Soviet canital" p from the fishing
industry (foreign concession rights were left temporarily
^touched), under a new order from the Soviet Covernment, however
the Five year Plan for the fishing industry was drastically
changed in 1929
. The new requirement
_ ^ ^^ ^^
more than two times over origin*! mal plan and by 1933 to achieve a
2.6 times higher catch than the pre-revolutionary level
X
Obviously, the plan was not fulfilled. However, the very
intensive work of many enterprises and organizations resulted
"
S°me ±aCreaSe
^ ^ fish -tch, in modest introduction of '
of new technology and in the building of a MBfi1-, J,a t considerable number of
fishing vessels.
_J^30j^rst Soviet steel f , sb . ng ^^^^ ^^ buiit
"Ribnoj^jcho^astvo (Fishing Industry) No. 2, 1971, pp. 6.8 .
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in Leningrad. They had installation for the production of fish
meal and canning, as well as storage capacities for salted and
fresh (refrigerated by ice) fish. In 1934 the first Soviet ....
floating canning factory, Lagan', was built for service in the
Caspian Sea. The ship was capable of receiving fish from
trawlers and processing it. In 1937 the first fish processing
factory ship was built for the Northern Basin.
During the second half of the 1930s, the construction of
fishing vessels was slowed down due to the lack of shipbuilding
capacities, which were taken up by naval construction. The
2
total catch for 1940 was 1.4 million tons. During the war many
fishing ships were mobilized by the Soviet Navy. However, fishing
3
continued even during the war, though at a lower intensity.
After the end of World War II, the Soviet Fishing Industry
was in a bad state. Many fishing vessels had been lost in the
war, and those which remained were in poor condition, with worn
machinery and hulls in need of repair. The problem was aggravated
by the fact that a considerable portion of the Soviet shipbuilding
and ship repair capacities, was either destroyed or severely






Shipbuilding No. 12, 1969.
Old

was also in extremely bad shape, and the country was in dire
need of foodstuff. Consequently, the fishing industry was once
again presented with an extensive plan for a fish catch/
Starting in 1947, the Soviets succeeded in building a
series of medium trawlers (SRT) for side trawling and for use
of drift nets. In the late 1940's the pre-war "catch level was
achieved. The greatest portion of the catch was obtained from
internal waters (rivers, Lakes) and close, off-shore, waters "
of the adjoining seas. Most of the fishing vessels of that time
were represented by small seiners, employing fishing methods and
gear which were not very productive.
The turning point occurred about 1950, after which there
was an accelerated development of high sea fishing, resulting
in steadily growing catches. Restoration of the war-damaged
industry and achievement of pre-war level of production together
with growing shipbuilding capacities in East Germany and Poland
assured rapid build-up of the fishing fleet. 4
It is well known in the Soviet Union that for the same
amount of protein, fish product requires considerably less capital
4
Emerging capability of the Satellite countries to build
ships, particularly fishing vessels, were very important forthe Soviet Union because its own shipbuilding industry, though
mainly restored and even growing, was busy fulfilling orders
of a extensive naval shipbuilding program, initiated in 1947.
5C7

investment than that needed for meat products ^ ^ ^ j
recognized that in order to achieve a large incase in the Soviet
catch, the high seas fishing operations would have to
To he efficient those operations required a special fishing fleet
consisting not only of trawlers, out mother ships, factory ships,
refrigerator-transports, and support ships such as tankers, tugs,
etc. A number of such ships were built in the second half of
1950
-s in the Soviet and foreign yards.
The Soviet fishing fleet appeared for the first time in -
the Northwest Atlantic near Newfoundland in 1956 and latetT OQ
the Western Edge of George's Bank. The similar development took
Place in the Soviet Far East. These efforts resulted in the
steadily growing Soviet catch: 1950 - 1,627,000 tons; 1955 -
2,495,000 tons; I960 - 3,051,000 tons.
6
!
The experience of operations in remote fishing grounds
convinced the Soviet specialists that the larger trawlers with
refrigerating or freezing facilities were needed to improve the
efficiency of^the fishing operations. Also, the absence of any
overseas base's and the remoteness of fishing areas forced the
Soviets to develop methods for processing the catch on the fishing
^^__
The d6Cade of the ^60-s witnessed a steady increase
5 i
Sudostroyeniye No. 12, 1969.
6







in the size and capability of Soviet trawlers and the development
of the auxiliary fleet, capable not only of supporting a large
group of such trawlers for months, thousands of miles away from
the Soviet shores, but also of processing the fish afloat. The
following measures were initiated to build such an efficient
fleet: Soviet domestic yards continued to build medium trawlers,
but their size was doubled compared to those built in the 1950's, J
all of them have either refrigerating or freezing facilities.
'
In 1963 the Soviet Union started to build two classes of
trawlers, the Mayak and the Pioner. Both trawlers have a
displacement of over 900 tons. In 1967-1969 two more classes of
trawlers, the Ol'ga and Sargassa, were built, both with a
displacement of around 1,000 tons. All four classes are capable
of using a variety of fishing equipment such as drift and seine
nets, trolls, and purse seines. At the end of the 1960's the
first series of Soviet stern trawlers was built. The Sudoiinport
Agency ordered hundreds of vessels abroad. In the early 1960 's
a series of over eighty Soviet-designed Tropik-class stern-slip
freezer trawlers were built by East Germany. This was followed
by the Atlantic-class stern trawler, successor to the Tropik, also
built in large series. Both classes of ships are equipped with
the Vostra powered rudder, which gives them exceptional
7




maneuverability, a„d sophisticated hydroacoustical gear for fish
detection, in both the horizontal and the vertical planes.
8
A Polish yard built a large series of Mayakovskii-class
stern trawlers under Code B-26, designed and originally bull/"
by the Soviet Union.
During the 1960's, the five classes of stem-slip trawlers,
the Pushkin, Mayakovskii, Leskov, Tropik and Atlantik, were
delivered in large quantities to the Soviet fishing industry.
'
They are called BMRT (Bolshoi Morozilniy Rybolovniy Trader) , "
or large freezer fishing trawler, and are capable of independent
operation for sixty-seventy days in remote areas of the oceans.
Supported by .other ships, not only BMRT's, but SRT's, caa stay
in the fishing area much longer, provided the crews are relieved.
in addition to freezing and refrigerating equipment, the
trawlers have fish processing plants. On the fishing grounds,
the trawlers are supported by factory-mother ships equipped with
Processing lines and refrigerated storage and able to supply
the trawlers with food, fuel, water, and medical and recreational
facilities for its crews.
Typical of the factory-mother ships is the Zakharov-class
«hich displaces 16,400 tons, has facilities for canning and freezing
fish and producing fish meal for animal and plant food. She is
8
U «? M!







capable of receiving fresh, chilled or frozen catches simultaneously
from up to eight fishing vessels, moored alongside .' Another
i
class of mother ships, the Severodvinsk, built in series by. the
Polish yards since 1955 (under modifications coded B-62 and
B-64) , is used as a mother ship for 20-30 trawlers. Construction
of a more advanced class of mother ships, the Professor Baranov,
in a Polish yard under Code B-69, started in late 1967.
Displacing 10,000 dwt, the ship has a fifty per cent greater
capacity than previous series, with twenty fewer men in the
crew thanks to the high degree of the automation. Her processing
plant is capable of preserving about 200,000 cans of fish per
day in addition to packaging and processing fish paste and fish
meal. Together with attached trawlers, she can operate at sea
9
up to nine months.
The fish transports also have fish processing lines and
refrigerated storage and, in addition, deliver turn-around crews
for fishing trawlers. Typical of such transports are the
Bratsk-class with a 2,500-ton displacement and the Pervomaisk and
Sevastopol classes, both displacing 5,000 tons.
-
The older whale factory ships, Slava and Aleut, were joined
by newer ones, Sovetskaya Rossiya and Sovetskaya Ukraina, 33,000
tons and 46,000 tons, respectively. Whereas the former two were
9U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1971.
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built primarily to process whales, the latter two are a
combination whale and fish factory. The experience gained
in operating the whaling
"flotillas" «h+k + k *. , '& xx x ii
,
with the whale factory
ship as conunand and
.other ships, made a considerable contribution
to the Soviet experience in developing the expeditionary type of
fishing operations and in designing and constructing appropriate
ships for that service.
The next step in sophistication in fishing methods and
'
'
operations introduced into the Soviet fishing industry was the
"
combination stern trawler-factory ship, Kataliya KoVshova.
Built by France as the lead ship in a series, she was the largest
trawler in the world, with a very sophisticated production
Plant. The cannery is equipped with the PTU-100 Soviet-built
industrial television system She can re.ain at sea without
replenishment for 120 dav<? -in in^. ^ys i independent operations. The
diagram below illustrates one day's caoacitv rt* *• ud P y of a fish processing
Plant of the ship and the types of product turned out:

































All these measures brought about a considerable increase
in the Soviet catch, which reached 6,030,000 tons ; in 1966. The
Soviet high seas fishing fleet, the socalled Expedition Fishing
Fleet, in 1966 accounted for more than 90% of the total Soviet
fish catch. Forty-five per cent of all the Soviet fishing
industry catch was processed afloat. The Soviet emphasis
on the larger trawlers and self-sustained fishing fleets paid
off. When operating near the Soviet shore, e.g. the Barents Sea,
one of the best Soviet trawlers would bring in one and one-half tons
of fish per casting, while in the Atlantic a casting brings in
fifteen or twenty tons. Therefore, the big trawlers could make
a profit even if the trip to and from the fishing grounds takes
a month, and costing from 2 to 2.5 million rubles to build were
amortized in 2.5 years.
The Twenty-Third Party Congress in April 1966 endorsed
the recommendations to increase Soviet efforts in developing
the fishing industry, and increased appropriations to that end
by eighty-four per cent for the period 1966-1970. This was
a powerful boost which accelerated the development of fishing
industry even more. The direction taken was toward more sophisticates
and more specialized ships.
10




April 1966, and Morskoy Flot No*. 7, 1967.
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in August of 1963, the Soviet Union was host to the
Internationa! Fishing Industry Fair, Inrybprom-68! held in
Leningrad, in which twenty-two countries, including the USA,
England, all the European countries, and Japan participated.
Soviet participation in the fair was very extensive. Twenty-five
ministries and directorates, more than fifty scientific research
institutes and about 150 enterprises represented. The Soviets
exhibited ten fishing ships, including the fish factory Uborevich,
whose automated oropp^cino' i-;„~~x a p cessing hoes are capable of producing 300,000 '
cans per day. 12
The Soviet search for more efficient and productive ships
in the 1960
-s resulted in the building of the first and only
catamaran fishing trawler, Experiment. The specially designed
fishery system for Experiment has permitted combining two kinds
of fishing, seining and trawling, and one of the trawl can be
used constantly, while the ship is only 130 feet long, it has
a beam of seventy feet, which gives an unusually large deck for
its size, and permits a large working area for its crew of
twenty-five. The extensive tests not only met, but exceeded, the
design specifications, and the decision was made to have ajspecial
shipyard in one of the Baltic Republics to specialize in the
12






construction of catamaran vessels.
13
In 1969 the largest f-ich-i«~ u-g S ls l*g ship m the world with a
displacement of over 41 nan »- '43,000 tons was launched in the Soviet-
Union. The vosto, factory ship combines in it the^^
capacity of over 13,000 tons; a fish factory ship, with the
capacity to process 300 tons of raw materiais, including the
Production of 150 ,000 cans and XS0 tons of fro.en fish, fishmeal
and industrial oil; a passenger s[]ip^ & ^^ ^ ^ ^
600; a tan.er, and a refrigerator ship. She is able tQ^
four months in tropical waters without replenishment. But
the most unique feature- of the vostok *»,>+„factory ship is the
fourteen Nadezhda-class fishing hoats carried aboard. The
Nadeshda-class fishing boat^^^^^ ^ ^
null is made of plastic. They can he deployed from a mother ship
to their fishing stations and, while fishing, are supported by a
helicopter from aboard the Vostok. The Vostok is ^^ Qf
independent as well as expeditionary fishing in the most remote
areas of the world oceans.
At the end of 1960's, the Soviets also increased the depth
^etrawlln., During the 1950s and ^^^ ^ ^^
13
Nedelya No. 9, March 1969, p. 21.
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e Meridian-class, wasdesigned. A more powerf.,1 nfUl propuls*°° Plant drives the ship




The „ ,„«• Mendian-class was f<>




000 tons Gorizont-classhas an underway speed of fifteen k
'
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"tee nots, ls equipped with theprocessing plant producing thirtv **, *
.
6 y-fxve tons of fish per d
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Sovie t fishermen arefxsh to depths of 5,000 meters and the
„.„,
oorresPonding fishing
vessels and equipment are heing planned. 16
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^°s*™yeni2e No. 12, 1969.
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increase in the tracer fleet has been accompanied by a
corresponding increase and sophistication in fish 'processing
factories and refrifrpM+a ^ *- 'a gerated transports. The fish factory,
Korablestroitel' Klopotov, has a fish processing plant with
a seventy-four percent higher productivity than that on the
Zakharov-class. Displacing is inn +~Piacm 15,300 tons, the ship has a crew of
only 120, thanks to the high de^rpp o-pmgn g ee of automation. The ship is
designed to operate only i„ northern and temperate latitudes.
For wor, in tropics and e quatorial waters, another ship, the
Khaharov, displacing 22
,
600 tons, was built. The ship production
plan is designed for sopriaiiv^n. •pec l zi g in expensive fish and producing
high-quality canned fish. To sat-i^fv +-h«10 is y the growing Soviet need
for fish meal, a series of Pos'et-class fish processing factories
is being built. Displacing 28,200 tons, the Pos'et is equipped
with special submersible fish pumps, and is capable of receiving
np to 800 tons of fish per day from the trawlers. Its plant
turns out 120 tons of fish meal per day in addition to other
varieties of fish products, including fillets and cans. 17 I
A series of twelve 12,500 dwt refrigerated transports has
been ordered and is under construction in Prance. The ship has
a very powerful refrigeration plant providing a temperature of
»^s 30°c and a powerful propulsion system which drives the




ship at a speed of nineteen knots. Some of the ships of the
series, which have already been constructed, are planned to be
used on the Soviet Far East-Black Sea line to deliver fish
products to the European part of the Soviet Union. 18 A series
of refrigerated transports, the Karl Libnekht class, is being
built in East Germany for service in the Soviet Northern Basin.
19
i The world-wide extension of fishing by the Soviet Union
through the socalled expeditionary method, which employs
large fishing flotillas centered around and supported by
factory mother ships, considerably reduces the unit cost of
sea food by processing the catches afloat. Besides the obvious
economic advantages, self-sufficient flotilla operations represent
the most logical solution, for the geographic factor dictates it.
The Soviet Union has no overseas bases from which fishing
20
operations can be conducted.
' Vodnyy Transport. July 8, 1971, and November 24, 1970
19
Vodnyy Transport
, February 18, 1971.
20
During the decade of the 1960 's Soviet efforts resulted
n an agreement with Spain to use a port in the Canary Islands
*s an overseas operating base. Cuba can be mentioned as a
;econd such place. A number of countries such as Nigeria and
.auntius, provide the Soviet fishing fleets with the right
o make port calls, where some minor repairs can be performed.
«, in general, those are rather minor exceptions comparedUh the magnitude of Soviet fishing expeditions, some of which
^voive up to several hundred vessels in a given area
519

The operations of a large fishing flotUla.for example
in the southeastern Atlantic, described recently resembled the
operation of a large naval fleet headed by the colander' (chief
of the expedition) and divided into formations (flotillas)
^"
each headed by its own commander.
A captain's conference held via radio resulted in the
decision to switch fishing grounds to an unidentified area
"
nearby Walvis Bay. A number of ships were sent ahead for fish
reconnaissance. After searching for fish with the help of
hydro-acoustical gear and supported by data obtained earlier
from research ships, oceanographic details, and fisheries
exploration data, the reconnaissance ships reported its
findings to the mother ship, which supplies direction and
guidance to fleet operations. After schools of fish were
found and caught, the trawlers headed to the mother ship or
the refrigerated transport, where the catch was unloaded.
According to a schedule, some fishing vessels went to Lagos,
Nigeria, where their crews were relieved and flown back home.
The expedition lasted for the six months. 21
The operations of each expedition and fishing flotilla
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of the fishing industry not only has the location of each fishing
vessel, but collects and analyzes the amount and qualities of the
catches and, hence, the effectiveness of the operations/ The -
center was described as follows: behind the panels of computer
tbere is a huge operational map of the fishing fleet. The
information showed that in the distant waters there were
1,929 Soviet fishing ships, of which 1,420 were fishing, 103
were underway (to or from fishing areas) and 149 were in ports. 22
Their catches for a day, a week, and from the beginning of. the" '
fishing cruise, as well as loads including fish, fuel, and other
supplies, were known. The center resembles the work of an
operations department of a naval staif
.
In 1970, 7.2 million tons of fish was caught in the seas
>nd the oceans (not counting the catch in the internal waters) -
» increase of close to fifty per cent over 1965. The growth
)f the Soviet Fishing Fleet and its technological sophistication
)bviously contributed greatly to such a catch. However, the
enlevement would not have been possible without the tremendous
ffort of the Soviet scientific research and development
rganizations supporting the Soviet Fishing Fleet. Now we shall










It is now generally accepted that the success of fishing
industry depends upon two factors: efficiency and knowledge^
While the former, efficiency, mainly is a product of
technology, which was briefly discussed above, the latter,
knowledge, comes from the marine science research. Many experts
in the field are agreed that the quality and emphasis of Soviet
research in support of fisheries exceeds that of any other
country and, especially in recent times, the Soviets have made
considerable progress in the application of modern science to
23
ocean fishing.
The first Soviet Scientific Research Institute of the
Fishing Industry, Plavmornin (Floating Marine Scientific
Institute) was organized in 1921 with the tasks of "broadly
24ranging research in the Arctic Ocean and adjoining seas". The
importance attached to the research in the interest of the fishing
industry can be illustrated by the following: the decree which
established Plavmornin and was signed by Lenin provided the
23
See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman, "The Soviet Turn




and Gilbert McL. Chapman, Fishery Resources in
^ishore Waters", The Law of the Sea : Offshore Boundaries and
illiLZpnes (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967).
24




nstitute with equipment, fuel, and food on the same basis
s "utmost important state agencies". As a result of more than
t
hirty expeditions in the Barents, White, and Kara Seas aboard
*»
he Persei, the first Bathymetric chart was created, the current
ystem was studied, and considerable knowledge of the biological
roductivity of the waters and the sea bottom was obtained.
uring the period 1921-1926 a network of specialized laboratories,
ubordinated to the CentraOL Institute of the Fishing Industry
n Moscow and serving the fishing regions around Murmansk, the
ar East, the Caspian, and the Black Sea was created.
Of considerable importance for the development of fishing
n the Barents Sea was the organization of GOIN (State
ceanographic Institute) at the end of 1929. In 1932 the
pecially organized Murmansk Herring Expedition established
he possibility of drift fishing for herring in the Barents Sea.
t the end of 1933. this expedition was merged with the Murmansk
etachment of GOIN, and the PINRO (Polar Scientific Research
nstitute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanography) was created.
i
In 1926 the Pacific Scientific-Fishing Station was
Tganized "to study the fish reserves of the Far Eastern seas
or the purpose of commercial fishing". In the late 1920's,
he Pacific Station concluded studied of the biology and
distribution of Kamchatka crabs. Based upon the findings of the
59 7OZ

station a rather sizable industry for catching, processing, and
canning of crabs was established in the area. In'the 1930's,
canned crab was one of the important items of Soviet export.
In 1930 the station was reorganized into the Pacific Scientific
Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography (TINRO)
.
In the late 1920' s and early 1930's, considerable
attention was devoted to the study and improvement of fish
processing methods, including salting processes, and quality
of salt. The work of the fishing industry research institutes
made an important contribution to the development of the Soviet
salt industry, thereby precluding the need for importation of
salt from abroad. (Salt used to be an important item in Russian
and later Soviet import) . The institutes also developed new
technological processes for the processing of caviar-the first
item of the fishing industry sold on export.
The fishing expeditions of 1936-1939 proved the profitability
of herring fishing in the open sea and discovered rich herring
grounds in the Northern and Pacific waters. The methodology of
long-term forcasts for bottom fish and herring was worked out.
As a result of work of the scientific institutes prior to World
War II, the Soviet Union had developed a good picture of the
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baS beea conducting work on
acclimatization of Pari in „c fic salmon in the White anrt » 25l d Barents SeasThe TINRO owns a fleet „f tM ,thirty-six research ships and
conducting research on all known or potential
la the Pacific Ocean. ^ ^^






factory ships. Such methods include smoking in a ^JV°ltage fi6ld iQ section with head processing • '
rays Th„
P usmgmfra-red
. e gamma radiation process for „= • 'canning is under
development, and an experimental installs-
._
_
x llation called Stavrida
25„.









was successfully tested in 1970 aboard the scientific ship
Akademik Knipovich, built in 1964 specifically for research
in the remote areas of the ocean, where the potentialities of
future fishing grounds are determined. Research work has
begun on determining the best means of utilizing Antarctic
Krill for human nutrition. (This represents the first attempt
to use plankton as a human food). The ship's processing plant
produced a special cheese containing krill protein.
In addition to the surface research ships, the industry ""
since 1958 has been using a converted W-Class submarine, Severyanka,
for the research. This submarine gathered considerable data on
fish habits as well as the efficiency of trawling methods.
In May 1971, the decision to build two more submarines for
fishing research was announced. One will be of long range and
26
endurance and the second, a midget type for short dives.
Also the Soviets are using anumber of submersibles, such as
Sever-1, with working depths up to six hundred meters; Sever-2,
a self-propelled type equipped with a manipulator and working
depths of more than 1,000 meters; and the Gvidon self-propelled
"underwater laboratory with submergence depths of several




hundred meters" An rt+uwcto
. Another devirp a-;^,-*,a ce aiding in the study of the
behavior of the trawls as well as of f • u A^11 fish is the Sathyplane
Atlant, which, with a man aboard is +™ * .o , towed behind the fishing
vessel and is capable °* "—aphing and reporting on the
fishing process itself.
The Atlantic Scipntifi« r> *o^xe r i c Research Tn<s^ +,, + ~ uU1 institute has special
department of marine electronics Th« „omcs. e department designed and
developed a number of underwater TV « •equipments which automatically
observe the behavior of the trawl and transmit th ,e picture to '
the trawler. Two c,,^ ^such equipments, IGEK and PRITSEL, are said
to improve trawx productive by more thaQ thirty per ^^
- toe latter is capable of seeing^ ^^ ^^
of meters away from the trawl 28 a „. u* i. A number Qf sophisticated
sonars for finding schools of f*~u ub n ish have been developed.
o- of them, the Kala?r
, is ^^ Qi detecUQg a siQgie
at depths up to 800 meters. 29
I- order to attract fish and to concentrate a fish school
»USt prior to the traw l, a special rocket Which spreads an
i
!r!^l!en USe" °riginally ' the "<**** -re
|
27
cSpveJskayj^Rossiva, July 12, 1968.
28
^^XJ^n^port, April 29, 1969.
^P^£2^niye No. 12, December 1968, pp. 27l30.
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propelled by solid fuel an nUGla d
—
°
f the. were expendable.Later, a special steam propell^




06 iS US6d t0 «tuat. the sprayer. 30
It was reported that by imit,*-
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opinion of scientists concerning the maximum level of fishing
which the oceans would be able to sustain differ widely.
Some conclude that the world fishery production could be
increased up to two hundred million tons without any radical
development such as fish farming, and the ocean would be able to
34
sustain it. Other scientists, including many Soviets, put the
maximum sustainable level somewhere between one hundred million
and 150 million tons. But the growth in world population, the
steadily increasing number and size of ships involved in fishing -
together with the sophistication of fishing equipment, and,
finally, the growth, though at a slower rate, of fish catches,
have convinced the majority of the scientists that, if the present
practice continues, the ocean might become a biological desert.
Moreover, it was clearly stated in the Soviet press that the
traditional methods of catching fish in the world oceans will
not meet human needs in the future. It was also emphasized
that in spite of existing possibility of increasing catches in
inland waters considerably, its capability, will be limited.
Strong arguments have been made in the Soviet Union for drastic
changes in fishing, to switch from the methods of simple hunting
of fish to rational and scientifically based methods of fish
34 ,_Milner B. Schaefer, "Economic and Social Needs for Marine
Resources," Ocean Engineering: Goals, Environment, Technology,





35harvesting. m order to achieve such a rational use of the
ocean wealth the following has been proposed: »
-
to study and master those areas of the ocean and catch
those forms of the aquatic life which has not been used
intensively;
- to increase fishing in the middle layers as well as
pelagic fishing were considerable resources of anchovies,
mackarel, tuna, marlins, sharks, and other types of fish
exist;
- to improve methods for determining fishing resources in
order to establish maximum sustainable level of catches*
- more rational fishing in relation to the size and the
age of the fish caught;
- considerably increase catches of small previously not
used fish and such form of sea life as krill, for production
of protein or fish protein concentrates (FPC)
;
- to increase the practice of transportation of certain
fish from one area of the ocean to another (primarily off-shore
i
areas) and to assist fish in acclimation;
- to intensify the use of the Continental Shelf and to
create there a sort of aquaculture which would potenially become







Presently, to exercise conservation practice, research
hips are being sent to the prospective fishing grounds, ahead
f the arrival of the fishing fleets, where they determine not
nly the quantity and type of fish available, but also measure
ish size and determine fish age. This procedure is claimed
o minimize the possibility of catching young fish and decreases
36 --
he chances of over-catch. As was stated above, the production
rocess for fish protein paste from krill has been developed
ad the needed equipment tested. It has been claimed that
he catches ofkrill measured in protein units may produce twice
37
s much protein as presently obtained from all world fishing.
Some steps are being initiated in the direction of
eveloping aquaculture. From the experimental grounds of
zcher-NIRO, some forms of sea life and sea weeds are being
arvested at half the cost of the conventional methods at sea.
oviet scientists have long been working to improve the breed
f the fish, and recently a major success was reported. A
rolonged experiment had resulted in the hybrid of a beluga and
sturgeon. It was claimed that nature's barrier had been -
vercome, and a new fish called bester, whose "parents" are the
eluga and the sturgeon is very viable and fast growing. In
Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya , July 13, 1971.
37
Vodnyy Transport, July 1, 1971. r
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1966 the second generation of this fish was developed from the
roe laid by the bester. It is now claimed that the bester came
out of the experimental state long ago and is ready for natural
breeding and reproduction, prospects for which were considered
very favorable.
Fishing by -Kolkhozes and in Inland Waters
In addition to the fishing enterprises subordinated to
the Ministry of the Fishing Industry, there are hundreds of
fishing kolkhozes (collectives, organizationally similar to
the agricultural collective farms) , involved in fishing in
inland waters as well as at high sea. Under the Model Statue
of the Fishing Kolkhoz, approved by the Council of People's
Commissars on 16 February 1939, all motor and sailing boats
used for fishing and transport, machinery, fishing gear and
net-making equipment were collectivized in the Fishing Kolkhoz.
An important role in the operation of Kolkhozes used to
be played by the socalled motor-fishing stations (MRS) . By
the end of the 1950' s however, the methods of allotment of
technical production equipment to Kolkhozes by the MRS were
found inadequate, and the system was changed. All equipment
formerly belonging to the MRS's was sold to the Kolkhozes, and
the MRS's became technical stations for the repair. Since that
53^

time, the ships, fishing gear, etc. have been sold to the
kolkhozes on a cash or credit basis.
In 1969 the total kolkhoz fishing fleet had about 10,000
fishing vessels and accounted for about one-quarter of the total
Soviet fish catch. Only in Kamchatka and Sakhalin are there
more than five hundred fishing kolkhozes, and more than 180
of them are involved in sea and ocean fishing. Their fleet has
a relatively small number of large freezer trawlers (BMRT) , a
few hundred medium refrigerator trawlers (SRT) and a few hundred
ocean-going seiners. Working for the kolkhozes there are over
2,000 captains and navigators with regular certificates. The
reason that the kolkhozes fish in distant waters (concurrently
and quite often together with the expeditions of the Ministry
of the Fishing Industry) is not for their love for navigation
or even the better quality of fish there, but the absence of
fish in nearby off-shore waters. The Far Eastern regions of the
Soviet Union are a classical example, but their case is especially
typical for another reason. Several years ago, not to mention
the p re-World War II period and the first decade following i fish
was found in abundance in those waters, but ever greater plans
i
for catches, the real demand for fish in the country, good pay
(frequently many times over that in the agricultural collective




in the kolkhozes, but unreasonably large catches which often
considerably exceed the processing capacity of the fishing
industry. In all fairness, it should be stated that the Soviet
fishermen are not alone responsible for the overexploited waters
of the Okhotsk Sea, around Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands;
Japanese fishermen made their own considerable contribution.
Soviet scientists made, what appeared to be, a correct prognosis,
set a quota of fishing and warned against excessive catches,
38
but they were ignored. As a result, all that could be done was
for the kolkhoz fishing fleet to follow Ministry of the Fishing
Industry and to fish all over the world.
However, to that end a qualitatively different, much more
sophisticated and expensive fleet of ships was needed, which
was developed but to such a degree that it does not now differs
much from the fishing fleet of Ministry of the Fishing Industry.
The kolkhoz fleet uses the same type of refrigerator-transports
and similar methods of fishing used by the Ministry's flotillas.
i
i
The economics of the state-owned fishing, enterprises and the
/ : !
kolkhozes, however, differ sharply, as does the pay received
I
i
by the fishermen, as illustrated by the following, hypothetical
example: Let us assume that Ivanov is a fisherman of the
i
State-Owned Fishing Flotilla, and Petrov is a fisherman of a
38




Kolkhoz. From the very beginning of a fishing cruise they are
in unequal positions. While underway to the fishing ground
Ivanov receives socalled "navigational pay" of approximately
160 rubles per month; Petrov is paid nothing. If the fishing
is extremely poor and Ivanov catches little or nothing, he will
still be paid his guaranteed salary (seventy-five per cent of
navigational pay), plus an "area differential".
Length of service in the state fishing industry is well
rewarded. For example, in the northern areas, fishermen receive
a ten per cent increase in their basic pay every six months.
Petrov receives none of those benefits and is paid only for the
fish caught and delivered ashore or aboard a ref rigerator-transport
It is true that kolkhozes pay their fishermen more per unit
of fish caught than the fishing industry pays its fishermen, but,
on the other hand, the State pays the kolkhozes considerably
less per unit than it' pays to the State owned fishing enterprises.
How do kolkhozes manage to exist under those conditions?
The "secret" is quite simple - by the considerably higher
productivity of their fishermen, by better and cheaper maintenance
and repairs, primarily performed by their members, and a very
normal desire of the Kolkhoz fishermen to make money. Kolkhoz
fishermen are making 400-600 rubles per month, considerably more
537

than the average wages of a Soviet worker of 140-160 rubles per
month. A smaller administrative superstructure and simplicity
of accounting methods and control make Kolkhoz overhead costs
considerably lower than those of the State owned enterprises.
39
It is a common practice that fishing kolkhozes in the
Soviet Union are assigned to a State owned fishing combine
(fish processing factory), whose existence is to a large degree
due to the kolkhozes. The system was designed in order to get
kolkhoz monies into the State budget, and works as follows;
The combine acts as a broker between the kolkhozes assigned to
it and buyers of fish the kolkhozes caught. Regardless of to
whom the kolkhoz catches are to be delivered, whether a domestic
or a foreign customer, this catch is counted as partial fulfillment
of the combine's plan, and the combine is paid for it by the
buyer. From the money received, the combine in turn pays the
kolkhozes, but a considerably smaller sum than received from the
buyer. By just such a practice, in 1969 in Kamchatka alone
the combines "-received" from the kolkhozes twelve million rubles.
But being on a self-accountability basis and because of their
lower productivity, in addition to the twelve million rubles
i
they received a nineteen million ruble subsidy from the state.
Proponents of the new economic reform launched in the
i
39




Soviet Union in 1965 raised the natural question: If kolkhozes
are managing to pay for their own operation and make a considerable
t
profit, and in effect are subsidizing the combines, maybe it is
40
more logical for them to own these combines. Naturally, this
question remained unanswered, because if the proposed "transaction"
were to go through, the next logical step would be to buy
regional, state-owned fishing enterprises and ultimately to
buy out the Ministry of the Fishing Industry. Another idea
proposed in the Soviet Press was to assign only off-shore fishing -
to kolkhozes, reserving pelagic fishing for the State-owned
fishing industry. But, as stated earlier, there are not many
fish left in the off-shore waters around the Soviet Union.
The notoriously inadequate Soviet price system is hurting
the kolkhozes badly. The July 1967 price reform elevated the
prices for metal and metal products. A seiner which used to
cost 400,000 rubles prior to the reform cost 750,000 rubles
after reform and a BMRT which used to cost 2.5 million rubles,
now costs 3.6 million. Even though the prices for a ton of
fish remained the same, the kolkhozes managed to operate at a
considerable profit by exercising initiative and ingenuity.
For example, after ship repair prices were raised, the kolkhozes
began to repair their ships themselves, and established a number
40
Literaturnaya Gazeta No. 43, October 22, 1969..
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of their own small repair yards, saving up to 100,000 rubles
on the repair of a BMRT compared with the cost of ' the repairs
at a state-owned ship repair yard. But because the socalled
"state interests'* always prevail, the initiative of the kolkhozes
in these directions is constantly being restrained. In spite
all of these, the kolkhozes catches are large, and the operational
cost lower.
The efforts of the State Fishing Industry and the- fishing
kolkhozes resulted in a steady increase of Soviet catches during
the five year period 1965-1970, with the total catch for the
five years exceeding 34 million tons, or fifty-five per cent
more than the preceding five years period. The annual Soviet
per capita consumption of sea food increased by 36.5%, to 17.2
41
kilograms (thirty-eight pounds) in 1970.
But sea fishing, though known and practiced in Russia for
centuries, has only recently become the predominant, for
(
traditionally, a considerable amount of fish was caught in the
inland waters (rivers, lakes, and other fresh wa.ter bodies) as
well as closed seas. In contrast to the steadily growing
I
catches in the seas and oceans, the catches in inland waters
are steadily declining. For example, the catches in Sea of Azov
were: 1936, 158,000 tons; 1946, 52,000 tons; 1956, 25,000 tons;
i
41





and 1965, 14,000 tons. The picture is not better in lakes and
rivers: prior to the Revolution, in 1913, 614, 006 tons of
t
fish were caught in them: in 1962 the figure was 426,000 tons,
and in 1968, 270,000 tons. (These figures reflect the catches
42
of only expensive fish, such as sturgeon, beluga, sterlet, etc.)
The declining catches have been the direct result of depletion
in fish stock, which have assumed alarming proportions. Compared
with 1937 the catches of certain fish decreased as follows:
sturgeon, two times; sundre, seven times; salmon, five times;
Caspian herring, thirty times. Continuous pressure from ever
increasing plans forced inland fishermen to catch more and
more small fish. In 1937, 254,000 tons of small fish were caught,
while in 1967 this figure reached 560,000 tons. But it is
well known fact that large fish eat small ones, and because of
the catastrophic decrease in the latter, the potential damage
to overall inland fish resources increased considerably. The
problem was aggravated by the pollution inevitably accompanying
industrial development, which, in addition, required more and more
electric power. Consequently , the large number of hydroelectric
stations and dams built on the Soviet rivers violated the regular
fish migration routes. It must be said that a number of provisions
to eliminate the problem were planned and implemented. Bypasses
42




and elevators were built at the dams, but fish quite often
refused to take a free ride on elevators or follow prescribed
channels and stubbornly tried to return to their spawning
grounds through familiar ways which were blocked by concrete.
Complaints are being voiced that the best scientists and
experts have been employed by the fishing industry involved
in the sea and ocean fishings and not enough funds have been
allocated for research in the interest of inland fishing.
Another problem, and this is of a typically Soviet nature, is
the administrative or organizational problem. It is impossible
to determine who is responsible for the inland waters, their
purity, and the preservation of fish. This was admitted by no
less an authority than the Minister of the Fishing Industry of
43
the RSFSR. The Soviet Ministry of the Fishing Industry is
nominally in overall charge of all matters concerning fishing.
Keeping waters free of pollution lies with the corresponding
ministries of the various industries, to whom the fulfillment of
the plan is the primary goal and anti-pollution measures, in
spite of the existing regulations, a remote, secondary goal at
best. The Ministry of the Fishing Industry, overwhelmed by the
problems associated with sea and oceanic fishing obviously does
not and, in all objectivity, probably cannot pay enough attention
43Pravda, May 31, 1969.
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to inland waters. For these reasons, the republic ministries
and administrations are arguing that they alone should be
entrusted with matters associated with inland fishing, and not
only responsible for the catches and fulfillment of plan. In
reality, the arguments, of course, are centered around of control
of funds research facilities. At the end of 1960's, only four
per cent of total capital investment in the Soviet fishing
44
industry was allocated for the development of inland fishing.
Certain measures aimed at correcting the existing situations-
have been undertaken. At present, the Main Directorate for
Fishing and Fish Farming in inland basins coordinates the efforts
of republic fishing ministries and directorates in their fish
preservation efforts. Ten scientific research institutes of
the Ministry of the Fishing Industry of the USSR and a group of
scientists from the Soviet Academy of Sciences are searching for
a solution and are experimenting in order to stabilize inland
water fish resources and to promote their growth. One hundred
and twenty fish factories and farms have been established J One
/ !
such enterprise occupies an area of 13,000 hectares and is capable
of producing 18,000 tons of fish for consumption and to growing
more than eleven million fish to one year of age.
The fresh water fish in the Soviet Union have traditionally
44





been considered a better fish, and certain types definitely
are. The possibilities for well organized fish farming in the
Soviet Union are very bright indeed. Its largest republic,-^^
the Russian, has 400,000 kilometers of rivers, about twenty
million hectares of lakes, and more than four million hectares
of artificial water reservoirs. At present, it also has close
to 40,000 hectares of fish ponds.
In 1971, the Ministry of the Fishing Industry of the USSR
inaugurated a new scientific industrial enterprise which is
charged with the task of increasing fish resources in Sea of
45
Azov and the Don River. In 1970, sixty-eight million juvenile
sturgeons, 760 million salmon, and about six billion other fish
were produced by the above mentioned 120 fish factories and farms
and released into Soviet inland water basins. A low catch limit
46










The Ministry of Fishing mdustry of the USSR is a Union
Republic ministry. In contrast to All-Union Ministries, which
have administrative power over the entire territory of the
Soviet Union, the Union Republic ministries coordinate similar
industries in the Republics T>ut directly control only a specified
number of enterprises, the list of which has been approved by
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
J
The Ministry is headed by the Minister assisted by the
central apparatus.
J
On representations made by the Minister, the Council of
Ministers of the USSR approves the collegium of the Ministry for
"collective examination of the most important matters relating
to fisheries". The collegium is chaired by the Minister, and
its members are the Deputy Ministers and senior officials
of the Ministry appointed by the Council of Ministers. Decisions
of the collegium are implemented by the Minister's orders.
|
The structures of the Ministry (USSR) comprises five Main
Basin Administrations, four Main Branch Administrations, fourteen
Administrations, six Departments and two Main Inspection
Apartments.
|
The Main Administration of Fleet Maintenanr^ is »to assure




The Main Administration for Fish Breeding and Conservation
i
(Glavrybvod) is concerned with the preservation of fish stocks,
the designing and implementation of measures for their
reproduction and the regulation of fishing.
The Main State Inspection of the Fishing Fleet (Glavgosryb-
flotinspektsiya) ensures the observance of the Soviet Merchant
Shipping Code in the fleets of the fishing industry and. the
fishing kolkhozes fleet, as well as of rules, regulations and
instructions concerning the safety of navigation and fishing.
It also administers the salvage service. Glavgosrybf lotinspektsiya
carries out the tasks assigned to it through Basin State
Inspection Departments.
Main Basin Administrations of the Fishing Industry were
established in 1962 for local direction of the fishing industry.
These Main Basin Administrations (Zapryba - Western Administration
#
of the Fishing Industry - in Murmansk; Dal* ryba - Far Eastern
j
Administration of the Fishing Industry - in Vladivostok; Kaspryba -
Caspian Sea Administration of the Fishing Industry; and - |
Azcherryba - Azov-Black Sea Administration of the Fishing Industry •
I
in Sevastopol) are a part of the central apparatus of the
i
Ministry.





Union Republics or territories are directly subordinate to
the Main Basin Administration. For instance, Zapryba is in
iirect charge of the Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian and
(aliningrad production-administrations, which in their turn
iirectly control shore fish-processing enterprises, fishing
seaports, plants for repair of ships, etc., within their respective
•egions, as well as trawling, refrigeration, transport and
tuxiliary fleets.
The Administration of Industrial Fishing pursues a uniform ^
echnological policy. The Administration is responsible for:
1) adequate distribution and maximum utilization of the
ishing fleet; (2) opening up and developing new sea regions
or fishing operations; (3) introduction of modern fishing
ethods; (4) perfecting sea-exploitation projects and fishing
ear.
The Shipbuilding Administration lays down the technological
olicy for the construction of fishing vessels, for the utilization
ad development of the production capacity of shipbuilding yards
i
ad controls the implementation of the shipbuilding plan.
The principal functions of the Administration of Fleet
nd Ports Utilization are: (1) development and improvement of
leet and fishing ports activities; (2) introduction into the
leet and fishing ports of the latest achievements of sciences
5 it 7

and technology; (3) distribution and full utilization of the
refrigeration and transport fleet. l-
i
The Administration of Fishing Kolkhozes is responsible for
the full exploitation of fish stocks by kolkhozes. It carries
out the following functions: (1) examines the work of the
kolkhoz fishery fleet; (2) participates in developing of new
types of vessels and fishing gear.
The Administration of the Sea Transport Fleet, Mortransf lot
,
is responsible for taking delivery of vessels built for the
Ministry of Fishing Industry at Soviet and foreign shipyards,
and to carry out production tests on the vessels so delivered
during the guarantee period. It gives technical assistance for
training crews of foreign firms which have purchased the Soviet-
built fishing vessels.
There are also: The Main Administration of Material
and Technical Supply; the Administrations of Economic Planning,
Finance, Fish Produce and Modern Technology ,. Personnel and
Training Institutions, Capital Building and Projects, Scientific
Research Institutes, Wages and Labor, Reserve Cadres," External
Relations; the Department of Signals and Search Techniques,
the Transport Department.
The Ministry of Fishing Industry is widely represented
abroad. In addition to various representatives in the UN
5i*8

organizations, those involved in the foreign trade and ship-
building, observing fulfillment of various agreements concerning
fishery, there are three important categories of representatives
whose existence and duty are illustrative, for they show the
scope of the Soviet fishing industry activity.
In accordance with bilateral agreements between the
government of the USSR and the governments of certain foreign
states, the Ministry has representatives residents abroad, whose
duties are defined by the contractual obligations of the Soviet
Union in each particular case.
The Ministry's representative at Dakar, the Republic of
Senegal: (1) supervises the performance of Soviet obligations
under the provisions of the Soviet-Senegalese Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Marine Fishing, of 22 March 1965,
and of obligations under certain other agreements to the extent
that the Ministry of Fisheries of the USSR is involved in them;
(2) attends to making arrangements for the calls of Soviet
fishing vessels in Senegalese ports; (3) coordinates with
Senegalese representatives all matters connected with the
servicing of USSR fishing vessels in their ports; (4) takes
care of the interests of Soviet fishing vessels in Senegalese
ports; (5) assists Soviet fishing and cargo ships in the
implementation of fishing and fishery-production plans; (6) helps
5^3

Soviet foreign trade organizations to solve operational problems
connected with delivery of fish produce to Senegal; (7) acquaints
the captains of Soviet vessels with the local port, customs,
sanitary and other rules and formalities, and with the
arrangements for servicing and supplying their vessels; (8)
renders the Soviet captains assistance in the organization of
"politico educational and cultural" work among the crews of
their vessels; (9) is authorized to represent the Ministry
in its contacts with the Senegalese; (10) is responsible for
the strict observance, by the crews of Soviet fishing industry
vessels, of Senegalese regulations, statues, instructions, and
legislative acts.
The representative in Cuba: (1) ensures the performance
of Soviet obligations under the Soviet-Cuban agreements on
cooperation in developing marine fishing and in constructing
a fishing harbor; (2) directs the servicing of Soviet vessels;
(3) deals with questions connected with the processing and
deliveries of fish and fish produce to Cuba; (4) supervises
the servicing, repairs and supply of Soviet fishery vessels
based in the fishing harbors; (5) assists in and controls the
activities of the operational group of the Kaliningrad Expedition
Base of the Oceanic Fishing and Refrigerator Fleet; (6)
coordinates and directs the activities of all Soviet fishery
.550

specialists in Cuba; (7) looks after the interests of the
Soviet fishing fleet in Cuban ports. \
The operational group of the Ministry in the United Arab
Republic: directs the activities of Soviet fishing, transport and
scientific vessels engaged in fishing and fishery research in
the waters of the Red Sea and in the northwest part of the
Indian Ocean. The second "operational group" is stationed in
Suez, and is charged with the training, on board of Soviet
47
vessels, the UAR citizens.
Problems, Trends of Development, Plans
In just the last five year period (1965-1970) the Soviet
fishing industry received 3.5 billion rubles of capital
48
investment, of which seventy per cent was spent for ships.
The interest of the State in the development of the fishing
industry and the importance attached to it can be seen in the
hundreds of rewards to fishermen- usually presented during a
specially proclaimed holiday, Fisherman's Day, celebrated in
July. The Soviet fishing industry annually receives thousands
of young specialists educated in the numerous institutions
47
A. A. Volkov, Morskoe Pravo (Maritime Law), Pishchprom,
Moscow, 1969, pp. 29-31, 58-73, 84-88.
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subordinated to the industry. There are five institutions of
highest learning, fourteen marine schools and other educational
institutions, with a total of 60,000 students and cadets. Two
maritime academies are training future captains and navigators.
And yet, in spite of the above figures, which apparently
represent the power of the Soviet fishing industry, there are
a number of serious problems. The nature of these problems
can be divided roughly into two major categories: the first
is associated with the Soviet centralized system of planning
and control, and the second, with the fast development in the
industry (what the Soviets called "problems of fast growth")
.
The existing problems resulted in the violation of certain
proportions in the development of various branches of the
fishing industry and the declining effectiveness of capital
investment in recent years. For example, in 1965 the State's
income from the fishing industry exceeded expenditures by 168
million rubles, while in 1968 expenditures exceeded income by
twenty-one million rubles. The main reason for the declining
profit, and, in fact, operating at a loss, was found to be 1 in
the ineffective use of the existing fishing fleet and the
declining catches per ship. For example, in 1965 the average
catch for a BMRT was 7.3 thousand tons, while in 1970 it was




ships dropped from 71.3% in 1962 to 64.3% in 1968.
Complaints have been made concerning the availability
of refrigerator-transports, especially in the Far Eastern
enterprises. Although these ships are badly needed on the
fishing grounds, they spend fifty-five to fifty-eight per cent
of the time in ports waiting to be unloaded or under repair,
and only seven to eight per cent of time receiving fish at sea.
Effective utilization of refrigerator-transports is handicapped
by the low capacities of the Soviet ports as well as of the
49
railroad system.
Available ship repair facilities obviously do not meet
the needs of the fishing fleet. Tire Ministry was accused of
spending too great proportion of allocated funds for shipbuilding,
neglecting a corresponding increase in ship repair facilities.
Previous major repair of a trawler required 146 days, presently
227 days are needed. In 1969, 90,000 ship-days were lost because
50
of low quality of repair. Even- the -decision of Ministry to
build mother-ship, Vostok, the ship which evoked such epithets
as "fantastic" in the world press, was severly critized in the
Soviet press and on seemingly good economic grounds. According
49 TIzvestiya
, March 20, 1970.
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to estimates, Vostok was supposed to cost 37.5 million rubles,
but, as early as the spring of 1970, it was clear'' that the ship
could cost no less than 50 million rubles, for which fifteen
to sixteen BMRT's could be built with the capacity to catch
2.5 to 3 times more fish than the mother ship Vostok.
The Soviet price system as well as the wage system have
also adversely influenced the productivity of the Soviet fishing
fleet, and urgent calls for modification have been made-. The *
centralized command of the Soviet fishing industry frequently
interferes with the decisions of captains by switching ships
and sometimes whole flotillas artibrarily from one fishing ground
to another. The time lost because of this practice is probably
considerable. Another factor is still poorly organized fish
reconnaissance. It is argued that a good reconnaissance preceding
the arrival of the fishing flotillas would eliminate the
unnecessary concentration of large numbers of ships whose
fishing capacities far exceed the? available* resources at a given
fishing ground, and minimize losses of time spent underway from
one fishing ground to another. Also, some of the fishing gear
has been found to be of low effectiveness, and the electronic
equipment employed to control them are in short supply. The
51
Izvestiya, March 20, 1970.
554

necessity for to swtich from the over-fished Continental Shelf
zone into the deeper areas of the world ocean is oeing well
recognized. The development of the Soviet fishing industry has
clearly demonstrated adherence to such a trend. The trend would
in turn continue to generate a demand for the construction of
primarily medium and large-. fishing vessels. As far as number
of large fishing ships, the Soviet Union is already in first
place in the world with 2,900 totalling 3,605,000 GRT.
5
^ Also,
the further remoteness of the fishing areas from home bases
would certainly require an even more accelerated development of
ships for the auxiliary fleet such as refrigerator-transports,
fish processing ships, tankers. The total tonnage of the world
fishing fleets during the last ten years grew 2.8 times, but
catches only 1.8 times. The Soviet Union expects this trend
to continue and, according to their forecasts for 1980, despite
the predicted growth of fishing fleet by 2.5 times, catches will
grow only 1.5 times, and, hence, fish will cost more.
It is expected that new methods of fish processing and
canning will be introduced soon, including pasteurization by
i
irradiation, freezing by liquid nitrogen, and so on.
I
Containerization of fish cargo and solution of the problem of
handling containers at sea, if necessary with the help of
52
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artificial suppression of waves, is expected. To elevate the
catch level two measures are proposed: (a) man's active
i
assistance to "King Ocean" through more rational fishing and
development of aquaculture, and (b) increased harvesting of
other forms of sea life, including krill, the shrimp-like
creatures which are frequently mentioned as the most promising.
The future development of the fishing industry during
1971-1975 is planned along these lines:
more complete and rational mastery of the world ocean
wealth and intensified fishing in inland basins;
the 1975 fish catch is planned to reach 10.3 million
tons, representing a growth of forty -seven- per cent over 1970;
Soviet per capita consumption of fishery produce is
planned to reach twenty-three kilogram per year;
the main attention and primary fund allocation will be
to further development of ocean fishing, but considerable
development of inland fishing is,- planned as well;
special attention will be paid to the development of
fishing farms on ponds and lakes, with production of 2.5 to 3
53
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were formerly consumed annually by Antarctic whales. With
the near disappearance of the whale, krill have multiplied




tons of per fish hectare of water;
it is planned to build and reconstruct forty-three
fish growing enterprises and their annual production in 1975
should reach the level of 150 million sturgeon, up to 850
million salmou, and up to nine billion other young fish;
- more than 900 new ships for the fishing industry will
be built in Soviet shipyards and ordered from East Germany,
Poland, Denmark, West Germany, France, and other countries;
- to change the designs of all basic types of fishing
54
,
ships operating in the high seas.
The main design organization of the Soviet fishing industry,
Central Design Bureau, Morpromsud, in Leningrad, is already
working on the design of ships for the next Five Year Plan,
1975-1980, including a specialized fish meal floating factory,
a catamaran, a trawler with a displacement of 1,000 tons, a
trawler-factory (canning) ship with a displacement of 10,000
tons, a trawler-mother ship with two fishing vessels aboard, a
I
trawler for Arctic waters capable of working in not very dense
/ I
ice field, a special high-speed ship for fish reconnaissance
55
with modern equipment and two helicopters.
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The socalled super trawlers with a cargo capacity of up
to 2,000 tons and speed up to fifteen knots are being developed.
Such ships will be capable of independent operations up to
10,000 miles from their bases. They will be an improved type
of existing super trawlers, Gruraant and Rembrandt, and an
improved version of the Atlantik-class trawler," Atlantik-3.
Fish canning will be done exclusively afloat, aboard special
fish processing factory ships and canning trawlers. The fleet '
of refrigerator-transport will be enlarged and mother-factory
ships with equipment capable of processing 300-400 tons of fish
per day will be built. The number of ships of the Kamchatskie
Gory class with over 12,000-ton cargo capacity and capability of
delivering to the fishing rounds about 2,500 tons of fuel and
produce and the production of about 100 tons of fresh water
per day will be increased.
It was also decided for reasons not given to greatly
increase the fishing fleet of the Lithuanian Republic, which
is supposed to receive one hundred fish processing factories
and refrigerator-transports during the current five-year period.
This new Soviet fishing fleet will be fishing inthe Atlantic,
using the most modern ships and fishing gear (such as fishing
with electric current and trawls capable of operating up to




All large Soviet fishing trawlers will be equipped with
electronic equipment controlling the effectiveness'of the trawl
in the process of fishing. The capacity of ship repair
'
enterprises should grow more than 1.7 times, the volume of
shore freezers and refrigerators, by 1.6 times, and the capacity
of fishing ports, by fifty-six per cent.
Considerable attention is planned to be devoted to the
organizational problems of the fishing industry. Further
development of centralized and computerized, automatic control
systems (ASU) for the fishing industry is planned. More
attention will be devoted to scientific forecasting in the trends
of development and operation of fishing industry. The role of
the scientific research institutions of the industry will be
further elevated.
It appears that the Soviet Union fishing industry well
understands the problem of future fishing in the considerably
depleted areas of the world ocean, and is making appropriate
i
provisions for not only sustaining the present level, but ^or a
considerable increase of catches.
The Soviet Union provides technical assistance to a






to some Asian countries, Mauritius, and recently Peru. Soviet
i
assistance in the development of Cuba's fishing industry has been
substantial. The Soviet Union in return is obtaining considerable
benefits from the countries to which assistance was granted, and
many Soviet fishing vessels are being serviced in the ports
of these countries. In the absence of foreign bases, the right
of the Soviet fishing vessels to make those port calls are of
obvious importance.
56In June 1971 an agreement was signed by the Soviet
Union and Peru which provides for technical aid to the latter
in the construction of a fishing port, the sending of a
scientific research vessel to study fishing resources in the
proximity of Peru's shores, and the training of fishing industry





Long before the growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine and
Navy caught the world's eyes, the Soviet fishing fleet had been
seen in various areas of the world's oceans remote from Soviet
shores. A high degree of imagination and innovation in the
development of the Soviet fishing industry, primarily for the
bulk of it operations in the high seas, has been demonstrated.
The first trawlers built in the early 1950's were of rather-
small size, but new programs generated in late 1950' s' and I960 's
produced a fishing fleet capable of operating thousands of <>
miles away from their bases for up to six to eight months.
Whereas the fishing vessels of many Western countries, including
most of the U.S., have to return to port after five to seven
days to deliver their catches, the Soviet fleet processes most
of the fish afloat, right in the areas where it was caught,





The fishing gear employed by the Soviet fleet is among
/
j
most efficient and advanced in the world. The development ;Of
i
I
the industry is not only being fed with considerable
i
appropriations permitting vigorous foreign orders for ship •
!




facilities, but is supported by the world's most powerful
research and development efforts, highly qualified scientific
personnel and a well developed large educational system turning
out about 10,000 specialists per year. It appears, that the
most of the problems associated with such a rapid development
of the industry, with the notable exception of "those associated
with the nature of the socio-political system, have been
recognized, and a search for the appropriate solutions and
implementation of corrective measures is underway.
The level of the Soviet catch reached 7.8 million tons
in 1970 and is steadily growing. The Soviet Union is now
catching more fish and other forms of sea life than the U.S.,
Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Canada combined. The
fear once expressed in the Western press that the Soviet fishing
industry would ignore conservation practices seems to be
unfounded. The advanced Soviet fishing technology certainly
provides an advantage over the fishermen from many other
countries, and provides the Soviet Union with the larger catch,
but it can hardly be criticized. It seems, that the Soviet
Union is honestly trying to observe fish conservation practices
and is an active participant in international agreements,
conventions, and organizations concerned with research,
regulations, and conservation practices.' There are now eighty
562

international agreements concerning fishery. The Soviet Union
is party to forty of
.then.. The present Soviet fishing industry
is certainly a tool for advancing national interests of the ^
Soviet Union and it has great potential not only for supplying
needed protein for the country's population, but for being an
instrument of foreign aid. --
The military and primarily naval value of the Soviet
fishing fleet is a less easily and clearly defined phenomenon.
'
While the great opportunity provided by the fishing fleet
operating in the high seas on a year-round basis for training
of sailors for the Soviet Navy, and the fact that many of the
fishing fleet ships have a para-naval value
;
is certainly
recognized, the problem should be viewed in the light of hard
facts concerning contemporary naval warfare and existing
geo-political realities. It is probably fair to say that the
only small portion of the Soviet fishing fleet can be used
effectively by the Soviet Navy in a case of an armed conflict.
The "side effect" of huge Soviet fishing fleet in relation to
military is, of course, considerable. The meteorological and
basic oceanographic research involving the collection of data
on water temperature and its distribution through various layers,
salinity, density, and distribution of plankton, the employment
of modern sonars and other equipment and' the plotting of the
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bottom charts, etc. is invaluable to the Soviet Navy. It
may also be true that the thousands of Soviet fishing ships
operating in all corners of the world ocean can be, and probably
are being the eyes and ears of Soviet intelligence. They also
provide good cover for the intelligence gathering operations
of several dozen Soviet Navy intelligence (ELINT) trawlers
employed by the Soviet Navy's special "Intelligence Divisions".
But in any case, the economic and political values of the Soviet
fishing fleet greatly outweigh the possible military factor, and
are, in the final analysis, of much greater importance. The
development of the Soviet fishing industry illustrates the






About two thirds of the total number of rivers iu Europe
and Asia flow through the territory of the Soviet Union. They
became natural transportation arteries around which the' economic
development of Russia, particularly European Russia, was to a
large degree centered. Moreover, the vastness of the territory
and the poorly developed land transportation system made rivers
iudispensible for the transportation of goods, raw materials,
and people. In many areas, particularly in Siberia, river
transport has been the only practical means of transportation
in extensive use. During the 18th and 19th centuries, a number
of artificial waterways (canals) were built. Use of the steam
engine on the Russian rivers dates as far back as the early 19th
century. Ia the second half of the 19th century, the mass
transportation of oil was being conducted on the Volga River
°a a regular basis. It may therefore be said that pre-




The river transport system was badly damaged by World V/ar
I. the Revolution and particularly the Civil War.'. Nevertheless,
a considerable number of river steamers survived and were put in
extensive use by the Soviet government, which nationalised ull
means of water transportation soon after the Revolution.
The first Five Year Plan (1928-1932) provided the
beginning of what was termed the "reconstruction of river transport-
on the basis of wide introduction of new technology". Although
not much new technology was introduced, particularly as far -
as ships were concerned, some improvements in the waterway"
system was achieved, the major such improvement being the
construction of a large dam on the Dnicpr River is 1932. A
year later the Belomor (White Sea-Baltic) Canal was built.
The second Five Year Plan (1933-1937) demanded a
considerable increase in the cargo transported by the river
fleets, from 26 billion ton - kilometers at the beginning of
the period to 63 billion tons - kilometers, a figure never
achieved, prior to World War II.
1
m 1913 (last year prior to
World War I) 28.5 billion ton - kilometers of cargo was transported
by the Russian river fleets, but the figure for 1940 was only
36.1 billion ton
- kilometers, i.e. there was little growth over
Rechnoy Transport (River Transport) No. 4, 1970.
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a period of nearly tweuty years.
An extensive program for the construction of canals was
planned for the second five-year period. At the end of the
period, in 1937, the construction of the Moskva Canal was
completed. Later, during the third Five Year Plan, the Dniepr -
Bug Canal was rebuilt. During the 1930' s, river passenger service
was considerably expanded.
The war not only interrupted the development of Soviet
river transport, but inflicted considerable losses on it. More
than 4,300 various vessels were lost, and hundreds of river ports
2
and docks, 300 dams, and more than 60 locks were destroyed.
River fleets actively participated in the war, making a noteworthy
contribution to the efforts of the overall Soviet transportation
system.
A decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of
September 1, 1947 approved a special program for the accelerated
development of river transport, which played an important role.
The program envisaged the accelerated construction of new river
/
I
vessels and also the reconstruction of ports and a number of
important waterways.
The directives of the fifth Five Year Plan approved by the
2




19th Party Confess (1956) considerably increased the
appropriations for river transport and allocated a greater
portion of the domestic shipbuilding facilities for the
'
construction of river vessels. A special provision was made for
reinforcing the Siberian river fleets, a goal which was reached
later by the transfer of a considerable number'of vessels via
the Northern Sea Route.
But the most rapid development of Soviet river transport
took place in the sixties, when the river fleets received
thousands of new vessels. New waterways connecting all the seas
washing the European part of the Soviet Union were opened,
making Moscow a real "port of the five seas". A new mode
of water transport, the socalled "mixed river-sea" was developed,
and thus river transport gradually became involved in carrying
foreign trade. In 1969 the river fleets alone carried more than
290 million tons of cargo with a cargo turnover about 150 billion
ton
- kilometers, and transported 112 million passengers. 3 :
Furthermore, the development of the rivers in Siberia and the Far
East, so essential for the exploitation of the rich natural
resources in those areas, was accelerated. This, in brief, is a
historical review of the development of Soviet river transport.
3
Recnnoy Transport No. 4, 1970.
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The more detailed analysis of the Soviet Union inland
water transportation systom will bo made according to tho
following outlino:
Organization and control structure;
Natural waterways and their navigability;
Soviet canals and the artificial waterways;
Mixed river - sea, transportation;
New ships of the Soviet river transport;
Military role.
Organization and Control Structure
Up to 1956, Soviet river transport was controlled
either by the Ministry of Merchant Marine or by the Ministry
of the River Fleet of the USSR. In 1956, in conjunction with
Khrushchev's experiments with "decentralization" , the Ministry
was abolished and in- its stead, organizations to control
the
river fleet were created in individual Republics. By
far the
largest has been the Ministry of the River Fleet of the
RSFSR
(Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) , and Administrations
(Directorates) for River Transport in the Ukrainian, Belorussian,
and. Kazakh Republics. In the Latvian Republic, river
transport






river transport in the Middle Asian Republics is subordinated
to the Ministry of Merchant Marine of the USSR in \ spite of the
fact that none of these republics has access to the sea.
This experiment with decentralized administration resulted
in confusion as to the responsibilities of the various organizations
for maintaining waterways and exercising unified policies. For
example, river transport on the Dniepr is divided between two
republics; in the upper Dniepr it is subordinated to the
Belorussian Republic, while in the middle and lower Dniepr it io
subordinated to the Ukrainian Administration for River Transport.
The Ministry of River Transport of the Russian Federation
controls the greatest part of the totao- USSR:, river fleet. This
Ministry has 22 steamships companies organized on the basin-
territorial principle. All major rivers, such as the Volga,
Kuban*, Lena, Ob', Yenisey, and Amur have correspondingly named
steamship companies. Regions incorporating several rivers, such
as the Northwestern and Sast Siberian, have their own steamship
companies. In spite of the fact that the RSFSR Ministry of the
River Fleet is obligated to coordinate the efforts of the various
Republic administrations in charge of their corresponding river
fleets, the administrative isolation of these organizations
handicaps the practice of a unified technological policy.
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modes of transportation such as the railroads and the merchant
marine, both of which are centrally controlled. Starting in
1971, demands were made for a central agency. A special
committee, created by the order of the Council of Ministers of the
USSR, in cooperation with the Academy of Science and with the
participation of representatives of all the transport ministries
made a number of recommendations. One of the recommendations
dealt with administrative problems and the necessity to. have a
central agency (All-Union Ministry or a Main Administration
subordinated to the Council of Ministers of USSR) to control and
4
coordinate activity of all river transport.
The accelerated development of tbc- northern areas of the
Soviet Union and particularly Siberia, elevated the role of
river transport considerably. In spite of a considerable
increase in its cargo turnover, Soviet transport system still
does not satisfy the growing demands of the newly developed
economic regions.
The importance of river transport is also evident from
the low cost of the transportation it provides. For example,
in 1969, ten ton - kilometers cost 4.1 kopeks on large Siberian
rivers and 6.7 kopeks on small rivers. By truck,- the same volume
4Vodnyy Transport, March 20, 1971.
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5
cost 56 kopeks. .
Another problem closely associated with the l administ ration
is the automated control (ASU) of river transport. Implementation
of the ASU has already begun, but it is not well suited for the
relatively loosely associated river fleet administrations of the
various republics. In 1966, the first Main Calculation Center,
based on the URAL-4 computer, began operation for the River
Fleet of the RSFSR. At the end of 1969, the Ministry of the
River Fleet already had 11 regional calculation centers and 62
computerized calculating bureaus serving more than 200 enterprises
and organizations, under the control of the Main Calculation
Center. As of the end of 1970 other calculation centers oxistod
in Moscow, Gorki, Novosibirsk, and Leningrad, and work began on
organizing a computerized system of control through various
steamship companies and ports. It is planned to link all




/5Rechnoy Transport No. 11, 1970, pp. 1-3 and No. 12, 1969,
pp. 10-11. .
Rechnoy Transport No. 2, 1969, pp. 14-16.
7
Rechnoy Transport No. 9, 1970, pp. 3-4, and Vodnyy
Transport, 24 April 1971.
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Natural Waterways and their Naviu'f.blAjLtv
In spite of the apparent abundance of natural waterways
ia the Soviet Union, the growing demand for river transportation
las been forcing the Soviets to introduce larger vousoIm, ami,
;his, in turn, has created a demand for deeper, more diroct, and
>etter navigable waterways. The construction of large hydroelectric
stations and dams increased the navigable depths of many Soviet
Ivers. On the Volga River, this type of work permitted the
avigation of river vessels with a 5,000 ton cargo capacity and
f so-called sectional trains with a cargo capacity of 7,500 tons
nd drafts up to 3.5 meters. When the Volga-system hydrolectrical
tations are completed in the next five to six years, navigation
ill be open to ships drawing up to four meters. The planned
onstruction of six hydroelectrical centers on the Dniepr River
ill increase navigable depths up to 3.5 meters.
»
Intensive economic development of Siberia, particularly
ts western part, generated an enormous demand for river
ransportation. In addition to the large Siberian rivers, a great
umber of smaller rivers have to be made navigable, and very
<ctensive dredging operations and work on straightening the
breams have been underway. During the 1966-1970 period, only
Q
Vodnyy Transport, 13 February 1971.
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in the Irtysh Basin, with its 17,000 kilometers of waterways,
3,100 kilometers of new waterways were mastered by a tremendous
amount of dredging often done through permafrosted ground and by
straightening the sharp turns in the rivers. As a result, the
rich oil regions of the Tumen' District and other Western Siberia
areas were connected by rivers with existing transportation
systems. The completion of hydro-electric stations on the
Angara River rapids and construction of Baikal-Angara River
waterway is being planned. After completion of the Middle Yenisey
and Osinovsk hydroelectric stations, navigation to the river ports
will be open not only for large river vessels, but for high sea
ships. In the future it is also planned to connect the Ob' River
-vith the Yenisey River and the Angara with the Lena. When the
Kama River and the Irtysh River are connected, the two great
waterway systems - the European and the Siberian will bo morgod,














Soviet Canals and the Artificial Waterways
The construction of the canals connecting various
frivers
and creating prolonged water-ways began in Russia in early 18th "
century. Following the Order of 1703 by Peter the Great, the
first canal was built in 1709, establishing a waterway connection
between Moscow and Petersburg. A~"nuniber of canal systems were
built later in the 18th and 19th centuries, but at the time the
devolution, only the Mariinsky Canal System still maintained its
sconomic value.
The White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal, completed in 1933, was
>uilt for non-self propelled wooden barges with a cargo capacity
>elow a thousand tons. The canal connected Leningrad with
.rchangelsk,. shortening the route between the two points hy
»ver 2,000 miles (as compared with the route around Scandinavia),
'he canal was damaged during the World War II and, soon after, it
as restored. During the 1950's and 1960's a number of
odifications were made, resulting in greater navigable depths of
he canal and an improved lock system, making the canal suitable
10
or modern vessels.
The next large project was the construction of the Moskva-
Rochnoy Transport No. 6, 1969 and 2xTo. 10, 1970. For
•ie general description of the Soviet canals as of the middle
JLXties, see also U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1967
P. 33-44. B- '
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olga Canal, thus connecting Moscow to the Caspian Sea through
he major Soviet river, the Volga. The canal was' completed in
937.
...
In 1953 the construction of another important canal, the
olga-Don, was completed thus connecting the Volga River and,
ence, the Caspian Sea with the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea.
t the end of the 1960's, it was decided to increase the depths
if the canal and the Tsimlyansk Reservoir to four meters, which
ii.ll assure the traffic of large river vessels of the Volga-Don
11
ype carrying the maximum load.
The major step toward completion of Unified Inland Water
'.^asportation System for the European part of USSR was made in
!)64 when the Vclga-BALT Waterway was opened. The Volga-BALT
:ivolved the reconstruction of the old Mariinsky System;
onstruction in 1933 of the Lower-Svirsk hydroelectric center, in
])41 the Rybinsk, and in 1952 the Upper-Svirsk hydroelectric
12
enters, and completion in June of 1964 of Volga-BALT Canal.
T.e total length of the canal is 361 kilometers, only 66 of which
£*e repx-esented by artificial canals and 295 by the artifical water
13
fcservoirs. The system connected five seas - the Baltic Sea,
11
Rechncy Transport No. 3, 1970.
12
Rechnoy Transport No. 4, 1969.
13
Vodny y Transport, 11 December 1969.
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Jiite Sea, Caspian Sea, Sea of Azov, ana tho Cluck Soft. In
970 almost fifteen million tons of cargo were transported
14 '
long the Volga-BALT waterway system. Many small and medium
ized ships of the Soviet Navy can transmit this sy^em to and
rom the Baltic and Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean.
Soviet river ships are presently sailing to ports in
ligland, Sweden, Germany, Bulgaria, Iran, and other countries,
n far as Egypt, using what is called the mixed, river-sea,
civigational method (to be discussed later) . The already existing-
c.nal system, carrying over 60% of the river transported cargo,
p.rticularly the White Sea-Baltic Sea, Volga-Don, and Volga-Baltic
cnals, closely approaches the planned Unified Inland Waterway
15
Sstem of European Part of the USSR. Six thousand kilometers of
te existing inland waterway system already permits navigation
16
o ships with draft up to 3.5 meters. The announced and widely
dscussed future plan includes the direct connection of the
Back Sea and the Baltic Sea through existing waterways on the
Jlepr River and the Pripyat' and Neman Rivers. New European
wterway systems, some planned, and some already under construction,
s\zh as the Rhine-Main-Danube, will certainly benefit and improve





Rechnoy Transport No. 10, 1970.
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\o operation of the Soviet-European Waterway System. The
jw European waterway systems will permit navigation from
>tterdam to Ismail and will pass through the Netherlands,
jrmany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania,
17
ilgaria, and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet plan to build a canal in the Far East connecting
le Amur River with the Tatar Strait was announced in 1969.
ie total length of the proposed canal will be 90 kilometers,
it it will shorten the distance from the Amur River to the
cific Ocean (Tatar Strait) by up to 1,500 kilometers and make
18
vigation cheaper.
Mixed, River - Sea, Transportation
The soviet term "mixed, river - sea, transportation" is
If-explanatory and means precisely what it says - the ability
ships, in this particular instance river ships, to engage in
ver, or inland, as well as sea navigation. True, sea navigation
i always, and quite often severely, restricted by the limited
uworthiness of the ships involved. The planned use of the
;rer ships in the direct transportation of cargo from the
















of the Volga-Don Canal, and greatly accelerated after the
opening of the Volga-Baltic waterway. Mijred navigation is now
developing by a gradual increase in the sea areas uaviga'ted by
the river fleet, and construction of special seagoing ships
suitable for navigation on inland waterways. So-called
conventional ships, either. for sea or river service, are poorly
suited for this type of navigation; the former, because of its "
greater cost, and more important, deeper draft, and the-, latter,'
mainly for the reason of very poor seaworthiness. The limits
of rational use of such ships were determined, with the prediction
that the volume of cargo carried in the three basins (Volga-Caspian-
Blac* Sea, Volga-White Sea-Baltic, and Aaur-Sakhalin-Oktots* Sea)
by them will soon reach 20 million tons per year and in the not
19too distant future, 50 million ton<? at~~ •*
,
-v iuj.Ao.ion x ns. Also, it was argued that
the LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship) type ships are very suitable for
that mode of transport. With two or three loads of lighters for
each LASH ship, lt will be possible to utilize up to 90% of its












Kovalev, "Direct Water Transports™
do^ hf^.°* Cargg"' Tran«P° rt • «°s«™ . 1S69 . This study'aeoc.ibes the optimum approach to such a mode of transportationand represents the results of celebrated research SploylSmathematical methods. «api ing
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A number of ships of the river register, such as Project
fo. 791 ("Volga-BALT" class) motorships with a cargo capacity
>f 2,700 tons; Project Number 558 ("Volganeft" class) tankers^
•ith a cargo capacity of 5,000 tons; Baltiysky, Project No. 781,
dl-ore carriers; Project No. 1553, and others were specially
21
esigned and are being successfully used in the mixed navigation.
hese ships are allowed to sail at sea with waves up to 3.5 meters
ud at distances of up to fifty miles from sheltered areas.
art of the river-sea fleet is used in the Baltic and Black
eas during the winter when most of the rivers and canals are
22
rozen over. This service includes carrying foreign trade cargos.
Two categories of ships for river-sea navigation were
ound most suitable. The first category includes ships capable
f navigating year round in the closed seas practically without
imitations, and the second category is composed of light and
aexpensive ships used only during periods of river navigation
ad capable of navigating in off-shore sea regions not far from
heltered areas. Typical of the first category are ships of
i
-IS III SP class with a cargo capacity of 2,000 tons; typical
'f the second category are pushed trains with a cargo capacity of
21




Rechnoy Transport. No. 3, 1071.
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,000 tons, and L'S? class ships (limited in closed sea to fifty
2°
ties from sheltered areas and in the open sea to' 20 miles).
The mixed navigation opened broad possibilities for a new
ypo of activity for the river fleet - participation in
ransportation of export-import cargos, as well as the chartering
f Soviet river ships by foreign shippers. An agreement on the
ransit shipment of Iranian goods via the Soviet Union was
igned in 1963 and an agency, Iransovtrans Ltd., was organized.
a average of 2-3 weeks are saved carrying goods from European
ountries to Iran compared with the traditional route around
urope, through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. With
he Suez Canal presently closed, x.ne importance oi this direct
oute is obviously increased. Foodstuff cargoes from Bulgaria,
reece, and other countries are also being shipped to the
24
candnavian countries and ports of northern Europe. Oil, oil
roducts, ore, and metals from the USSR now are carried by the
25
iver fleet to various European countries and even as far as Egypt.
23
Sudostrayeniye No. 11, 1970.
24
Vodnyy Transport , 24 October 1970.
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New Ships of the Soviet River Tran-jport
During the 1966-1970 period the construction of new river
ships was accelerated. In 1969, Catamaran Brat'ya Igrotovy,
Project No. R19 GTSKB, was built. The vessel with a thousand-ton
cargo capacity has a cargo deck area of 900 square meters and
is capable of carrying 450 containers, twice as much as a motor
ship with a cargo capacity of 2,000 tons. Smaller Catamarans
26 *
with a 600-ton cargo capacity are also being built.
In 1967 a river motor ship with capacity of 2,700 tons,
Sormovskiy Class, capable of carrying timber and bulk cargos
vas built. The ship made a few cruises from Arkhangelsk to
27
England with a cargo of timber.
In 1970 an experimental river ship with a unique hull made
from the three long cylindrical tanks welded together, was built,
it is a combination of tanker and dry cargo ship with the
)Ossibility of carrying containers in addition to oil. Greater
28
I
lull strength has been claimed for the ship.
The desire to prolong the navigation period has created an
/
i
irgent demand for river ice-breakers, and a number of them were
26^ ,Recnnoy Transport No. 1, 1971, pp. 6-11.
27Rechnoy Transport No. 4, 1970, pp. 6-7.
28Vodnyy Transport, 10 October 1970.
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built. In addition to the conventional method of breaking the
29
ice, a special ice cutting machine was designed and built.
*
Another device permits the conversion of regular pusher tugs into
a sort of ice-breaker, thanks to the special mechanism generating
intensive vibration of the ship's hull and thus crushing the
Lee ax-ound the vessel. With the duration of navigational period
for most rivers not exceeding 55% of the calendar year in the
European part of the USSR and 45% in Siberia, the need for river
30
.ce-breakers is obvious.
The State Committee for Science and Technology recommended
ider introduction of pushed vessel trains "to increase the
31
roductivity of the river transport". It is anticipated that
uring the current Five Year Plan (1971-1975) the use of the
ushed-vessel trains in the Soviet inland water transportation
ystem will be increased considerably.
A number of new classes of passenger ships, including a
umily of large hydrofoil types which have been in operation
since the middle of the 1950' s have been developed and built.
i large series of semi-skimming boats (Zarya class) with water
j$t propulsion is being presently produced. The shallow draft
29




Vodnyy Transport , 20 January 1970, and Rechnoy Transport
N. 4, 1970.
31
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>f this boat, which carries GO passengers, peraits operation in
32
small rivers with depths not exceeding .6 meters.' Another
lass produced passenger ship is the air-cushion Gor 'kovchanin,
>roject No. 3435. It carries 48 passengers. Presently,
:onsiderable attention is being devoted to the development of
33 •
,ew classes of air-cushion passenger ships.
Plans for the Future
V
In 1970, the Soviet river fleet transported 358 million
ons of cargo. The total cargo turnover amounted to 174 billion
34
on - kilometers. In 1971, according to the plan, the RSFSR
iver fleet alone is supposed to carry 318 million tons, with
argo turnover amounting to 168 billion ton - kilometers. It
s also planned to transport about 122 million passengers. The
argest increase in the transportation of cargo by river fleet
is planned to take place in the northeastern region of European
hssia and the Siberian rivers (particularly western Siberia)
.
!
(a.rgo for the oil-rich regions of western Siberia through
32
River Transport No. 4, 1970.
33
The development of hydrofoil and air-cushion ships is
Jialyzed in the chapter entitled "Shipbuilding".
34
Rechnoy Transport No. 3, 1971.
/
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Ob'-Irtysh Basin will amount to five million tons in 1071.
35
In 1975 total Soviet river transport cargo turnover is
planned to be 216 billion ton - kilometers. Considerable
improvement is planned for passenger service. Presently there
ire more than 150 passenger lines served by high speed boats
[mainly hydrofoils)
.
The number of passenger lines is planned to
»e increased considerably with primary attention being paid to
;he small rivers where wide introduction of air-cushion ships
ith speeds of 50-60 kilometers per hour, and later up to 250
36
Hometers per hour, is planned.
Until recently, the low cost of river transportation
as the main advantages of this mode of transport. However,
uring the last decade, the rate of decrease in transportation
osts in the river transport slowed down. While during the six-
:sar period 1960-1966, the Soviet railroad system managed to
ower transportation costs by 11 percent, the decrease in river
ransport for the same period was only five per cent.
Since 1966 there was no trend toward further decrease in
1-ansportation cost. The most important reasons are the following:
35
,Sotsialisticheskaya Indust riya, 26 March 1971 and P.echnoyl^nsport No. 1, 1971, pp. 1-5. Details of 1971-1975 plan
*re discussed in Vodnyy Transport 19 January 1971 and Rechnoy
Transport No. 1, 1971.
36
Vodnyy Transport
, 24 April 1971.
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(J.) The capacity o£ existing porta ttiui Uiuii » ...... «....
does not match the number of ships alroady in operation, and
lags behind in rate of development. More than 36% of navigation
time is spent by ships in ports.
(2) A number of technologically advanced ships designed,
and some even with prototypes tested, were not built or were
delayed in construction due to the lack of allocated shipbuilding
capacity.
(3) The previous plan (1966-1970) to supply river fleets
with new ships was not fulfilled, and 140,000 tons of total
cargo capacity of tankers and dry cargo vessels as well as
380,000 tons of total cargo capacit7 of ncn*-oc2f-pi*opelled
vessels were not delivered to the river transport.
In accordance to the new plan for 1971-1975, accelerated
construction of river ports with the introduction of technologically :r.
advanced cargo handling equipment and increased allocation of
the shipbuilding industry capacity for river vessels were
promised. Party directives specifically projected delivery
of river vessels with larger cargo capacity, including a
considerable increase in ships of mixed navigation. The construction z~z
of dry cargo - tanker ships employing the cylindrical method with
cargo capacity up to 9,000 tons as well as container ships and
self




Considerable work to improve the navigability of inland




In addition to its tremendous economic importance, the
oviet river transport has a number of military applications
hose significance was well demonstrated during World War II.
•
he river ships of the Don and Kuban* Steam Ship Companies were
ubordinated to the Azov Naval Flotilla commanded by Admiral
38
orsbkov, and many were used for amphibious operations.
n fact, all river transport of the European part of the USSR
djacent to the front was controlled by the Soviet Navy. A
umber of river flotillas were organized, and actively participated
n the war. Many of the ships of those flotillas were formerly
iver vessels converted into warships. During the defense of
talingrad, the Volga River Flotilla and river vessels of the
I
olga Steamship Company played a very important role.
At the, present time, the role of river transport in military
i












n charge of military transportation exist in every Soviet
ilitary district. Incorporated in such departments are branches
esponsible for the transportation of troops and hardware on the
nland basins. They are also responsible for maintainance of
iver vessels in a constant state of readiness for military
ransportation, and the majority of river vessels have special
quipment, not used during normal operations, needed for
ilitary transportation. It is also the duty of those branches
o see to it and require that "not a single vessel would leave
heir shipbuilding or ship repair enterprise with defective
39
pecial equipment." Undoubtedly the river fleet is being and
ill be used for the delivery of supplier to- the Soviet Armed
orces. Particularly important are the "sea-river" ships.
The existence of an extensive network of deep inland
aterways makes it possible to shuttle naval ships up to DEsize
s well as some classes of submarines among the various seas of
he European part of the USSR. Seme types of river vessels are
uited for the auxiliary naval combat role in coastal warfare,
acluding mine laying and mine sweeping. Familiarity of the river
leet personnel, particularly their captains and navigators, with
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The Arctic Ocean differs sharply from all the other
regions of the world ocean with respect to its climatic and
especially its ice conditions. The development of the Polar
Regions and the Northern Sea Route, Soviets consider as one of
the brightest pages in the history of Russia. Recognizing the
important contribution by foreigners, historically Russia, and
by succession, the Soviet Union was the major discoverer of
most of the Arctic Islands and lands, and first to achieve
practical mastery of navigation along the Northern Sea Route.
The first complete passage of the Northern Sea Route from
East to West was made in 1915 by two Russian ships, Taimyr and
Vaigach, under command of Captain Vil'kitskiy . The expeditions
/
of 1910-1914/ established a number of routes to the Northern
/ i
Regions of Russia from its Pacific Coast.
In September of 1916 a note by the Russian Foreign
I
Ministry was sent to all nations ascerting the Russian claim to
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undiscovered between the Russian Coast on the Arctic Ocean and
the North Pole, with the exception of previously recognized
1
territories of other nations. Thus, the recognition of economic
and strategic value of the region was clearly demonstrated by
the Russian government.
As was pointed out by Captain 0. P. Araldsen, Royal
Norweigen Navy, "the October 1917 Revolution changed many things,
2
but not the Russian preoccupation with the Arctic". Practically
from the very beginning of its existence, the Soviet government
has recognized the economic and strategic value of the Northern
Region. In January 1919 a commission for the study of the north
was created under the Scientific-Technical I/i rectorate of the
Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKH) . In December
1919 the Russian Academy of Sciences worked up a plan involving
measures for the revival of hydrographic work in the northern
seas. During the same year, the famous Kara Expeditions for the
delivery of Northern Siberian grain, were organized. In the
course of the expeditions, the Northern Sea Route was opened up
from the West to the mouth of great Siberian rivers, Ob and Yenisey
For the details of this diplomatic move see: Constantine
Krypton, The Norther Sea Route and the Economy of the Soviet North ,
(Praeger, New York, 1956), and Ost rov Vrangelya (Wrangel Island),
Moscow, Glavsevmorput, 1946, pp. 35-36.
2
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1967, pp. 49-57.
r*t"
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udimentary ice service and weather sorvico stations wora
rgaaized along the route of the expeditions. s
Soon, in the East, the ships also bogan to make raoro or
ess regular voyages from the East to tho mouths of Kolyma
,nd Lena Rivers. In 1921 twenty-three detachments of the
orthern Scientific Fishing Expedition were operating in the
3
lorthem waters and on the islands of the Arctic Ocean. On
[ay 4, 1920, the Soviet Government declared the White Sea to be
ts internal waters. A year later on May 24, 1921, a degree
of
;he Council of People's Commissars signed by Lenin claimed the
?ight of the Soviets to exclusive exploitation of the fish
resources and sea mammals in the White Sea and in the Arctic
)cean along the shore from the State boundary with Finland
to
4
the Northern extremity of Navaya Zemlya. On 4 November
1924,
following unsuccessful attempts of Canada to lay claim
to
ffrangel Island? a memorandum to all states was sent
by Soviet
Government reiterating the 1916 notification from the
Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs and calling attention to
the Eastern
boundaries between Russia and the U.S. established by
the
3
Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88









In 1924 the first ice-air reconnaissance was made in Kara
Sea. Two years later landing and taking off from the ice was
mastered. Gradually, the aviation began regular ice-air
n
reconnaissance and thus Polar Aviation was developed. The
aetwork of Polar Stations had been growing steadily. In 1932,
an expedition headed by 0. Schmidt aboard Sibiryakov completed
a voyage through the Northern Sea Route during one navigational
season. In December of the same year, by the special resolution "
3f the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Main
directorate of the Northern Sea Route, Glav Sev Mor Put', was
organized. This organization, with extremely wide range of
responsibilities, played a very important role in the development
>f Soviet Arctic in general and Northern Sea Route in particular,
[n 1934 the loss of the Cheluskin and rescue operation for the
lembers of expedition and ship's crew, performed by aviation,
resulted in awarding for the first time the highest Soviet
iecoration, Hero of Soviet Union, to the seven rescue pilots.
:n 1936 Arctic Seas were navigated by 160 ships, including some
;hips of the Soviet Navy. In that year two destroyers accompanied
6Ibid., p. 46.
7
Morskoy Flot No. S, 1967, pp. 9-11.
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by ice-breaker Litke (the Russians call it ice-cutter) , ice





transferred from Kronshtadt (Baltic Fleet) via White Sea - Baltic
Canal to Vladivostak where they became the first sizeable
surface ships of newly created Soviet Pacific Fleet. The
destroyer's hulls were reinforced with already tested lumber-
8 -
metal protective layer along the water line called Shuba.
During World War II, in 1942, the transfer of three ships from




to the Northern Fleet was achieved. The Soviet mastery of the
route was demonstrated in 1939 when in addition to navigation
by ships of the merchant marine, r.grcip of i^ucise^-aredgers, a
suction-dredger, and a number of tugs were transferred from
Murmansk to Nikolaevsk on the Amur. Those were the ships of
the so-called Technical Fleet, poorly suited not only for ice
10
navigation, but even for off-shore navigation. Prior to
World War II, duration of navigation reached over a hundred days
in the Western part of the Northern Sea Route and over seventy
days in its eastern part. The first and to the best knowledge of
Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88.
9Sudostroyeniye Ho. 7, pp. 65-67, No. 8, pp. 69-70, 1966.
Sudostreyeniye No. 8, 1969, pp. 71-72.
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this writer, the only passage of foreign warship along the
Northern Sea Route took place in 1940, when after 'signing of
Soviet-German Pact, a German raider, classified as Auxiliary
Cruiser and called "Ship 45" (Comet) made a successful passage
to Pacific, assisted by Soviet pilotage and ice-breaker, Stalin .
While in Pacific the Ship-45, in cooperation with other German
raider Ship 36, and alone sank several allied and neutral
merchant ships. During the war the route was used to all
possible extent, including the transportation of lend-lease
supply from the United States, initially delivered to the Soviet
Far East. Each year tens of ships passed from the Pacific
toward the West being accompanied la the western part of the
route by convoys. German's effort to interrupt this rather
important transportation artery by employing submarines, raiders,
and aviation, though resulting in some losses, was generally
unsuccessful, due to a number of factors among which climatic
conditions, size of the forces employed, and lack of reconnaissance
were the major.
After the war the efforts for further mastering of the
Northern Sea Route continued. Systematic, planned research
in the Arctic was intensified during the period of 1948-1951,
followed by three years of passivity. After 1954 the Soviet
Union has maintained at least two drifting stations on the ice.
/
i
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The total number of these stations in a 34 year period,
11
starting with 1937 I. Papanin Station has been 20 1 Polar
1
aviation was reinforced with a greater number and better
quality of aircraft. By the mid 1950 's the Northern Sea Route
was fully operational.
Icebreakers
The first Russian Icebreaker, Ermak
, was designed by
Admiral Makarov specifically for Arctic navigation and was built '
in England in 1899. Makarov's efforts were supported by the
12
famous scientist Mendeleyev. Many ideas incorporated into the
design of Ermak are still valid and being used in construction
Df contemporary icebreakers. Ermak, which was called the
'Grandpa cf ice-breaker fleet" served 65 years, was awarded
3rder of Lenin and, after final retirement in 1964, has been
iistinguished by memorial in Murmansk.
•
1
Before the revolution of 1917, Russia had eight ice
i
i
>reakers and a number of steam ships reinforced for ice navigation.
/
lost of the ships survived the revolution and civil war, but
lajor reinforcement of icebreaker's fleet did not come until
11
Vodnyy Transport , 15 December 1970.
Sudostroyeniye No. 9, 19S9, p. 57.
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1938 wheu four ice-breakers of the Stalin class (presently
Sibil'' Class) wore built.
t
The next reinforcement of Soviet Ice-breaker's Fleot
came in the mid 1950 's when three ice-breakers of Kapitan
class (Kapitan Belousov, ; Kapitan Voronin, Kapitan Melekhov) were
built for the USSR by Finland. In 1959 the nuclear powered
ice breaker, Lenin , the most powerful ship of this type, was
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As of 1970, the Soviets divided icebreakers into three
ajor categories: ,
(1) Harbor Icebreakers with propulsion plant up
to 5,000 - 6,000 SHP (Shaft Horse Power)
(2) Auxiliary Icebreakers up to 12,000 - 15,000 SHP
(3) Liner Icebreakers above 15,000 SHP
ucb a classification reflects Soviet experience in the Arctic,
bere not as much displacement, although a factor, but power
3 needed and icebreakers above 15,000 SHP, preferably in range
13
if 30,000 - 40,000 SHP, are required.
All, but one (Lenin)
,
post war Soviet icebreakers were
hilt in Finland. Presently, there are only six liner
tiebreakers in the Soviet Union. But, there are only three more
jjebreakers in the entire world fleet which would fall in this
ategory. They are: American Glacier, and two Canadian ships,
Luis S. St. Laurent and John A. MacDonald.
In the decade of the 1960 's, the Soviet Union built two
icebreaker type hydrographic ships - Petr Pakhtusov (1966) and
Gorgii Sedov (1967) - both with 5,400 SHP. A large series! of
Lrbor icebreakers, V. Pronchisctsev-class, was also built in
3







the decade of the 1960's.
Soviet experience in the Arctic, however, convinced then
that more powerful ice breakers and in greater number are needed
in order to prolong navigation along the Northern Sea Route and
make it more reliable. As a result, the Soviet Union ordered
three large icebreakers to be built during 1971-1975 period by
Wartsila, Finland. The 20,000 ton ships will be powered by
diesel-electric plant of 36,000 SHP. They will be among • the most
15
powerful motor ships in the world. Another Soviet plan visualizes
construction of two nuclear powered icebreakers of Arktika Class.
With their help, it is planned to prolong navigation along the
complete Northern Route up to six months', and to make navigation
in the route's western and eastern areas uninterrupted during the
whole year. In addition, it is planned to double the speed of
16
the ships following the new nuclear icebreakers. But, it would
be incorrect to assume, that nuclear icebreakers would soon
14
There is no internationally accepted classification of
icebreakers. Canada, for example, divides its icebreakers into
two major categories, full icebreakers, and light icebreakers.
Roughly, the first category would include Soviet Liner Icebreakers
and Auxiliary Icebreakers and the second category would include
Soviet harbor icebreakers.
15
Vodnyy Transport , 15 October, 1970.
16Izvestiya , 21 February 1970.
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represent the backbone of the Soviet icebreakers fleet, More
likely, the conventionally powered icebreakers will continue to
play the most important role. Increased power of their propulsion
plants and improved hulls would make them as reliable as nuclear,
but much cheaper.
No country in the world is afflicted with so much loss
and inconvenience by winter as the Soviet Union. Almost every
sea which washes Soviet territory freezes over. The Baltic in its
eastern part in severe winter is frozen up to 140 days. Even
Odessa, a Black Sea port, is sometimes frozen in for up to 100
days in a year. All this demands constant efforts to search for
new means of cutting ice.
During the last several years, a number of new means to
cut ice were designed. A new type of special vessel, which appears
to have very little in common with the icebreaker, but nevertheless
serves the same purpose, was designed by the Ice Laboratory of the
Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in Leningrad by a group
i
j
headed by Professor Peschanskyi. The bow of the ship slopes
/ !
forward below the waterline, forming a kind of slip-way. Mounted
•
i
on the bow are four rows of large rotary cutting discs which
j
bite into the ice and cut out large bars of it as the ship moves
forward. These bars are forced up the slip-way where they are
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,nto the ice, well away from the ship's side leaving an ice-free
aanel. Though, theoretically, the new device can saw through
ze of any thickness, calculations have shown that it would be
apractical to use it on the ice of more than two feet in thickness
icause of slow speed.
Another new method to fight the ice is the water jet gun;
daimed to be capable of pulverizing ice barriers more than three
:?et thick. It was said that the two new methods are planned to
h used for keeping channels and port approaches free of ice,
...
uile conventional icebreakers will do the job in the open sea.
A method to keep ice bound ports free of ice was said to
fe also developed. It is achieved with the help of pipes laid
own on the bottom. Air, which was fed through the pipe, bubbled
p through the water and constantly mixed the warm lower layers




In addition to weather and navigational aid services and
leet of icebreakers, another essential element for successful
/ . !
ivigation in the Arctic is ice reconnaissance. The best, of
Durse, and most productive is air-ice reconnaissance, and Soviet
olar Aviation has been employed for this purpose for many years.
17
Sputnik (from magazine Znanie-Sila) No. 1, Moscow, 1968.
/
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b to recent times, the major means of ice reconnaissance were
isual and photo reconnaissance - both depend heavily upon weather
onditions.
Recently the system called TOROS (translated ICE HAMMOCK)
:>r the ice reconnaissance and assiAing ice breakers and ships
| ice navigation was successfully tested. The system, installed
sioard an aircraft, incorporates as its major element side-looking
a.rborne radar. All weather operation and the ability "to see"
tirough the snow and observe ship tracks in the ice field was
c.aimed for the system. The high resolution picture is simultaneously
rgistered on the scope and video-tape and via photo-telemetry
Vansmitted to ships and to shore c^-troi points^ Simultaneously
u.th the picture, the system produces the exact coordinates of
lie aircraft which carries it. The system was successfully tested
18
i 1970.
Another radar equipment designed to measure the thickness
c! the ice field from an airborne .helicopter was tested during
3'71. A cross section cut of the ice field is displayed on
tie screen of the equipment. Many Soviet icebreakers and some
orchant ships, particularly those with ice reinforced hulls,
ve carrying or are capable of carrying helicopters. These
i'licopters equipped with the above device (especially coupled
18Prayda, 3 May 1970; Morskoy Plot No. 9, 1970, pp. 27-28,
6G2

with photo telemetry capability) would help not only to improve
and simplify ice reconnaissance but would increase 'productivity
of ice breakers by permitting them to select thinner ice for a
passage. The equipment could, under certain conditions, permit
ships with ice reinforced hulls to navigate alone without
19
assistance from icebreakers.
Legal Aspects of Soviet Arctica
and Northern Sea Route
The Soviet government has issued a series of legal acts
related to the status of Soviet Arctic and to the exploitation
and organization of the route. In addition to the above mentioned
reinforcement of the Tsarist government acts concerning Arctic
possessions, the resolution of 15 April 1926 by the Presidium of
the Central Executive Committee of the USSR proclaimed the
establishment of the geographical boundaries of the Soviet Sector
of the Arctic between "meridians 32 04 '35" East longitude and
168o49'30" V/est longitude. Within the boundaries of the
/
indicated sector, the Soviet Union claims to exercise full
'
i .
sovereignty of all "land and islands located in the Arctic Ocean,
! 20
north of the coast of the Soviet Union, as far as the North Pole".
19
Trud, 12 June 1971.
20
Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-SS.
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The navigation along the Northern Sea Route is treated
jf
the Soviets as navigation in Soviet Territorial ^Waters. To
apport such a claim the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi
i;as, through which the Northern Sea Route passes, are viewed as
21
'>road, shallow bays with specific ice conditions", surrounded
i the cost of the Soviet Union. The exceptionally severe
c.imatic conditions of the Siberian Seas and straits and the
pesence of ice during the greater part of the year "serving as a
strt of continuation of Soviet territory" are used to substantiate
lie Soviet arguments. The majority of the straits through which
tie Northern Sea Route passes are said to be within the Soviet
territorial waters, particularly Karskie Vorota, Yogorskiy Shar
aid Vil'kitskiy Straits. The Straits of Dmitri Laptev and Sannikova
22
s*e considered as belonging to the Soviet Union historically.
Colossal expenditures by the Soviet and previously Russian
sates, are also cited in defense of the claim that the Northern
£.a Route is the national route . The cost involved in the
23
n.intenance of the route is of course considerable.
21




As an example, the "SEVER-69" upper-latitude expedition
involved dozens of airplanes and helicopters. The expedition
laced seventy drifting automatic radio-meteorlogical stations
4 addition to existing stations.
^

The Northern Sea Route is compared by the Soviets with"
tie Norweigan Indreleia Sea Route which the International- Court
it Justice of the United Nations in its decision on 18 December
:)51 recognized as an inner national Route of Norway. Canada's
daims of sovereignty over the passages between. the Arctic Islands
right be used by the Soviets as another precedent.
The Canadian concern over the possible pollution in the
i^ctic is shared by the Soviets. Unsuitable ships, especially
ji the absence of icebreaker's assistance, have definitely"
pesented the ecological hazard, for it can easily be damaged
ad so cause the pollution. Following the Canadian Prime Minister
1'udeau's visit to USSR (May, 1971), the development of Soviet-
Cindian relations and future cooperation including that in the
24
^ctic were praised by the Soviets.
The present Soviet claims can be summarized as follows:
The Northern Sea ftoute belongs to only one nation, the 1
I
£>viet Union, as an internal national route which guarantees the
I
ction's vital economic, political, and defense interests in
tie Arctic region. (b) The special geographical location of
te Northern Sea Route, the most vital sectors of which pass
i
trough Soviet Territorial and Inland waters, gives the Soviet
?4
Typical was an article in Pravda , June 18, 1971,
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jaion an indisputable right to regulate in it the regime of
25
lavigation by foreign merchant and naval ships. v
The seriousness of the claim and uncompromisiveness of the
Soviet Union was demonstrated in the summer of 1967, when two
J. S. Coast Guard Icebreakers, Edisto and Eastwind
,
after
jnsuccessful attempts to pass north of Severnaya Zemlya were
forced to enter the Vilkitskiy Straits and were turned back by
26
the Soviets.
The importance of the Northern Sea Route is elevated by
the numerous navigable rivers of the country (Pechora, Ob,
ifenisey, Khatanga, Olenek, Lena, Yana, Indigirka, Kolyma and
3thers) connecting it with the northern regions of the USSR.
There are an extensive network of ports, the majority of which
have been developed during the years of Soviet power. Among those
of particular economic importance are: in the Barents Sea -
Pechenga, which exports copper-nickel ores, and Nar'yan-Mar, a
port for the export of bituminous coal from the Vorkuta Basin
and timber that has been rafted down the Pechora; in the Kara
/
-Sea - Kilson and Dudinka, which provide an outlet to the sea for
2^
Morskoy Sbornik No. 6, 1970, pp. 83-88.
26
The detailed description of this voyage is given in




te production of the Noril'sk mining region, and Igarka, the
lrgest center of timber export; in the Laptev Sea'- Nordvik
Katanga, and Tiksi, the maritime gateways to Yakut; in the
EJst Siberian Sea - Ambarohik *iu| l>ev*k, riuUuly ^mU^ H»M|MttM
ad industrial centers o£ tho Northeast.
The Soviet North is tho richest bn*;o for tho wood »
cemical industry, a world exporter of timber. It is also
rch in useful minerals - mineral fuel, iron ores, phosphates,
vrious construction materials, bauxite, copper, and a number
o other nonferrous and rare metals. New industrial regions are
bing rapidly developed there.
The Twenty-Fourth Party Congress Directives for the five
y&r plan (1971 - 1975) projected further development of the
£>rthern Region. The special attention in the directives was
i-ven to Norilsk Metallurgical Combine. The industrial development
c: the region which started in the decade of 1960's had already
osorbed 24 billion rubles of capital investment, exceeding the
27
nm spent in the previous forty years, 1920-1960, more than twice.
The development of the Arctic region has been accompanied with
; number of original solutions. An urgent demand for power,
or example, generated design, construction, and beginning of
peration in the end of 1970 of Floating Gas-Turbine I'ower Station,
27
Komsomol ' skaya Pravda , 14 March 1971.
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Drthern Lights (20,000 KW) . A decision was made to build a
:jries of such power stations which can be placed anywhere
Mere there is waterway (bay, chaunel, river) which permit
lissage of a ship with 1.55m draft.
Combined with the rapid development of Soviet Arctic
I;gions, where water transport is still, for all practical
firposes, the only means of transportation, the importance of
r>rthern Sea Route to Soviet Union is obvious. The Route has
ben used practically exclusively by the Soviet ships and legally
obody challenged it. With the growth of its merchant marine,
bwever, and the development of much wider cooperation with
niritime organizations of the world, the Soviet Union is starting
1» change its position. Convinced that the mastery of the
i>ute in general has been achieved and navigational period
iicreased and probably from the desire to obtain some reciprocity
i»r the Soviet merchantmen in the other part of the world, the
£>viets, starting with 1966, but particularly after the closure
c the Suez Canal in 1967, began the promotion of the route for
/ !
i-reign shipping. The economic advantages for certain shipping
i
t use the Northern Sea Route are obvious. The length of the
t'Ute from Murmansk to Provideniya (southern part of the Bering
Srait) is 3,400 nautical miles. Murmansk - Vladivistok distance




in 12,000 miles. From London to Yokohama via the route is
,30 miles shorter than via the Suez Canal. In spite of some
)uction in speed while transiting the ice a ship saves
laverage of 13 days in one direction via the Arctic Transit
mi London to Yokohama compared with that via the Suez Canal.
1 1967 the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine announced the
L;i to open traffic along the Northern Sea Route between ports
i .Yestern Europe and the Pacific Ocean. The use of Ice-class
v.ps was proposed. The navigation was promised to be supported
assigned icebreakers, polar aviation, by the Hydrographic
2;/ice, and by special "scientific-operational groups" from
at Hydrometeorologic Service. Referring to the difficult
ligation and the ice situation in Volkitskiy Strait, the
dilatory icebreaker and pilot use was specified for the convoys,
ojthern Sea Route Sailing Instructions were published for the
oifoying of foreign ships. The scale of fees for the icebreaker
Q( pilot were announced. The Northeastern Administration of
b« Merchant Marine was established in the center of the Arctic
Hi headquarters in Tiksi with primary mission to support
rasportation and further development of navigation along the
Mfce
.
The strategic value of the Arctic including the Northern
to Route was well understood long before the revolution. The
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icious Russian scientist, D. I. Mendeleev wrote "When it would
oi possible to transfer fleets or even part of them from Atlantic
tc Pacific Ocean and reverse, the naval defense of the country
Kjj.1 gain a lot, for Russia should keep strong fleets to defend
28
Lt; vital interest in the both oceans"
. Soviet war ships can
jeand have been transferred between Europeans and the Pacific
Sciet Fleets avoiding the necessity to enter foreign waters
u.or to World War II, during the World War II, and after World
tof II. The number of transferred ships has not been great,
icever. The transfer of submarines is another matter, and this
icloubtedly is done on a more regular basis. The calls for
:cistruction and use of the large transport submarines for
reir-round delivery of cargoes and oil have been made in Soviet
29/con for many years.
The Arctic became one of the major places where Soviet
ii' Defense Units are located and quite extensive network of
)bervation radars and communication centers have been built.
4-
^From the Scientific Archives of D. I. Mendeleev, cited
^ Mastering The Extreme North
,
Volume I, Academy of Sciences
rtthe USSR, Moscow - Leningrad, 1960.
29
A detailed study, dealing with feasibility of such
>iject was completed by Professor Pokrovskii in 1955. Since
tijit time, the problem was repeatedly mentioned by the Ministry
>j Merchant Marine and its Central Scientific Research Institute.
te, for example, its Transactions, V. 133, Leningrad, 1970.
610
.w ww .«i »w n-n>m»,niwinnrtr

pesently hardly a month would pass without Soviet Military
pess mentioning harsh duty of Air Defense Units, performing
i Arctic Region.
To summarize: (1) The Soviet Union successfully continued
te Russian efforts of long duration to master the Northern Sea
Rute and advance in the Arctic Region; (2) the development
o Arctic and Siberia regions with their wealth of natural
rsources drastically elevated the importance of the route; (3)
cnstantly increasing Soviet foreign trade, associated with fast
gowth of Soviet Merchant Marine, added to route's importance;
() the use of the route by foreign shipping, though up to now
sow in developing, would probably be intensified in the future;
() the military role of the Arctic Region and the Northern
Sa Route is significant for the defense (Anti-Air and ASY/)









Soviet maritime power of today is the result of more
than fifty years of the Soviet Union's development as a state.
The magnitude of Soviet maritime power historically has generally
reflected the level of the Soviet economy or, more correctly
of the industrial capacities. More particularly, however, the <*
naval element of Soviet maritime power in a number of instances
swung upward in its development from the general level of the
Soviet economy. Traditional Soviet preoccupation with defense
matters has for a long time produced a peculiar combination of
modernity and backwardness in its economy in which the armament
sector has received the best production capacities and priority
allocation of resources. The civilian sector, on the contrary,
being supplied on a residual basis, has been developing much
more slo?/ly and still has a technological level below that of
most developed countries. Analyzing the IChruschchev period,
Michel Garder observed: "Thanks to him, the Soviet Union's
military power could frighten, but its internal economy could
not inspire envy. Hitler at least produced cannons in order to
seize the butter of other countries; the Soviet arsenal was intended
612





Together with the seizure of political power in tho' course
f the 1917 Revolution, the Communists inherited a considerable
aritime tradition. Historically, the Russians have demonstrated
.any times a thorough understanding of the importance of tho
ea and were among the early pioneers of the sea. The drive toward
he sea was an essential element of Russian policy for centuries.
t is enough to recall Russian stubborness and consistency in
.ttempts to gain control of the Straits or rights to uninterrupted
lassage to doubt the claim that Russian development was marked
>y a lack of understanding of sea power. One may ask what they
leeded the straits for - to march their regiments through? The
leglect of maritime power by certain rulers was well compensated
>y the achievements of Peter the Great and the skillful employment
)f navy under Catherine ghe Great. The Russian Imperial Navy
/as a center where innovative scientific thoughts often found
mderstanding and many were implemented. In turn, the navy
)roduced a considerable number of officers who distinguished
themselves in exploratory and scientific work, and some in the
theory of naval art as well. One of the main reasons that Russia
failed in the past to achieve a degree of world sea power was
the backwardness of her technology and the general weakness of
613
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tffi economy. The same factors had kept the Soviet Union froa
booming a recognized world maritime power, despite1 the fact that
its importance has always been understood and despite two . -~_
attempts to develop at least the naval element of miritime power
11 excess of her economic capability.
The rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union interrupted
bj the World War II was resumed after the war and the economy,
^stored. The death of Stalin permitted a major revision of Soviet
nreign policy, not in respect to the goals, but to the means
f<r achieving the same ends. Mastering of nuclear energy and
tb beginning of the introduction of nuclear armament probably
seeded up the realization by the new Soviet leaders that the
od policy of uncompromising confrontation, keeping the country
o the brink of war, was dangerous and, in the long run,
unproductive. The proclaimed course of peaceful coexistence
btter suited Soviet interests in the rapidly changing world.
iVile continuing to be antagonistic to many basic interests
o the West, the new course implied the development of Soviet
miritime power as an essential element. Thus, the accelerated
dvelopment and gradual coordinated application of the Soviet
n.ritime power, which permitted Soviet political, economic, and
ii.litary influence to be extended over a wide range and with far




Particular atteatioa has been paid to the underdeveloped
orld, specifically the non-allied countries in it) Combining
plitical support for key countries with economic and military
ad, Soviet foreign policy in the selected areas of the Third
\>rld was in most cases quite pragmatic, demonstrating the
tcistence of a mutually interacting relationship between Soviet
ams and capabilities. H. Dinerstein distinguished three types of
i>viet activity:
(1) denial of influence in neutral areas to adversaries;
(2) intrusion into the opponent's sphere of influence;
(3) promotion of a revolutionary situation.
jt is not difficult to see that the marxxime power is needed for
;L1 three of them.
The Soviet Union's own economic interests, evident in her
apidly growing foreign trade and the development of remote areas
<£ the country rich in natural resources needed to support the
jrowing industry, as well as defease interests were among the
ajor factors generating the quite rapid development of maritime
;^wer, during the second half of the 1950 's and the decade of the
360 's. Although having the longest coastline in the world washed
/ 12 seas, the Soviet Union's access to the open ocean is
K. Dinerstein, Moscow and the Third World: Power Politics
r Revolution? ; Problems of Communism, January-February I96S, p. 52
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handicapped by the peculiar geography, which, while restricting
to a degree the employment of maritime power, particularly its
naval aspect, does not prevent it.
Moreover, the Soviet Union is not strategically located
in relation to the world trade routes. These routes, however,
are not the result of geography alone, but to the large degree
of the econimic development of certain regions of the world,
particularly their industrial capability to produce for export .
and their purchasing power for imports. Historically, trade
routes are constantly shifting, depending upon the emergence
or disappearance of those factors in certain regions of the world.
It seems that the ability of a military power, and historically it
has been a naval power, to adjust the distribution of trade
routes is rapidly disappearing. The system of military alliances
has produced a number of examples where two opponents belonging
to the opposing camps and exercising their navies to combat each
other, might be quite faithful trade partners. Such a situation
not only has contributed to the development of Soviet foreign
trade, but has helped the development of Soviet industry, which,
in the final analysis, makes trade possible. The trade also
provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity to buy advanced
technology from the industrially developed countries of the Vest.




t> the Soviet effort to develop its maritime power, particularly
ue merchant marine and fishing fleet, was quite substantial.
Iiradoxically
,
the same countries, in the raid-lOSO's realizing
tie momentum and scope of the Soviet maritime development and
bginning to feel its competition started to scream, "The Russians
re coming!". In fact, some had invited them.
-
The role of the Navy as one of the leading forces has been
dearly recognized in the Soviet Union and, as evident from the
Ktensive naval programs of the last seventeen years and the
ontinuous appearance of new, more sophisticated ships, the Soviet
livy has neither a shortage of allocated industrial capacity nor
it funds for research and development. The Soviet leadership's
atisfaction with the Navy's performance appears to be expressed
a the continued presence of Gorshkov as Commander-in-Chief of
be Soviet Navy for 17 years, his membership in the Central
lommittee of the CPSU and the presence as candidate-member in the
entral Committee of two Commanders of the Soviet Fleets, the
orthern and the Pacific. The top echelon of the Soviet naval
ommand holds the highest ranks ever in the history of the Soviet
avy, including one Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union,
hree fleet admirals, and a considerable number of full admirals.
Even the top echelon of the Soviet Army has explicitly




in-Chief of Ground Forces expresses its "constant rcadic
support the Navy," a complete turnabout from tho tradit:
treatment of tho Navy as "faithful helper of tho Army." Minister
of Defense Marshall A. A. Grechko recently said, "under modern
conditions combat operations on the oceans and seas are acquiring
special significance. Navies can have an enormous impact on the
2-
entire course of a future war."
The role of the Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the
strategic delivery system is growing, as evident from the
intensive Y-class program presently underway. Because of the
relative invulnerability of the submarine-based system to
preventive attack, it is unlikely that their role- will decline
in the foreseeable future. For several years, the Soviet ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) have been considered next in importance
only to strategic missile troops. The importance of the number
of SSBNs on station seems to be well recognized by tho Soviets,
as witness the increased total number of submarines and the
attempts to increase the ranges of their missiles, which would
make them even more invulnerable and reduce transit time and
hence, increase time on patrol. While alleged Soviet desire to
have an advanced base in Cuba for their ballistic missile
submarines, similar to the US base at Holy Loch, cannot be




pjjected out of hand, it does scorn to be a very remote possibility.
/llle available port facilities in the areas of nav.al forces
doloyment are utilized, the basic trend appears to be to avoid
doendence upon bases. Even the employment of tenders based in
jioa and replenishing submarines on the high seas (more likely
tan a base for SSBNs) seems to be questionable;' even if they
wre so employed, it would be only in an auxiliary capacity.
The thesis that the Soviet Navy can operate only behind
te shield of the full power base of the USSR seems to be outdated
Te Soviet Navy itself has become a very important element of the
Sviet power base, and the question "would the Soviets risk the
blocaust of a nuclear war?" cannot bo applied to the Goviot
Uion alone anymore. The most logical answer, of course, is "no";
tit who would? It follows that at any point of confrontation
viere the naval forces in an area are the main representatives
C the military power of a state, and they alone have the
(ipability to be employed world-wide, the need for a credible
:>vel of these forces is evident. It appears that the
principle
i not only understood, but is being
implemented by the Soviet
avy. If such an assumption is accepted, the logical step
laid be a new vision of the Soviet naval policy in the
direction
f "further to the ocean", i.e. more ships with a
self-contained
apability in remote deployment, more submarines for close
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cooperation with such deployed forces, and inevitable emphasis
on the availability of air power - long-range naval aviation for
the striking role and reconnaissance, and ship-borne aviation
(VTOL aircraft and helicopters) for air defense, including anti-
cruise missile defense, and local ASW. This would not mean a
drastic revision of the previous Soviet decision not to build
attack aircraft carriers, for ships carrying VTOL's and helicopters
would not be employed in such a role.
It is questionable whether the Soviet Navy would try to
acquire an intervention capability, for there is hardly any need
for it. By preventing intervention and supplying arms to friends
to deal locally with the opposition as well as to resist
intervention by a country whose forces have either outmaneuvered
the Soviet Navy or even ignored it, Soviet Maritime power would
fulfill one of its important roles. The Soviets have demonstrated
a good understanding of the potential of naval power in peacetime
to achieve the desired effect in support of national policy.
They have found that it is cheaper, less dangerous, and more
promising to grant protection from the sea, while supplying enough
armament to build up a client country's capability to fight on land.
Any notion of superiority actually pursued by an opponent,
or just interpreted as being part of his policy from a position




Soviet government statement on 21 August 1963 declared: "As
a result of intensive efforts by tho Soviot people^ and Soviet
scientists in the development of nuclear weaponry, tho American
nuclear monopoly has been broken, the world Socialist system,
has acquired its own nuclear shield, and the imperialist powers
have been deprived of the material basis for conducting their
policy of nuclear blackmail and .their policies from a 'position
3
of strength', in relations with the Socialist countries." The
discussions of the ULMS system in tho US and the Washington Post
claim that "the hawks and the doves in Congress have found
common ground in pushing for strategic weaponry that promises
to draw enemy fire away from the continental United States and
toward the sea" produced an extremely negative reaction in the
Soviet Union. Several reasons were seen by the Soviets behind
the alleged US attempt to adopt an "oceanic strategy":
continuous reliance on force as the chief means of
attaining foreign policy goals which "remain unchanged", i.e.
allegedly "imperialistic and aggressive";
the desire to obtain unilateral military advantages while
talking about "sufficiency" and equal security;
"to divert a retaliatory strike away from the (continental)
US";
3
Pravda, 21 August 1963.
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"to improve the geography", particularly the maritime
;ography, which, with the advance of ballistic missiles,'
aegedly became unfavorable to the US ascompared to that of the
4
m. . .
Krasnaya Zvezda stated that the calculation to achieve
uilateral military advantages" did not materialize in the past,
il will not materialize now and "any attempt by anyone to assure
liLitary superiority over the USSR will be met with a corresponding
urease of military power to guarantee our defense". The official
lcjazine of the Soviet Navy, Morskoy Sbornik
,
was more specific:
"here is no doubt that the Soviet Navy, in developing itself
.1 the future on the basis of the latest achievements in science,
;ohnology, and production, will increase its strategic capabilities
>t the scale necessary to. reliably protect our homeland and the
icmtries of the Socialist community. And if the U.S.A. adopts
i
ir 'oceanic strategy' as a new course of the "grand strategy,"
I
n? navy will, of course, be on a level which will ensure the
solution of problems in the new situation that will arise on the
>4s and oceans."
4
"The Nixon Doctrine: Declarations and Realities " , a
i:;cussion at the Institute on the US of the Academy of Sciences,
JoR. USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology. Moscow, No. 2,
^oruary 1971, pp. 18-48; Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 July 1971; Rear
^iiral Stalbo, The Zigzags o£ American Grand Strategy , Morskoy
Sftrnik No. 8, 1971, pp. 96-S9.
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Admiral Gorshkov's article in Pravda of July 25, 1971,
proclaimed: "Vain hopes! No strategy, including the socalled
'oceanic' will save from condign punsihment any aggressor who
would risk starting a war against the USSR". Basically the same
idea was advanced earlier, criticizing the alleged desire of the
US strategy to divert Soviet retaliatory strikes to the ocean-based
strategic delivery system by asserting that "American politicans
understand that if it comes to a matter of strategic nuclear warfare
between the tv/o super powers, then all the socalled strategic *"
5limitations will remain basically on paper."
It has become a standard assertion in the Soviet Union
that the Americans have always bees disturbed by the advantage
of the Soviet Union in the size of its territory, in that the US
"by expanding its naval forces, has, figuratively speaking,
attempted to expand its territory". It was claimed that "the
U.S. transition to an 'oceanic strategy* should also be viewed
as an attempt to extricate itself from the difficult situation which
has arisen due to the fact that geography (as expressed by Vice
Admiral Rickover) , following the emergence of intercontinental
missiles, played a "nasty trick" on the U.S.A. - the oceans have
ceased to protect her territory from the vicissitudes of war."
5USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology , No. 2, 1971.
Rear Admiral Stalbo, op. cit., p. 98.
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The foregoing Soviet reaction illustrates a sensitivity oi the
Soviet Union to any attempt by its main opponent, real or
imagined, to change the balance of naval forces. The open emphasis
on the strategic delivery system in the framework of "oceanic
strategy" allegedly emphasized by the United States is not
convincing, for, in reality, Soviet concern about the possible
growth of general purpose naval forces in the US Navy is not
less, and perhaps, is even greater. While the possibility of an
all-out war at sea seems to be clearly rejected by the Soviet Union',
as it has been in pronouncements of some US officials, the
growing importance of naval forces in general, particularly general
purpose forces, is clearly recognized.
Besides the military purpose, the role of the world ocean
in supporting the life resources of mankind is being viewed hy
the Soviet Union as extremely important, and their emphasis on
the simultaneous development of other elements of maritime
power, besides the Navy, is not accidental. The planned 37%
increase in merchant marine during the 1971-1975 period (5.3
/
million dwt; 550 new ships) represents a continuing drive to -
develop efficient sea transportation, capable not only of
assuring the Soviets a pattern of commerce, but also of







Military assistance. Greater emphasis upon more efficient ships
inevitably results in their specialization, a trend evident in
the current Soviet shipbuilding and from their orders abroad..
The fast expansion of Soviet foreign trade and the demands
of domestic transportation generated by the development of new
economic regions in the North and the Far East are creating an
increasing demand for sea transportation. The Soviet Merchant
Marine does not have excessive tonnage in relation to the total *
demand and while the drive to increase the chartering of Soviet
ships by foreign shippers continues, and will most likely
increase, the chartering of foreign ships cannot at the same
time be reduced substantially. Moreover, while the size and
composition of the Soviet Merchant Marine are capable of
influencing shipping policies in certain regions, they are not
considered great enough to dictate those policies, particularly
world-wide. The Soviets are also interested in the profit to be
gained, and they are unlikely to operate on uneconomical terms.
As members of various international shipping organizations, the
i
Soviets are obliged to observe the rules imposed by them. j
*
It is logical to assume* that the Soviet Navy views the
civilian ships as a reserve, and contingency plans to utilize
7
them in war time, after conversion and arming, have long existed.
See, for example, Admiral V. A. Alafuzov critical review
of the book, Military Strategy , Morskoy Sbornik No. 1, 1963, p. 96
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\± further specialization of the ships and their growing tonnage
jirticularly tankers)
,
directed toward satisfying >the need of
;(imerce to be competitive and profitable, makes their military
i», even after conversion, questionable.
The inability of Soviet agriculture to meet requirements
c protein will most likely continue. This factor alone
oresents a strong stimulus for" further development of a Soviet
j;h sea fishing fleet despite a declining fish stock and rising
i.t cost. In addition, the demand for higher efficiency and
cger fishing ships and the necessity to search for new fishing
-
nunds, which also requires larger and more sophisticated support
ihps, will intensify. Soviet cooperation in conserving
i£'ine resources is virtually assured.
Soviet oceanographic efforts represented by the joint
search of numerous scientific organizations and coordinated by
;b Academy of Sciences has no equal, at least in its scale.
kiefits obtained by the merchant marine and the fishing fleet
1
'*>ia oceanographic research are numerous and growing. Heavy
/ ' !
^mhasis on military oceanography and its benefits to the Soviet
£7, particularly to submarine operations and ASW, while
ii:ficult to measure quantitatively, must be considered substantial
j
"b scope of the Soviet work to master the depths for exploration
uj exploitation of marine resources is being widened. Intensive
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-) of converted submarines for testing; equipment and concepts has




The simultaneous coordinated use of several ships,
i:rcraft and weather satellites for oceanographic research in a
;./en region is becoming a routine Soviet practice.
The Soviet shipbuilding industry continues to perform
3;tisfactorily , being neither overloaded nor under utilized.
[•3 output supplemented by sizeable foreign deliveries appears
l< be satisfying the Soviet demands for ships, both naval and
:;/ilian. Compared with the previous five-year period, either
acause of enlarged production capacities coupled with increased
Lbor productivity, or because of a planned reduction in naval
sip construction which is unlikely, or combination of the two,
i: the current 1971-1975 five year period it is planned to
i crease the domestic share of civilian ship production by 30%.
Lrge Soviet orders for ship construction abroad have played a
altiple role. Not only did they provide conditions for the
rpid development of the merchant marine and the fishing and
i
oeanographic fleets, and permitted the Soviet shipbuilding
idustry to implement extensive naval programs, but they assui-ed
8The latest experiment, during which four aquanauts "who
ir the first time ever left the submarine at depths measured in
tree-digit numbers" (in meters), and who were in. the water "for




the avoidance of an overcapacity in the shipbuilding industry.
Of particular importance has been the rolo of the Y/arsaw Pact
t
country shipbuilding industries with a considerable degree.--
of specialization in cex*tain types of ships built and mutual '
deliveries. In general, Soviet shipbuilding has been quite
innovative, and a number of new methods in hull assembly and
propulsion technology have been employed.
In addition to its important economic role, the development
of maritime power has provided the Soviet Union with a tool to
be employed in competition for political influence on a world-wide
scale. In the Soviet approach, each element of maritime power
contributes to a specific political objective. Y/hile the main
task of the Soviet Navy's general-purpose forces is to neutralize
the US Navy influence through selective containment in carefully
selected regions, other elements do their job in a coordinated
effort, i.e. delivering economic and military assistance, promoting
trade, conducting research in waters adjoining a specific region,
building ports, teaching how to fish, etc. Quite often such
coordinated efforts produce desirable results for the Soviet Union,
but Soviet success, whenever and whereever it has been achieved,
cannot be explained l>y their effectiveness along, for the
mistakes and ineptitude of the West have played no lesser a rolo.
As Hans Horgcnthau observed: "In large parts of the world there
828

exists today an objective revolutionary situation. This
revolutionary situation would exist even if Communism had never
been heard of ... that this national and social revolutions are
largely identified with Communism is primarily the result of the
West's failure to identify with them morally and to support them
9 ...
materially." The Soviet Union definitely took advantage of a
number of opportunities, and maritime power played an important
role in their exploitation.
The growth of Soviet maritime power has not been marked by
size alone, but also by innovation. Its development has rested
on a powerful scientific and a reasonably well developed
technological base, both supported by the world's most powerful
maritime educational establishment, which graduates specialists
on a production-line basis. More important, with the obvious
support from the leadership, innovative maritime thinking was
not only made popular, but encouraged and well rewarded, both
morally and materially. Such an attitude should and did produce
positive results. In the United States, on the contrary, when
/ I
the economy slows down, the scientists whose efforts should be
essential in restoring the momentum of the economy are fired
i
first. Even while business is normal, those whose research made
9
Hans Morgethau, A New Foreign Policy for the US , Praeger,






design and production possible are often paid less than those
who sell the product, thus, in effect, being economically penalized
for thinking. Such practices result in adherence to outdated
concepts, lack of innovativeness, and extrememly high cost of
new systems. By way of example, during the post-war period, no
single nation ever bad more than one fifth of the aircraft
carriers than the US Navy did. The carrier became the major ship
around which, in effect, the United States Navy had been, developed.
Of three major innovations, the angled deck, the steam catapult,
and the mirror landing methods, each drastically improving the
carrier as a platform for launching its singular weapon system,
its aircraft, not one was of American origin; all were British
inventions. It just happens that Great Britain has been the
closest ally of the US, but the fact by itself is alarming.
At present, in factors such as variety of submarines, cruise
missile armament, types of surface ships, and propulsion systems,
it is not the Soviet navy, but the US Navy, which has to catch up.
The development of Soviet maritime power has been product
of the industrial and technological base of the country and
skillful use of foreign technology, often obtained under adverse
political relations with the West. Conceptually, it is wrong
to speak about the sudden awakening of the Soviet leadership in




tc speak of the realization of the long-cherished Russian and
Mfiet dream to be a great maritime power, achieved by skillful
ail innovative application of efforts and considerable resources.
The further sophistication of the Warsaw Pact mechanism
;;s, in the decade of the 1960's, resulted in the appearance of
cabined pact fleets, particularly in the Baltic Sea, and of
isort of integrated merchant marine, no small asset to the total
srength of Soviet maritime power. Under the present complex
international relations, each increment in Soviet maritime power
3 in that of her allies is in harsh reality detrimental to the
interests of the US and its allies, providing Moscow with
iditional options in the framework of the proclaimed. "competition
> the two world systems." The challenge to the West resulting
fom the Soviet maritime development is constantly increasing
troughout the whole maritime spectrum.
N. V. Gogol', a prominent Russian writer of 19th century,
:>mpared Russia to a fast moving troika . In "Dead Souls" he
vote, "Russia, whither flyest thou? Answer! She gives no
stswer. The ringing of bells melts into music; the air, torn
iito shreds, whirs and rushes like the wind, everything that is
:i earth is flying by, and the other states and nations, with
!>oks askance, make way for her and draw aside." In the
Dntezaporary world, there is a new Russia, the Soviet Union, the
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;t.te with a different ideology which is alien to the West.
;v rything in that state, including the economy, traditions,
is;ional pride and aspirations, is directed by and subordinated
;c the interests of this ideology. Often chaotic in the past,
;b gait of the old Russian troika has been replaced by a v/ell
patrolled and coordinated movement, over foreign courses, of a
ya troika. Recently, for the foreign "drives", to the tired,
^ng and not very effective thill horse of Communist ideology,
;v> young and growing trace horses were added: one of them is
.h Soviet economy manifesting itself in the form of growing
:c:eign trade, technological assistance, and economic and
ditary aid, and the second, although a by-product of the first,
La Soviet maritime power. The future will show if "other states












The Counsel for Mutual Economic Assistance, CMEA, began
ordination of the. economic plans of its members in the 1950 T s.
nil 1965 this coordination was exercised on the basis of
leady approved national plans, but starting in 1965, the--
ordination of plans preceded their approval by each individual
entry government. In the course of such multilateral coor-
i.ation, the countries have exchanged information on the key
e.tures of their national long-term plans. For example, in
S'O and beginning of 1971, the CMEA countries have completed
ck on the coordination of national economic plans for 1971-
S'5. Bilateral coordination between the USSR and other CMEA
cintries has also been arranged and formalized in the signing
fa series of protocols. Compared with the preceding five
ars, the Soviet Union's trade with other Comecon countries
r 1971-1975 is to increase as follows: by 57$ with Bulgaria,
.oe than $0% with Hungary, 56$ with East Germany, about 65$
'in Poland, over 35$ with Rumania, and over 40$ with
^choslovakia.





The trade among Comecon countries relies upon the long
tpm contracts and consistent promotion of socalled Socialist
ionomic Integration. The latter has been especially actively
pomoted by the Soviet Union since the decision of the special
3rd Session of the CMEA, held in April 1969. Total volume
y Soviet foreign trades with CMEA countries in 1971-1975.
oriod is planned to exceed 76 billion rubles (growth of lj
2
:.nes compared with previous five years). The Bucharest's _
2ph Session of the CMEA considered a long range program for
:'.e integration of countries' economies in the next twenty
/ars.
In the past members of the CMEA were acting on the
tfrld charter market practically exclusively as importers of
3?:oduction of sea transport. With the growth of their merchant
nrines, they are becoming more and more exporters of it. In
tja economic terms, the goal is to achieve &z least a positive
3<Lance and thus not being forced to spend foreign currencies
fjr sea transport. Another goal is more political than
ionomic - "liberation from the dependence upon capitalist
Gantries, in the area of sea transportation." I
About 65% of the total volume of Communist countries' i
t:ad'e is among themselves. The volume of goods transported by
s<i is constantly growing. Presently more than 1+0% is carried
^New Times~~No. 3 , 1971.
^By chartering foreign ships and permitting charter of
tfiir ships, the merchant marines of the Communist countries






j; sea and, in general, the rate of development of sea transport
jjceeds that of land transportation.
The attempts to coordinate activity of the CM£A countries'
tenant marines goes back to its creation in 1949 in spite
x the fact that both the merchant marines of the member
:untries and the foreign trade were very weak. The acknowledged
ml of such cooperation is the rational use of tonnage,
:ordinated action in charter market, and, in general, increased
;:fectiveness of foreign trade and improved balance of payments.
A 1952 it was decided that the conferences of organizations
j/olved in charter market will be held on the annual basis.
[] 1957 j the 3tb Session of the CMEA organized a working
pup for transport, whose function among others, was to
^ordinate plans for the foreign trade transportation. The
L
(5$ 9th Session of CMEA established a commission for
Gnomical, scientific, and technical cooperation in the area
): transport. Commission coordinates plans for capital
Li/estment in transport development, research, and is responsible
ft mutual efforts to create scientific research centers and
i*3ign bureaus. During the period of I962-I965 the Commission
:ordimted plans for the development of sea transport of all
4
-mecon members for 1966-1970 period.
Considerable attention was devoted to the ship-building
iiiustries. It was decided to reduce the number of ships types
bilt by CMEA countries from sixty down to eighteen and to build
Hi. D. Mozharov, " Cooperation of Socialist Countries




socialized ships in large series assuring their technological
Jdernity and suitability for the needs of the CMEA countries.
In 1963 the Bureau for Coordination of Ships' Charter was
coated. The Bureau with headquarters in Moscow assisted in
dafting the organizational principles of joint shipping lines.
Ge of the reasons behind the coordination of ship charter is
;
'o apply active influence upon world charter market through
5
cordinated action". The proposals for creation of CMEA
carter center and liner conferences were under considerations
ij 1970.
The CMEA organizations dealing with their merchant marine
rsemble the North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping
Kown as PBOS. The PBOS purpose has been to mobilize ocean
^ing shipping in a single pool and aliocaxe, it on a world-wide
osis in time of emergency. The Defense Shipping Authority,
stablished by the Board, is to insure the effective use of NATO
sips, which participating governments should, in war time
urgency, place in a central pool for allocation by the
Dfense Shipping Authority. Existing organizations and
ahieved level of cooperation among Warsaw Pact members in
aea of their merchant marines has all provisions if not more,
the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. In December 1971
a important agreement -concerning the CMEA countries cooperation
i shipping was signed by all members. The agreement is to
asure the coordinated transportation of all foreign trade







urgos of the CMEA meml- , rational distribution of cargo
low awontf r > •>• oj.' various noimtr.inn .. il ill ' riliiji linow,
In general, the development of the CMEA countries merchant
urines has been as following: In 1951-1955 period, when the
sa trade began to develop, the increase of their merchant marines
v, s practically negligible (from 2.2 million tons in 1950 to
I.
2p million tons in 1955). This growth was far behind the
dmands. The period witnessed a considerable dependence upon
chartered ships. The United. States introduced a number of
rstrictions demanding special permission to charter American
sips for the Soviet and Chinese cargos and published list of
srategic goods which were prohibited to carry on American
sips and ships of the flag of convenience to Communist countries.
In the period of 1955-1960 the foreign trade of the CMEA
cuntries continued to grow, including that with the developed
capitalist countries. The growth of merchant marines (2.2
tmes during the period) approximately correspondent to
ie tempo of their foreign trade development. However, it
ws not enough to overcome lack of tonnage developed in the
peceding period. The situation not only improved, but
agrevated in the early sixties. Victory of the Castro
Involution in Cuba generated considerable pressure upon the .
3EA countries and their merchant marines. During only one
yar, 1961, socalled trade with Cuba grew from 192 million
rbles to 314 million rubles or 4.3 times. One of the major
"^Ibid., p. 84. See also Vodny Transport , January 4, 1972.







argos has been oil. The economic sunctions aggrevated already
ad situation with tonnage. For example, Standard Oil of
ew Jersey warned the associations of ship owners 'and brokers
hat it will not charter tankers involved in the transportation
f oil to the Comecon countries and Cuba. A number of decisions
y the U.S. Government applied pressure upon countries whose
hips were involved in the delivering cargos to. Cuba. All this
.orced the CMEA countries to accelerate the development of
heir merchant marines and to improve their effectiveness.
he task "to assure independence of foreign trade from *
apitalist charter market, to decrease spending of the foreign
xchange for charter and to increase effectiveness of the
oreign trade" was proclaimed. The task to eliminate the
harter of foreign ships was never set up. The available
tatistics shows, that simultaneously with a fast growth of
he CMEA merchant marines and the steadily increasing number
f the Communist ships chartered by foreign countries, the
MEA countries charter of foreign ships is being increased
oo. 7 During decade of 1960 r s, the CMEA fleet tonnage
ncreased more than twice, while foreign trade grew by 1.5
•imes. There were qualitative changes as well. In 1963 more
nan 40% of the ships were less than five years old, of modern
iesign, suitable for the needs of the CMEA foreign trade. The
breaking point in the fulfillment of proclaimed task was
ichieved in 1963 , when the percentage of tonnage of chartered










ountries carried four-fifths of the cargo sold by CIF and
jjught by FOB.
During the second half of the 1960 T s there was steady
rowth of tonnage and percentage of the CMEA ships chartered
V foreign countries, i.e. the growth of the "export" of the-
reduction of merchant marine.
A brief review of the development of merchant marines
f individual CMEA countries (with the exception of the
oviet Union) now in order.
Post World War II developments of Polish Merchant Marine
egan in March of 1946 when twenty-five ships, total capacity
f 92,000 registered tons, returned to the country. In 1947
oviet Union transferred to Poland 15$, of 56,000 registered
ons, of ships received by reparations. During the six years
Ian, 1950-1955? the growth of Polish Merchant Marine was slow
nd mainly achieved through buying old ships from the Western
ountres. Communist victory in China aggravated the situation
n Polish Merchant Marine. Trade with China grew during period
f 1950-1955 more than eight times. In addition, Poland was
major country training China's Merchant Marine crews. The
oint lines, ships of which were men by the mixed Polish-Chinese
rews, were organized. During the first five-year plan,
"' 8Ibi~ p. 81, 134-147.
^For the details see: l) B. B. Gorozontov, "Transport
nd Internationa l Socialistic Division of Labor", Moscow,
anaie", 19677 2) "Sea Transport of the USSR during 1966-1970",
•oscow, Transport, 1967. 3) "Fifty Years of Sea Transport of
h g Soviet Union," Mo3 c ow , Tran s port , 19 67. 4 ) Lloyd r s Re gister
lOhipping, Statistical Tables, 1950,1955, I960, I'WT* 5) T. D.
joins rov
, £ojlIJt^Ill:k9ILJJJ^^ in the Area of Sea
Iransport






956-1960, domestic •shipbuilding industry provided half the
onnage, and the percentage of old ship:: bought declined,
uring the second five-year plan, I96I-I965, the percentage of
omestically built ships delivered to Polish Merchant Marine
;rew up to sixty-three. Starting with 1966, over 95% of the
"
rowth of Polish Merchant Marine was achieved by delivery of
ew ships, the majority of them built by the domestic yards.
he growth of Polish Merchant Marine tonnage (thousand tons,
ead-weight) was as follows:. 1949-206; 1955-392; 1960-326;
965-1,233; 1967-1,603. 10 In the middle of 1960 T s a number
f advanced ships were ordered aboard.
All these measures resulted in quantitative renovation
nd improvements in economic performance of the Polish Merchant
iarine. At the end of 1960 r s the future of the Polish Merchant
11iarine was widely debated. A special committee of the
[erchant Marine Ministry recommended a plan of merchant marine
:evelopment up to 1935. According to plan, "the development
)f sea transport of the country should be oriented mainly on
•he earning of foreign exchange", and its tonnage in 1935
Should reach 3.5-9 million dwt, out of which 3-5-4 million
iwt should be allocated for "export", i.e. for the purpose
)f earning foreign exchange. The main task of the
1"0n. D. Mozharov, "Cooperation of Socialist Countries in
;he Area of Sea Transport", Transport PH , Moscow, 1969, p. 94.
Morski Rocznik Statystyc zny; B. Polkowski. Stan 1
;tnjktura polskie.i floty trans porv. owe 1 3-1 grudr.ia .I9 o7, V.ryd.
JULLl-lt u : u Mor s k j . o :o , Ga an s k , 1 9o8 . (Maritime Statistical
Yearbook. 3. Polkovski, "The Condition and Structure of
polish Merchant Marine, 31 December 1967", Published by
Maritime Institute, Gdansk, 1963.
S^iO

n-rchant marine of the country was formulated as "protection





The Polish Merchant Marine industry is relied upon its ^
uil developed ship-building industry. There are three
major
nip-building yards in Gdansk, Gdynya, and Stettin. As of
addle of 1970 a thousand ships were built in the Polish
yards
[it of which were more than 700 ships sold. As of 1969;
14
8% of ships sold were delivered to the Soviet Union.
At
he beginning of 1971, Gdansk shipyard had built for
export
66 ships out of which 425 were built for the USSR.
The
SSR bought close to three million tons of Polish built
ships
raring the decades of 1950 's and 1960's. Presently,
about
10% of Soviet Merchant Marine tonnage are represented
by
15
ships built in Poland.
The size of the Polish built ships is being
constantly
increased.- Polish ship-building techniques is
quite advanced
and many innovations (including welding of ship-s
sections
afloat) are employed. Toward the end of 1970,
the following
types of ships were under construction or
planned: three types
'Technology and MaritlmVtlallagement- J,
±9o/., wo.
"i ^ ^ T-.-.V.O q l Q70 and Economicheskava
•^Sovetskaya Rossiya , June 9, xjfv, emu _± _
Gazeta No. 27 , July 19~69 . -
1/fPravda , April 16, 1971-





of tankers, the largest 94,500 dwt ; seven types of bulk
carriers, the largest 75,000 dwt; twelve, typos of general
cargo ships, some with seppd of 22 knots; three ty»pes of
refrigerator ships. Soviet Union continues to be the major
customer of Polish built ships and in 1971 additional orders
were signed with Polish foreign trade enterprise Centromor.
According to the agreement, in a period of 1972-1975, Poland
will built thirty-five universal ships with total cargo
capacity of 262,000 tons and nine large fish processing
16
factories.
Most of the propulsion plants for Polish built ships
are domestically produced. Poznan's Cegieiski plant is one
of the largest European diesel building enterprises. Most
of the diesels are built on foreign licenses from Zulzer,
Burmeister and Wain, and Fiat. TLe second enterprise, Zgocla,
builds smaller high revolution diesels of 1,500 to 3,000
horsepower output. A rather extensive network of education,
research, and design institutions support the Polish Merchant
Marine industry.
At the end of 19?0, the Polish Merchant Marine consisted
of 259 ships, with total cargo capacity of more than 1,900,000
tons. More than half of this tonnage was represented by ships
less than five years old. According to the 1971-1975 plan,
Polish Merchant Marine will be enlarged by 99 ships and in
1975 its tonnage should reach 3.5 million tons. A' new "Northern





(and in future up to 250,000 dwt) will be built. The con-
struction of this port proclaimed to be a national task. 7
East Germany ( German Democratic Republic - G\)R ) has the
third largest, after the Soviet Union and Poland, merchant
marine among Warsaw Pact Countries. At the end of 1955 East
German Merchant Marine had 9 ships. In 1957, the first two
domestically built ships entered the service. The urgent need
for a greater number of ships forced the East German Government
to adopt in 195$ a decision for accelerated development of
its merchant marine. During 195&-1960 period, fourteen "old
ships were bought agroad and twenty new ships were built at
domestic yards. Two tankers were built in the Soviet Union.
All these measures resulted in the rather rapid growth of
East German Merchant Marine. If in 1950 it had 1.3 thousand
dwt, in I960 it has 277,000, in 1965, 794,000, and in 1970
it was 1.3 million dwt. Between 195& and I967
cargo turnover of East German Merchant Marine grew more than
19
fifty times, and in 1967 it was 23,603 million ton-miles.
Simultaneously, East German port structure was rapidly developed.
According to a special decision of October 1957, the construction
I
of Rostok port was proclaimed as a national task. This port,
i
the largest in East Germany, became the major East German port
^Yodnyy Transport , July 15, 1971.
-^Stat 1 stiches Jahrbuch der Deutschen pemoktattschen
Republik
,
T90S". ( "German Democratic Republic's Year cook
of Statistics", 1966', 1970).
19
1




to service cargo to Cuba. According to new 1971-1975 plan
in 1975 East German Merchant Marine should grow to 1,750,000 dwt. 20
East German ship-building industry is no less, important.
There are twelve ship-building yards. The major of them 'are
located in the Rostok area:
1. The Warnow Yard in Warnemunde, employs over £,000
workers, and specializes on construction of dry
cargo ships up to 16,000 dwt. Total annual
production close to 200,000 dwt..
2. The Neptune Yard in Rostok specializes in building
dry cargo ships up to 11,000 dwt, research vessels
and auxiliary ships. Total annual production close
to 100,000 dwt.
3. The Stralsund Yard employs over 6,000 workers and
specializes in building fishing vessels. Annual
output is more than £0,000 reg. tons (74,369 reg.
tons of 1970 output went to the Soviet Union).
Quite advance methods of ship-building - sectional
and block, automated steel processing - are employed
by the yard.
4. The Wismar Yard also employs over 6,000 workers,
but it specializes in building of passenger liners
up to 25,000 reg. tons, fishing factory-ships,
refrigerators and expeditionary ships. Annual
output is 50,000 dwt.
Two machine building factories, one in Rostok and second in
Magdeburg, are producing diesels for all types of ships.
Presently, East German ship-building industry completely
satisfies the needs of its merchant marine, and the bulk of
the production is going for export. The major consumer is
|
the Soviet Union.
During twenty years more than 3,000 ships were built.
Twenty-six countries have ordered ships from East Germany,
particularly famous for its fishing vessels (19$ of world T s
total are East German built). In 1970 92$ of the newly







onstructed tonnage went for export. According to all agree-
ents signed between USSR and East Germany only in 1970, the
otal delivery of ships amounted to 800,000,000 rubles. East
erman ship-building industry was first to initiate construction
f container ships among Communist countries. At the present
oo
ontainer ships up to 23,000 tons are built. The industry
s supported by an extensive network of research institutes.
As a result of World War II, Rumania lost practically
11 of its merchant fleet. In -1950 eight ships were obtained
nd, later, up to I960 Rumanian fleet did not grow. In -the
>eriod of 1960-1965 the fast growth of Rumanian fleet was
chieved, mainly by the deliveries of domestically built
hips. The growth of Rumanian fleet can be illustrated by
he following figures: 19.60-31,000 dwt; 1965-166,000 dwt;
.970--around 600,000 dwt. 2^
Rumanian ship-building industry is quite advanced and
'ast growing. During 1971-1975 its output should be tripled,
:ompared with 1970. There are six ship-building yards, major
if them located in Galati, Turnu-Severin, and Constanta.
Soviet Union has been 'the major customer of the Rumanian ship-
milding industry. However, in the last two or three years
24
Soviet's orders have been reduced.
^Vodnyy Transport , June 15, 1971; Sudostroyeniye No. g ,
.971, pp. 72-73.
22Vodnyy Transport , May 3, 1971; Pravda , March 2, 1972.
23
N. D. Mozharov, pp. 107-103.






Up to I960 development of the Bulgarian Merchant Marine
was slow, but was vastly accelerated during the decade of
1960 f s. If in I960 total deadweight was 60,000 tons, in 1965
it was 576,000 tons and in 1970 it exceeded one million tons.
Beginning ifl 1967 Bulgarian Merchant Marines became profitable
and started to earn foreign exchange. The growth of Bulgarian
Merchant Marine has been mainly achieved by domestic ship-
building industry. In 1950 a joing Soviet-Bulgarian ship-
building and repair enterprise, Korbso, was set up. In 1954
it became a Bulgarian enterprise which merged with three other
shipyards in Varna and became known as Georgi Dimitrov
ship-building yard and ship repair yard. Another ship-building
yard, in Burgas, is presently being enlarged. Bulgaria
builds ships for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea,
China, and Norway, but its major customer has been the Soviet
Union. Presently, different types of ships are being built,
including bulk carriers up to 33,000 dwt. The Bulgarian
Merchant Marine should be doubled during the 1971-1975 period
primarily by the deliveries at domestic ship-building industry.
It is also planned to 'increase the use of Bulgarian ships for
charter and the task to increase foreign currency earning
25
power .of merchant marine has been set.
Hungary has two types of merchant fleets - sea and mixed,
river-sea, navigation. Total tonnage of both fleets in 1967
exceeded 23,000 dwt. Hungarian ship-building industry builds
^5 vodnyy Transport , February 14, 1971.
2
°N. D. Mozharov, p. 113.
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hips up to 2,000 dwt. Seventy-five per cent of its production
s going for export. Most ships have been ordered by the
oviet Union. However, orders from England, Belgium, Italy,
uba, Greece, and other countries have been received.
Even Czechoslovakia has its own merchant marine. As of
.967 its whole fleet - ten ships of some 150,000 tons was
-ployed in liner shippings, serving two linos J, Far Rasfcerni
rom Black Sea, and Baltic-Cuba (joint with East Germany,
luba , and Poland )
.
Growing foreign trade of Comecon countries, among them-
selves as well as with capitalist and developing countries,
;he desire to economize on the transportation, particularly
Ln terms of foreign exchange, the need to participate
In programs such as economic-military aid, assistance to
tforth Vietnam, and Cuba forced the CMEA members to accelerate
the development of their merchant marines. None of them
excludes charter of foreign ships, but the policy of
"positive balance in the sea transport charter" has been
vigorously pursued, particularly by Poland, Bulgaria, and
East Germany.
If, in the past, considerable percentage of ships
for
their merchant marines was bought from Western countries
an'd
Japan, the development of domestic ship-building industries
has reduced it considerably, and the majority of CMEA countries
are ship's exporters. By large, the major portion of their
7/New York Times , March 7, 1967.
— ~ * *
2
N. D. Mozharov, p. 124-125- /
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^lip-building capacities is occupied by the Soviet orders
nich certainly stimulated the industries' development and
live helped the Soviet Union to develop its merchant marine,
Ashing, and oceanographic fleets. Parallel to the constantly
^creasing tonnage, the measures designed to improve effective-
uss of the industry have been implemented. At the present,
ne coordination of the CMEA countries' Merchant Marines,
,)int nature of their operation and control exercised from -
bscow are such, that to a certain degree one can speak of
integrated fleet, or CMEA's Merchant Marine. Effectiveness
<f it has been particularly well demonstrated by the
^interrupted delivery of cargo to Cuba, North Vietnam, and
* k_«.V«N
hvies
The development, or more precisely, the gradual restor-
oion of the navies by the present East European members of
tie Warsaw Pact- was initiated soon after the end of World War
"[. The Soviet Union granted major assistance initially to
Ue Polish and Bulgarian navies, and later to the East German
ad Rumanian navies. The initial order of battle of the
hst European countries' navies represented a not very
lamerous collection of old, mainly obsolete ships with the
ame quality of armament. Soviet deliveries of warships
:> these countries could not and did not change the situation,
or in the main they, too, were old and to a large degree
osolete ships. The situation with the personnel of East
648

jropean navies was, however, different. A large number of
ijlish and Bulgarian and later East German and Rumanian
r.val officers were trained in Soviet naval school's and the
Aademy. Since the early l950's these countries initiated
te training of future naval officers domestically, but
avanced training, although on diminished scale, continued
i.the Soviet Navy education establishment.
While the Polish, Bulgarian, and Rumanian navies had -
;on developing openly, the East German Navy officially did
u: come into existence until January 1956. Nonetheless,
ft East German naval forces, although not numerous and
strong, have been in existence since late 1940 f s when the
'Ht units of the socalled Sea Police were organized. 29
With the creation of the Warsaw Traaty Organization (WTO)
>rl4 May 1955, a new course was set for the development
dEast European navies. Much closer cooperation between
East European and Soviet navies has been established,
aalleling the renovation of forces. An operational system
c posed of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Pollah Navy, ,md
h East German Navy, which in the event of a war would
1 be subordinated to a joint command, has been established
30
nthe Baltic. During the second half of the 1950 T s the
oiets delivered warships to Poland (Skory-class destroyers,
~
2 9Mar ine Runcischau No. 1
, 1969, pp. 16-33.
30Praeglad Morski (Polish Ma
r
itime Review) No. 6
,




submarines and torpedo boats) and East Germany (Riga-cla:
escorts, torpedo and patrol boats)
. On a somewhat smalle:
scale, Soviet ships were transferred to the Bulgarian and
Rumanian navies as well. Simultaneously, domestic construction
was initiated of warships outfitted with Soviet armament "
^
and equipment or produced according to Soviet designs.
Gradually, starting in the late 1950 's there have been joint
exercises of the Soviet Baltic Fleet with the Polish and
East German navies and the Black Sea Fleet with the Bulgarian
and Rumanian navies. While Rumania .has refrained to a large
'
degree from joint exercises, in late 1960 l s Bulgaria, in
contrast, went further than ever before, exercising her ships
together with the Soviet
_ Mediterranean Eskadra. s *
In the Baltic, the cooperation of Warsaw Pact navies is
particularly extensive. After acquiring an amphibious
capability, development of which started in the early 1960's,
a number of joint landing exercises have been observed,
including one during exercise Sever (1968-), in which forces
from all three navies participated. The Polish Navy has a
shore defense division trained for amphibious landing while ;
East Germany uses specially trained army regiment for this
31
purpose. In the summer of 1971 joint Soviet-Polish
and East German naval forces for the first time carried out
exercises in the Skagerrak off southern Norway. 32
nJHne RurA schau , January-February 1972. vo. 91-97;
and No. 1, 1969, pp. 32-33.
32
Internatlon Defense Digest No. 4, 1971. »
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The decisions of the March 1969 Budapest meeting of the
"TO Political Consultative Committee established the Committee
f Defense Ministers, and outlined new provisions 'concerning
he combined (Ob'yedinennyye ) armed forces and combined
arsaw Pact command. The necessity for wider application of
ommon principles in military theory, training methods, and
.ilitary education were emphasized during the meeting. The.
nits for the combined naval forces of the WTO are allocated..
33
'rom the navies of member nations. The March 1971 Budapest
meeting of the Committee of Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers
onsidered the further improvement of the WTO armed forces
nfrastructure, the further development of means of control
.nd prospects for the joint development of their armies and
• 34
.avies.
Recently, the Warsaw Pact navies have been supplied with
tore sophisticated armament and better ships, both domestically
nd Soviet built. Thus, it was reported that East German
'.SW Forces are being reinforced with new ships propelled by
. combined gas turbine-diesel plant. The Polish Navy
•
1
eceived its first missile armed ship, a converted Kotlin-
35
:lass destroyer armed with SAMs.
3Marshall Grechko in Pravda, February 23, 1970; and
>rmy General Shtemenko, Combined Brotherhood, Krasnaya









































































































































































































































The naval strength of the Warsaw Pact countries illus-
' rated by the table obviously augments the Soviet Navy poten-
ial for coastal operations in the Baltic and Black 3ea areas.
t also provides the Soviet Navy with a legal pretext for' the
dvance (300-400 miles) base system. The East European navies
osess types of ships in considerable number which are essen-
ial for fulfilling certain tasks assigned to the naval forces
f the Warsaw Pact, including amphibious operations, mine and
ounter-mine operations, ASW and limited support of Soviet
ubmarines, and support of the army flank. The Warsaw Pact
>rovides the Soviet Union with better opportunities to improve
.ts strategic position in the two maritime flanks of the Euro-
\-acv* "^ *»* ^ c ^~ d ""* /"> "* ^.*C T*
3oSee Dr. R. A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact : Case Studies
in Communist Conflict Resolution, Cambridge, Massachusetts:





SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
'oreign Trade
Pre-revolutionary Russia traded with many countries,
mt only a few major European countries and the United States
>layed a decisive role. Germany was the most important
-rading partner, accounting for nearly k.0% of trade turnover
jb 1913".
Soon after the 1917 October Revolution, all foreign and
Liiternal debts were counselled. In December 12, 1917, "the
Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC) adopted the resolution
'on interim order in the field of foreign trade" under
vhich the export and import activity could be conducted only
}y permission of the export department of the SNEC. By the
29 December 1917 resolution of the Council of People's
3ommissars the foreign trade department of the People's
Oommissariat of Commerce and Industry was granted exclusive
J
right to issue licenses for export and import. Finally, by
a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 22 April 191$
foreign trade was nationalized, thus creating a state monoply.
During the first years of Soviet power, trade relations
^-Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History) No. 6, 1967, pp. 3^-53.
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arere maintained only with few neutral countries, mainly Sweden.
During the first three years, 1913, 1919, and 1920, the
exports totalled only 7.5 million rubles and imports #7.5 million
rubles, thus creating an £0-million ruble deficit. In January
L920 the Entente Supreme Council resolution permitted the
exchange of commodities with Russia on condition that trade
:e carried out with the Soviet cooperative organizations
rather than directly with the Soviet government, which was
lot recognized.
The Soviet government then began its diplomatic maneuvering.
I peace treaty signed with Estonia on February 2, 1920, was
in important step in the development of foreign trade, for
.t helped the Soviets to come out on the West European markets
ind thus reducing the impact of the .Enieniie. Supreme Council
"esolution. The peace treaties with Lithuania, Latvia,
''inland, and Poland served the same purpose, because the
treaties were followed by the organization of foreign trade
igencies abroad in the form of the trade delegation of Soviet
Uissia. The result was that in 1921 Soviet foreign trade was
sight times greater than that- of 192Q-, exports- growing 14 times
ind the imports more than seven times. (In 1921 the import
)f food stuffs constituted 60% of all imports and played an
.mportant role in easing the famine.)
But the Entente resolution continued to handicap the
levelopment of Soviet foreign trade a great deal. Under the
:ircumstances, the Soviet government decision on December 2, 1922,
•ranted the Centrosoyuz (The Central Cooperatives Union) the
'ight to administer its foreign trade through national
K Kba

Doperatives associations and also through any international
riolesale purchases cooperative union. On December 5, 1921,
he People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the* Centrosoyuz
igned an agreement under which the latter acted as the
ommissioner of the Commissariat in foreign markets. 2 The
alance of foreign trade continued to be unfavorable to the
oviet Union, and in 1921 reached a deficit of 150 million
ubles, which has to be covered by the sale of gold, reserves
f which were very limited. What the Soviets needed were
redits, which were refused until the Soviet government -
•ecognized the pre-war and wartime debts of Tsarist Russia
.nd the Provisional government. During the Genoa Economic
lonference, the Soviets were presented with a bill for Id.
5
>illion so called gold rubles, whereupon the Soviet delegation
^resented a countcrbill, indicating that tho Allied inter-
vention and blockade, and the Civil War which they supported
for more than three years had caused losses to Russia of
39 billion rubles. Obviously, the Conference was deadlocked.
The Rapallo Treaty signed on April 16, 1922, helped the
Soviet Union in developing its foreign trade. Even more
favorable development resulted in -1924 after the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Britain, Italy, Austria, Norway,
Sweden, China, Denmark, Mexico, and France. v Total foreign
trade turnover in 1924 reached hflO million rubles, in 1925,
ZVoprosy Istorii No. S, 1967, pp. 42 -4#.
5 b

.,123 million rubles, and in 1928, 1,377 million rubles,
luring the four years of the first Five Year Plan (1929-1932),
he turnover of Soviet foreign trade was 5,900 million |*whl&B,
'ollowing a policy of promoting rapid industrialization, the
ommodity group "plant and equipment" represented close to
•0% of the entire Soviet imports during the period and was
qual to the total amount of plant and equipment imported
.uring the period of 1918-192$.
The major stress, however, was placed on the policy
>f so called liberation of the Soviet Union from import *
iependence by developing domestic industry. The most
'evealing example of such a policy can be cited in case of
tractor production. In the early 1930 T s, forced collectivi-
sation of the Soviet agriculture required, machines, mainly
;ractors. In 1931 the tractor imports were already 2.5 times
greater than in 1929.
The first large industrial enterprise built during the
first Five Year Plan was the Stalingrad, now the Volgograd,
Tractor Plant, stocked with American equipment which cost
28 million rubles to import. The. Kharkov Tractor Plant,
//hick was built two years later, was partially equipped with
Soviet made machinery, while the value of imported machinery
tfas only 12 million rubles. While in 1924-1931 180 million
rubles were spent to import 86,000 tractors, in 1934 the
Soviet tractor producing enterprises produced 93,500 tractors
at a cost of 58 million rubles. Starting in 1933, the tractor
imports into the Soviet Union were stopped.
/
" 3 voprosy Istorii No. 6 , 1967, p. 41.
r» r- "7

During the second Five Year Plan (1933-193$) and in
general up to the beginning of World War II, Soviet
foreign trade had been consistently declining (with the
exception of 1940, when trade with Nazi Germany somewhat '
increased total foreign trade turnover after the signing of
the Soviet -German pact). There were a number of reasons for
this. Soviet authors liked to emphasize industralization as
a major one. While this is an important factor, it should
be stressed, however, that a number of political reasons were
no less important in the curtailment of Soviet foreign trade.
Before the Nazis came to power, Germany was the biggest
trading partner of the Soviet Union. Also important were
trading relations with Italy and Japan, which degenerated
sharply after 1933. Moreover, the major export items were
raw materials, which the Soviet industry, involved in an
extensive military build-up, needed for itself and hence
the shortage of foreign exchange. The trade figures in
millions of rubles were as follows:
Year Export Import Turnover
1930 313 #3'0 1,643
1933 38$ 273 661
1935 288 139" 477
1940 240 242 4^2
Source : Voprosy Istorii No. 8 , 1967.
The first post-war years produced drastic changes in the
orientation of Soviet foreign trade, which began to grow
steadily soon after the restoration of the Soviet economy,






%6, total trade turnover with Western countries amounted to
/?1 million rubles of which 304 was with the United States;
:i 1950 it was 440 million rubles, of which only 5,0 million
ubles was with the United States. Meanwhile, the trade'
iLth socialist countries, especially after the creation of
fie Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) has played
(decisive role, as can be seen from the table below.
POSTWAR SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
(Millions of rubles, in prices at the time)

































































































SOVIET TRADE WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(In millions of rubles)
1946 1950 1955 I960 1965 1970
Ttal 491 440 904 1,917 • 2,306- 4,700
Bitain 36 12S 216 271 399 641
Fnland 62 55 211 264 408 531
list Germany 43 286 243 544
F'ance 35 6 86 183 202 413
ialy 0.5 34 30 173 225 • 472
iieden 14 31 41 90 93 235
'dtzerland 0.7 10 11 13 28 61*
astria 1 23 44 116 102 155
blgium 6 28 35 46 74 149*
blland 1 5 60 63 35 154*
apan 4 4 124 326 652
anada 6 0.3 4. •14 240 131-
5A 3C4 53 22 76' 25 m S-
- 1968 figures
ource - International Affairs #12 , 1969; New Times #14 , April 1971;




After the Communist victory in China, Soviet trade with
that country grew steadily, reaching its peak in 1959, when
total turnover was 1,850 million rubles. However,; the decline
since 1959 was considerably faster than the growth during the
previous period. Between I960 and 1965 the volume of Soviet-
Chinese trade dropped to nearly one-fifth and in 1965 it
amounted to only 376 million rubles. In 1969 the trade
between two Communist giants reached its lowest point (around
50 million rubles). At the' end of 1970 a trade agreement
between the Soviet Union and China was signed resulting •• in the
cv:*u-v,^vU- i;;oro;U^vi cvu^;"C ©Jf Cr^oc Cci" Che- I?©1I©W&K3$ ye&r«
Soviet deliveries of industrial raw materials played an
important role in trade with the CMEA countries. Between 1955
and I965 the USSR delivered 16$ million tons of iron ore,
5.5 million tons of manganese ore and more than 25 million
tons of coke to the CMEA countries. Trade between them has
been conducted on the basis of long-term agreements. 'During
the decade of the 1960 T s East Germany replaced China as the
Soviet's biggest foreign trade partner.
Khrushchev's decision to intensify the development of
the Soviet chemical industry at the end of the 1950 r s contributed
to a considerable increase in the Soviet foreign trade with
the developed countries. But the availability of credit
remained to be a major obstacle. The method of bilateral
trade and clearing accounts applied for the first 'time after





he war in trade between the Soviet Union and Western countries
ks replaced during the 19oO T s by accounts in freely convertible
urrency. Under these conditions, the problem of balancing
xports and imports became less acute. '
However, it has always been general Soviet foreign trade
olicy to strive to balance its receipts and expenditures for
ny given individual country. Soviet imports from the
ndustrially developed 'countries consist mainly of machinery^
nd equipment and sophisticated manufacturers. The major
oviet problem in trading with industrially developed countries
'
s the structure of Soviet exports, which has been mainly
5
epresented by raw materials.
.
The structure of Soviet exports and imports has also
een changing in the post World War II period . The share
if plant and equipment in export has been growing and as
:arly as 1965 amounted to 1,472 million rubles. Oil and
)il products had been the next largest item in the Soviet
ixports. During the period of 1955-1965 more than 36O
lillion tons of oil and oil products valued at 6,300 million
^ubles were exported.' The third biggest Soviet commodity
^roup, accounted for over 10$ of the total export, was iron
ind steel.
On the whole, the turnover of Soviet foreign trade during
:he period of the Seven Year Plan (195^-1965) had been
Increasing faster than planned. According to the plan, Soviet
foreign trade in 1965 was to exceed the 195^ level by 50$ but
^Tr.t.nr-nfU-.innal Affairs No. 12, 1969, PP. 29-33.
i GG2

tie actual increase during the period was 1.9 tir.es.
The 23rd Party Congress Directives for the 1966-1970
I.ve Year Plan demanded a further increase in the Soviet
i>reign trade with the improvement of the structure of
<>viet exports to be achieved mainly by stepping-up the export
if machines, equipment, instruments, transport, and commun-
ication facilities and other finished goods of the processing
jidustry.
As can be seen from the table, Soviet Foreign Trade,
:?65-1970, the volume of Soviet foreign trade during the
jjriod 1966-1970 exceeded 91,000 million rubles compared
iLth 64,000 million rubles in I96I-I965. The average annual
:icrease of Soviet foreign trade during that period, 8.8%,
Kceeded the rate of growth of national income, 7.1%.
The Soviet Union is trading with over a hundred countries.
at, nearly two-thirds of the trade turnover in 1966-1970
50, 600 million rubles) was with the Socialist countries
CMEA countries amounted to 51,600 million rubles). Nearly
alf of the machinery and equipment exported by the CMEA
ountries were bought by the Soviet Union including 85% of
7
he shipping tonnage and marine equipment.
While the volume of trade with the developed countries
uring the five years increased from 2,800 million rubles in
965 to 4,700 million rubles in 1970, their share in the total
olume of Soviet foreign trade decreased somewhat toward the
nd of the period from 21.9% in 1969 to 21.3% in 1970.
Kconomichoakaya Gazeta #24 , June 1971.
7Mgw Times #50, December 16, 1970.
6 h"tr

SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE, I965-I97O
(OOO million rubles, in prices at the time)"'
1
1965 1966 1967 196^ 1969 1970
H.6 15.1 16.4 ia.0 19. £ 22.1
r)tal turnover
With Socialist 10.0 10.0 "ll.l 12. 1 12.9 ill
countries









2. a 3.2 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.7
Source - New
£4, June 1971.
Times #50, 1970, and Economicheskaya Gazeta
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Trade with Japan during five years, 1966-1970, amounted
to 2,600 million rubles. In 1970, it stood at 653 million
rubles, placing Japan first among Soviet trading partners of
the developed countries (Great Britain, with 641 million'
rubles, was second). Nearly 96% of Soviet exports to Japan
were raw materials and less than 1%, engineering products.
Soviet imports from Japan, in contrast, were mostly manufactured
goods. The new trade agreement signed at the end of September
1971 envisages a total turnover of 4,750 million rubles over
the five years 1971-1975. The 1975 annual target is set at
1,000 million rubles. Joint development of the Port of
Wrangel, with its facilities designed to handle 10 million
-->„- .,_-» ~~ c ~ inn ~ " ~ «« - -"• r,Trmrt o>1r -" r - a-rA 1 Ld fWl r*nni'£ Jf*&*&
annually and Soviet approval for the transshipment of
containerized cargo across Siberia between Japan and Europe,
should further increase the volume of Soviet-Japanese foreign
trade. The general agreement concerning the development of
the Port of Wrangel Bay was signed in December 1970 with the
IV Kabushiki Kaisha firm acting on behalf of fourteen
9-
cooperating Japanese companies.
Trade with the developing countries during 1966-1970
amounted to over 11,000 million rubles - 4,000 million more
ihan in I96I-I965, - representing 13.5% of the total Soviet
foreign trade. In 1970 total turnover with Egypt was 606 million
rubles, with India, 365 million rubles, Iran, 231 million






•ubles, Algeria, 113 million rubles.
In 1970 Soviet exports amounted to 11. 5 billion rubles,
'he task set by the 23rd Party Congress for a considerable
.ncrease in export of machinery and equipment can hardly 'be
:alled fulfilled, increasing from 20% in 1965 to 21.5% in 1970.
In 1970 imports amounted to 10.6 billion rubles, of
hich more than one-third was spent on machines and equipment.
h 1970 more than 600 million rubles were spent for ships
nd ship equipment and 297 million rubles, for auto transport.
According to directives of the 24th Party Congress, foreign
rade during the period of 1971-1975 is supposed to increase
y 33-35% with the main role, as always, assigned to the
ocialist countries. In 1975 > annual foreign trade turnover *
s supposed to reach approximately 30 billion rubles. Total
rade turnover with the CMEA countries for 1971-1975 period
s planned at over 76 billion rubles, an increase of more
han half compared with 1966-1970. An unspecified increase in
olume of trade and greater scientific and technical
ooperation with the developing countries was also promised,
number of long-term' agreements signed with France, Britain,
inland, Japan, Italy, Sweden, and other developed countries
hould certainly produce a considerable increase in trade.
he availability of long-term and rather large credits from
he developed capitalist countries, particularly for a truck
uilt plant, large diameter oil pipes, and the development





of Siberia might help to generate a considerable increase in
the Soviet trade.
For years, the Soviet Union has been active in oil
exports, the majority of which have been seaborne.
Oil exports have brought a considerable amount of hard
currency and have also generated the demand for a rather
sizeable tanker fleet. In the period between the two world
wars, the USSR exported 50 million tons of oil and oil products
After the war the export of oil was resumed in 1955.^2 a
considerable portion (approximately l/3 ) of the Soviet oil
export goes to the Socialist countries, particularly to the
CMEA members. The remaining two-thirds are sold to West
European countries and Japan. Starting in I960 the Soviet
Union began delivery of oil to Cuba (approximately 4 million
tons per year). Soviet oil to Poland and East Germany, with
the further possibility of delivering it to some West
European countries, is pumped through the Druzhba (Friendship)
pipeline. In 1966 the Soviet export of oil amounted to
73 million tons, of which 41 million tons were sold to the
developed countries. ^ The Soviet Union presently operates
a few oil corporations, which might be called international,
NAFTA-A in Finland and NAFTA-B in Belgium. In Belgium the
Soviets hold 60% of the company's stock with an investment
; llEconomicheskaya Gazeta #24 , June 1971, and New Times
£14, April 1971.





f 750 million Belgian francs. A Soviet Company, NAFTA
united, exists in Great Britain.
The Soviet Union has 1S,600 miles of oil pipelines,
^presenting 13% of the world T s total. New pipelines from
estern Siberia oil fields are planned. In addition to the
astern line, the 3, 700-mile eastern line would bring
iberian oil to Nakhodka, which is about 400 miles from
apan. It was reported that the Soviet negotiators tried
1) persuade Japan to participate in the construction of
iiese pipelines, arguing that the 1.9 billion dollars needed
1) built the line would be a small price to pay for reduced
15 ' —
ependence on Middle East oil. y
The plan for stepped-up cooperation with the Soviet Union
:i exploiting Soviet natural gas and oil resources was
anounced in Tokyo. The agreement, reached on September 7,
$71, reflected the decision of Japanese business to go
ciead with two projects to explore oil deposits in Tyumen',
Astern Siberia, and to secure stable natural gas supplies
i>r Japan through a pipeline from north Sakhalin and Yakutsk,
hstern Siberia. |
Construction of a refinery at Nakhodka oil base had
17
£.ready handled 4 million tons of oil. It is planned to
" 1Z| -Vodnyy Transport , July 17, 1971-
^Washington Post , February 28, 1971-
16Washing,ton Post , September 9, 1971.
17Vyshka
,




.ncrease the base capacity by 150$. Large off-shore gas
ind oil deposits were discovered in the Sakhalin area.
During the previous five-year period an important oil
ixport base was established in Ventspills on the Baltic Sea
rith a capacity to export 6 million tons a year. It is
>lanned to double this capacity during the current Five Year
Ian. The Soviet oil output for 1975 is planned to be 500
tillion tons, so it would be logical to expect an increase
n Soviet oil exports.
At the end of 19&3 the Soviet Union entered negotiations
ith a number of foreign ship owners for the delivery, of
1&
oviet built ships. The Soviet Union had delivered ships
some foreign, mainly Communist, countries, previously,
ut their number was small. Since. the, rrJ.dd.le 19&Q T s, the
hip export has been growing steadily. During the last
our years, Sudoimport sold to a number' of countries, including
est Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, 26 dry cargo ships,
wo tankers (one fifty thousand tonner), eight production and
ransport refrigerators. A hundred or more Kometa passenger
ydrofoils have been exported since 1967 to Yugoslavia,
est Germany, Finland, and since spring 1970, to the Western
emisphere, when International Hydrolines Incorporated of
ew York, bought the first vessel and started hydrofoil
ervice in the Virgin Islands. The company expressed
19
eadiness to buy eight more of the vessels. A number of
^The New York Times , February 17, 19&4-





Regoletto-class ships have been built for Sweden in an
apparent barter deal.
The Soviet drive to accelerate the export of technological
products can be illustrated by her recently expressed readi-
ness to sell enriched uranium and atomic reactors to anybody
in the West who will pay for them. Moreover, the quoted
price ($27.00) was almost $5.00 less than the U.S. unit
price for enriched uranium. The Soviet Union has also
been conducting a vigorous compaign for the sale of Soviet
made commerical jets. In September 1971 it was reported
that Moscow made an attractive offer to that end to Chile. 20
Economic Aid
Since 1954, the Soviet Union has extended an estimated N
7.2 billion dollars in economic aid. to over LQ developing
countries. The ten top recipients in the 1954-1970 period
are India, (1.6 billion), Egypt (1.1 billion), Afghanistan
(700 million), Iran (560 million), Turkey(370 million),
Indonesia (370 million) , Iraq (320 million) , Pakistan
21
(265 million), Syria (235 million), and Algeria (230 million).
Providing an alternative to Western aid, Soviet economic
aid probably helped to create a climate for neutralizing
Western "influence, and thus provides Moscow with a sort of









program was neither a roaring success nor a dismal failure,
and successes seemed to outnumber the- failures.
With time, the Soviet Union has become more sophisticated
in the distribution of its economic aid, and during certain
periods, much tighter with her purse, developing a more
business-like approach to the program. Such changes occurred
during the middle of the 1960 f s when extensive surveys prior
to making nev; aid commitment were conducted and a considerable
portion of commercial credits were distributed with the
design to promote exports of Soviet machinery and equipment.
Moreover, in 1967 there was a decline in the economic aid
commitment to the developing countries. The decline probably
did not constitute any fundamental change in the Soviet
attitude toward foreign aid and should probably be attributed
to the large backlog of unexpended credits which were still
available from the allocations of the two previous years.
During the last two years of the 1960's and in 1970,
the economic aid figures have been growing. In the spring of
1971 during the 14th Annual Meeting of the UN Economic
Commission for Latin America, the Soviet Union offered
22 !
technical and other aid to Latin America. As reported by,
the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations under the
/ -
Soviet Council of Ministers at the beginning of 1971, the
Soviet Union had economic and technical cooperation agreements
23
with IS Asian, 20 African, and 2 Latin American countries.
-22Washington Post, May 30, 1971.





The distribution of Soviet aid among the basic branches of
the economy of the developing countries is as follows:
jIndustry and. power 63.7$
Agriculture 6.2$
Transport and communications 10.0$
Geological prospecting 10.
Education, culture, public
health, and sports 4.2$
Housing construction and
municipal services 0.4$
Other branches 0.5% '
Total 100.0$
Source - New Times 77/3 , 1971.
In total the Soviet Union has helped with the construc-
tion of more than 700 industrial enterprises and other projects,
of which some 340 have already been put into operation. The
openly proclaimed goal of the Soviet aid is to help to
• create and extend the state sector of the recipient country's
economy, particularly heavy industry enterprises, for which
more than half of the total aid is going. In most cases
the Soviet credits are of long duration and at relatively low
interest rates (2.5 - 3$ annually) applied only on credits
actually used.
In many cases the credits are repaid in the developing
country's traditional exports and, in some cases, in
national currencies, for which the Soviet Union is buying some
raw material and consumer goods. A statement by V. Sergeyev,
Vice-Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic
Relations, emphasized that "Soviet economic and technical
2
^-Iew Times No. 3, 1971, p. 19.
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aid to the developing countries benefits both sides and in
25
no sense is a matter of charity".
The exported Soviet machinery and equipment has few buyers
in the industrial countries, but are in demand in the *
developing countries. In addition, many developing countries
found that the Soviet Union represents a market for their
agricultural, raw materials and foodstuffs. Thus, the Soviet
economic aid to the developing countries and trade with
-
them has a rather sound economic basis and very likely




While economic aid represents a phenomenon originating
mainly in the post-Stalin era (Afghanistan, in 1954, was the
first country to receive aid), Soviet military aid to
"promising" movements goes back to the early years of Soviet
power. During the 1920 T s the movements led by Kemal
.Uttarturk of Turkey and Chiang Kai-shek of China received
Soviet military aid. During the second half of the 1930 r s,
a considerable amount of ammunition, arms, and advisors were
sent to the Kuomintang in China and the Spanish Republicans.
Ifter World War II, the goal of undermining Western countries'
position led to the supply of arms to Israel. Later, however,
;he rigidity of the doctrine pronounced by Zhdanov in the
'ominform session, the weak economic situation of the USSR,
"-he beginning of the Cold War and the opposition of the
Tnited States and its allies clearly expressed in the Truman
2




Doctrine, forced the Soviet Union to refrain fro-, active arms
support in late forties and early fifties (excluding, of course,
Korea type situation).
In the mid-1950' s, however, the situation had changed,
and rather drastically: Stalin was dead, the military sector
of the Soviet economy improved considerably.
Tn the spring of 1955 Mikoyan visited Yugoslavia.
Obviously designed to prepare the ground for Khrushchev's
meeting with Tito, tfhe visit produced an unusual classified
letter from the CPSU Central Committee. The letter reported
the results of Mikoyan 's meetings with Tito, emphasizing
Tito's advice concerning the number of non-allied nations
and their leaders. In particular, Nasser was mentioned as
a strong anti-imperialist quite in need of support. Events
followed one another with remarkable speed. Shepilov, who
was considered as the best Soviet export in the Middle East,
made a trip to Cairo and was soon appointed Soviet Foreign
Minister. A number of military aid assistance agreements
were signed, thus initiating what has become an essential




Initially, the Soviet Union preferred to remain in the
background, using Czechoslovakia and Poland as inter-
mediaries. Czechoslovakia signed an initial arms agreement
2
^Many leaders of neutralist countries used to be viewed
at that time by the Soviet propaganda as counter-revolutionary,




with Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. 27
Toward the end of the 1950 <s such ill devised camouflage
was dropped, and the Soviet Union began supplying arms to
various countries, and primarily the Arab World, openly. 'The
first Soviet naval ships arrived in Egypt just prior to the
Suez Crisis of November 195*. Starting in 195* an arms deal
with Indonesia was closed, and the first groups, of Indonesian
naval officers and crews started to be trained by the Soviet-
Navy in Poland. During the next five years, one Sverdlov-
class cruiser (Ordzhonikidze)
, seven Skory-class destroyers,
12 W-class submarines, 7 Riga-class destroyer escorts, about
two dozen torpedo boats, a number of minesweepers, Komar-class
missile boats, and auxiliary ships were transferred to the -
Indonesian Navy. Neither were the majority of transferred
ships suitable for the environment and operational requirements
nor was the Indonesian Navy ready or capable of operating-
them properly. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Indonesian
needed such a collection of naval armament. The Soviet Navy
at least was honest in the deal involving the cruiser, trying
to persuade the Indonesians that they did not need it. As
for "the rest of the ships transferred, the majority of them were
obsolescent and the Soviet Navy was glad to get rid of them,
^'instead of "military aid", a more accurate term wouldbe military Loans" for almost all Soviet agreements involvedlong-term, low-interest loans. For a detailed analysis of
Soviet supplies of arms, see: Arms for the Third .•.ro^'ld :
Soviet Mi litary Aid Diplomacy by IVynfred Joshua and Stephen
P. Givert; Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, I969.
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lot a difficult task in the case of such an eager "buyer" as
Sukarno vras.
In 1961 the Soviet Union began to supply arms, to Cuba.
Irms shipments were especially substantial during the second
lalf of 1961 and 1962, up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, after
rtiich it was continued on the basis of maintaining a certain
legree of combat capability of the Cuban armed forces. During
;he I960' s, arms were also supplied to a number of African
iations.
The first agreement for the delivery of Soviet arms to
India was reached in I960, but the agreement on naval ships
2$
[as not signed until 1965-. Apparently, India was reluctant
,0 be dependent upon Soviet arms supply and for a while tried
.o reach an agreement with Western countries, particularly
iritain. The Soviet Union had long before expressed her
•eadiness to cooperate. In February 1957 a Soviet military
lission headed by Marshall Zhukov visited India and toured
-he Indian defense establishments. During July of the same
-ear, a return visit was made by a group of high ranking
Indian military officers, headed by General Timaya, then
Ihief of the Indian General Staff. The group was not only !
/
;
ery well received "as personal guests of Marshall Zhukov"
in July 1957 this had significance), but it was also given*
. good look at the Soviet ships and naval establishments.
.nother high ranking Indian delegation visited the- Soviet Union
nd was given a good opportunity to see the Soviet's Navy in




"Arms For The Third World, p. 87. /
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was decisive, and a plan to acquire a number of submarines and
ships was worked out. The Soviet Union not only delivered
four large attack F-class submarines and a number ,of small
surface ships, including some missile boats, but offered ;to
help India build its own submarines and other ships. 2^ ~"^
Presently, it looks as if India's dependence upon Soviet
armaments, which might lead to a dependence upon tactics, is
growing.
The supply of Soviet arms to North Vietnam, very substantial
in volume, though restricted in nature, is common knowledge.
Dther countries of the Indochina Peninsula, Laos and Cambodia,
tfere also given Soviet military aid. In the case of Laos,"
a I960 emergency request from the regime of Souvanna Phouma
v
tfas met by an arms airlift.
Toward the end of the 1960 T s the list of Soviet military
31
aid recipients included 25 countries. While, in general,
the arms were supplied to neutralist, former colonial, countries
nost of which were openly anti-western, there were some
exceptions (such as the case with Iran and Pakistan). As
Soviet military aid programs progressed, they were justified
32
on the basis of aid to movements of national liberation.
00









32Lt. Col. G. Eskov and Col. Priiepskii, "World Socialist
System: A Decisive Contemporary Factor," Kommur.i st Vo ruzhennykh
Sil, No. 22, November 1964, ?V- 34-41.
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Neither the infrequent failure to produce reliable
friends fas was the case with Ghana, the Congo, and recently
Sudan), nor poor prospects of repayment, nor the cpsts of the
programs prevent the Soviet Union from continuing military aid,
particularly to certain key countries in given areas. Geograph-
ically, the; scope of the Soviet military aid has also been
widening. The competition with China for the influence in
the Third World has definitely been a factor, and, materially,
the Soviet capacity compared, with the Chinese is considerably
greater. As for the quality of the armament supply, in ..general,
it was adequate for the needs of the recipient countries.
In a number of occasions in the past, certain key recipient,
countries (particularly Indonesia and Egypt) were supplied
tfith the better armaments than the majority of the Warsaw Pact
nembers. Egypt, which to a certain degree represents a special
:ase, prior to the June 1967 war possessed and at present
still possesses many weapon systems still in use by the Soviet
irmed forces. The increased sophistication of the armaments
supplied through the military aid programs was to be expected
since technological advances resulted in more rapid changes
in Soviet weapon systems and hence, the ready availability of
•"eplaced systems for the military aid programs. But the
-
technological progress of developed countries produced even
1 greater gap between them and the developing countries. Such
i gap and the sophistication of the weaponry received in turn
;enerate a greater dependence on the part of the recipient
;ountries upon the arms suppliers.
678

Military assistance has become an essential instrument
of Soviet foreign policy toward many developing countries,
and will definitely continue in the foreseeable future. The
obviously unchanging goal of the Soviet Union of undermining
Western positions might even intensify the military aid program.
Conclusions
During the very first years of Soviet power, the state
monopoly on foreign trade was established. Since then it '
has been viewed as one of the "commanding heights" of the
economy and closely' guarded. After the so called economic
reform of 1965, the number and specialization of foreign
trade associations were increased and some of them were
transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to other
organizations (including some in the merchant marine).
However, no further steps to give producing industries direct
access to foreign markets were permitted. Moreover, the
Soviet Union has exercised a close watch over the situation
concerning the state monopoly on foreign trade in other
Socialist countries, openly admitting that "if the foreign
trade monopoly were lifted even in one Socialist country,
'
The very strictest maintenance of the foreign trade monopoly
has been viewed as the necessity to achieve the close inter-
weaving of the foreign political and foreign economic tasks
of the Soviet government, admitting that "in developing its
foreign economic relations, the USSR cannot fail to take into
33 " Foreign Trade ", The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade,





account the position which one country or another occupies
in relation to our country and to states allied with us."
Soviet foreign trade, particularly since the .end of
1950 T s, has been growing steadily and rather rapidly. The bulk
of it has been with CMEA countries. Trade with developed
Western countries and Japan, especially during the last five
or six years has been considerably increased too. While the
main export items to the developed countries continued to be
raw materials, particularly oil, natural gas, timber, and
other minerals, imports from them come mainly under the.,
heading of machinery, plant, and equipment or, in general,
advanced technology. The recent Soviet trade agreements with
Italy, Austria, Japan, and other countries indicated that
such a trend will continue, at least for a while. Since the
middle 1960 f s, the task to increase the export of machinery
was set, and while its total volume increased (mainly thanks
to exports, to the developing countries), it's share in Soviet
foreign trade did not. But foreign trade inevitably helps
to improve the efficiency of domestic production which in
turn further stimulates the trade itself. A number of Soviet
owned banks were established in many European countries, the
most important being the Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd. in London.
Since the middle 1950 T s, the Soviet Union has been
involved .in economic and military aid to the developing countries
As a rule, the recipients of the Soviet military and economic
aid are also trade partners, representing about 14$ (3 billion
"^Izvestiya , April 21,' 19&3.
G80

rubles in 1970) of total Soviet trade turnover. As the Soviets
themselves acknowledge "the significance of the Soviet Union's
ties with Asian, African, and Latin American countries is
measured not only by figures. These ties promote the break-up
of obsolete forms, the development of society's new productive
forces and the early winning of economic independence. Today,
although the positions of the West in foreign trade and
economic ties with the Third World are still strong, the
external economic policy of the Soviet Union and other Socialist
states has deprived imperialism of its monopolistic position
in trade, the provision of technical assistance and technical
know-how and also in. the purchase of export goods from the
35developing states." A portion of the Soviet economic aid ^
has been devoted to the development of maritime industries
of the recipient countries, particularly ports, thus,
benefitting not only the Soviet Merchant Marine but in a
number of cases the Soviet Navy as well. The growth of
the Soviet foreign trade and the Soviet Union's involvement
in economic and military aid have definitely influenced the
development of the merchant marine.




SOME ASPECTS OF THE MARITIME LAW,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The growth of the Soviet maritime power has been naturally
accompanied by wider Soviet participation in various inter-
national maritime organizations, and intensified development
of various aspects of the Soviet Maritime Law (in general,
relevant aspects of international law as well). The Soviet
system of normative acts governing internal and territorial ,
waters, jurisdiction over foreign vessels, concept of
innocent passage, various treaties and statutes, etc., has
been considerably widened. ¥. E. Butler, in his survey of
Soviet maritime legislation and practice had found that
"there have been and are significant even creative differences
of opinion among Soviet lawyers with respect to international
legal questions which' can have an impact on Soviet state
practice, Soviet positions in maritime disputes with other
states, and the Soviet approach to study of international law
in general".
While restraining from any attempt to undertake analysis
of the jurisprudential foundations of Soviet Maritime Law,
Willieam E. Butler, The Law of Soviet Territorial Waters ;
A Case Study of Maritime Legislation and Practice, New York,





-it is desirable to outline the major Soviet normative acts
and State Practices, for they definitely constitute an
inseparable part of the development of Soviet maritime power.
Similarly, the oceans are being taken more and more into''
the sphere of politics and the legal norms of states quite
often are, or even in more cases might be, sources of
international problems.
In general, both principal sources of international lav/,
the customary international law, (the practices of states,
precedents) and conventional international law (formal >
agreements, treaties) are widely practiced by the Soviet Union..
The Soviet Union is a member of various international maritime
organizations. Since 195&, it has been a member of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).
At the beginning of 1971 > some Soviet ports were accepted
into the International Association of Ports and Harbors.
2
A number of socialist countries and their ship lines organized,
in June 1970, the International Association of Shippers - INSA.
At the end of 1963 , the Soviet Association of Maritime Lav/
was founded with the task "of protecting Soviet merchant
marine interests". In May 1969, the Soviet Union was made
3
the 31st member of the International Maritime Committee.
An important source of the Soviet Maritime Law is the
Soviet Merchant Shipping Code (KTM - Kodeks Torgovogo
Moreplavaniya) which was prepared by TsNIIMF (Central Scientific
^Vodr.yy Transport , 20 February 1971.
3Morskoy Flot No. 2 , 1971.
oo3

Research Institute of Merchant Marine) and approved by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1963.^ The
code contains norms applicable to the right of sailing under
the Soviet flag, the right of ownership of sea-going vessels,
the registration of vessels in the Register of Shipping, the
crew composition of sea-going vessels, etc. The Code also
contains provision relating to contracts of carriage by sea,
general and particular average, compensation for damages
resulting from collision, rewards for rendering assistance
at sea (including salvage), and maritime insurance. The,
provisions contained in the Code are amplified by subordinate
legislation: ordinances of the Counsel of Ministers of the
USSR, orders of the Ministers of Merchant Marine and Fishing.
Industry, tariff regulations, etc.
According to the Code, the Ministry of Merchant Marine
is obligated to control adherence to laws on mercantile
navigation- and to agreements signed by the Soviet Union.
The USSR Registry of Shipping, also administered by the USSR
Ministry of Merchant Marine, executes independent (irrespective
of the ownership of ships by various ministries and departments)
technical control over sea-going ships and their preparation
and construction. The Registry is also responsible for the
classification of ships and for issuing ship documents as
5
provided by international agreements and conventions.
^TsNIIMF Transactions , 1970, Vol. 133, p. 2.
^A. A. Vnikov. - Morskoe Pravo (Maritime Lav;), PischProm,
Moscow, 1969, pp. 14-16.
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It has been a standard Soviet claim, that Soviet ship
lines are judicial persons and are lawful owners of the Soviet
merchant ships. Simultaneously Soviet merchant sh,ips are the
property of the state and hence, have privileged immunity.
Article 10 of the KTM recognizes the person who uses the
vessel as ship owner irrespective of whether he is its actual
:-j\-\cr or whether he r.akes use of it on ser.e other legal
-round. Soviet legal publications assert that the immunity
)f state property in general, and state owned vessels in
^articular, results from the principle of the equality of
sovereign states and hence, no compulsory measures against
»tate property can be undertaken. Article 20 of the KTM
>rovides that state vessels may not be arrested or sued without
he consent of the Counsel of Ministers; Article 77 of the
TM directs that the rules regulating detention of a vessel
t the request of plaintiff do not apply to the vessels owned
7
y a foreign state.
The Soviet Union is a party to various international
onventions including older ones such as, The International
onvention for the Protection of Submerged Telegraph Cables
igned in Paris in 1881+, The Brussels Convention of 1910,
he Lisbon Agreement of 1930 (concerning maritime signals),




7With the exceotion of cases specified in the Article
<L of the Basic Provisions of Civil Procedure of the Soviet
|




rhe International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea
signed in London in i960. The Geneva International Convention
3f 195B dealing with, the territorial sea and the continuous
sone, the high seas, and the continental shelf, were signed
:y the Soviet Union and ratified by the Presidium of The
Supreme Soviet. However, the provisions outlined in Article
>0 of the Geneva Convention of 1953, on the territorial sea
md the contingious zone, recognizing the right of coastal
states to take proceedings against and to arrest foreign
ships in the territorial waters was found inconsistent with
ihe principles of international law by the Soviet Union and
.s regarded as unlawful. While signing the convention, the
Soviet representative stated that "the state vessels in
'oreign territorial waters enjoy immunity and therefore,
.pplication to them of measures mentioned in this article
tay take place only with the consent of the state under
9
rhose flag, the vessel sails."
Certain provisions of the Geneva Convention of 195& on
Ishing and conservation of living resources of the high
eas were found unacceptable by the Soviet Union and were
ot signed. The Soviet Union is a member of various inter-
ational commissions dealing with fisheries. A number of
ishing regulations were recognized and officially approved
y the Soviet Union.
erritorial Waters







jlaiming a 12 mile extension as the base line for its
territorial sea. During the decades of the 1950' s and 1960 f s
[particularly after the 195S Geneva Convention) there has
>een a notable tendency to expand territorial waters. At' the
leginning of the 1950 f s there were only three states claiming
,2 mile limits, the USSR, Columbia, and Guatamela; toward the
nd of the 1960 f s the number had increased to 41 (Columbia
eanwhile reduced its claim to six miles), and more than
states claimed more than a three mile limit. Many states,
ncluding the U.S., while still maintaining three mile v
10
lmits, extended their authorities over fisheries to
egions beyond their territorial waters up to a total depth"
f 12 miles.
The legal regime of the Soviet territorial waters is
ainly constituted in The Statue on the Protection of the
tate Frontier of the USSR, approved by the Supreme Soviet
a December 22, i960. The statute provides that the territorial
uters of the USSR are comprised of a 12 mile-wide belt
£ coastal waters measured from the low water mark both
;Long the mainland and around islands, or from the line
onstituting the outer limit of the interior waters of the
I3SR. The outer limit of the Soviet territorial waters is
onsidered as the state sea frontier and the vertical extension
C this line is the frontier of Soviet air space. Foreign
vir ships require prior permission of the Soviet Government
oa
It may be assumed that for all practical purposes, the
tiited States recognizes claims up to 12 miles as valid by
tiling to challenge the claims.
687

for passage through the territorial waters and for entry to
the interior waters of the USSR, and must observe special''
regulations published in the "Notifications to Mariners".
Foreign submarines, permitted to visit the territorial '
and interior waters, must stay on the surface and not submerge.
The right of innocent passage through the territorial waters
of the USSR, which is defined as sailing through the terri-
torial waters for the purpose of
-traversing them without
entering into interior waters, or for the purpose of leaving
the interior waters and entering the v high seas, is given,
exclusively to foreign vessels other than warships. The
passage is considered innocent if the vessels follow the ~~
.
usual navigational course or one recommended by the competent
organs of the USSR, and if the vessels abide by the prescribed
regulation and avoid regions closed to navigation (such
regions' are usually announced in "Notifications to Mariners") .^
The Soviet Union has taken a negative stance on the
tendency to extend territorial waters beyond the 12 mile
limit, stating the practice "infringes on the principle
of freedom at sea and*, constitutes a violation of international
law", For example, the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires
declared on January 25, 196?, that "the Soviet Union does
not recognize as lawful the Argentine Government's recent




11A. Volkov, p. 6£.
12 " !
"Territorial waters and international lav;", International







The protection of the Soviet state frontier at cor, is
conducted by the frontier forces of KGB (the State Committee
for Security). Frontier servich ships are authorized to *
pursue and detain offending vessels not only within territorial
'
or interior waters, but also on the high seas until a
pursued vessel enters foreign territorial waters and to
use arms if the violation cannot be stopped. 1/f *
The Soviet Union has widely exercised the concept of
interior waters and" "historic" bays. 15 For example, the
White Sea is considered as interior waters based on historic
tradition. The Bay of Peter the Great has been called ~
historic bay and special permission of the Soviet authorities
is required for foreign vessels to navigate there with the
exception of calls at (and departure from) the port of
Nakhodka. There were attempts to consider the Sea of
Okhotsk as an internal sea. The official Soviet navy magazine
stated that "in points of fact, many historical, economic,
foreign policy, military, and legal arguments confirm the
rightness of fixing the status of the Sea of Okhotsk as
both a closed and an internal sea, coming under the international
law concept of historic waters". But in spite of the claim that "the
-kJ Izvestiya
, February 7, 1967.
14.
A. Volkov, pp. 71-72.,
15According to the Geneva Convention, interior waters
are those situated between the coast and the base line from
which the extent of territorial waters is measured.
889

question of closing the Sea of Okhotsk to foreign military
navigation and flights of aircraft is not a farfetched one"
no official declaration has been made. 1
Continental Shelf
The 195S Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
specifies that the coastal state has sovereign rights over
the Continental Shelf in order to explore and to exploit
its natural resources. The term shelf was used to designate
the sea bed situated beyond the territorial waters up to
a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit up to a point
where the depth of the water allows the exploitation of
natural resources. But the growing technological development
already left very few regions of the world ocean, and soon
will probably leave none, where man cannot penetrate. The
ability to mine and harvest the resources of both the
Continental Shelf and the deep sea bed has created the
possibility that large areas of oceans will be used by a
few technologically developed nations for their own benefit,
tothe detriment of the' less developed states which are in ,
....
the majority. The. existing ambiguity in the definition of
/
I
the Continental Shelf, in the part stressing the limit of
expolitability, generated legitimate concern in a number of
Western states, particularly among some American scholars
1 f)





and specialists in international law. 17 However, no similar
concern was expressed in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the
decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
on February 6, 1963, in effect expanded the definition of
the Continental Shelf given by the 1953 Convention, adding
that "the sea bed and the sub-soil of depressions situated in
the Continental Shelf of the USSR irrespective of their
depths shall be part of the Continental Shelf of the USSR". 1^
The Counsel of Ministers of the USSR instructed the
corresponding ministries and departments 'to work out the.
necessary regulations and instructions for rational use and
"
protection of the natural wealth of the Soviet Continental"
Shelf and to pay special attention to the Organization of
Control over the observance of the law operating in the
19USSR on these questions". It was further stated that
"foreigners may exploit the natural wealth only on the basis
of inter-governmental agreements or special permits issued
by competent Soviet authorities."
The Joint Declaration on the Baltic Continental Shelf
"
was signed in Moscow on October 23, 1963, by the Soviet Union,
!
i
T^he problem was discussed in great detail during the 1
International Symposium held in Stockholm, June 1965. See
Towards a Better Use of the Ocean
,
Contemporary Legal Problems
in Ocean Development by Professor W. T. Burke; Comments and"
Recommendations by an International Peace Research Institute.
13
Moscow TASS International Service in English 1L17 GMT,
14 December 19oo, ana William E", Butler, "Edict on Continental
Shelf
, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 6 February 1968;






Poland, and East Germany. It was declared that the Baltic
Continental Shelf must be used for peaceful purposes only
and that the signatories will consult with one another on
matters of mutual interest relating to the shelf, and the
particulars of the bar on its military use. 20
The declaration does not establish the actual boundaries
of the Continental Shelf appertaining to different Baltic
States, leaving determination to the provisions of the
195$ Geneva Convention. Further, the participants agreed
not to give over parcels of the Baltic Continental Shelf to
non-Baltic States or to citizens or firms of those states
for the purpose of exploration, exploitation, etc.
Apparently, the attempts to persuade certain Baltic
states to join the declaration were made. During the summer
of 1969 visit of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme to Moscow,
21
the declaration on the Baltic Continental Shelf was discussed.
But, as was later stated in Stockholm, "the difficulty in
carrying out this work lies in the fact that Sweden and
other Nordic countries have no diplomatic relations with
the GDR. A solution heeds to be found to make it possible
22
to conclude an agreement with Sweden on an official basis."
The USSR possesses about 20% of the world Continental Shelf
and for this reason alone, any legal steps initiated by the
Soviet Government are important.
^.'ew 'Jimes No. 47 , 1963, pp. 6-7.






Fishing in certain regions of the world ocean has been
carried on with excessive intensity and too often without
regard to the state of fish stocks. The expected result
was the sharp decrease in the catches in certain areas. The
increase in fishing efforts is by itself a major factor in
fishery jurisdictional problems. Fishery development and
conservation, mainly thanks to the United Nation efforts
supported by the major states, have been strengthened consid-
erably during the decade of the 1960 T s. The Soviet Union,
it seems, supports the effort. In May of 1965, a joint
American-Soviet inspection team, the first joing inspection
by the two nations, spent thirteen days cruising, the Georges
Bank fishing grounds in the Northwest: A.tlan-tic^- The joint
inspection was result of plans made to exchange law
enforcement officers at the 1964 meeting of the International
Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. It was reported
that the Soviets offered American fishermen free emergency
medical care aboard their ships and also suggested "that
disputes between American and Soviet fishermen could be
solved on the spot".
The Permanent International Counsel for the Exploration
of the Sea is the oldest international organization concerned
with fishing and fishery research. Established on 22 July 1902,
at a conference held in Copenhagen and attended by represen-




tatives of Russia, the counsel presently enforces over 60
international agreements relating to fishing, and the
Soviet Union is a party to many of them. Apparently, the
most difficult area, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned,
and where interest with other states have collided more
often, is the Northwest Pacific.
The Soviet-Japanese Convention on the High Seas Fisheries
in the Northwest Pacific was concluded on May 14, 1956, and
in its subsequent development a Soviot-Japanoso Northwest
Pacific Fishery Commission was established. It spite o£
this, it became common practice in the Soviet press and
in official government statements to blame the Japanese si'de
for overfishing and violating the conservation practice. ' s
In the spring of 1971, Japanese fishermen and, indirectly,
the Japanese Government were accused of overfishing for
herring in the Sea of Okhotsk and of being in violation of
existing agreements on crab catches. Japan was reminded
that the permission for its fishermen to catch fish and
crabs in the Sea of Okhotsk is an act of good will on the
side of the Soviet Union, and that the provisions of 195#
Geneva Convention as well as the Edict of the Supreme Soviet
of February 6, 196S concerning "the sovereign rights of
25
Soviet Union upon its continental shelf" applied. ^
An inter-governmental agreement on the settlement of
claims with respect to damage to fishing gear was -signed in
^ Izvostiya




Moscow on December 9, 1939 between the governments of the USSR
and Norway. Two special commissions, one in Moscow, and another
in Oslo, were set up to deal with claims made by tjieir
respective fishermen. The commissions were not competent
to hear cases of damage to fishing gear which occurred within
the territorial waters of the state, since they fall into
exclusive jurisdiction of the state in whose territorial
waters the damage occurred. In case of dissent with the
Commission's verdict, either by plaintiff or defendant, the
Commission could address both parties with a proposal to
settle the dispute by way of voluntary arbitration. Such
arbitration would take place before the Maritime Arbitration
Commission in Moscow if the defendant were a Soviet ship
owner, and in Norway if the defendant were a Norweigan ship
owner. (Norway has no permanent Maritime Arbitration
Commission and hence, a special arbitration tribunal would
have to be set up for each concrete case). Fishing in the
Soviet waters is regulated by the statute on the Conversation
of Fish Stocks in Water Bodies of the USSR No. 1045, approved
26 • I
by the Counsel of Ministers on 15 September 1958.
The Soviet Sea Rescue Service is composed of the rescue
/
i
services of the Soviet Merchant Marine, Fishing Industry,
and the Emergency Rescue Service (ERS) of the Soviet Navy.
The Service has been coordinated by the ERS and in January
1971, celebrated its 50th Anniversary. The Soviet Union has
eight agreements with its neighbors for rescue at sea; the \
2oA. Voikov, Maritime Lav; , p. 69.
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cooperation is particularly well organized in the Baltic
Sea where joint exercises are held occasionally with Poland,
27Sweden, and other countries. In October 1965. the Soviet
Union and Denmark signed a new agreement on salvage and *
ship raising operations. The Agreement, in addition to the
mutual obligation for help to a ship in distress, provides
the rights for rescue ships of one country to be called into
the territorial or inland waters of the other in case of
necessity.
The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil concluded in London in 1954 and
amended in 1962 was signed by the Soviet Union, but so far""
has not been ratified by the Supreme Soviet. Rather extensive
measures exercised to prevent oil pollution have been reported
by Soviet Press and at least for one sea, the Caspian, it
was claimed that the oil pollution has been halted. The
special types of ships, one to clean the harbors and another
to clean storage tanks on tankers and whaling factory ships
have been employed by the Soviet Merchant Marine and Fishing
Inaustry.
The Sea Bed Treaty
-
/ The decade of the 1960's witnessed intensified interest
in national rights and international obligations relating
to the oceans, their sea beds, and their resources. During
the second half of the 1960's, the subject of the military
•2P-
/ d nyy T ra n s - rt
,
7 'January 1971 and October 11, 1967.
06
• Vodnyy Transport , IS February 1971.
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use of the sea bed was of prime concern. The August 1967
United Nations Malta Resolution proposed a "declaration
and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful
purposes of the sea bed and the ocean floor". The United:
Nations Ad Hoc Committee of 35 nations to study the peaceful"^
uses of the sea bed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction was established. The Soviet memorandum
of July 1, 196&, on some urgent measures for stopping the
arms race and for disarmament, proposed that the sea bed and
the ocean floor be used for peaceful purposes only. On
March Id, 1969, the Soviet Union placed before the
Disarmament Committee a treaty draft on the prohibition of",
the implacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction on the sea bed, the ocean floor, and the
sub-soil. This draft was accepted as a basis for the
29
Committee T s work on this problem. As a result of the
negotiations within the framework of the Disarmament
Committee, a joint Soviet-American Treaty Draft was worked
out and submitted for the Committee's consideration on
October 7 r 1969. The -Soviet draft proposed a 12 mile off-
shore zone, contending this took due account of the
security interest of the coastal states while insuring the
maximum coverage of the sea bed area by the treaty. The
Soviet-American draft also proposed the 12 mile limit for
the widest contigious zone provided for by the 195$ Oeneva
Convention. During the course of debates, various proposals
"^International Affairs No. 1, 1970, pp. 41-45.*
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by other states, including the U.S. proponnl. mruln ),y
President Nixon in Kay 1970, were argued anain^t
.
3 ° The
Soviets claim that "there can be little doubt that once the
U.S. has established "deep water bases or sea bed fortifications
it will sooner or later use them to back up its claims to' "^^
. ,.,
'31
sizable portions of the world ocean". The United States
had been accused of allowing the Navy to dictate policy.
Towards the end of 1970, however, the Geneva Sea Red Arms
Talks showed definite progress, especially when the United
States and the_Soviet Union came up with a new draft on the
treaty in September 1970. The Soviet-American draft
envisaged a ban on the implacement of mass destruction weapons
over the whole sea bed outside the 12 mile coastal zone.
Finally, on February 11, 1971, the treaty was signed by the
United States, the Soviet Union, and some 60 other states.
Luring the signing ceremony in Moscow, Soviet Premier Kosygin
referred to the agreement as the "first step toward complete
demilitarization of the ocean floor".
^ uIt should be noted that the initial position of the
United States at the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations
and some articles which appeared in the American Press made i
good ammunition for Soviet propaganda. For example, during
the third meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, the United States
set forthe the view that peaceful purposes did not preclude
military activities "in pursuit of peaceful aims or in
1' fulfillment of peaceful intents, consistent with the United
Nations ' charter and the obligation of international law".
An article in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in May 19&9
entitled The Paper Torpedo , claimed that "the United States
has a huge stake in the outcome of the U. N. sea beds
discussions" and demanded that "the U.S. Navy's voice must
'come through loud and clear and above all effectively", and
argued against the Malta Resolution and in effect -the proposed
treaty.
31New' Times' No! '27
, pp. ltf-20, 1969.
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In July 1971, the Soviet delegation to the Geneva
Committee for peaceful use of the sea bed proposed a preliminary
draft of the treaty for peaceful use of the sea be.d beyond
the Continental Shelf. The proposal stressed the necessity
to keep the shelf open, if already closed, for undiscriminated
exploitation by all states and prohibiting its use for
military purposes. It was claimed that particular attention
was being paid in the draft to the interests of the developing
countries and the interests of all states regarding navigation
32
and flights in the area of international straits and fishing.
A number of bilateral shipping agreements exist between
the Soviet Union and other countries. The first one was
concluded between USSR and France in Paris, on April 20, 19&7>
and became effective on September 1, 19&7. ^n addition to
the express desire of both sides to ensure first and foremost
the coordinated use of their merchant marine, the promotion
of the normal development of international shipping on the
basis of freedom of mercantile navigation was also stressed
as an aim of the agreement. Article III of the agreement
states "the parties to the agreement again confirm their
1
adherence to the principle of freedom of international maritime
shipping and .agree to refrain from any action of a discrim-|
/
inatory character, since they are confinced that such actions
may cause harm to the development of international trade".
The agreement also emphasized that both sides will- encourage
?
2 ?ravda
, 29 July 1971.
-^ Vodnyy Transport , August 31, 19o7-
S3

the participation of Soviet and French ships in the transpor-
tation of cargo between their ports, and neither side will
hamper the participation of the ships of other side in
carrying cargo between its ports and third countries, etc\
The agreement also made the provision for a joint commission
to observe the implementation of the agreement and to discuss
unsolved problems. Somewhat similar agreements were signed
between the Soviet Union and" Great Britain in 1965, and
between the Soviet Union and the Netherlands in 1969.
Beginning in 1965, the Soviet steamship companies have
been entering various freight (rate fixing) conferences.
The process has not been a smooth one and has been accompanied
by numerous accusations. Western ship owners accuse the
Soviets of attempted rate cutting, unfair competition,
untrustworthiness, etc. The Soviet Ministry of Merchant
Marine, in turn, occasionally employing an aggressive
tactics demanded fair treatment, blamed the West for the
blockades, black lists, a desire to maintain a monopolistic
position, etc. Debates were particularly heated on the
Soviet entrance to the Australian conferences. Finally, during
I969, the disputes were settled and it seems that the original
fears of Western ship owners were not justified. In the long -
run ^ it might be even beneficial for world shipping to have
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Since 1956, the Central Scientific Research Institute
of Merchant Fleet, TsNIIMF, became the center for work
dealing with Soviet and International maritime legal problems.
The TsNIIMF prepared recommendations and working papers for
the Soviet delegation to 195£ Geneva Conventions, the i960,
1965, and 1966 London Conferences, the 12th Session of the
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law in Brussels in 1967,
etc. The Institute plan for 1971-1975 visualized extensive
work on the problems of maritime law, including recommendations
concerning the relations between Soviet steamship lines and
ports with foreign shipping companies; recommendations
concerning the safety of navigation, and protection of ~~
property and Soviet merchant fleet interests in case of
collision, and other works dealing with the general improvement
of Soviet maritime legislation. 35o-
It may be concluded that the Soviet Union's development
of its merchant marine, fishing industry and other aspects
of maritime power, and their unavoidably broader association
with the world's maritime community have produced considerable
intensification of, and the necessity for much wider partici-
pation at various international organizations dealing with
the maritime problem and corresponding development of Soviet
maritime legislation.
35 •






ichkasov, V. I., Basov, A. B., arid others, Boyevoy put T
Sovetskogo Voyenno - Morskogo Flota ( "Combat Path of
the Soviet Navy" j . Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1967.
mdrassy, J.
, International Law and the Resources of the
Sea/ New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. v
?he Military Balance
,
all 1960s editions and 1971-1972.
London: The Institute for Strategic Studies.
telov, M. I. , Istoriya otkrytiya i osvoeniya Severnogo
Morskogo Puti ("History of Discovery and Mastering of
the Northern Sea Route"), 4 "Vols., Morskoy Transport
and Gidpometeoizdat, 1971.
3reyer, Siegfried, Guide to the Soviet Navy
, United States
Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1970.
Sutler, W. E., The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.
Subcommittee on Foreign Policy, Joint Economic Committee,
Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the
Soviet Union. A compendium of papers , Sept. IS, 1970.
V/ashington, 1970.. 295 p. (Jt. Com. PrintT
ilrickson, John, Soviet Military Power , London: Royal United
Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1971.
?airhall, David, Russian Sea Power . Boston: Cambit, 1971.
rriedman, W.
,
The Future of the Oceans . New York: Braziller,
-1971-
Iretton, Sir Peter, Vice Adm., Royal Navy (Ret.), Maritime
Strategy . New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
luzhenko, T. B., Minister of Merchant Marine, USSR, Morskoy
FIct v vos'rr.oy pyatiletke ("Sea Transport during Eighth





The Postwar Expansion of Russia's Fi sh:ijig
Industry
.
U.S. Government Printing -Office. (88th
Congress, 2nd Session, Senate), 1964.
Herrick, R.'W., Soviet Naval Strategy
, United States Naval
Institute, Annapolis, 1968. ~~
Heizlet, Sir Arthur, Vice Adm. , Aircraft and Sea Power . New
York: Stein and Day, 1970.
;
Idyll, C. P., The Sea Against Hunger . New York: Crowell.
1970.
Istoriva Velikoy Otechestvennov Voiny Sovetskogb Soyuza
1941-194 ? ("History of the Great Patriotic War of
the Soviet Union, 1941-1945" ) , 6 Vols., Moscow,
Voenizdat, I96O-I965.
Kuznegsov, N. G-. Nakanune ("On the Eve"), Moscow, Voyenizdat,
1966.
Kuznetsov, N. G. Gody Voiny ("The War Years"), Octyabr f
,
_
#3, 9, 12, 196S" or Voyenizdat, 1971.
Khesin, S. S.
3
Oktyabr T skava Revolyutsiya i Flot ("The
October Revolution and the Navy";, Nauka, Moscow, 1971.
Jane T s Fighting Ships, Jane's Weapon Svstems, Jane's All the
World's Aircraft, Jane's Surface Skimmer Systems, Jane's
Freight Containers . Jane's Yearbooks, England.
Iagovskiy, A., Strategiya i Ekonomika ("Strategy and Economics"),
Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1957.
Lifshits, IT." L., Tekhnika podvodnoy debychi poleznykh
Ickopaemykh ("Technology of Underwater Extraction of
Minerals" ) , Znaniya, Moscow, 1971.
Martin, L; W.
,
The Sea in Modern Strategy . New Jersey:
Praeger, 1967 •
Medvedev, N. F. , Suda dlya issledovaniya mirovogo okeana
("Ships for the Research in the World's Ocean"),
Sudostroyeniye, 1971.
Mikhailov, S. V., Mirovoy okean i chelovechestvo ("Humanity
and the OceanTf ) , Ekonomika P. H. , Moscow, 1969.
Moiseyev, P. A., Biologicheskiya Resursy Mirovo okeana
("Biological Resources of the World Ocean"),





, Sotrudnichestvo Sotsialisticheski kh stran
v oblasti norskogo transnorta (''Cooperation of Socialist
Countries in the Area of Sea Transport''). Transport
P. H. , Moscow, 19o9.
1
Nurok, G. A., Dobycha nolesnykh iskoraemykh so dna rr.oroy i
okcanov ( "extract-ion of i-iinerais from the Bottom of'
Seas and Oceans"), Nedra, Moscow, 1970.
Osvoyenive Mirovogo Okeana ("Mastering of the World Ocean"),
Collection of Articles, Voyenizdat, 1971.
Pavlovich, N. B., Rear Adm. , Flot v Pervoy Mirovoy Voyne
,
("The Navy in the First World War") , Vol, 1, Voenizdat,
Moscow, 1964.
Petrov, M. A. , Podgotovka Rossii k Pervoy Mirovoy Voyne na
more ' ("Preparation of Russia for the First "World War
at Sea"), Voyenizdat, 1926.
Podvodnoye Korablestroyeniye v Rossii 1900-1917 ("Submarine
Construction in Russia 1900-1917"); Sudostroyeniye
,
1965.
Stalbo, K. A., Rear Adm., ed., Istoriya Voenno-Morskogo
Iskusstva ("History of Naval Art"), Voyenizdat, Moscow,
196^
Strokov, A. A., Istoria Voennogo Iskusstva,- ("History of
Military Art") , Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965.
Sokolovskiy'V. D. (ed)., Voennaya Strategiya ("Military
Strategy")', Voenizdat, 3 editions.
Trusov, G. M.
,
Podvodnyve lodki y Russkom i Sovetskom Flots
( "Submarines in the Russian and the Soviet Navies"),
Cubpromgiz, Moscow, 1963.
Pechenik. L. N. , Troyanovskiy, F. M. , Syr T evava baza tralovogo
rybolovstva na materikovom sklone severnoi Atlantika
("The Trawling Resources on the North Atlantic Conti-
nental Slope"), Murmansk Publishing House, 1970.
Wolfe, Thomas W. , Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 - Baltimore
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
Yakovlev, V. DV, Vice Adm., Sovetskiy Voenno-Morskoy Flot
("The Soviet Navy"), Moscow, 1969.
PERIODICALS
United States Naval Institute Proceedings , Annapolis.







Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil ("Communist of the Armed Forces"),
semimonthly, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet
Army and Navy, Moscow.
Morskov Sbornik ("Naval Digest"), since 1^43 , monthly, the
Soviet Navy, Moscow.
Morskov Flot ( "Merchant Marine" ) , since 191S, monthly,
Ministry of Merchant Marine, Moscow.
Okeanologiya ("Oceanology") , monthly, the USSR Academy of
Sciences, Moscow.
Rybnoye Khozyastvo ("Fishing Industry"), since 1920, monthly,
Ministry of Fishing Industry, Moscow.
Rechnoy Transport ("River Transport"), since 1913, monthly,
Ministry of River Transport of RSFSR, Moscow.
Sudostroyeniye ("Shipbuilding")",' since 1910, monthly, the
USSR Ministry of Shipbuilding and. JL*. N-- Kryiov" Scien-
tific and Technical Society of Shipbuilding, Leningrad.
Tekhnika i Vooruzheniye ("Equipment and Armament"), monthly,
the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow.
Tyl i snabzheniye ("Rear Services and Supply"), monthly,
the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow.
USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology , monthly, by the
Institute of U.S. Studies of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR, Moscow.
Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal ("Journal of Military History"),
monthly, the USSR Ministry of Defense, Moscow.
Voprosy Ikhtiologii ("Problems of Ighthyology" ) , the USSR
Academy of Sciences, Moscow.
MAGAZINES (In German)
Marine Rundschau ("Naval Review"), bimonthly, Verlag E. S.
Mittler & Sohn , P . H
.
, Frankfur t / main , FRG
.





















("Military-Political Information")weekly, Dr. Lather Lahrish, publisher, FRG.
x * id «-° >>
MAGAZINES (In Polish)
Morze ("The Sea"), monthly, Ministry of Merchant MarineWarsaw.
.
'
Przeslad Morski ("Maritime Review"), monthly, published *byPolish Navy, Gdynia. J
Wojskowy Przeglad Technicznv ("Military Technical Review" )7
monthly, Ministry of Defense, Warsaw.
NEWSPAPERS (In Russian)
Pravda ("Truth"), daily, CC CPSU, Moscow.
Izvestiya ("News^), daily, Soviet Government, Moscow.
Nedelya ("The Week"), weekly, supplement to Izvestiya
.
Krasnaya Zvezda ("Red Star"), daily, the USSR Ministry of
Defense, Moscow.
Economicheskaya Gazeta ("Economic Gazette"), weekly, CC
CPSU, Moscow. '
Sotsialisticheskaya Idustriya ("Socialist Industry"), CC
CPSU, Moscow.
Vodnyy Transport ("Water Transport"), the USSR Ministry of





Attack carrier striking forces : Naval forces, the primary
offensive weapon of which is carrier-based aircraft. Ships,
other than carriers, act primarily to support and screen
against submarine and air- threat, and secondarily against
surface threat. (D., p. 35)*
Deployment : In a strategic sense, the relocation of forces
to desired areas of- operation (D., p. 95)
V
Displacement : The weight of a ship, in long tons. It is
equal to the weight of the water displaced.
Gross tonnage (GT) : The entire internal cubic capacity of
a ship expressed in tons of 100 cubic feet to the ton.
Certain spaces such as ballast tanks, inner bottoms, deck
shelters, wheel houses and the like are included.
Dead weight tonnage (dwt) : The total weight"- carrying
capacity of a ship in 2240 pound tons. Tt includes cargo,
fuel oil, fresh water, stores, crew, etc., which brings
the ship down to its maximum permissible draft.
Knot : The sea-going unit of speed and is one nautical mile
To080.27 feet) per hour.
Draft of a vessel : The vertical distance in feet between
the waterline and the keel. It is indicative of the load
carried.
Strategic mission : A mission directed against one or more
of a selected series of enemy targets with the purpose of
progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's
war-making capacity and his will to make war. Targets
include key manufacturing systems, transportation systems,
communications facilities, and other such target systems.
As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations are
designed to have a longer-range, rather than immediate,
effect on the enemy and his military forces. (D., p. 2&6)
*D. - Dictiona ry of Military 'and As sociated Terms .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff., January 3, 197*2.
707

Submarine striking forces : Submarines having guided or
missile launching and/or guidance capabilities
launch offensive nuclear strikes. (D. , p. 289)*
ballistic
formed to
Surface striking forces : Forces which are organized primarily
to do battle with enemy forces or to conduct shore bombard-
ment. Units comprising such a force are generally incorpor-
ated in and operate as part of another force, but with
provisions for their formation into a surface striking
force should such action appear likely and/or desirable.
(T)., 0. 291)
\ *D. - Dictionary of Military and Associate d
Terms.




























Development of Soviet maritime power.
3 2768 001 04101 5
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
